| |
| /* |
| * SSL/TLS transport layer over SOCK_STREAM sockets |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2012 EXCELIANCE, Emeric Brun <ebrun@exceliance.fr> |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
| * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License |
| * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version |
| * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. |
| * |
| * Acknowledgement: |
| * We'd like to specially thank the Stud project authors for a very clean |
| * and well documented code which helped us understand how the OpenSSL API |
| * ought to be used in non-blocking mode. This is one difficult part which |
| * is not easy to get from the OpenSSL doc, and reading the Stud code made |
| * it much more obvious than the examples in the OpenSSL package. Keep up |
| * the good works, guys ! |
| * |
| * Stud is an extremely efficient and scalable SSL/TLS proxy which combines |
| * particularly well with haproxy. For more info about this project, visit : |
| * https://github.com/bumptech/stud |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| #define _GNU_SOURCE |
| #include <ctype.h> |
| #include <dirent.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <fcntl.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| |
| #include <sys/socket.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <netdb.h> |
| #include <netinet/tcp.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) |
| #include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #include <import/lru.h> |
| #include <import/xxhash.h> |
| |
| #include <common/buffer.h> |
| #include <common/compat.h> |
| #include <common/config.h> |
| #include <common/debug.h> |
| #include <common/errors.h> |
| #include <common/standard.h> |
| #include <common/ticks.h> |
| #include <common/time.h> |
| #include <common/cfgparse.h> |
| #include <common/base64.h> |
| |
| #include <ebsttree.h> |
| |
| #include <types/global.h> |
| #include <types/ssl_sock.h> |
| |
| #include <proto/acl.h> |
| #include <proto/arg.h> |
| #include <proto/connection.h> |
| #include <proto/fd.h> |
| #include <proto/freq_ctr.h> |
| #include <proto/frontend.h> |
| #include <proto/listener.h> |
| #include <proto/pattern.h> |
| #include <proto/proto_tcp.h> |
| #include <proto/server.h> |
| #include <proto/log.h> |
| #include <proto/proxy.h> |
| #include <proto/shctx.h> |
| #include <proto/ssl_sock.h> |
| #include <proto/stream.h> |
| #include <proto/task.h> |
| |
| /* Warning, these are bits, not integers! */ |
| #define SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE 0x00000001 |
| #define SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE 0x00000002 |
| #define SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED 0x00000004 |
| #define SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT 0x00000008 |
| |
| /* bits 0xFFFF0000 are reserved to store verify errors */ |
| |
| /* Verify errors macros */ |
| #define SSL_SOCK_CA_ERROR_TO_ST(e) (((e > 63) ? 63 : e) << (16)) |
| #define SSL_SOCK_CAEDEPTH_TO_ST(d) (((d > 15) ? 15 : d) << (6+16)) |
| #define SSL_SOCK_CRTERROR_TO_ST(e) (((e > 63) ? 63 : e) << (4+6+16)) |
| |
| #define SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CA_ERROR(s) ((s >> (16)) & 63) |
| #define SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CAEDEPTH(s) ((s >> (6+16)) & 15) |
| #define SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CRTERROR(s) ((s >> (4+6+16)) & 63) |
| |
| /* Supported hash function for TLS tickets */ |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
| #define HASH_FUNCT EVP_sha1 |
| #else |
| #define HASH_FUNCT EVP_sha256 |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 */ |
| |
| /* server and bind verify method, it uses a global value as default */ |
| enum { |
| SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_DEFAULT = 0, |
| SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED = 1, |
| SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_OPTIONAL = 2, |
| SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE = 3, |
| }; |
| |
| int sslconns = 0; |
| int totalsslconns = 0; |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| struct list tlskeys_reference = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tlskeys_reference); |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| static int ssl_dh_ptr_index = -1; |
| static DH *global_dh = NULL; |
| static DH *local_dh_1024 = NULL; |
| static DH *local_dh_2048 = NULL; |
| static DH *local_dh_4096 = NULL; |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ |
| |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| /* X509V3 Extensions that will be added on generated certificates */ |
| #define X509V3_EXT_SIZE 5 |
| static char *x509v3_ext_names[X509V3_EXT_SIZE] = { |
| "basicConstraints", |
| "nsComment", |
| "subjectKeyIdentifier", |
| "authorityKeyIdentifier", |
| "keyUsage", |
| }; |
| static char *x509v3_ext_values[X509V3_EXT_SIZE] = { |
| "CA:FALSE", |
| "\"OpenSSL Generated Certificate\"", |
| "hash", |
| "keyid,issuer:always", |
| "nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment" |
| }; |
| |
| /* LRU cache to store generated certificate */ |
| static struct lru64_head *ssl_ctx_lru_tree = NULL; |
| static unsigned int ssl_ctx_lru_seed = 0; |
| #endif // SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL |
| /* The order here matters for picking a default context, |
| * keep the most common keytype at the bottom of the list |
| */ |
| const char *SSL_SOCK_KEYTYPE_NAMES[] = { |
| "dsa", |
| "ecdsa", |
| "rsa" |
| }; |
| #define SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES 3 |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) |
| /* |
| * struct alignment works here such that the key.key is the same as key_data |
| * Do not change the placement of key_data |
| */ |
| struct certificate_ocsp { |
| struct ebmb_node key; |
| unsigned char key_data[OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH]; |
| struct chunk response; |
| long expire; |
| }; |
| |
| struct ocsp_cbk_arg { |
| int is_single; |
| int single_kt; |
| union { |
| struct certificate_ocsp *s_ocsp; |
| /* |
| * m_ocsp will have multiple entries dependent on key type |
| * Entry 0 - DSA |
| * Entry 1 - ECDSA |
| * Entry 2 - RSA |
| */ |
| struct certificate_ocsp *m_ocsp[SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES]; |
| }; |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * This function returns the number of seconds elapsed |
| * since the Epoch, 1970-01-01 00:00:00 +0000 (UTC) and the |
| * date presented un ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME. |
| * |
| * In parsing error case, it returns -1. |
| */ |
| static long asn1_generalizedtime_to_epoch(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d) |
| { |
| long epoch; |
| char *p, *end; |
| const unsigned short month_offset[12] = { |
| 0, 31, 59, 90, 120, 151, 181, 212, 243, 273, 304, 334 |
| }; |
| int year, month; |
| |
| if (!d || (d->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) return -1; |
| |
| p = (char *)d->data; |
| end = p + d->length; |
| |
| if (end - p < 4) return -1; |
| year = 1000 * (p[0] - '0') + 100 * (p[1] - '0') + 10 * (p[2] - '0') + p[3] - '0'; |
| p += 4; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| month = 10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0'; |
| if (month < 1 || month > 12) return -1; |
| /* Compute the number of seconds since 1 jan 1970 and the beginning of current month |
| We consider leap years and the current month (<marsh or not) */ |
| epoch = ( ((year - 1970) * 365) |
| + ((year - (month < 3)) / 4 - (year - (month < 3)) / 100 + (year - (month < 3)) / 400) |
| - ((1970 - 1) / 4 - (1970 - 1) / 100 + (1970 - 1) / 400) |
| + month_offset[month-1] |
| ) * 24 * 60 * 60; |
| p += 2; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| /* Add the number of seconds of completed days of current month */ |
| epoch += (10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0' - 1) * 24 * 60 * 60; |
| p += 2; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| /* Add the completed hours of the current day */ |
| epoch += (10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0') * 60 * 60; |
| p += 2; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| /* Add the completed minutes of the current hour */ |
| epoch += (10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0') * 60; |
| p += 2; |
| if (p == end) return -1; |
| /* Test if there is available seconds */ |
| if (p[0] < '0' || p[0] > '9') |
| goto nosec; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| /* Add the seconds of the current minute */ |
| epoch += 10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0'; |
| p += 2; |
| if (p == end) return -1; |
| /* Ignore seconds float part if present */ |
| if (p[0] == '.') { |
| do { |
| if (++p == end) return -1; |
| } while (p[0] >= '0' && p[0] <= '9'); |
| } |
| |
| nosec: |
| if (p[0] == 'Z') { |
| if (end - p != 1) return -1; |
| return epoch; |
| } |
| else if (p[0] == '+') { |
| if (end - p != 5) return -1; |
| /* Apply timezone offset */ |
| return epoch - ((10 * (p[1] - '0') + p[2] - '0') * 60 + (10 * (p[3] - '0') + p[4] - '0')) * 60; |
| } |
| else if (p[0] == '-') { |
| if (end - p != 5) return -1; |
| /* Apply timezone offset */ |
| return epoch + ((10 * (p[1] - '0') + p[2] - '0') * 60 + (10 * (p[3] - '0') + p[4] - '0')) * 60; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static struct eb_root cert_ocsp_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE; |
| |
| /* This function starts to check if the OCSP response (in DER format) contained |
| * in chunk 'ocsp_response' is valid (else exits on error). |
| * If 'cid' is not NULL, it will be compared to the OCSP certificate ID |
| * contained in the OCSP Response and exits on error if no match. |
| * If it's a valid OCSP Response: |
| * If 'ocsp' is not NULL, the chunk is copied in the OCSP response's container |
| * pointed by 'ocsp'. |
| * If 'ocsp' is NULL, the function looks up into the OCSP response's |
| * containers tree (using as index the ASN1 form of the OCSP Certificate ID extracted |
| * from the response) and exits on error if not found. Finally, If an OCSP response is |
| * already present in the container, it will be overwritten. |
| * |
| * Note: OCSP response containing more than one OCSP Single response is not |
| * considered valid. |
| * |
| * Returns 0 on success, 1 in error case. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response(struct chunk *ocsp_response, struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp, OCSP_CERTID *cid, char **err) |
| { |
| OCSP_RESPONSE *resp; |
| OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL; |
| OCSP_SINGLERESP *sr; |
| unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)ocsp_response->str; |
| int rc , count_sr; |
| ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *revtime, *thisupd, *nextupd = NULL; |
| int reason; |
| int ret = 1; |
| |
| resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, ocsp_response->len); |
| if (!resp) { |
| memprintf(err, "Unable to parse OCSP response"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| rc = OCSP_response_status(resp); |
| if (rc != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP response status not successful"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp); |
| if (!bs) { |
| memprintf(err, "Failed to get basic response from OCSP Response"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| count_sr = OCSP_resp_count(bs); |
| if (count_sr > 1) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP response ignored because contains multiple single responses (%d)", count_sr); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| sr = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0); |
| if (!sr) { |
| memprintf(err, "Failed to get OCSP single response"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| rc = OCSP_single_get0_status(sr, &reason, &revtime, &thisupd, &nextupd); |
| if (rc != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: certificate status not good"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (!nextupd) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: missing nextupdate"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| rc = OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, OCSP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_SKEW, -1); |
| if (!rc) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: no longer valid."); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (cid) { |
| if (OCSP_id_cmp(sr->certId, cid)) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Certificate ID does not match certificate and issuer"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!ocsp) { |
| unsigned char key[OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| |
| rc = i2d_OCSP_CERTID(sr->certId, NULL); |
| if (!rc) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Unable to encode Certificate ID"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (rc > OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Certificate ID too long"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| p = key; |
| memset(key, 0, OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH); |
| i2d_OCSP_CERTID(sr->certId, &p); |
| ocsp = (struct certificate_ocsp *)ebmb_lookup(&cert_ocsp_tree, key, OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH); |
| if (!ocsp) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Certificate ID does not match any certificate or issuer"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* According to comments on "chunk_dup", the |
| previous chunk buffer will be freed */ |
| if (!chunk_dup(&ocsp->response, ocsp_response)) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP response: Memory allocation error"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| ocsp->expire = asn1_generalizedtime_to_epoch(nextupd) - OCSP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_SKEW; |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| out: |
| if (bs) |
| OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs); |
| |
| if (resp) |
| OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| /* |
| * External function use to update the OCSP response in the OCSP response's |
| * containers tree. The chunk 'ocsp_response' must contain the OCSP response |
| * to update in DER format. |
| * |
| * Returns 0 on success, 1 in error case. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_update_ocsp_response(struct chunk *ocsp_response, char **err) |
| { |
| return ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response(ocsp_response, NULL, NULL, err); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function load the OCSP Resonse in DER format contained in file at |
| * path 'ocsp_path' and call 'ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response' |
| * |
| * Returns 0 on success, 1 in error case. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response_from_file(const char *ocsp_path, struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp, OCSP_CERTID *cid, char **err) |
| { |
| int fd = -1; |
| int r = 0; |
| int ret = 1; |
| |
| fd = open(ocsp_path, O_RDONLY); |
| if (fd == -1) { |
| memprintf(err, "Error opening OCSP response file"); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| trash.len = 0; |
| while (trash.len < trash.size) { |
| r = read(fd, trash.str + trash.len, trash.size - trash.len); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (errno == EINTR) |
| continue; |
| |
| memprintf(err, "Error reading OCSP response from file"); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| else if (r == 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| trash.len += r; |
| } |
| |
| close(fd); |
| fd = -1; |
| |
| ret = ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response(&trash, ocsp, cid, err); |
| end: |
| if (fd != -1) |
| close(fd); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| static int ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) |
| { |
| struct tls_sess_key *keys; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| int head; |
| int i; |
| |
| conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(s); |
| keys = objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->keys_ref->tlskeys; |
| head = objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->keys_ref->tls_ticket_enc_index; |
| |
| if (enc) { |
| memcpy(key_name, keys[head].name, 16); |
| |
| if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, keys[head].aes_key, iv)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[head].hmac_key, 16, HASH_FUNCT(), NULL); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } else { |
| for (i = 0; i < TLS_TICKETS_NO; i++) { |
| if (!memcmp(key_name, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].name, 16)) |
| goto found; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| |
| found: |
| HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].hmac_key, 16, HASH_FUNCT(), NULL); |
| if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].aes_key, iv)) |
| return -1; |
| /* 2 for key renewal, 1 if current key is still valid */ |
| return i ? 2 : 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_ref_lookup(const char *filename) |
| { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(ref, &tlskeys_reference, list) |
| if (ref->filename && strcmp(filename, ref->filename) == 0) |
| return ref; |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_ref_lookupid(int unique_id) |
| { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(ref, &tlskeys_reference, list) |
| if (ref->unique_id == unique_id) |
| return ref; |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_sock_update_tlskey(char *filename, struct chunk *tlskey, char **err) { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref = tlskeys_ref_lookup(filename); |
| |
| if(!ref) { |
| memprintf(err, "Unable to locate the referenced filename: %s", filename); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy((char *) (ref->tlskeys + ((ref->tls_ticket_enc_index + 2) % TLS_TICKETS_NO)), tlskey->str, tlskey->len); |
| ref->tls_ticket_enc_index = (ref->tls_ticket_enc_index + 1) % TLS_TICKETS_NO; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* This function finalize the configuration parsing. Its set all the |
| * automatic ids |
| */ |
| void tlskeys_finalize_config(void) |
| { |
| int i = 0; |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref, *ref2, *ref3; |
| struct list tkr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tkr); |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(ref, &tlskeys_reference, list) { |
| if (ref->unique_id == -1) { |
| /* Look for the first free id. */ |
| while (1) { |
| list_for_each_entry(ref2, &tlskeys_reference, list) { |
| if (ref2->unique_id == i) { |
| i++; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (&ref2->list == &tlskeys_reference) |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* Uses the unique id and increment it for the next entry. */ |
| ref->unique_id = i; |
| i++; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* This sort the reference list by id. */ |
| list_for_each_entry_safe(ref, ref2, &tlskeys_reference, list) { |
| LIST_DEL(&ref->list); |
| list_for_each_entry(ref3, &tkr, list) { |
| if (ref->unique_id < ref3->unique_id) { |
| LIST_ADDQ(&ref3->list, &ref->list); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (&ref3->list == &tkr) |
| LIST_ADDQ(&tkr, &ref->list); |
| } |
| |
| /* swap root */ |
| LIST_ADD(&tkr, &tlskeys_reference); |
| LIST_DEL(&tkr); |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB */ |
| |
| int ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(int evp_keytype) |
| { |
| switch (evp_keytype) { |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA: |
| return 2; |
| case EVP_PKEY_DSA: |
| return 0; |
| case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Callback used to set OCSP status extension content in server hello. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_ocsp_stapling_cbk(SSL *ssl, void *arg) |
| { |
| struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp; |
| struct ocsp_cbk_arg *ocsp_arg; |
| char *ssl_buf; |
| EVP_PKEY *ssl_pkey; |
| int key_type; |
| int index; |
| |
| ocsp_arg = (struct ocsp_cbk_arg *)arg; |
| |
| ssl_pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl); |
| if (!ssl_pkey) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| |
| key_type = EVP_PKEY_type(ssl_pkey->type); |
| |
| if (ocsp_arg->is_single && ocsp_arg->single_kt == key_type) |
| ocsp = ocsp_arg->s_ocsp; |
| else { |
| /* For multiple certs per context, we have to find the correct OCSP response based on |
| * the certificate type |
| */ |
| index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(key_type); |
| |
| if (index < 0) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| |
| ocsp = ocsp_arg->m_ocsp[index]; |
| |
| } |
| |
| if (!ocsp || |
| !ocsp->response.str || |
| !ocsp->response.len || |
| (ocsp->expire < now.tv_sec)) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| |
| ssl_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(ocsp->response.len); |
| if (!ssl_buf) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| |
| memcpy(ssl_buf, ocsp->response.str, ocsp->response.len); |
| SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, ssl_buf, ocsp->response.len); |
| |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function enables the handling of OCSP status extension on 'ctx' if a |
| * file name 'cert_path' suffixed using ".ocsp" is present. |
| * To enable OCSP status extension, the issuer's certificate is mandatory. |
| * It should be present in the certificate's extra chain builded from file |
| * 'cert_path'. If not found, the issuer certificate is loaded from a file |
| * named 'cert_path' suffixed using '.issuer'. |
| * |
| * In addition, ".ocsp" file content is loaded as a DER format of an OCSP |
| * response. If file is empty or content is not a valid OCSP response, |
| * OCSP status extension is enabled but OCSP response is ignored (a warning |
| * is displayed). |
| * |
| * Returns 1 if no ".ocsp" file found, 0 if OCSP status extension is |
| * succesfully enabled, or -1 in other error case. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_ocsp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *cert_path) |
| { |
| |
| BIO *in = NULL; |
| X509 *x, *xi = NULL, *issuer = NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; |
| OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL; |
| SSL *ssl; |
| char ocsp_path[MAXPATHLEN+1]; |
| int i, ret = -1; |
| struct stat st; |
| struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp = NULL, *iocsp; |
| char *warn = NULL; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| |
| snprintf(ocsp_path, MAXPATHLEN+1, "%s.ocsp", cert_path); |
| |
| if (stat(ocsp_path, &st)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| ssl = SSL_new(ctx); |
| if (!ssl) |
| goto out; |
| |
| x = SSL_get_certificate(ssl); |
| if (!x) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* Try to lookup for issuer in certificate extra chain */ |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS |
| SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx, &chain); |
| #else |
| chain = ctx->extra_certs; |
| #endif |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { |
| issuer = sk_X509_value(chain, i); |
| if (X509_check_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK) |
| break; |
| else |
| issuer = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* If not found try to load issuer from a suffixed file */ |
| if (!issuer) { |
| char issuer_path[MAXPATHLEN+1]; |
| |
| in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); |
| if (!in) |
| goto out; |
| |
| snprintf(issuer_path, MAXPATHLEN+1, "%s.issuer", cert_path); |
| if (BIO_read_filename(in, issuer_path) <= 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| xi = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback, ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata); |
| if (!xi) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (X509_check_issued(xi, x) != X509_V_OK) |
| goto out; |
| |
| issuer = xi; |
| } |
| |
| cid = OCSP_cert_to_id(0, x, issuer); |
| if (!cid) |
| goto out; |
| |
| i = i2d_OCSP_CERTID(cid, NULL); |
| if (!i || (i > OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| ocsp = calloc(1, sizeof(struct certificate_ocsp)); |
| if (!ocsp) |
| goto out; |
| |
| p = ocsp->key_data; |
| i2d_OCSP_CERTID(cid, &p); |
| |
| iocsp = (struct certificate_ocsp *)ebmb_insert(&cert_ocsp_tree, &ocsp->key, OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH); |
| if (iocsp == ocsp) |
| ocsp = NULL; |
| |
| if (!ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { |
| struct ocsp_cbk_arg *cb_arg = calloc(1, sizeof(struct ocsp_cbk_arg)); |
| |
| cb_arg->is_single = 1; |
| cb_arg->s_ocsp = iocsp; |
| cb_arg->single_kt = EVP_PKEY_type(X509_get_pubkey(x)->type); |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_ocsp_stapling_cbk); |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, cb_arg); |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * If the ctx has a status CB, then we have previously set an OCSP staple for this ctx |
| * Update that cb_arg with the new cert's staple |
| */ |
| struct ocsp_cbk_arg *cb_arg = (struct ocsp_cbk_arg *) ctx->tlsext_status_arg; |
| struct certificate_ocsp *tmp_ocsp; |
| int index; |
| |
| /* |
| * The following few lines will convert cb_arg from a single ocsp to multi ocsp |
| * the order of operations below matter, take care when changing it |
| */ |
| tmp_ocsp = cb_arg->s_ocsp; |
| index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(cb_arg->single_kt); |
| cb_arg->s_ocsp = NULL; |
| cb_arg->m_ocsp[index] = tmp_ocsp; |
| cb_arg->is_single = 0; |
| cb_arg->single_kt = 0; |
| |
| index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(EVP_PKEY_type(X509_get_pubkey(x)->type)); |
| if (index >= 0 && !cb_arg->m_ocsp[index]) |
| cb_arg->m_ocsp[index] = iocsp; |
| |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| warn = NULL; |
| if (ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response_from_file(ocsp_path, iocsp, cid, &warn)) { |
| memprintf(&warn, "Loading '%s': %s. Content will be ignored", ocsp_path, warn ? warn : "failure"); |
| Warning("%s.\n", warn); |
| } |
| |
| out: |
| if (ssl) |
| SSL_free(ssl); |
| |
| if (in) |
| BIO_free(in); |
| |
| if (xi) |
| X509_free(xi); |
| |
| if (cid) |
| OCSP_CERTID_free(cid); |
| |
| if (ocsp) |
| free(ocsp); |
| |
| if (warn) |
| free(warn); |
| |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) |
| |
| #define CT_EXTENSION_TYPE 18 |
| |
| static int sctl_ex_index = -1; |
| |
| /* |
| * Try to parse Signed Certificate Timestamp List structure. This function |
| * makes only basic test if the data seems like SCTL. No signature validation |
| * is performed. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_parse_sctl(struct chunk *sctl) |
| { |
| int ret = 1; |
| int len, pos, sct_len; |
| unsigned char *data; |
| |
| if (sctl->len < 2) |
| goto out; |
| |
| data = (unsigned char *)sctl->str; |
| len = (data[0] << 8) | data[1]; |
| |
| if (len + 2 != sctl->len) |
| goto out; |
| |
| data = data + 2; |
| pos = 0; |
| while (pos < len) { |
| if (len - pos < 2) |
| goto out; |
| |
| sct_len = (data[pos] << 8) | data[pos + 1]; |
| if (pos + sct_len + 2 > len) |
| goto out; |
| |
| pos += sct_len + 2; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| out: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_load_sctl_from_file(const char *sctl_path, struct chunk **sctl) |
| { |
| int fd = -1; |
| int r = 0; |
| int ret = 1; |
| |
| *sctl = NULL; |
| |
| fd = open(sctl_path, O_RDONLY); |
| if (fd == -1) |
| goto end; |
| |
| trash.len = 0; |
| while (trash.len < trash.size) { |
| r = read(fd, trash.str + trash.len, trash.size - trash.len); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (errno == EINTR) |
| continue; |
| |
| goto end; |
| } |
| else if (r == 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| trash.len += r; |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl_sock_parse_sctl(&trash); |
| if (ret) |
| goto end; |
| |
| *sctl = calloc(1, sizeof(struct chunk)); |
| if (!chunk_dup(*sctl, &trash)) { |
| free(*sctl); |
| *sctl = NULL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| end: |
| if (fd != -1) |
| close(fd); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_sock_sctl_add_cbk(SSL *ssl, unsigned ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *add_arg) |
| { |
| struct chunk *sctl = (struct chunk *)add_arg; |
| |
| *out = (unsigned char *)sctl->str; |
| *outlen = sctl->len; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_sock_sctl_parse_cbk(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *parse_arg) |
| { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_load_sctl(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *cert_path) |
| { |
| char sctl_path[MAXPATHLEN+1]; |
| int ret = -1; |
| struct stat st; |
| struct chunk *sctl = NULL; |
| |
| snprintf(sctl_path, MAXPATHLEN+1, "%s.sctl", cert_path); |
| |
| if (stat(sctl_path, &st)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (ssl_sock_load_sctl_from_file(sctl_path, &sctl)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (!SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(ctx, CT_EXTENSION_TYPE, ssl_sock_sctl_add_cbk, NULL, sctl, ssl_sock_sctl_parse_cbk, NULL)) { |
| free(sctl); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, sctl_ex_index, sctl); |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| out: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| BIO *write_bio; |
| (void)ret; /* shut gcc stupid warning */ |
| |
| if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) { |
| /* Disable renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) */ |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED) { |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR; |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_RENEG; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((where & SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) == SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) { |
| if (!(conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE)) { |
| /* Long certificate chains optimz |
| If write and read bios are differents, we |
| consider that the buffering was activated, |
| so we rise the output buffer size from 4k |
| to 16k */ |
| write_bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); |
| if (write_bio != SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) { |
| BIO_set_write_buffer_size(write_bio, 16384); |
| conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Callback is called for each certificate of the chain during a verify |
| ok is set to 1 if preverify detect no error on current certificate. |
| Returns 0 to break the handshake, 1 otherwise. */ |
| int ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x_store) |
| { |
| SSL *ssl; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| int err, depth; |
| |
| ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(x_store, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); |
| conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| |
| conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE; |
| |
| if (ok) /* no errors */ |
| return ok; |
| |
| depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x_store); |
| err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x_store); |
| |
| /* check if CA error needs to be ignored */ |
| if (depth > 0) { |
| if (!SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CA_ERROR(conn->xprt_st)) { |
| conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CA_ERROR_TO_ST(err); |
| conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CAEDEPTH_TO_ST(depth); |
| } |
| |
| if (objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->ca_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) { |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_CA_FAIL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CRTERROR(conn->xprt_st)) |
| conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CRTERROR_TO_ST(err); |
| |
| /* check if certificate error needs to be ignored */ |
| if (objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->crt_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) { |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_CRT_FAIL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Callback is called for ssl protocol analyse */ |
| void ssl_sock_msgcbk(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) |
| { |
| #ifdef TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT |
| /* test heartbeat received (write_p is set to 0 |
| for a received record) */ |
| if ((content_type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) && (write_p == 0)) { |
| struct connection *conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| unsigned int payload; |
| |
| conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT; |
| |
| /* Check if this is a CVE-2014-0160 exploitation attempt. */ |
| if (*p != TLS1_HB_REQUEST) |
| return; |
| |
| if (len < 1 + 2 + 16) /* 1 type + 2 size + 0 payload + 16 padding */ |
| goto kill_it; |
| |
| payload = (p[1] * 256) + p[2]; |
| if (3 + payload + 16 <= len) |
| return; /* OK no problem */ |
| kill_it: |
| /* We have a clear heartbleed attack (CVE-2014-0160), the |
| * advertised payload is larger than the advertised packet |
| * length, so we have garbage in the buffer between the |
| * payload and the end of the buffer (p+len). We can't know |
| * if the SSL stack is patched, and we don't know if we can |
| * safely wipe out the area between p+3+len and payload. |
| * So instead, we prevent the response from being sent by |
| * setting the max_send_fragment to 0 and we report an SSL |
| * error, which will kill this connection. It will be reported |
| * above as SSL_ERROR_SSL while an other handshake failure with |
| * a heartbeat message will be reported as SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. |
| */ |
| ssl->max_send_fragment = 0; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return; |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED |
| /* This callback is used so that the server advertises the list of |
| * negociable protocols for NPN. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_advertise_npn_protos(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, |
| unsigned int *len, void *arg) |
| { |
| struct bind_conf *conf = arg; |
| |
| *data = (const unsigned char *)conf->npn_str; |
| *len = conf->npn_len; |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| /* This callback is used so that the server advertises the list of |
| * negociable protocols for ALPN. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_advertise_alpn_protos(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, |
| unsigned char *outlen, |
| const unsigned char *server, |
| unsigned int server_len, void *arg) |
| { |
| struct bind_conf *conf = arg; |
| |
| if (SSL_select_next_proto((unsigned char**) out, outlen, (const unsigned char *)conf->alpn_str, |
| conf->alpn_len, server, server_len) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) { |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| } |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| static DH *ssl_get_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen); |
| |
| /* Create a X509 certificate with the specified servername and serial. This |
| * function returns a SSL_CTX object or NULL if an error occurs. */ |
| static SSL_CTX * |
| ssl_sock_do_create_cert(const char *servername, unsigned int serial, |
| struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| X509 *cacert = bind_conf->ca_sign_cert; |
| EVP_PKEY *capkey = bind_conf->ca_sign_pkey; |
| SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL; |
| X509 *newcrt = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| const EVP_MD *digest; |
| X509V3_CTX ctx; |
| unsigned int i; |
| |
| /* Get the private key of the defautl certificate and use it */ |
| if (!(pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Create the certificate */ |
| if (!(newcrt = X509_new())) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Set version number for the certificate (X509v3) and the serial |
| * number */ |
| if (X509_set_version(newcrt, 2L) != 1) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(newcrt), serial); |
| |
| /* Set duration for the certificate */ |
| if (!X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(newcrt), (long)-60*60*24) || |
| !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newcrt),(long)60*60*24*365)) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* set public key in the certificate */ |
| if (X509_set_pubkey(newcrt, pkey) != 1) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Set issuer name from the CA */ |
| if (!(name = X509_get_subject_name(cacert))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (X509_set_issuer_name(newcrt, name) != 1) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Set the subject name using the same, but the CN */ |
| name = X509_NAME_dup(name); |
| if (X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, |
| (const unsigned char *)servername, |
| -1, -1, 0) != 1) { |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| } |
| if (X509_set_subject_name(newcrt, name) != 1) { |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| } |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| |
| /* Add x509v3 extensions as specified */ |
| X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, cacert, newcrt, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| for (i = 0; i < X509V3_EXT_SIZE; i++) { |
| X509_EXTENSION *ext; |
| |
| if (!(ext = X509V3_EXT_conf(NULL, &ctx, x509v3_ext_names[i], x509v3_ext_values[i]))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!X509_add_ext(newcrt, ext, -1)) { |
| X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| } |
| X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); |
| } |
| |
| /* Sign the certificate with the CA private key */ |
| if (EVP_PKEY_type(capkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) |
| digest = EVP_dss1(); |
| else if (EVP_PKEY_type (capkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
| digest = EVP_sha256(); |
| else if (EVP_PKEY_type (capkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
| digest = EVP_sha256(); |
| else { |
| #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000000fL) |
| int nid; |
| |
| if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(capkey, &nid) <= 0) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!(digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| #else |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| if (!(X509_sign(newcrt, capkey, digest))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Create and set the new SSL_CTX */ |
| if (!(ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey)) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ssl_ctx, newcrt)) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx)) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| if (newcrt) X509_free(newcrt); |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ssl_ctx, ssl_get_tmp_dh); |
| #if defined(SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) |
| { |
| const char *ecdhe = (bind_conf->ecdhe ? bind_conf->ecdhe : ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE); |
| EC_KEY *ecc; |
| int nid; |
| |
| if ((nid = OBJ_sn2nid(ecdhe)) == NID_undef) |
| goto end; |
| if (!(ecc = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))) |
| goto end; |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl_ctx, ecc); |
| EC_KEY_free(ecc); |
| } |
| #endif |
| end: |
| return ssl_ctx; |
| |
| mkcert_error: |
| if (ssl_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx); |
| if (newcrt) X509_free(newcrt); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX * |
| ssl_sock_create_cert(struct connection *conn, const char *servername, unsigned int serial) |
| { |
| struct bind_conf *bind_conf = objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf; |
| return ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, serial, bind_conf, conn->xprt_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* Do a lookup for a certificate in the LRU cache used to store generated |
| * certificates. */ |
| SSL_CTX * |
| ssl_sock_get_generated_cert(unsigned int serial, struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| struct lru64 *lru = NULL; |
| |
| if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) { |
| lru = lru64_lookup(serial, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, bind_conf->ca_sign_cert, 0); |
| if (lru && lru->domain) |
| return (SSL_CTX *)lru->data; |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Set a certificate int the LRU cache used to store generated |
| * certificate. Return 0 on success, otherwise -1 */ |
| int |
| ssl_sock_set_generated_cert(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, unsigned int serial, struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| struct lru64 *lru = NULL; |
| |
| if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) { |
| lru = lru64_get(serial, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, bind_conf->ca_sign_cert, 0); |
| if (!lru) |
| return -1; |
| if (lru->domain && lru->data) |
| lru->free((SSL_CTX *)lru->data); |
| lru64_commit(lru, ssl_ctx, bind_conf->ca_sign_cert, 0, (void (*)(void *))SSL_CTX_free); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Compute the serial that will be used to create/set/get a certificate. */ |
| unsigned int |
| ssl_sock_generated_cert_serial(const void *data, size_t len) |
| { |
| return XXH32(data, len, ssl_ctx_lru_seed); |
| } |
| |
| /* Generate a cert and immediately assign it to the SSL session so that the cert's |
| * refcount is maintained regardless of the cert's presence in the LRU cache. |
| */ |
| static SSL_CTX * |
| ssl_sock_generate_certificate(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| X509 *cacert = bind_conf->ca_sign_cert; |
| SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL; |
| struct lru64 *lru = NULL; |
| unsigned int serial; |
| |
| serial = ssl_sock_generated_cert_serial(servername, strlen(servername)); |
| if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) { |
| lru = lru64_get(serial, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, cacert, 0); |
| if (lru && lru->domain) |
| ssl_ctx = (SSL_CTX *)lru->data; |
| if (!ssl_ctx && lru) { |
| ssl_ctx = ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, serial, bind_conf, ssl); |
| lru64_commit(lru, ssl_ctx, cacert, 0, (void (*)(void *))SSL_CTX_free); |
| } |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ssl_ctx); |
| } |
| else { |
| ssl_ctx = ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, serial, bind_conf, ssl); |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ssl_ctx); |
| /* No LRU cache, this CTX will be released as soon as the session dies */ |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx); |
| } |
| return ssl_ctx; |
| } |
| |
| /* Sets the SSL ctx of <ssl> to match the advertised server name. Returns a |
| * warning when no match is found, which implies the default (first) cert |
| * will keep being used. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, struct bind_conf *s) |
| { |
| const char *servername; |
| const char *wildp = NULL; |
| struct ebmb_node *node, *n; |
| int i; |
| (void)al; /* shut gcc stupid warning */ |
| |
| servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); |
| if (!servername) { |
| if (s->generate_certs) { |
| struct connection *conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| unsigned int serial; |
| SSL_CTX *ctx; |
| |
| conn_get_to_addr(conn); |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ADDR_TO_SET) { |
| serial = ssl_sock_generated_cert_serial(&conn->addr.to, get_addr_len(&conn->addr.to)); |
| ctx = ssl_sock_get_generated_cert(serial, s); |
| if (ctx) { |
| /* switch ctx */ |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ctx); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return (s->strict_sni ? |
| SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL : |
| SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK); |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < trash.size; i++) { |
| if (!servername[i]) |
| break; |
| trash.str[i] = tolower(servername[i]); |
| if (!wildp && (trash.str[i] == '.')) |
| wildp = &trash.str[i]; |
| } |
| trash.str[i] = 0; |
| |
| /* lookup in full qualified names */ |
| node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_ctx, trash.str); |
| |
| /* lookup a not neg filter */ |
| for (n = node; n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) { |
| if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) { |
| node = n; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!node && wildp) { |
| /* lookup in wildcards names */ |
| node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_w_ctx, wildp); |
| } |
| if (!node || container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) { |
| SSL_CTX *ctx; |
| if (s->generate_certs && |
| (ctx = ssl_sock_generate_certificate(servername, s, ssl))) { |
| /* switch ctx */ |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| return (s->strict_sni ? |
| SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL : |
| SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING); |
| } |
| |
| /* switch ctx */ |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */ |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| |
| static DH * ssl_get_dh_1024(void) |
| { |
| static unsigned char dh1024_p[]={ |
| 0xFA,0xF9,0x2A,0x22,0x2A,0xA7,0x7F,0xE1,0x67,0x4E,0x53,0xF7, |
| 0x56,0x13,0xC3,0xB1,0xE3,0x29,0x6B,0x66,0x31,0x6A,0x7F,0xB3, |
| 0xC2,0x68,0x6B,0xCB,0x1D,0x57,0x39,0x1D,0x1F,0xFF,0x1C,0xC9, |
| 0xA6,0xA4,0x98,0x82,0x31,0x5D,0x25,0xFF,0x8A,0xE0,0x73,0x96, |
| 0x81,0xC8,0x83,0x79,0xC1,0x5A,0x04,0xF8,0x37,0x0D,0xA8,0x3D, |
| 0xAE,0x74,0xBC,0xDB,0xB6,0xA4,0x75,0xD9,0x71,0x8A,0xA0,0x17, |
| 0x9E,0x2D,0xC8,0xA8,0xDF,0x2C,0x5F,0x82,0x95,0xF8,0x92,0x9B, |
| 0xA7,0x33,0x5F,0x89,0x71,0xC8,0x2D,0x6B,0x18,0x86,0xC4,0x94, |
| 0x22,0xA5,0x52,0x8D,0xF6,0xF6,0xD2,0x37,0x92,0x0F,0xA5,0xCC, |
| 0xDB,0x7B,0x1D,0x3D,0xA1,0x31,0xB7,0x80,0x8F,0x0B,0x67,0x5E, |
| 0x36,0xA5,0x60,0x0C,0xF1,0x95,0x33,0x8B, |
| }; |
| static unsigned char dh1024_g[]={ |
| 0x02, |
| }; |
| |
| DH *dh = DH_new(); |
| if (dh) { |
| dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof dh1024_p, NULL); |
| dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof dh1024_g, NULL); |
| |
| if (!dh->p || !dh->g) { |
| DH_free(dh); |
| dh = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| static DH *ssl_get_dh_2048(void) |
| { |
| static unsigned char dh2048_p[]={ |
| 0xEC,0x86,0xF8,0x70,0xA0,0x33,0x16,0xEC,0x05,0x1A,0x73,0x59, |
| 0xCD,0x1F,0x8B,0xF8,0x29,0xE4,0xD2,0xCF,0x52,0xDD,0xC2,0x24, |
| 0x8D,0xB5,0x38,0x9A,0xFB,0x5C,0xA4,0xE4,0xB2,0xDA,0xCE,0x66, |
| 0x50,0x74,0xA6,0x85,0x4D,0x4B,0x1D,0x30,0xB8,0x2B,0xF3,0x10, |
| 0xE9,0xA7,0x2D,0x05,0x71,0xE7,0x81,0xDF,0x8B,0x59,0x52,0x3B, |
| 0x5F,0x43,0x0B,0x68,0xF1,0xDB,0x07,0xBE,0x08,0x6B,0x1B,0x23, |
| 0xEE,0x4D,0xCC,0x9E,0x0E,0x43,0xA0,0x1E,0xDF,0x43,0x8C,0xEC, |
| 0xBE,0xBE,0x90,0xB4,0x51,0x54,0xB9,0x2F,0x7B,0x64,0x76,0x4E, |
| 0x5D,0xD4,0x2E,0xAE,0xC2,0x9E,0xAE,0x51,0x43,0x59,0xC7,0x77, |
| 0x9C,0x50,0x3C,0x0E,0xED,0x73,0x04,0x5F,0xF1,0x4C,0x76,0x2A, |
| 0xD8,0xF8,0xCF,0xFC,0x34,0x40,0xD1,0xB4,0x42,0x61,0x84,0x66, |
| 0x42,0x39,0x04,0xF8,0x68,0xB2,0x62,0xD7,0x55,0xED,0x1B,0x74, |
| 0x75,0x91,0xE0,0xC5,0x69,0xC1,0x31,0x5C,0xDB,0x7B,0x44,0x2E, |
| 0xCE,0x84,0x58,0x0D,0x1E,0x66,0x0C,0xC8,0x44,0x9E,0xFD,0x40, |
| 0x08,0x67,0x5D,0xFB,0xA7,0x76,0x8F,0x00,0x11,0x87,0xE9,0x93, |
| 0xF9,0x7D,0xC4,0xBC,0x74,0x55,0x20,0xD4,0x4A,0x41,0x2F,0x43, |
| 0x42,0x1A,0xC1,0xF2,0x97,0x17,0x49,0x27,0x37,0x6B,0x2F,0x88, |
| 0x7E,0x1C,0xA0,0xA1,0x89,0x92,0x27,0xD9,0x56,0x5A,0x71,0xC1, |
| 0x56,0x37,0x7E,0x3A,0x9D,0x05,0xE7,0xEE,0x5D,0x8F,0x82,0x17, |
| 0xBC,0xE9,0xC2,0x93,0x30,0x82,0xF9,0xF4,0xC9,0xAE,0x49,0xDB, |
| 0xD0,0x54,0xB4,0xD9,0x75,0x4D,0xFA,0x06,0xB8,0xD6,0x38,0x41, |
| 0xB7,0x1F,0x77,0xF3, |
| }; |
| static unsigned char dh2048_g[]={ |
| 0x02, |
| }; |
| |
| DH *dh = DH_new(); |
| if (dh) { |
| dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof dh2048_p, NULL); |
| dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof dh2048_g, NULL); |
| |
| if (!dh->p || !dh->g) { |
| DH_free(dh); |
| dh = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| static DH *ssl_get_dh_4096(void) |
| { |
| static unsigned char dh4096_p[]={ |
| 0xDE,0x16,0x94,0xCD,0x99,0x58,0x07,0xF1,0xF7,0x32,0x96,0x11, |
| 0x04,0x82,0xD4,0x84,0x72,0x80,0x99,0x06,0xCA,0xF0,0xA3,0x68, |
| 0x07,0xCE,0x64,0x50,0xE7,0x74,0x45,0x20,0x80,0x5E,0x4D,0xAD, |
| 0xA5,0xB6,0xED,0xFA,0x80,0x6C,0x3B,0x35,0xC4,0x9A,0x14,0x6B, |
| 0x32,0xBB,0xFD,0x1F,0x17,0x8E,0xB7,0x1F,0xD6,0xFA,0x3F,0x7B, |
| 0xEE,0x16,0xA5,0x62,0x33,0x0D,0xED,0xBC,0x4E,0x58,0xE5,0x47, |
| 0x4D,0xE9,0xAB,0x8E,0x38,0xD3,0x6E,0x90,0x57,0xE3,0x22,0x15, |
| 0x33,0xBD,0xF6,0x43,0x45,0xB5,0x10,0x0A,0xBE,0x2C,0xB4,0x35, |
| 0xB8,0x53,0x8D,0xAD,0xFB,0xA7,0x1F,0x85,0x58,0x41,0x7A,0x79, |
| 0x20,0x68,0xB3,0xE1,0x3D,0x08,0x76,0xBF,0x86,0x0D,0x49,0xE3, |
| 0x82,0x71,0x8C,0xB4,0x8D,0x81,0x84,0xD4,0xE7,0xBE,0x91,0xDC, |
| 0x26,0x39,0x48,0x0F,0x35,0xC4,0xCA,0x65,0xE3,0x40,0x93,0x52, |
| 0x76,0x58,0x7D,0xDD,0x51,0x75,0xDC,0x69,0x61,0xBF,0x47,0x2C, |
| 0x16,0x68,0x2D,0xC9,0x29,0xD3,0xE6,0xC0,0x99,0x48,0xA0,0x9A, |
| 0xC8,0x78,0xC0,0x6D,0x81,0x67,0x12,0x61,0x3F,0x71,0xBA,0x41, |
| 0x1F,0x6C,0x89,0x44,0x03,0xBA,0x3B,0x39,0x60,0xAA,0x28,0x55, |
| 0x59,0xAE,0xB8,0xFA,0xCB,0x6F,0xA5,0x1A,0xF7,0x2B,0xDD,0x52, |
| 0x8A,0x8B,0xE2,0x71,0xA6,0x5E,0x7E,0xD8,0x2E,0x18,0xE0,0x66, |
| 0xDF,0xDD,0x22,0x21,0x99,0x52,0x73,0xA6,0x33,0x20,0x65,0x0E, |
| 0x53,0xE7,0x6B,0x9B,0xC5,0xA3,0x2F,0x97,0x65,0x76,0xD3,0x47, |
| 0x23,0x77,0x12,0xB6,0x11,0x7B,0x24,0xED,0xF1,0xEF,0xC0,0xE2, |
| 0xA3,0x7E,0x67,0x05,0x3E,0x96,0x4D,0x45,0xC2,0x18,0xD1,0x73, |
| 0x9E,0x07,0xF3,0x81,0x6E,0x52,0x63,0xF6,0x20,0x76,0xB9,0x13, |
| 0xD2,0x65,0x30,0x18,0x16,0x09,0x16,0x9E,0x8F,0xF1,0xD2,0x10, |
| 0x5A,0xD3,0xD4,0xAF,0x16,0x61,0xDA,0x55,0x2E,0x18,0x5E,0x14, |
| 0x08,0x54,0x2E,0x2A,0x25,0xA2,0x1A,0x9B,0x8B,0x32,0xA9,0xFD, |
| 0xC2,0x48,0x96,0xE1,0x80,0xCA,0xE9,0x22,0x17,0xBB,0xCE,0x3E, |
| 0x9E,0xED,0xC7,0xF1,0x1F,0xEC,0x17,0x21,0xDC,0x7B,0x82,0x48, |
| 0x8E,0xBB,0x4B,0x9D,0x5B,0x04,0x04,0xDA,0xDB,0x39,0xDF,0x01, |
| 0x40,0xC3,0xAA,0x26,0x23,0x89,0x75,0xC6,0x0B,0xD0,0xA2,0x60, |
| 0x6A,0xF1,0xCC,0x65,0x18,0x98,0x1B,0x52,0xD2,0x74,0x61,0xCC, |
| 0xBD,0x60,0xAE,0xA3,0xA0,0x66,0x6A,0x16,0x34,0x92,0x3F,0x41, |
| 0x40,0x31,0x29,0xC0,0x2C,0x63,0xB2,0x07,0x8D,0xEB,0x94,0xB8, |
| 0xE8,0x47,0x92,0x52,0x93,0x6A,0x1B,0x7E,0x1A,0x61,0xB3,0x1B, |
| 0xF0,0xD6,0x72,0x9B,0xF1,0xB0,0xAF,0xBF,0x3E,0x65,0xEF,0x23, |
| 0x1D,0x6F,0xFF,0x70,0xCD,0x8A,0x4C,0x8A,0xA0,0x72,0x9D,0xBE, |
| 0xD4,0xBB,0x24,0x47,0x4A,0x68,0xB5,0xF5,0xC6,0xD5,0x7A,0xCD, |
| 0xCA,0x06,0x41,0x07,0xAD,0xC2,0x1E,0xE6,0x54,0xA7,0xAD,0x03, |
| 0xD9,0x12,0xC1,0x9C,0x13,0xB1,0xC9,0x0A,0x43,0x8E,0x1E,0x08, |
| 0xCE,0x50,0x82,0x73,0x5F,0xA7,0x55,0x1D,0xD9,0x59,0xAC,0xB5, |
| 0xEA,0x02,0x7F,0x6C,0x5B,0x74,0x96,0x98,0x67,0x24,0xA3,0x0F, |
| 0x15,0xFC,0xA9,0x7D,0x3E,0x67,0xD1,0x70,0xF8,0x97,0xF3,0x67, |
| 0xC5,0x8C,0x88,0x44,0x08,0x02,0xC7,0x2B, |
| }; |
| static unsigned char dh4096_g[]={ |
| 0x02, |
| }; |
| |
| DH *dh = DH_new(); |
| if (dh) { |
| dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh4096_p, sizeof dh4096_p, NULL); |
| dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh4096_g, sizeof dh4096_g, NULL); |
| |
| if (!dh->p || !dh->g) { |
| DH_free(dh); |
| dh = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns Diffie-Hellman parameters matching the private key length |
| but not exceeding global.tune.ssl_default_dh_param */ |
| static DH *ssl_get_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen) |
| { |
| DH *dh = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl); |
| int type = pkey ? EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type) : EVP_PKEY_NONE; |
| |
| /* The keylen supplied by OpenSSL can only be 512 or 1024. |
| See ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() in ssl/s3_srvr.c |
| */ |
| if (type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { |
| keylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); |
| } |
| |
| if (keylen > global.tune.ssl_default_dh_param) { |
| keylen = global.tune.ssl_default_dh_param; |
| } |
| |
| if (keylen >= 4096) { |
| dh = local_dh_4096; |
| } |
| else if (keylen >= 2048) { |
| dh = local_dh_2048; |
| } |
| else { |
| dh = local_dh_1024; |
| } |
| |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| static DH * ssl_sock_get_dh_from_file(const char *filename) |
| { |
| DH *dh = NULL; |
| BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); |
| |
| if (in == NULL) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (BIO_read_filename(in, filename) <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| |
| dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| |
| end: |
| if (in) |
| BIO_free(in); |
| |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_sock_load_global_dh_param_from_file(const char *filename) |
| { |
| global_dh = ssl_sock_get_dh_from_file(filename); |
| |
| if (global_dh) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Loads Diffie-Hellman parameter from a file. Returns 1 if loaded, else -1 |
| if an error occured, and 0 if parameter not found. */ |
| int ssl_sock_load_dh_params(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file) |
| { |
| int ret = -1; |
| DH *dh = ssl_sock_get_dh_from_file(file); |
| |
| if (dh) { |
| ret = 1; |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh); |
| |
| if (ssl_dh_ptr_index >= 0) { |
| /* store a pointer to the DH params to avoid complaining about |
| ssl-default-dh-param not being set for this SSL_CTX */ |
| SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index, dh); |
| } |
| } |
| else if (global_dh) { |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, global_dh); |
| ret = 0; /* DH params not found */ |
| } |
| else { |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| if (global.tune.ssl_default_dh_param <= 1024) { |
| /* we are limited to DH parameter of 1024 bits anyway */ |
| local_dh_1024 = ssl_get_dh_1024(); |
| if (local_dh_1024 == NULL) |
| goto end; |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, local_dh_1024); |
| } |
| else { |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, ssl_get_tmp_dh); |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; /* DH params not found */ |
| } |
| |
| end: |
| if (dh) |
| DH_free(dh); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_add_cert_sni(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct bind_conf *s, char *name, int order) |
| { |
| struct sni_ctx *sc; |
| int wild = 0, neg = 0; |
| |
| if (*name == '!') { |
| neg = 1; |
| name++; |
| } |
| if (*name == '*') { |
| wild = 1; |
| name++; |
| } |
| /* !* filter is a nop */ |
| if (neg && wild) |
| return order; |
| if (*name) { |
| int j, len; |
| len = strlen(name); |
| sc = malloc(sizeof(struct sni_ctx) + len + 1); |
| for (j = 0; j < len; j++) |
| sc->name.key[j] = tolower(name[j]); |
| sc->name.key[len] = 0; |
| sc->ctx = ctx; |
| sc->order = order++; |
| sc->neg = neg; |
| if (wild) |
| ebst_insert(&s->sni_w_ctx, &sc->name); |
| else |
| ebst_insert(&s->sni_ctx, &sc->name); |
| } |
| return order; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* The following code is used for loading multiple crt files into |
| * SSL_CTX's based on CN/SAN |
| */ |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL |
| /* This is used to preload the certifcate, private key |
| * and Cert Chain of a file passed in via the crt |
| * argument |
| * |
| * This way, we do not have to read the file multiple times |
| */ |
| struct cert_key_and_chain { |
| X509 *cert; |
| EVP_PKEY *key; |
| unsigned int num_chain_certs; |
| /* This is an array of X509 pointers */ |
| X509 **chain_certs; |
| }; |
| |
| #define SSL_SOCK_POSSIBLE_KT_COMBOS (1<<(SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES)) |
| |
| struct key_combo_ctx { |
| SSL_CTX *ctx; |
| int order; |
| }; |
| |
| /* Map used for processing multiple keypairs for a single purpose |
| * |
| * This maps CN/SNI name to certificate type |
| */ |
| struct sni_keytype { |
| int keytypes; /* BITMASK for keytypes */ |
| struct ebmb_node name; /* node holding the servername value */ |
| }; |
| |
| |
| /* Frees the contents of a cert_key_and_chain |
| */ |
| static void ssl_sock_free_cert_key_and_chain_contents(struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!ckch) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Free the certificate and set pointer to NULL */ |
| if (ckch->cert) |
| X509_free(ckch->cert); |
| ckch->cert = NULL; |
| |
| /* Free the key and set pointer to NULL */ |
| if (ckch->key) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ckch->key); |
| ckch->key = NULL; |
| |
| /* Free each certificate in the chain */ |
| for (i = 0; i < ckch->num_chain_certs; i++) { |
| if (ckch->chain_certs[i]) |
| X509_free(ckch->chain_certs[i]); |
| } |
| |
| /* Free the chain obj itself and set to NULL */ |
| if (ckch->num_chain_certs > 0) { |
| free(ckch->chain_certs); |
| ckch->num_chain_certs = 0; |
| ckch->chain_certs = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* checks if a key and cert exists in the ckch |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_is_ckch_valid(struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch) |
| { |
| return (ckch->cert != NULL && ckch->key != NULL); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Loads the contents of a crt file (path) into a cert_key_and_chain |
| * This allows us to carry the contents of the file without having to |
| * read the file multiple times. |
| * |
| * returns: |
| * 0 on Success |
| * 1 on SSL Failure |
| * 2 on file not found |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_crt_file_into_ckch(const char *path, struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch, char **err) |
| { |
| |
| BIO *in; |
| X509 *ca = NULL; |
| int ret = 1; |
| |
| ssl_sock_free_cert_key_and_chain_contents(ckch); |
| |
| in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); |
| if (in == NULL) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (BIO_read_filename(in, path) <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| |
| /* Read Certificate */ |
| ckch->cert = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| if (ckch->cert == NULL) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load certificate from file '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* Read Private Key */ |
| ckch->key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| if (ckch->key == NULL) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load private key from file '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* Read Certificate Chain */ |
| while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { |
| /* Grow the chain certs */ |
| ckch->num_chain_certs++; |
| ckch->chain_certs = realloc(ckch->chain_certs, (ckch->num_chain_certs * sizeof(X509 *))); |
| |
| /* use - 1 here since we just incremented it above */ |
| ckch->chain_certs[ckch->num_chain_certs - 1] = ca; |
| } |
| ret = ERR_get_error(); |
| if (ret && (ERR_GET_LIB(ret) != ERR_LIB_PEM && ERR_GET_REASON(ret) != PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load certificate chain from file '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| ret = 1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| end: |
| |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| if (in) |
| BIO_free(in); |
| |
| /* Something went wrong in one of the reads */ |
| if (ret != 0) |
| ssl_sock_free_cert_key_and_chain_contents(ckch); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Loads the info in ckch into ctx |
| * Currently, this does not process any information about ocsp, dhparams or |
| * sctl |
| * Returns |
| * 0 on success |
| * 1 on failure |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_put_ckch_into_ctx(const char *path, const struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch, SSL_CTX *ctx, char **err) |
| { |
| int i = 0; |
| |
| if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, ckch->key) <= 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL private key into SSL Context '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, ckch->cert)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL certificate into SSL Context '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Load all certs in the ckch into the ctx_chain for the ssl_ctx */ |
| for (i = 0; i < ckch->num_chain_certs; i++) { |
| if (!SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(ctx, ckch->chain_certs[i])) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load chain certificate #%d into SSL Context '%s'. Make sure you are linking against Openssl >= 1.0.2.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", (i+1), path); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx) <= 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sinconsistencies between private key and certificate loaded from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void ssl_sock_populate_sni_keytypes_hplr(const char *str, struct eb_root *sni_keytypes, int key_index) |
| { |
| struct sni_keytype *s_kt = NULL; |
| struct ebmb_node *node; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < trash.size; i++) { |
| if (!str[i]) |
| break; |
| trash.str[i] = tolower(str[i]); |
| } |
| trash.str[i] = 0; |
| node = ebst_lookup(sni_keytypes, trash.str); |
| if (!node) { |
| /* CN not found in tree */ |
| s_kt = malloc(sizeof(struct sni_keytype) + i + 1); |
| /* Using memcpy here instead of strncpy. |
| * strncpy will cause sig_abrt errors under certain versions of gcc with -O2 |
| * See: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=60792 |
| */ |
| memcpy(s_kt->name.key, trash.str, i+1); |
| s_kt->keytypes = 0; |
| ebst_insert(sni_keytypes, &s_kt->name); |
| } else { |
| /* CN found in tree */ |
| s_kt = container_of(node, struct sni_keytype, name); |
| } |
| |
| /* Mark that this CN has the keytype of key_index via keytypes mask */ |
| s_kt->keytypes |= 1<<key_index; |
| |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Given a path that does not exist, try to check for path.rsa, path.dsa and path.ecdsa files. |
| * If any are found, group these files into a set of SSL_CTX* |
| * based on shared and unique CN and SAN entries. Add these SSL_CTX* to the SNI tree. |
| * |
| * This will allow the user to explictly group multiple cert/keys for a single purpose |
| * |
| * Returns |
| * 0 on success |
| * 1 on failure |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_multi_cert(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **sni_filter, char **err) |
| { |
| char fp[MAXPATHLEN+1] = {0}; |
| int n = 0; |
| int i = 0; |
| struct cert_key_and_chain certs_and_keys[SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES] = { {0} }; |
| struct eb_root sni_keytypes_map = { {0} }; |
| struct ebmb_node *node; |
| struct ebmb_node *next; |
| /* Array of SSL_CTX pointers corresponding to each possible combo |
| * of keytypes |
| */ |
| struct key_combo_ctx key_combos[SSL_SOCK_POSSIBLE_KT_COMBOS] = { {0} }; |
| int rv = 0; |
| X509_NAME *xname = NULL; |
| char *str = NULL; |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names = NULL; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Load all possible certs and keys */ |
| for (n = 0; n < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; n++) { |
| struct stat buf; |
| |
| snprintf(fp, sizeof(fp), "%s.%s", path, SSL_SOCK_KEYTYPE_NAMES[n]); |
| if (stat(fp, &buf) == 0) { |
| if (ssl_sock_load_crt_file_into_ckch(fp, &certs_and_keys[n], err) == 1) { |
| rv = 1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Process each ckch and update keytypes for each CN/SAN |
| * for example, if CN/SAN www.a.com is associated with |
| * certs with keytype 0 and 2, then at the end of the loop, |
| * www.a.com will have: |
| * keyindex = 0 | 1 | 4 = 5 |
| */ |
| for (n = 0; n < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; n++) { |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ckch_valid(&certs_and_keys[n])) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* A lot of the following code is OpenSSL boilerplate for processing CN's and SAN's, |
| * so the line that contains logic is marked via comments |
| */ |
| xname = X509_get_subject_name(certs_and_keys[n].cert); |
| i = -1; |
| while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(xname, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) { |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname, i); |
| |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, entry->value) >= 0) { |
| /* Important line is here */ |
| ssl_sock_populate_sni_keytypes_hplr(str, &sni_keytypes_map, n); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| str = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Do the above logic for each SAN */ |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| names = X509_get_ext_d2i(certs_and_keys[n].cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
| if (names) { |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) { |
| GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i); |
| |
| if (name->type == GEN_DNS) { |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) { |
| /* Important line is here */ |
| ssl_sock_populate_sni_keytypes_hplr(str, &sni_keytypes_map, n); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| str = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */ |
| } |
| |
| /* If no files found, return error */ |
| if (eb_is_empty(&sni_keytypes_map)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL certificate file '%s' file does not exist.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| rv = 1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* We now have a map of CN/SAN to keytypes that are loaded in |
| * Iterate through the map to create the SSL_CTX's (if needed) |
| * and add each CTX to the SNI tree |
| * |
| * Some math here: |
| * There are 2^n - 1 possibile combinations, each unique |
| * combination is denoted by the key in the map. Each key |
| * has a value between 1 and 2^n - 1. Conveniently, the array |
| * of SSL_CTX* is sized 2^n. So, we can simply use the i'th |
| * entry in the array to correspond to the unique combo (key) |
| * associated with i. This unique key combo (i) will be associated |
| * with combos[i-1] |
| */ |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&sni_keytypes_map); |
| while (node) { |
| SSL_CTX *cur_ctx; |
| |
| str = (char *)container_of(node, struct sni_keytype, name)->name.key; |
| i = container_of(node, struct sni_keytype, name)->keytypes; |
| cur_ctx = key_combos[i-1].ctx; |
| |
| if (cur_ctx == NULL) { |
| /* need to create SSL_CTX */ |
| cur_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()); |
| if (cur_ctx == NULL) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| rv = 1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* Load all required certs/keys/chains/OCSPs info into SSL_CTX */ |
| for (n = 0; n < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; n++) { |
| if (i & (1<<n)) { |
| /* Key combo contains ckch[n] */ |
| snprintf(trash.str, trash.size, "%s.%s", path, SSL_SOCK_KEYTYPE_NAMES[n]); |
| if (ssl_sock_put_ckch_into_ctx(trash.str, &certs_and_keys[n], cur_ctx, err) != 0) { |
| SSL_CTX_free(cur_ctx); |
| rv = 1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) |
| /* Load OCSP Info into context */ |
| if (ssl_sock_load_ocsp(cur_ctx, trash.str) < 0) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "%s '%s.ocsp' is present and activates OCSP but it is impossible to compute the OCSP certificate ID (maybe the issuer could not be found)'.\n", |
| *err ? *err : "", path); |
| SSL_CTX_free(cur_ctx); |
| rv = 1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Load DH params into the ctx to support DHE keys */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (ssl_dh_ptr_index >= 0) |
| SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(cur_ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index, NULL); |
| |
| rv = ssl_sock_load_dh_params(cur_ctx, NULL); |
| if (rv < 0) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load DH parameters from file '%s'.\n", |
| *err ? *err : "", path); |
| rv = 1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Update key_combos */ |
| key_combos[i-1].ctx = cur_ctx; |
| } |
| |
| /* Update SNI Tree */ |
| ssl_sock_add_cert_sni(cur_ctx, bind_conf, str, key_combos[i-1].order++); |
| node = ebmb_next(node); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Mark a default context if none exists, using the ctx that has the most shared keys */ |
| if (!bind_conf->default_ctx) { |
| for (i = SSL_SOCK_POSSIBLE_KT_COMBOS - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| if (key_combos[i].ctx) { |
| bind_conf->default_ctx = key_combos[i].ctx; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| end: |
| |
| if (names) |
| sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free); |
| |
| for (n = 0; n < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; n++) |
| ssl_sock_free_cert_key_and_chain_contents(&certs_and_keys[n]); |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&sni_keytypes_map); |
| while (node) { |
| next = ebmb_next(node); |
| ebmb_delete(node); |
| node = next; |
| } |
| |
| return rv; |
| } |
| #else |
| /* This is a dummy, that just logs an error and returns error */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_multi_cert(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **sni_filter, char **err) |
| { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to stat SSL certificate from file '%s' : %s.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path, strerror(errno)); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL: Support for loading multiple certs into a single SSL_CTX */ |
| |
| /* Loads a certificate key and CA chain from a file. Returns 0 on error, -1 if |
| * an early error happens and the caller must call SSL_CTX_free() by itelf. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_cert_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, struct bind_conf *s, char **sni_filter, int fcount) |
| { |
| BIO *in; |
| X509 *x = NULL, *ca; |
| int i, err; |
| int ret = -1; |
| int order = 0; |
| X509_NAME *xname; |
| char *str; |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names; |
| #endif |
| |
| in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); |
| if (in == NULL) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| |
| x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback, ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata); |
| if (x == NULL) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (fcount) { |
| while (fcount--) |
| order = ssl_sock_add_cert_sni(ctx, s, sni_filter[fcount], order); |
| } |
| else { |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| names = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
| if (names) { |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) { |
| GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i); |
| if (name->type == GEN_DNS) { |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) { |
| order = ssl_sock_add_cert_sni(ctx, s, str, order); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free); |
| } |
| #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */ |
| xname = X509_get_subject_name(x); |
| i = -1; |
| while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(xname, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) { |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname, i); |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, entry->value) >= 0) { |
| order = ssl_sock_add_cert_sni(ctx, s, str, order); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; /* the caller must not free the SSL_CTX argument anymore */ |
| if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x)) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL) { |
| sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free); |
| ctx->extra_certs = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback, ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))) { |
| if (!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca)) { |
| X509_free(ca); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| err = ERR_get_error(); |
| if (!err || (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)) { |
| /* we successfully reached the last cert in the file */ |
| ret = 1; |
| } |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| end: |
| if (x) |
| X509_free(x); |
| |
| if (in) |
| BIO_free(in); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_load_cert_file(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **sni_filter, int fcount, char **err) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| SSL_CTX *ctx; |
| |
| ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()); |
| if (!ctx) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context for cert '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, path, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL private key from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl_sock_load_cert_chain_file(ctx, path, bind_conf, sni_filter, fcount); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL certificate from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| if (ret < 0) /* serious error, must do that ourselves */ |
| SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx) <= 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sinconsistencies between private key and certificate loaded from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* we must not free the SSL_CTX anymore below, since it's already in |
| * the tree, so it will be discovered and cleaned in time. |
| */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| /* store a NULL pointer to indicate we have not yet loaded |
| a custom DH param file */ |
| if (ssl_dh_ptr_index >= 0) { |
| SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl_sock_load_dh_params(ctx, path); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load DH parameters from file '%s'.\n", |
| *err ? *err : "", path); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) |
| ret = ssl_sock_load_ocsp(ctx, path); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "%s '%s.ocsp' is present and activates OCSP but it is impossible to compute the OCSP certificate ID (maybe the issuer could not be found)'.\n", |
| *err ? *err : "", path); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) |
| if (sctl_ex_index >= 0) { |
| ret = ssl_sock_load_sctl(ctx, path); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "%s '%s.sctl' is present but cannot be read or parsed'.\n", |
| *err ? *err : "", path); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| if (bind_conf->default_ctx) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sthis version of openssl cannot load multiple SSL certificates.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (!bind_conf->default_ctx) |
| bind_conf->default_ctx = ctx; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_sock_load_cert(char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **err) |
| { |
| struct dirent **de_list; |
| int i, n; |
| DIR *dir; |
| struct stat buf; |
| char *end; |
| char fp[MAXPATHLEN+1]; |
| int cfgerr = 0; |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL |
| int is_bundle; |
| int j; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (stat(path, &buf) == 0) { |
| dir = opendir(path); |
| if (!dir) |
| return ssl_sock_load_cert_file(path, bind_conf, curproxy, NULL, 0, err); |
| |
| /* strip trailing slashes, including first one */ |
| for (end = path + strlen(path) - 1; end >= path && *end == '/'; end--) |
| *end = 0; |
| |
| n = scandir(path, &de_list, 0, alphasort); |
| if (n < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to scan directory '%s' : %s.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path, strerror(errno)); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| else { |
| for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { |
| struct dirent *de = de_list[i]; |
| |
| end = strrchr(de->d_name, '.'); |
| if (end && (!strcmp(end, ".issuer") || !strcmp(end, ".ocsp") || !strcmp(end, ".sctl"))) |
| goto ignore_entry; |
| |
| snprintf(fp, sizeof(fp), "%s/%s", path, de->d_name); |
| if (stat(fp, &buf) != 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to stat SSL certificate from file '%s' : %s.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", fp, strerror(errno)); |
| cfgerr++; |
| goto ignore_entry; |
| } |
| if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) |
| goto ignore_entry; |
| |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL |
| is_bundle = 0; |
| /* Check if current entry in directory is part of a multi-cert bundle */ |
| |
| if (end) { |
| for (j = 0; j < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; j++) { |
| if (!strcmp(end + 1, SSL_SOCK_KEYTYPE_NAMES[j])) { |
| is_bundle = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (is_bundle) { |
| char dp[MAXPATHLEN+1] = {0}; /* this will be the filename w/o the keytype */ |
| int dp_len; |
| |
| dp_len = end - de->d_name; |
| snprintf(dp, dp_len + 1, "%s", de->d_name); |
| |
| /* increment i and free de until we get to a non-bundle cert |
| * Note here that we look at de_list[i + 1] before freeing de |
| * this is important since ignore_entry will free de |
| */ |
| while (i + 1 < n && !strncmp(de_list[i + 1]->d_name, dp, dp_len)) { |
| free(de); |
| i++; |
| de = de_list[i]; |
| } |
| |
| snprintf(fp, sizeof(fp), "%s/%s", path, dp); |
| ssl_sock_load_multi_cert(fp, bind_conf, curproxy, NULL, err); |
| |
| /* Successfully processed the bundle */ |
| goto ignore_entry; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| cfgerr += ssl_sock_load_cert_file(fp, bind_conf, curproxy, NULL, 0, err); |
| ignore_entry: |
| free(de); |
| } |
| free(de_list); |
| } |
| closedir(dir); |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| cfgerr = ssl_sock_load_multi_cert(path, bind_conf, curproxy, NULL, err); |
| |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| /* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot. The work is only |
| * done once. Zero is returned if the operation fails. No error is returned |
| * if the random is said as not implemented, because we expect that openssl |
| * will use another method once needed. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_initialize_random() |
| { |
| unsigned char random; |
| static int random_initialized = 0; |
| |
| if (!random_initialized && RAND_bytes(&random, 1) != 0) |
| random_initialized = 1; |
| |
| return random_initialized; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_sock_load_cert_list_file(char *file, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **err) |
| { |
| char thisline[LINESIZE]; |
| FILE *f; |
| struct stat buf; |
| int linenum = 0; |
| int cfgerr = 0; |
| |
| if ((f = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) { |
| memprintf(err, "cannot open file '%s' : %s", file, strerror(errno)); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| while (fgets(thisline, sizeof(thisline), f) != NULL) { |
| int arg; |
| int newarg; |
| char *end; |
| char *args[MAX_LINE_ARGS + 1]; |
| char *line = thisline; |
| |
| linenum++; |
| end = line + strlen(line); |
| if (end-line == sizeof(thisline)-1 && *(end-1) != '\n') { |
| /* Check if we reached the limit and the last char is not \n. |
| * Watch out for the last line without the terminating '\n'! |
| */ |
| memprintf(err, "line %d too long in file '%s', limit is %d characters", |
| linenum, file, (int)sizeof(thisline)-1); |
| cfgerr = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| arg = 0; |
| newarg = 1; |
| while (*line) { |
| if (*line == '#' || *line == '\n' || *line == '\r') { |
| /* end of string, end of loop */ |
| *line = 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| else if (isspace(*line)) { |
| newarg = 1; |
| *line = 0; |
| } |
| else if (newarg) { |
| if (arg == MAX_LINE_ARGS) { |
| memprintf(err, "too many args on line %d in file '%s'.", |
| linenum, file); |
| cfgerr = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| newarg = 0; |
| args[arg++] = line; |
| } |
| line++; |
| } |
| if (cfgerr) |
| break; |
| |
| /* empty line */ |
| if (!arg) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (stat(args[0], &buf) == 0) { |
| cfgerr = ssl_sock_load_cert_file(args[0], bind_conf, curproxy, &args[1], arg-1, err); |
| } else { |
| cfgerr = ssl_sock_load_multi_cert(args[0], bind_conf, curproxy, NULL, err); |
| } |
| |
| if (cfgerr) { |
| memprintf(err, "error processing line %d in file '%s' : %s", linenum, file, *err); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| fclose(f); |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.7 */ |
| #define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0 |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.7 */ |
| #define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0 |
| #define SSL_renegotiate_pending(arg) 0 |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.8 */ |
| #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0 |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.8 */ |
| #define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0 |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.9 */ |
| #define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0 |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 /* needs OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 */ |
| #define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 0 |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 /* needs OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 */ |
| #define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 0 |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.6 */ |
| #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0 |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE /* needs OpenSSL >= 1.0.0 */ |
| #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0 |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS /* needs OpenSSL >= 1.0.0 */ |
| #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0 |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS /* needs small_records.patch */ |
| #define SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS 0 |
| #endif |
| |
| int ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL_CTX *ctx, struct proxy *curproxy) |
| { |
| int cfgerr = 0; |
| int verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| long ssloptions = |
| SSL_OP_ALL | /* all known workarounds for bugs */ |
| SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | |
| SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION | |
| SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE | |
| SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE | |
| SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | |
| SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE; |
| long sslmode = |
| SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE | |
| SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER | |
| SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS | |
| SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS; |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) * ciphers = NULL; |
| SSL_CIPHER * cipher = NULL; |
| char cipher_description[128]; |
| /* The description of ciphers using an Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange |
| contains " Kx=DH " or " Kx=DH(". Beware of " Kx=DH/", |
| which is not ephemeral DH. */ |
| const char dhe_description[] = " Kx=DH "; |
| const char dhe_export_description[] = " Kx=DH("; |
| int idx = 0; |
| int dhe_found = 0; |
| SSL *ssl = NULL; |
| |
| /* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */ |
| if (!ssl_initialize_random()) { |
| Alert("OpenSSL random data generator initialization failed.\n"); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3) |
| ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10) |
| ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11) |
| ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12) |
| ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS) |
| ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3) { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
| SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, SSLv3_server_method()); |
| #else |
| Alert("SSLv3 support requested but unavailable.\n"); |
| cfgerr++; |
| #endif |
| } |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10) |
| SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_server_method()); |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11) |
| SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_1_server_method()); |
| #endif |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12) |
| SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_2_server_method()); |
| #endif |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ssloptions); |
| SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, sslmode); |
| switch (bind_conf->verify) { |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| break; |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_OPTIONAL: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; |
| break; |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; |
| break; |
| } |
| SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk); |
| if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) { |
| if (bind_conf->ca_file) { |
| /* load CAfile to verify */ |
| if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, bind_conf->ca_file, NULL)) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': unable to load CA file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| curproxy->id, bind_conf->ca_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| /* set CA names fo client cert request, function returns void */ |
| SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(bind_conf->ca_file)); |
| } |
| else { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': verify is enabled but no CA file specified for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| curproxy->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK |
| if (bind_conf->crl_file) { |
| X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); |
| |
| if (!store || !X509_STORE_load_locations(store, bind_conf->crl_file, NULL)) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': unable to configure CRL file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| curproxy->id, bind_conf->crl_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| else { |
| X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| } |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| if(bind_conf->keys_ref) { |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ctx, ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb)) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': unable to set callback for TLS ticket validation for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| curproxy->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (global.tune.ssllifetime) |
| SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, global.tune.ssllifetime); |
| |
| shared_context_set_cache(ctx); |
| if (bind_conf->ciphers && |
| !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, bind_conf->ciphers)) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': unable to set SSL cipher list to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| curproxy->id, bind_conf->ciphers, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| |
| /* If tune.ssl.default-dh-param has not been set, |
| neither has ssl-default-dh-file and no static DH |
| params were in the certificate file. */ |
| if (global.tune.ssl_default_dh_param == 0 && |
| global_dh == NULL && |
| (ssl_dh_ptr_index == -1 || |
| SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index) == NULL)) { |
| |
| ssl = SSL_new(ctx); |
| |
| if (ssl) { |
| ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); |
| |
| if (ciphers) { |
| for (idx = 0; idx < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); idx++) { |
| cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, idx); |
| if (SSL_CIPHER_description(cipher, cipher_description, sizeof (cipher_description)) == cipher_description) { |
| if (strstr(cipher_description, dhe_description) != NULL || |
| strstr(cipher_description, dhe_export_description) != NULL) { |
| dhe_found = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| SSL_free(ssl); |
| ssl = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (dhe_found) { |
| Warning("Setting tune.ssl.default-dh-param to 1024 by default, if your workload permits it you should set it to at least 2048. Please set a value >= 1024 to make this warning disappear.\n"); |
| } |
| |
| global.tune.ssl_default_dh_param = 1024; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (global.tune.ssl_default_dh_param >= 1024) { |
| if (local_dh_1024 == NULL) { |
| local_dh_1024 = ssl_get_dh_1024(); |
| } |
| if (global.tune.ssl_default_dh_param >= 2048) { |
| if (local_dh_2048 == NULL) { |
| local_dh_2048 = ssl_get_dh_2048(); |
| } |
| if (global.tune.ssl_default_dh_param >= 4096) { |
| if (local_dh_4096 == NULL) { |
| local_dh_4096 = ssl_get_dh_4096(); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_infocbk); |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L |
| SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_msgcbk); |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED |
| if (bind_conf->npn_str) |
| SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_advertise_npn_protos, bind_conf); |
| #endif |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| if (bind_conf->alpn_str) |
| SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_advertise_alpn_protos, bind_conf); |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk); |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, bind_conf); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) |
| { |
| int i; |
| EC_KEY *ecdh; |
| |
| i = OBJ_sn2nid(bind_conf->ecdhe ? bind_conf->ecdhe : ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE); |
| if (!i || ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(i)) == NULL)) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': unable to set elliptic named curve to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| curproxy->id, bind_conf->ecdhe ? bind_conf->ecdhe : ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE, |
| bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| else { |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh); |
| EC_KEY_free(ecdh); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(const char *pattern, const char *hostname) |
| { |
| const char *pattern_wildcard, *pattern_left_label_end, *hostname_left_label_end; |
| size_t prefixlen, suffixlen; |
| |
| /* Trivial case */ |
| if (strcmp(pattern, hostname) == 0) |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* The rest of this logic is based on RFC 6125, section 6.4.3 |
| * (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3) */ |
| |
| pattern_wildcard = NULL; |
| pattern_left_label_end = pattern; |
| while (*pattern_left_label_end != '.') { |
| switch (*pattern_left_label_end) { |
| case 0: |
| /* End of label not found */ |
| return 0; |
| case '*': |
| /* If there is more than one wildcards */ |
| if (pattern_wildcard) |
| return 0; |
| pattern_wildcard = pattern_left_label_end; |
| break; |
| } |
| pattern_left_label_end++; |
| } |
| |
| /* If it's not trivial and there is no wildcard, it can't |
| * match */ |
| if (!pattern_wildcard) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Make sure all labels match except the leftmost */ |
| hostname_left_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.'); |
| if (!hostname_left_label_end |
| || strcmp(pattern_left_label_end, hostname_left_label_end) != 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Make sure the leftmost label of the hostname is long enough |
| * that the wildcard can match */ |
| if (hostname_left_label_end - hostname < (pattern_left_label_end - pattern) - 1) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Finally compare the string on either side of the |
| * wildcard */ |
| prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern; |
| suffixlen = pattern_left_label_end - (pattern_wildcard + 1); |
| if ((prefixlen && (memcmp(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) != 0)) |
| || (suffixlen && (memcmp(pattern_wildcard + 1, hostname_left_label_end - suffixlen, suffixlen) != 0))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_srv_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| SSL *ssl; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| char *servername; |
| |
| int depth; |
| X509 *cert; |
| STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *alt_names; |
| int i; |
| X509_NAME *cert_subject; |
| char *str; |
| |
| if (ok == 0) |
| return ok; |
| |
| ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); |
| conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| |
| servername = objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.verify_host; |
| |
| /* We only need to verify the CN on the actual server cert, |
| * not the indirect CAs */ |
| depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); |
| if (depth != 0) |
| return ok; |
| |
| /* At this point, the cert is *not* OK unless we can find a |
| * hostname match */ |
| ok = 0; |
| |
| cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); |
| /* It seems like this might happen if verify peer isn't set */ |
| if (!cert) |
| return ok; |
| |
| alt_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
| if (alt_names) { |
| for (i = 0; !ok && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(alt_names); i++) { |
| GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(alt_names, i); |
| if (name->type == GEN_DNS) { |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.ia5) >= 0) { |
| #else |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) { |
| #endif |
| ok = ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(str, servername); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(alt_names, GENERAL_NAME_free); |
| } |
| |
| cert_subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert); |
| i = -1; |
| while (!ok && (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(cert_subject, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) { |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(cert_subject, i); |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, entry->value) >= 0) { |
| ok = ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(str, servername); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| /* prepare ssl context from servers options. Returns an error count */ |
| int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct server *srv, struct proxy *curproxy) |
| { |
| int cfgerr = 0; |
| long options = |
| SSL_OP_ALL | /* all known workarounds for bugs */ |
| SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | |
| SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION; |
| long mode = |
| SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE | |
| SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER | |
| SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS | |
| SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS; |
| int verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| |
| /* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */ |
| if (!ssl_initialize_random()) { |
| Alert("OpenSSL random data generator initialization failed.\n"); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| |
| /* Automatic memory computations need to know we use SSL there */ |
| global.ssl_used_backend = 1; |
| |
| /* Initiate SSL context for current server */ |
| srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = NULL; |
| if (srv->use_ssl) |
| srv->xprt = &ssl_sock; |
| if (srv->check.use_ssl) |
| srv->check.xprt = &ssl_sock; |
| |
| srv->ssl_ctx.ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method()); |
| if (!srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) { |
| Alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to allocate ssl context.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, |
| srv->id); |
| cfgerr++; |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) { |
| if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { |
| Alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to load SSL private key from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, |
| srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| else if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) <= 0) { |
| Alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to load ssl certificate from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, |
| srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| else if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) <= 0) { |
| Alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': inconsistencies between private key and certificate loaded from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, |
| srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3) |
| options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10) |
| options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11) |
| options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12) |
| options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS) |
| options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3) { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
| SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, SSLv3_client_method()); |
| #else |
| Alert("SSLv3 support requested but unavailable.\n"); |
| cfgerr++; |
| #endif |
| } |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10) |
| SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, TLSv1_client_method()); |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11) |
| SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, TLSv1_1_client_method()); |
| #endif |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12) |
| SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, TLSv1_2_client_method()); |
| #endif |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_options(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, options); |
| SSL_CTX_set_mode(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, mode); |
| |
| if (global.ssl_server_verify == SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_REQUIRED) |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; |
| |
| switch (srv->ssl_ctx.verify) { |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| break; |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; |
| break; |
| } |
| SSL_CTX_set_verify(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, |
| verify, |
| srv->ssl_ctx.verify_host ? ssl_sock_srv_verifycbk : NULL); |
| if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) { |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file) { |
| /* load CAfile to verify */ |
| if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file, NULL)) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] unable to load CA file '%s'.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| if (global.ssl_server_verify == SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_REQUIRED) |
| Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] verify is enabled by default but no CA file specified. If you're running on a LAN where you're certain to trust the server's certificate, please set an explicit 'verify none' statement on the 'server' line, or use 'ssl-server-verify none' in the global section to disable server-side verifications by default.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line); |
| else |
| Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] verify is enabled but no CA file specified.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file) { |
| X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx); |
| |
| if (!store || !X509_STORE_load_locations(store, srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file, NULL)) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] unable to configure CRL file '%s'.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| else { |
| X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| if (global.tune.ssllifetime) |
| SSL_CTX_set_timeout(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, global.tune.ssllifetime); |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers && |
| !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers)) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] : unable to set SSL cipher list to '%s'.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| /* Walks down the two trees in bind_conf and prepares all certs. The pointer may |
| * be NULL, in which case nothing is done. Returns the number of errors |
| * encountered. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_prepare_all_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *px) |
| { |
| struct ebmb_node *node; |
| struct sni_ctx *sni; |
| int err = 0; |
| |
| if (!bind_conf || !bind_conf->is_ssl) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Automatic memory computations need to know we use SSL there */ |
| global.ssl_used_frontend = 1; |
| |
| if (bind_conf->default_ctx) |
| err += ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, bind_conf->default_ctx, px); |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_ctx); |
| while (node) { |
| sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name); |
| if (!sni->order && sni->ctx != bind_conf->default_ctx) |
| /* only initialize the CTX on its first occurrence and |
| if it is not the default_ctx */ |
| err += ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, sni->ctx, px); |
| node = ebmb_next(node); |
| } |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx); |
| while (node) { |
| sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name); |
| if (!sni->order && sni->ctx != bind_conf->default_ctx) |
| /* only initialize the CTX on its first occurrence and |
| if it is not the default_ctx */ |
| err += ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, sni->ctx, px); |
| node = ebmb_next(node); |
| } |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* release ssl context allocated for servers. */ |
| void ssl_sock_free_srv_ctx(struct server *srv) |
| { |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) |
| SSL_CTX_free(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* Walks down the two trees in bind_conf and frees all the certs. The pointer may |
| * be NULL, in which case nothing is done. The default_ctx is nullified too. |
| */ |
| void ssl_sock_free_all_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| struct ebmb_node *node, *back; |
| struct sni_ctx *sni; |
| |
| if (!bind_conf || !bind_conf->is_ssl) |
| return; |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_ctx); |
| while (node) { |
| sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name); |
| back = ebmb_next(node); |
| ebmb_delete(node); |
| if (!sni->order) /* only free the CTX on its first occurrence */ |
| SSL_CTX_free(sni->ctx); |
| free(sni); |
| node = back; |
| } |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx); |
| while (node) { |
| sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name); |
| back = ebmb_next(node); |
| ebmb_delete(node); |
| if (!sni->order) /* only free the CTX on its first occurrence */ |
| SSL_CTX_free(sni->ctx); |
| free(sni); |
| node = back; |
| } |
| |
| bind_conf->default_ctx = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Load CA cert file and private key used to generate certificates */ |
| int |
| ssl_sock_load_ca(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *px) |
| { |
| FILE *fp; |
| X509 *cacert = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *capkey = NULL; |
| int err = 0; |
| |
| if (!bind_conf || !bind_conf->generate_certs) |
| return err; |
| |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| if (global.tune.ssl_ctx_cache) |
| ssl_ctx_lru_tree = lru64_new(global.tune.ssl_ctx_cache); |
| ssl_ctx_lru_seed = (unsigned int)time(NULL); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (!bind_conf->ca_sign_file) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': cannot enable certificate generation, " |
| "no CA certificate File configured at [%s:%d].\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| goto load_error; |
| } |
| |
| /* read in the CA certificate */ |
| if (!(fp = fopen(bind_conf->ca_sign_file, "r"))) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': Failed to read CA certificate file '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->ca_sign_file, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| goto load_error; |
| } |
| if (!(cacert = PEM_read_X509(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': Failed to read CA certificate file '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->ca_sign_file, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| goto read_error; |
| } |
| rewind(fp); |
| if (!(capkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, bind_conf->ca_sign_pass))) { |
| Alert("Proxy '%s': Failed to read CA private key file '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->ca_sign_file, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| goto read_error; |
| } |
| |
| fclose (fp); |
| bind_conf->ca_sign_cert = cacert; |
| bind_conf->ca_sign_pkey = capkey; |
| return err; |
| |
| read_error: |
| fclose (fp); |
| if (capkey) EVP_PKEY_free(capkey); |
| if (cacert) X509_free(cacert); |
| load_error: |
| bind_conf->generate_certs = 0; |
| err++; |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Release CA cert and private key used to generate certificated */ |
| void |
| ssl_sock_free_ca(struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| if (!bind_conf) |
| return; |
| |
| if (bind_conf->ca_sign_pkey) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(bind_conf->ca_sign_pkey); |
| if (bind_conf->ca_sign_cert) |
| X509_free(bind_conf->ca_sign_cert); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function is called if SSL * context is not yet allocated. The function |
| * is designed to be called before any other data-layer operation and sets the |
| * handshake flag on the connection. It is safe to call it multiple times. |
| * It returns 0 on success and -1 in error case. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| /* already initialized */ |
| if (conn->xprt_ctx) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (global.maxsslconn && sslconns >= global.maxsslconn) { |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_TOO_MANY; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* If it is in client mode initiate SSL session |
| in connect state otherwise accept state */ |
| if (objt_server(conn->target)) { |
| int may_retry = 1; |
| |
| retry_connect: |
| /* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */ |
| conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.ctx); |
| if (!conn->xprt_ctx) { |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc2(); |
| goto retry_connect; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* set fd on SSL session context */ |
| if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) { |
| SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| conn->xprt_ctx = NULL; |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc2(); |
| goto retry_connect; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* set connection pointer */ |
| if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) { |
| SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| conn->xprt_ctx = NULL; |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc2(); |
| goto retry_connect; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_set_connect_state(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess) { |
| if(!SSL_set_session(conn->xprt_ctx, objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess)) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess); |
| objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* leave init state and start handshake */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN; |
| |
| sslconns++; |
| totalsslconns++; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else if (objt_listener(conn->target)) { |
| int may_retry = 1; |
| |
| retry_accept: |
| /* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */ |
| conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->default_ctx); |
| if (!conn->xprt_ctx) { |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc2(); |
| goto retry_accept; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* set fd on SSL session context */ |
| if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) { |
| SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| conn->xprt_ctx = NULL; |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc2(); |
| goto retry_accept; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* set connection pointer */ |
| if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) { |
| SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| conn->xprt_ctx = NULL; |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc2(); |
| goto retry_accept; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_set_accept_state(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| |
| /* leave init state and start handshake */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN; |
| |
| sslconns++; |
| totalsslconns++; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* don't know how to handle such a target */ |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_TARGET; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* This is the callback which is used when an SSL handshake is pending. It |
| * updates the FD status if it wants some polling before being called again. |
| * It returns 0 if it fails in a fatal way or needs to poll to go further, |
| * otherwise it returns non-zero and removes itself from the connection's |
| * flags (the bit is provided in <flag> by the caller). |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsigned int flag) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!conn->xprt_ctx) |
| goto out_error; |
| |
| /* If we use SSL_do_handshake to process a reneg initiated by |
| * the remote peer, it sometimes returns SSL_ERROR_SSL. |
| * Usually SSL_write and SSL_read are used and process implicitly |
| * the reneg handshake. |
| * Here we use SSL_peek as a workaround for reneg. |
| */ |
| if ((conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED) && SSL_renegotiate_pending(conn->xprt_ctx)) { |
| char c; |
| |
| ret = SSL_peek(conn->xprt_ctx, &c, 1); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| /* handshake may have not been completed, let's find why */ |
| ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret); |
| if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { |
| /* SSL handshake needs to write, L4 connection may not be ready */ |
| __conn_sock_stop_recv(conn); |
| __conn_sock_want_send(conn); |
| fd_cant_send(conn->t.sock.fd); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { |
| /* handshake may have been completed but we have |
| * no more data to read. |
| */ |
| if (!SSL_renegotiate_pending(conn->xprt_ctx)) { |
| ret = 1; |
| goto reneg_ok; |
| } |
| /* SSL handshake needs to read, L4 connection is ready */ |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN) |
| conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN; |
| __conn_sock_stop_send(conn); |
| __conn_sock_want_recv(conn); |
| fd_cant_recv(conn->t.sock.fd); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) { |
| /* if errno is null, then connection was successfully established */ |
| if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN) |
| conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN; |
| if (!conn->err_code) { |
| if (!((SSL *)conn->xprt_ctx)->packet_length) { |
| if (!errno) { |
| if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EMPTY; |
| } |
| else { |
| if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_ABORT; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| } |
| } |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| else { |
| /* Fail on all other handshake errors */ |
| /* Note: OpenSSL may leave unread bytes in the socket's |
| * buffer, causing an RST to be emitted upon close() on |
| * TCP sockets. We first try to drain possibly pending |
| * data to avoid this as much as possible. |
| */ |
| conn_sock_drain(conn); |
| if (!conn->err_code) |
| conn->err_code = (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) ? |
| CO_ER_SSL_KILLED_HB : CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| } |
| /* read some data: consider handshake completed */ |
| goto reneg_ok; |
| } |
| |
| ret = SSL_do_handshake(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (ret != 1) { |
| /* handshake did not complete, let's find why */ |
| ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret); |
| |
| if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { |
| /* SSL handshake needs to write, L4 connection may not be ready */ |
| __conn_sock_stop_recv(conn); |
| __conn_sock_want_send(conn); |
| fd_cant_send(conn->t.sock.fd); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { |
| /* SSL handshake needs to read, L4 connection is ready */ |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN) |
| conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN; |
| __conn_sock_stop_send(conn); |
| __conn_sock_want_recv(conn); |
| fd_cant_recv(conn->t.sock.fd); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) { |
| /* if errno is null, then connection was successfully established */ |
| if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN) |
| conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN; |
| |
| if (!((SSL *)conn->xprt_ctx)->packet_length) { |
| if (!errno) { |
| if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EMPTY; |
| } |
| else { |
| if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_ABORT; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| } |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| else { |
| /* Fail on all other handshake errors */ |
| /* Note: OpenSSL may leave unread bytes in the socket's |
| * buffer, causing an RST to be emitted upon close() on |
| * TCP sockets. We first try to drain possibly pending |
| * data to avoid this as much as possible. |
| */ |
| conn_sock_drain(conn); |
| if (!conn->err_code) |
| conn->err_code = (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) ? |
| CO_ER_SSL_KILLED_HB : CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| reneg_ok: |
| /* Handshake succeeded */ |
| if (!SSL_session_reused(conn->xprt_ctx)) { |
| if (objt_server(conn->target)) { |
| update_freq_ctr(&global.ssl_be_keys_per_sec, 1); |
| if (global.ssl_be_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr > global.ssl_be_keys_max) |
| global.ssl_be_keys_max = global.ssl_be_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr; |
| |
| /* check if session was reused, if not store current session on server for reuse */ |
| if (objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess) |
| SSL_SESSION_free(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess); |
| |
| if (!(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_REUSE)) |
| objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = SSL_get1_session(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| } |
| else { |
| update_freq_ctr(&global.ssl_fe_keys_per_sec, 1); |
| if (global.ssl_fe_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr > global.ssl_fe_keys_max) |
| global.ssl_fe_keys_max = global.ssl_fe_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* The connection is now established at both layers, it's time to leave */ |
| conn->flags &= ~(flag | CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN); |
| return 1; |
| |
| out_error: |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| /* free resumed session if exists */ |
| if (objt_server(conn->target) && objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess); |
| objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Fail on all other handshake errors */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR; |
| if (!conn->err_code) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Receive up to <count> bytes from connection <conn>'s socket and store them |
| * into buffer <buf>. Only one call to recv() is performed, unless the |
| * buffer wraps, in which case a second call may be performed. The connection's |
| * flags are updated with whatever special event is detected (error, read0, |
| * empty). The caller is responsible for taking care of those events and |
| * avoiding the call if inappropriate. The function does not call the |
| * connection's polling update function, so the caller is responsible for this. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int count) |
| { |
| int ret, done = 0; |
| int try; |
| |
| if (!conn->xprt_ctx) |
| goto out_error; |
| |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_HANDSHAKE) |
| /* a handshake was requested */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* let's realign the buffer to optimize I/O */ |
| if (buffer_empty(buf)) |
| buf->p = buf->data; |
| |
| /* read the largest possible block. For this, we perform only one call |
| * to recv() unless the buffer wraps and we exactly fill the first hunk, |
| * in which case we accept to do it once again. A new attempt is made on |
| * EINTR too. |
| */ |
| while (count > 0) { |
| /* first check if we have some room after p+i */ |
| try = buf->data + buf->size - (buf->p + buf->i); |
| /* otherwise continue between data and p-o */ |
| if (try <= 0) { |
| try = buf->p - (buf->data + buf->o); |
| if (try <= 0) |
| break; |
| } |
| if (try > count) |
| try = count; |
| |
| ret = SSL_read(conn->xprt_ctx, bi_end(buf), try); |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) { |
| /* CO_FL_ERROR may be set by ssl_sock_infocbk */ |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| if (ret > 0) { |
| buf->i += ret; |
| done += ret; |
| if (ret < try) |
| break; |
| count -= ret; |
| } |
| else if (ret == 0) { |
| ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret); |
| if (ret != SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN) { |
| /* error on protocol or underlying transport */ |
| if ((ret != SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) |
| || (errno && (errno != EAGAIN))) |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR; |
| |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| } |
| goto read0; |
| } |
| else { |
| ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret); |
| if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { |
| /* handshake is running, and it needs to enable write */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS; |
| __conn_sock_want_send(conn); |
| break; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { |
| if (SSL_renegotiate_pending(conn->xprt_ctx)) { |
| /* handshake is running, and it may need to re-enable read */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS; |
| __conn_sock_want_recv(conn); |
| break; |
| } |
| /* we need to poll for retry a read later */ |
| fd_cant_recv(conn->t.sock.fd); |
| break; |
| } |
| /* otherwise it's a real error */ |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| } |
| return done; |
| |
| read0: |
| conn_sock_read0(conn); |
| return done; |
| out_error: |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR; |
| return done; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Send all pending bytes from buffer <buf> to connection <conn>'s socket. |
| * <flags> may contain some CO_SFL_* flags to hint the system about other |
| * pending data for example, but this flag is ignored at the moment. |
| * Only one call to send() is performed, unless the buffer wraps, in which case |
| * a second call may be performed. The connection's flags are updated with |
| * whatever special event is detected (error, empty). The caller is responsible |
| * for taking care of those events and avoiding the call if inappropriate. The |
| * function does not call the connection's polling update function, so the caller |
| * is responsible for this. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_from_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int flags) |
| { |
| int ret, try, done; |
| |
| done = 0; |
| |
| if (!conn->xprt_ctx) |
| goto out_error; |
| |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_HANDSHAKE) |
| /* a handshake was requested */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* send the largest possible block. For this we perform only one call |
| * to send() unless the buffer wraps and we exactly fill the first hunk, |
| * in which case we accept to do it once again. |
| */ |
| while (buf->o) { |
| try = bo_contig_data(buf); |
| |
| if (!(flags & CO_SFL_STREAMER) && |
| !(conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED) && |
| global.tune.ssl_max_record && try > global.tune.ssl_max_record) { |
| try = global.tune.ssl_max_record; |
| } |
| else { |
| /* we need to keep the information about the fact that |
| * we're not limiting the upcoming send(), because if it |
| * fails, we'll have to retry with at least as many data. |
| */ |
| conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED; |
| } |
| |
| ret = SSL_write(conn->xprt_ctx, bo_ptr(buf), try); |
| |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) { |
| /* CO_FL_ERROR may be set by ssl_sock_infocbk */ |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| if (ret > 0) { |
| conn->xprt_st &= ~SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED; |
| |
| buf->o -= ret; |
| done += ret; |
| |
| if (likely(buffer_empty(buf))) |
| /* optimize data alignment in the buffer */ |
| buf->p = buf->data; |
| |
| /* if the system buffer is full, don't insist */ |
| if (ret < try) |
| break; |
| } |
| else { |
| ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret); |
| if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { |
| if (SSL_renegotiate_pending(conn->xprt_ctx)) { |
| /* handshake is running, and it may need to re-enable write */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS; |
| __conn_sock_want_send(conn); |
| break; |
| } |
| /* we need to poll to retry a write later */ |
| fd_cant_send(conn->t.sock.fd); |
| break; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { |
| /* handshake is running, and it needs to enable read */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS; |
| __conn_sock_want_recv(conn); |
| break; |
| } |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| } |
| return done; |
| |
| out_error: |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR; |
| return done; |
| } |
| |
| static void ssl_sock_close(struct connection *conn) { |
| |
| if (conn->xprt_ctx) { |
| SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| conn->xprt_ctx = NULL; |
| sslconns--; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* This function tries to perform a clean shutdown on an SSL connection, and in |
| * any case, flags the connection as reusable if no handshake was in progress. |
| */ |
| static void ssl_sock_shutw(struct connection *conn, int clean) |
| { |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_HANDSHAKE) |
| return; |
| /* no handshake was in progress, try a clean ssl shutdown */ |
| if (clean && (SSL_shutdown(conn->xprt_ctx) <= 0)) { |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| } |
| |
| /* force flag on ssl to keep session in cache regardless shutdown result */ |
| SSL_set_shutdown(conn->xprt_ctx, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN); |
| } |
| |
| /* used for logging, may be changed for a sample fetch later */ |
| const char *ssl_sock_get_cipher_name(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| if (!conn->xprt && !conn->xprt_ctx) |
| return NULL; |
| return SSL_get_cipher_name(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* used for logging, may be changed for a sample fetch later */ |
| const char *ssl_sock_get_proto_version(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| if (!conn->xprt && !conn->xprt_ctx) |
| return NULL; |
| return SSL_get_version(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* Extract a serial from a cert, and copy it to a chunk. |
| * Returns 1 if serial is found and copied, 0 if no serial found and |
| * -1 if output is not large enough. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssl_sock_get_serial(X509 *crt, struct chunk *out) |
| { |
| ASN1_INTEGER *serial; |
| |
| serial = X509_get_serialNumber(crt); |
| if (!serial) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (out->size < serial->length) |
| return -1; |
| |
| memcpy(out->str, serial->data, serial->length); |
| out->len = serial->length; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Extract a cert to der, and copy it to a chunk. |
| * Returns 1 if cert is found and copied, 0 on der convertion failure and |
| * -1 if output is not large enough. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssl_sock_crt2der(X509 *crt, struct chunk *out) |
| { |
| int len; |
| unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)out->str;; |
| |
| len =i2d_X509(crt, NULL); |
| if (len <= 0) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (out->size < len) |
| return -1; |
| |
| i2d_X509(crt,&p); |
| out->len = len; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Copy Date in ASN1_UTCTIME format in struct chunk out. |
| * Returns 1 if serial is found and copied, 0 if no valid time found |
| * and -1 if output is not large enough. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssl_sock_get_time(ASN1_TIME *tm, struct chunk *out) |
| { |
| if (tm->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) { |
| ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gentm = (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *)tm; |
| |
| if (gentm->length < 12) |
| return 0; |
| if (gentm->data[0] != 0x32 || gentm->data[1] != 0x30) |
| return 0; |
| if (out->size < gentm->length-2) |
| return -1; |
| |
| memcpy(out->str, gentm->data+2, gentm->length-2); |
| out->len = gentm->length-2; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| else if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { |
| ASN1_UTCTIME *utctm = (ASN1_UTCTIME *)tm; |
| |
| if (utctm->length < 10) |
| return 0; |
| if (utctm->data[0] >= 0x35) |
| return 0; |
| if (out->size < utctm->length) |
| return -1; |
| |
| memcpy(out->str, utctm->data, utctm->length); |
| out->len = utctm->length; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Extract an entry from a X509_NAME and copy its value to an output chunk. |
| * Returns 1 if entry found, 0 if entry not found, or -1 if output not large enough. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(X509_NAME *a, const struct chunk *entry, int pos, struct chunk *out) |
| { |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; |
| int i, j, n; |
| int cur = 0; |
| const char *s; |
| char tmp[128]; |
| |
| out->len = 0; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) { |
| if (pos < 0) |
| j = (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)-1) - i; |
| else |
| j = i; |
| |
| ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, j); |
| n = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object); |
| if ((n == NID_undef) || ((s = OBJ_nid2sn(n)) == NULL)) { |
| i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ne->object); |
| s = tmp; |
| } |
| |
| if (chunk_strcasecmp(entry, s) != 0) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (pos < 0) |
| cur--; |
| else |
| cur++; |
| |
| if (cur != pos) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (ne->value->length > out->size) |
| return -1; |
| |
| memcpy(out->str, ne->value->data, ne->value->length); |
| out->len = ne->value->length; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* Extract and format full DN from a X509_NAME and copy result into a chunk |
| * Returns 1 if dn entries exits, 0 if no dn entry found or -1 if output is not large enough. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssl_sock_get_dn_oneline(X509_NAME *a, struct chunk *out) |
| { |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; |
| int i, n, ln; |
| int l = 0; |
| const char *s; |
| char *p; |
| char tmp[128]; |
| |
| out->len = 0; |
| p = out->str; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) { |
| ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i); |
| n = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object); |
| if ((n == NID_undef) || ((s = OBJ_nid2sn(n)) == NULL)) { |
| i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ne->object); |
| s = tmp; |
| } |
| ln = strlen(s); |
| |
| l += 1 + ln + 1 + ne->value->length; |
| if (l > out->size) |
| return -1; |
| out->len = l; |
| |
| *(p++)='/'; |
| memcpy(p, s, ln); |
| p += ln; |
| *(p++)='='; |
| memcpy(p, ne->value->data, ne->value->length); |
| p += ne->value->length; |
| } |
| |
| if (!out->len) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| char *ssl_sock_get_version(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return (char *)SSL_get_version(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_sock_set_servername(struct connection *conn, const char *hostname) |
| { |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return; |
| |
| SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(conn->xprt_ctx, hostname); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* Extract peer certificate's common name into the chunk dest |
| * Returns |
| * the len of the extracted common name |
| * or 0 if no CN found in DN |
| * or -1 on error case (i.e. no peer certificate) |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_get_remote_common_name(struct connection *conn, struct chunk *dest) |
| { |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| const char find_cn[] = "CN"; |
| const struct chunk find_cn_chunk = { |
| .str = (char *)&find_cn, |
| .len = sizeof(find_cn)-1 |
| }; |
| int result = -1; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| goto out; |
| |
| name = X509_get_subject_name(crt); |
| if (!name) |
| goto out; |
| |
| result = ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(name, &find_cn_chunk, 1, dest); |
| out: |
| if (crt) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| /* returns 1 if client passed a certificate for this session, 0 if not */ |
| int ssl_sock_get_cert_used_sess(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| return 0; |
| |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* returns 1 if client passed a certificate for this connection, 0 if not */ |
| int ssl_sock_get_cert_used_conn(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE & conn->xprt_st ? 1 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* returns result from SSL verify */ |
| unsigned int ssl_sock_get_verify_result(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return (unsigned int)X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION; |
| |
| return (unsigned int)SSL_get_verify_result(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /***** Below are some sample fetching functions for ACL/patterns *****/ |
| |
| /* boolean, returns true if client cert was present */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_has_crt(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL; |
| smp->data.u.sint = SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE & conn->xprt_st ? 1 : 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* binary, returns a certificate in a binary chunk (der/raw). |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_der(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| int ret = 0; |
| struct chunk *smp_trash; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| |
| if (!crt) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp_trash = get_trash_chunk(); |
| if (ssl_sock_crt2der(crt, smp_trash) <= 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN; |
| ret = 1; |
| out: |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer && crt) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* binary, returns serial of certificate in a binary chunk. |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_serial(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| int ret = 0; |
| struct chunk *smp_trash; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| |
| if (!crt) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp_trash = get_trash_chunk(); |
| if (ssl_sock_get_serial(crt, smp_trash) <= 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN; |
| ret = 1; |
| out: |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer && crt) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* binary, returns the client certificate's SHA-1 fingerprint (SHA-1 hash of DER-encoded certificate) in a binary chunk. |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_sha1(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| const EVP_MD *digest; |
| int ret = 0; |
| struct chunk *smp_trash; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp_trash = get_trash_chunk(); |
| digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| X509_digest(crt, digest, (unsigned char *)smp_trash->str, (unsigned int *)&smp_trash->len); |
| |
| smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN; |
| ret = 1; |
| out: |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer && crt) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* string, returns certificate's notafter date in ASN1_UTCTIME format. |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| int ret = 0; |
| struct chunk *smp_trash; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp_trash = get_trash_chunk(); |
| if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_get_notAfter(crt), smp_trash) <= 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| ret = 1; |
| out: |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer && crt) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* string, returns a string of a formatted full dn \C=..\O=..\OU=.. \CN=.. of certificate's issuer |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_i_dn(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| int ret = 0; |
| struct chunk *smp_trash; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| goto out; |
| |
| name = X509_get_issuer_name(crt); |
| if (!name) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp_trash = get_trash_chunk(); |
| if (args && args[0].type == ARGT_STR) { |
| int pos = 1; |
| |
| if (args[1].type == ARGT_SINT) |
| pos = args[1].data.sint; |
| |
| if (ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(name, &args[0].data.str, pos, smp_trash) <= 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| else if (ssl_sock_get_dn_oneline(name, smp_trash) <= 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash; |
| ret = 1; |
| out: |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer && crt) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* string, returns notbefore date in ASN1_UTCTIME format. |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| int ret = 0; |
| struct chunk *smp_trash; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp_trash = get_trash_chunk(); |
| if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_get_notBefore(crt), smp_trash) <= 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| ret = 1; |
| out: |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer && crt) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* string, returns a string of a formatted full dn \C=..\O=..\OU=.. \CN=.. of certificate's subject |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_s_dn(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| int ret = 0; |
| struct chunk *smp_trash; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| goto out; |
| |
| name = X509_get_subject_name(crt); |
| if (!name) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp_trash = get_trash_chunk(); |
| if (args && args[0].type == ARGT_STR) { |
| int pos = 1; |
| |
| if (args[1].type == ARGT_SINT) |
| pos = args[1].data.sint; |
| |
| if (ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(name, &args[0].data.str, pos, smp_trash) <= 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| else if (ssl_sock_get_dn_oneline(name, smp_trash) <= 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash; |
| ret = 1; |
| out: |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer && crt) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* integer, returns true if current session use a client certificate */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_c_used(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| X509 *crt; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate returns a ptr on allocated X509 struct */ |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (crt) { |
| X509_free(crt); |
| } |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL; |
| smp->data.u.sint = (crt != NULL); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* integer, returns the certificate version |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_version(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.sint = (unsigned int)(1 + X509_get_version(crt)); |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* string, returns the certificate's signature algorithm. |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_sig_alg(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt; |
| int nid; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| return 0; |
| |
| nid = OBJ_obj2nid((ASN1_OBJECT *)(crt->cert_info->signature->algorithm)); |
| |
| smp->data.u.str.str = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(nid); |
| if (!smp->data.u.str.str) { |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_CONST; |
| smp->data.u.str.len = strlen(smp->data.u.str.str); |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* string, returns the certificate's key algorithm. |
| * The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate |
| * should be use. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0; |
| X509 *crt; |
| int nid; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert_peer) |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| else |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!crt) |
| return 0; |
| |
| nid = OBJ_obj2nid((ASN1_OBJECT *)(crt->cert_info->key->algor->algorithm)); |
| |
| smp->data.u.str.str = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(nid); |
| if (!smp->data.u.str.str) { |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate increase X509 * ref count */ |
| if (cert_peer) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_CONST; |
| smp->data.u.str.len = strlen(smp->data.u.str.str); |
| if (cert_peer) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* boolean, returns true if front conn. transport layer is SSL. |
| * This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th |
| * char is 'b'. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0; |
| struct connection *conn = objt_conn(smp->strm->si[back_conn].end); |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL; |
| smp->data.u.sint = (conn && conn->xprt == &ssl_sock); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* boolean, returns true if client present a SNI */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_has_sni(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| struct connection *conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL; |
| smp->data.u.sint = (conn && conn->xprt == &ssl_sock) && |
| conn->xprt_ctx && |
| SSL_get_servername(conn->xprt_ctx, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) != NULL; |
| return 1; |
| #else |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* boolean, returns true if client session has been resumed */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_is_resumed(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL; |
| smp->data.u.sint = (conn && conn->xprt == &ssl_sock) && |
| conn->xprt_ctx && |
| SSL_session_reused(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* string, returns the used cipher if front conn. transport layer is SSL. |
| * This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th |
| * char is 'b'. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->strm->si[back_conn].end); |
| if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str.str = (char *)SSL_get_cipher_name(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!smp->data.u.str.str) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_CONST; |
| smp->data.u.str.len = strlen(smp->data.u.str.str); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* integer, returns the algoritm's keysize if front conn. transport layer |
| * is SSL. |
| * This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th |
| * char is 'b'. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| int sint; |
| |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->strm->si[back_conn].end); |
| if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!SSL_get_cipher_bits(conn->xprt_ctx, &sint)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.sint = sint; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* integer, returns the used keysize if front conn. transport layer is SSL. |
| * This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th |
| * char is 'b'. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_use_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->strm->si[back_conn].end); |
| if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.sint = (unsigned int)SSL_get_cipher_bits(conn->xprt_ctx, NULL); |
| if (!smp->data.u.sint) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_npn(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str.str = NULL; |
| SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(conn->xprt_ctx, |
| (const unsigned char **)&smp->data.u.str.str, (unsigned *)&smp->data.u.str.len); |
| |
| if (!smp->data.u.str.str) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alpn(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str.str = NULL; |
| SSL_get0_alpn_selected(conn->xprt_ctx, |
| (const unsigned char **)&smp->data.u.str.str, (unsigned *)&smp->data.u.str.len); |
| |
| if (!smp->data.u.str.str) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* string, returns the used protocol if front conn. transport layer is SSL. |
| * This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th |
| * char is 'b'. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_protocol(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->strm->si[back_conn].end); |
| if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str.str = (char *)SSL_get_version(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!smp->data.u.str.str) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST; |
| smp->data.u.str.len = strlen(smp->data.u.str.str); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* binary, returns the SSL stream id if front conn. transport layer is SSL. |
| * This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th |
| * char is 'b'. |
| */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL |
| int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0; |
| SSL_SESSION *ssl_sess; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->strm->si[back_conn].end); |
| if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ssl_sess = SSL_get_session(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| if (!ssl_sess) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str.str = (char *)SSL_SESSION_get_id(ssl_sess, (unsigned int *)&smp->data.u.str.len); |
| if (!smp->data.u.str.str || !smp->data.u.str.len) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| #else |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_sni(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str.str = (char *)SSL_get_servername(conn->xprt_ctx, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); |
| if (!smp->data.u.str.str) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.u.str.len = strlen(smp->data.u.str.str); |
| return 1; |
| #else |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_fc_unique_id(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL |
| int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| int finished_len; |
| struct chunk *finished_trash; |
| |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->strm->si[back_conn].end); |
| if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| finished_trash = get_trash_chunk(); |
| if (!SSL_session_reused(conn->xprt_ctx)) |
| finished_len = SSL_get_peer_finished(conn->xprt_ctx, finished_trash->str, finished_trash->size); |
| else |
| finished_len = SSL_get_finished(conn->xprt_ctx, finished_trash->str, finished_trash->size); |
| |
| if (!finished_len) |
| return 0; |
| |
| finished_trash->len = finished_len; |
| smp->data.u.str = *finished_trash; |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN; |
| |
| return 1; |
| #else |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* integer, returns the first verify error in CA chain of client certificate chain. */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_c_ca_err(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; |
| smp->data.u.sint = (unsigned long long int)SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CA_ERROR(conn->xprt_st); |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* integer, returns the depth of the first verify error in CA chain of client certificate chain. */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_c_ca_err_depth(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; |
| smp->data.u.sint = (long long int)SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CAEDEPTH(conn->xprt_st); |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* integer, returns the first verify error on client certificate */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_c_err(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; |
| smp->data.u.sint = (long long int)SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CRTERROR(conn->xprt_st); |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* integer, returns the verify result on client cert */ |
| static int |
| smp_fetch_ssl_c_verify(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin); |
| if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) { |
| smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!conn->xprt_ctx) |
| return 0; |
| |
| smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT; |
| smp->data.u.sint = (long long int)SSL_get_verify_result(conn->xprt_ctx); |
| smp->flags = 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "ca-file" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_ca_file(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CAfile path", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((*args[cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.ca_base) |
| memprintf(&conf->ca_file, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| else |
| memprintf(&conf->ca_file, "%s", args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "ca-sign-file" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_ca_sign_file(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CAfile path", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((*args[cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.ca_base) |
| memprintf(&conf->ca_sign_file, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| else |
| memprintf(&conf->ca_sign_file, "%s", args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the ca-sign-pass bind keyword */ |
| |
| static int bind_parse_ca_sign_pass(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CAkey password", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| memprintf(&conf->ca_sign_pass, "%s", args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "ciphers" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_ciphers(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing cipher suite", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| free(conf->ciphers); |
| conf->ciphers = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "crt" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_crt(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| char path[MAXPATHLEN]; |
| |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing certificate location", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((*args[cur_arg + 1] != '/' ) && global.crt_base) { |
| if ((strlen(global.crt_base) + 1 + strlen(args[cur_arg + 1]) + 1) > MAXPATHLEN) { |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : path too long", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", global.crt_base, args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| if (ssl_sock_load_cert(path, conf, px, err) > 0) |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl_sock_load_cert(args[cur_arg + 1], conf, px, err) > 0) |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "crt-list" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_crt_list(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing certificate location", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl_sock_load_cert_list_file(args[cur_arg + 1], conf, px, err) > 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : %s", args[cur_arg], *err); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "crl-file" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_crl_file(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| #ifndef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support CRL verify", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #else |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CRLfile path", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((*args[cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.ca_base) |
| memprintf(&conf->crl_file, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| else |
| memprintf(&conf->crl_file, "%s", args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "ecdhe" bind keyword keywords */ |
| static int bind_parse_ecdhe(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090800fL |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (too old)", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #elif defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (disabled via OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #else |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing named curve", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| conf->ecdhe = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "crt_ignerr" and "ca_ignerr" bind keywords */ |
| static int bind_parse_ignore_err(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| int code; |
| char *p = args[cur_arg + 1]; |
| unsigned long long *ignerr = &conf->crt_ignerr; |
| |
| if (!*p) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing error IDs list", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(args[cur_arg], "ca-ignore-err") == 0) |
| ignerr = &conf->ca_ignerr; |
| |
| if (strcmp(p, "all") == 0) { |
| *ignerr = ~0ULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| while (p) { |
| code = atoi(p); |
| if ((code <= 0) || (code > 63)) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : ID '%d' out of range (1..63) in error IDs list '%s'", |
| args[cur_arg], code, args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| *ignerr |= 1ULL << code; |
| p = strchr(p, ','); |
| if (p) |
| p++; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "force-sslv3" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_force_sslv3(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "force-tlsv10" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_force_tlsv10(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "force-tlsv11" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_force_tlsv11(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 |
| conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11; |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support protocol TLSv1.1", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "force-tlsv12" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_force_tlsv12(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 |
| conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12; |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support protocol TLSv1.2", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* parse the "no-tls-tickets" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_no_tls_tickets(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* parse the "no-sslv3" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_no_sslv3(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "no-tlsv10" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_no_tlsv10(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "no-tlsv11" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_no_tlsv11(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "no-tlsv12" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_no_tlsv12(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "npn" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_npn(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED |
| char *p1, *p2; |
| |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing the comma-delimited NPN protocol suite", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| free(conf->npn_str); |
| |
| /* the NPN string is built as a suite of (<len> <name>)* */ |
| conf->npn_len = strlen(args[cur_arg + 1]) + 1; |
| conf->npn_str = calloc(1, conf->npn_len); |
| memcpy(conf->npn_str + 1, args[cur_arg + 1], conf->npn_len); |
| |
| /* replace commas with the name length */ |
| p1 = conf->npn_str; |
| p2 = p1 + 1; |
| while (1) { |
| p2 = memchr(p1 + 1, ',', conf->npn_str + conf->npn_len - (p1 + 1)); |
| if (!p2) |
| p2 = p1 + 1 + strlen(p1 + 1); |
| |
| if (p2 - (p1 + 1) > 255) { |
| *p2 = '\0'; |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : NPN protocol name too long : '%s'", args[cur_arg], p1 + 1); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| *p1 = p2 - (p1 + 1); |
| p1 = p2; |
| |
| if (!*p2) |
| break; |
| |
| *(p2++) = '\0'; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support TLS NPN extension", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "alpn" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_alpn(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| char *p1, *p2; |
| |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing the comma-delimited ALPN protocol suite", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| free(conf->alpn_str); |
| |
| /* the ALPN string is built as a suite of (<len> <name>)* */ |
| conf->alpn_len = strlen(args[cur_arg + 1]) + 1; |
| conf->alpn_str = calloc(1, conf->alpn_len); |
| memcpy(conf->alpn_str + 1, args[cur_arg + 1], conf->alpn_len); |
| |
| /* replace commas with the name length */ |
| p1 = conf->alpn_str; |
| p2 = p1 + 1; |
| while (1) { |
| p2 = memchr(p1 + 1, ',', conf->alpn_str + conf->alpn_len - (p1 + 1)); |
| if (!p2) |
| p2 = p1 + 1 + strlen(p1 + 1); |
| |
| if (p2 - (p1 + 1) > 255) { |
| *p2 = '\0'; |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : ALPN protocol name too long : '%s'", args[cur_arg], p1 + 1); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| *p1 = p2 - (p1 + 1); |
| p1 = p2; |
| |
| if (!*p2) |
| break; |
| |
| *(p2++) = '\0'; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support TLS ALPN extension", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "ssl" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_ssl(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| struct listener *l; |
| |
| conf->is_ssl = 1; |
| |
| if (global.listen_default_ciphers && !conf->ciphers) |
| conf->ciphers = strdup(global.listen_default_ciphers); |
| conf->ssl_options |= global.listen_default_ssloptions; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(l, &conf->listeners, by_bind) |
| l->xprt = &ssl_sock; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "generate-certificates" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_generate_certs(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| conf->generate_certs = 1; |
| #else |
| memprintf(err, "%sthis version of openssl cannot generate SSL certificates.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| #endif |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "strict-sni" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_strict_sni(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| conf->strict_sni = 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "tls-ticket-keys" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| FILE *f; |
| int i = 0; |
| char thisline[LINESIZE]; |
| struct tls_keys_ref *keys_ref; |
| |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing TLS ticket keys file path", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| keys_ref = tlskeys_ref_lookup(args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| if(keys_ref) { |
| conf->keys_ref = keys_ref; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| keys_ref = malloc(sizeof(struct tls_keys_ref)); |
| keys_ref->tlskeys = malloc(TLS_TICKETS_NO * sizeof(struct tls_sess_key)); |
| |
| if ((f = fopen(args[cur_arg + 1], "r")) == NULL) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : unable to load ssl tickets keys file", args[cur_arg+1]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| keys_ref->filename = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| |
| while (fgets(thisline, sizeof(thisline), f) != NULL) { |
| int len = strlen(thisline); |
| /* Strip newline characters from the end */ |
| if(thisline[len - 1] == '\n') |
| thisline[--len] = 0; |
| |
| if(thisline[len - 1] == '\r') |
| thisline[--len] = 0; |
| |
| if (base64dec(thisline, len, (char *) (keys_ref->tlskeys + i % TLS_TICKETS_NO), sizeof(struct tls_sess_key)) != sizeof(struct tls_sess_key)) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : unable to decode base64 key on line %d", args[cur_arg+1], i + 1); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| i++; |
| } |
| |
| if (i < TLS_TICKETS_NO) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : please supply at least %d keys in the tls-tickets-file", args[cur_arg+1], TLS_TICKETS_NO); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| fclose(f); |
| |
| /* Use penultimate key for encryption, handle when TLS_TICKETS_NO = 1 */ |
| i-=2; |
| keys_ref->tls_ticket_enc_index = i < 0 ? 0 : i; |
| keys_ref->unique_id = -1; |
| conf->keys_ref = keys_ref; |
| |
| LIST_ADD(&tlskeys_reference, &keys_ref->list); |
| |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : TLS ticket callback extension not supported", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB */ |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "verify" bind keyword */ |
| static int bind_parse_verify(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing verify method", args[cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "none") == 0) |
| conf->verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE; |
| else if (strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "optional") == 0) |
| conf->verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_OPTIONAL; |
| else if (strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "required") == 0) |
| conf->verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED; |
| else { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : unknown verify method '%s', only 'none', 'optional', and 'required' are supported\n", |
| args[cur_arg], args[cur_arg + 1]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /************** "server" keywords ****************/ |
| |
| /* parse the "ca-file" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_ca_file(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CAfile path", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((*args[*cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.ca_base) |
| memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.ca_file, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]); |
| else |
| memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.ca_file, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "check-ssl" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_check_ssl(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->check.use_ssl = 1; |
| if (global.connect_default_ciphers && !newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers) |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers = strdup(global.connect_default_ciphers); |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= global.connect_default_ssloptions; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "ciphers" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_ciphers(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) { |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing cipher suite", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| free(newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers); |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers = strdup(args[*cur_arg + 1]); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "crl-file" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_crl_file(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| #ifndef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support CRL verify", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #else |
| if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CRLfile path", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((*args[*cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.ca_base) |
| memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.crl_file, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]); |
| else |
| memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.crl_file, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]); |
| |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "crt" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_crt(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing certificate file path", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((*args[*cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.crt_base) |
| memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]); |
| else |
| memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "force-sslv3" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_force_sslv3(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "force-tlsv10" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_force_tlsv10(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "force-tlsv11" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_force_tlsv11(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11; |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support protocol TLSv1.1", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "force-tlsv12" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_force_tlsv12(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12; |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support protocol TLSv1.2", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "no-ssl-reuse" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_no_ssl_reuse(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_REUSE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "no-sslv3" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_no_sslv3(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "no-tlsv10" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_no_tlsv10(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "no-tlsv11" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_no_tlsv11(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "no-tlsv12" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_no_tlsv12(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "no-tls-tickets" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_no_tls_tickets(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* parse the "send-proxy-v2-ssl" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_send_proxy_ssl(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2; |
| newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2_SSL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "send-proxy-v2-ssl-cn" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_send_proxy_cn(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2; |
| newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2_SSL; |
| newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2_SSL_CN; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "sni" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_sni(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| #ifndef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : the current SSL library doesn't support the SNI TLS extension", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| #else |
| struct sample_expr *expr; |
| |
| if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) { |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing sni expression", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| (*cur_arg)++; |
| proxy->conf.args.ctx = ARGC_SRV; |
| |
| expr = sample_parse_expr((char **)args, cur_arg, px->conf.file, px->conf.line, err, &proxy->conf.args); |
| if (!expr) { |
| memprintf(err, "error detected while parsing sni expression : %s", *err); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(expr->fetch->val & SMP_VAL_BE_SRV_CON)) { |
| memprintf(err, "error detected while parsing sni expression : " |
| " fetch method '%s' extracts information from '%s', none of which is available here.\n", |
| args[*cur_arg-1], sample_src_names(expr->fetch->use)); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| px->http_needed |= !!(expr->fetch->use & SMP_USE_HTTP_ANY); |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.sni = expr; |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "ssl" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_ssl(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| newsrv->use_ssl = 1; |
| if (global.connect_default_ciphers && !newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers) |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers = strdup(global.connect_default_ciphers); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "verify" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_verify(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing verify method", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(args[*cur_arg + 1], "none") == 0) |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE; |
| else if (strcmp(args[*cur_arg + 1], "required") == 0) |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED; |
| else { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : unknown verify method '%s', only 'none' and 'required' are supported\n", |
| args[*cur_arg], args[*cur_arg + 1]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "verifyhost" server keyword */ |
| static int srv_parse_verifyhost(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) |
| { |
| if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) { |
| if (err) |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing hostname to verify against", args[*cur_arg]); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| newsrv->ssl_ctx.verify_host = strdup(args[*cur_arg + 1]); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "ssl-default-bind-options" keyword in global section */ |
| static int ssl_parse_default_bind_options(char **args, int section_type, struct proxy *curpx, |
| struct proxy *defpx, const char *file, int line, |
| char **err) { |
| int i = 1; |
| |
| if (*(args[i]) == 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "global statement '%s' expects an option as an argument.", args[0]); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| while (*(args[i])) { |
| if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-sslv3")) |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions |= BC_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-tlsv10")) |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-tlsv11")) |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-tlsv12")) |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "force-sslv3")) |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions |= BC_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "force-tlsv10")) |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions |= BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "force-tlsv11")) { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions |= BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11; |
| #else |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' '%s': library does not support protocol TLSv1.1", args[0], args[i]); |
| return -1; |
| #endif |
| } |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "force-tlsv12")) { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions |= BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12; |
| #else |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' '%s': library does not support protocol TLSv1.2", args[0], args[i]); |
| return -1; |
| #endif |
| } |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-tls-tickets")) |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS; |
| else { |
| memprintf(err, "unknown option '%s' on global statement '%s'.", args[i], args[0]); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| i++; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* parse the "ssl-default-server-options" keyword in global section */ |
| static int ssl_parse_default_server_options(char **args, int section_type, struct proxy *curpx, |
| struct proxy *defpx, const char *file, int line, |
| char **err) { |
| int i = 1; |
| |
| if (*(args[i]) == 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "global statement '%s' expects an option as an argument.", args[0]); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| while (*(args[i])) { |
| if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-sslv3")) |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-tlsv10")) |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-tlsv11")) |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-tlsv12")) |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "force-sslv3")) |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "force-tlsv10")) |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10; |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "force-tlsv11")) { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11; |
| #else |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' '%s': library does not support protocol TLSv1.1", args[0], args[i]); |
| return -1; |
| #endif |
| } |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "force-tlsv12")) { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12; |
| #else |
| memprintf(err, "'%s' '%s': library does not support protocol TLSv1.2", args[0], args[i]); |
| return -1; |
| #endif |
| } |
| else if (!strcmp(args[i], "no-tls-tickets")) |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS; |
| else { |
| memprintf(err, "unknown option '%s' on global statement '%s'.", args[i], args[0]); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| i++; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten. |
| * Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted. |
| */ |
| static struct sample_fetch_kw_list sample_fetch_keywords = {ILH, { |
| { "ssl_bc", smp_fetch_ssl_fc, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5SRV }, |
| { "ssl_bc_alg_keysize", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5SRV }, |
| { "ssl_bc_cipher", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5SRV }, |
| { "ssl_bc_protocol", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_protocol, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5SRV }, |
| { "ssl_bc_unique_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_unique_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5SRV }, |
| { "ssl_bc_use_keysize", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_use_keysize, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5SRV }, |
| { "ssl_bc_session_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5SRV }, |
| { "ssl_c_ca_err", smp_fetch_ssl_c_ca_err, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_ca_err_depth", smp_fetch_ssl_c_ca_err_depth, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_der", smp_fetch_ssl_x_der, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_err", smp_fetch_ssl_c_err, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_i_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_x_i_dn, ARG2(0,STR,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_key_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_notafter", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_notbefore", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_sig_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_sig_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_s_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_x_s_dn, ARG2(0,STR,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_serial", smp_fetch_ssl_x_serial, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_sha1", smp_fetch_ssl_x_sha1, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_used", smp_fetch_ssl_c_used, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_verify", smp_fetch_ssl_c_verify, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_c_version", smp_fetch_ssl_x_version, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_der", smp_fetch_ssl_x_der, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_i_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_x_i_dn, ARG2(0,STR,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_key_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_notafter", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_notbefore", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_sig_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_sig_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_s_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_x_s_dn, ARG2(0,STR,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_serial", smp_fetch_ssl_x_serial, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_sha1", smp_fetch_ssl_x_sha1, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_f_version", smp_fetch_ssl_x_version, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc", smp_fetch_ssl_fc, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc_alg_keysize", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc_cipher", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc_has_crt", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_has_crt, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc_has_sni", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_has_sni, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc_is_resumed", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_is_resumed, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED |
| { "ssl_fc_npn", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_npn, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| #endif |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| { "ssl_fc_alpn", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alpn, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| #endif |
| { "ssl_fc_protocol", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_protocol, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc_unique_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_unique_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc_use_keysize", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_use_keysize, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc_session_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { "ssl_fc_sni", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_sni, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI }, |
| { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0 }, |
| }}; |
| |
| /* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten. |
| * Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted. |
| */ |
| static struct acl_kw_list acl_kws = {ILH, { |
| { "ssl_fc_sni_end", "ssl_fc_sni", PAT_MATCH_END }, |
| { "ssl_fc_sni_reg", "ssl_fc_sni", PAT_MATCH_REG }, |
| { /* END */ }, |
| }}; |
| |
| /* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten. |
| * Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted, doing so helps |
| * all code contributors. |
| * Optional keywords are also declared with a NULL ->parse() function so that |
| * the config parser can report an appropriate error when a known keyword was |
| * not enabled. |
| */ |
| static struct bind_kw_list bind_kws = { "SSL", { }, { |
| { "alpn", bind_parse_alpn, 1 }, /* set ALPN supported protocols */ |
| { "ca-file", bind_parse_ca_file, 1 }, /* set CAfile to process verify on client cert */ |
| { "ca-ignore-err", bind_parse_ignore_err, 1 }, /* set error IDs to ignore on verify depth > 0 */ |
| { "ca-sign-file", bind_parse_ca_sign_file, 1 }, /* set CAFile used to generate and sign server certs */ |
| { "ca-sign-pass", bind_parse_ca_sign_pass, 1 }, /* set CAKey passphrase */ |
| { "ciphers", bind_parse_ciphers, 1 }, /* set SSL cipher suite */ |
| { "crl-file", bind_parse_crl_file, 1 }, /* set certificat revocation list file use on client cert verify */ |
| { "crt", bind_parse_crt, 1 }, /* load SSL certificates from this location */ |
| { "crt-ignore-err", bind_parse_ignore_err, 1 }, /* set error IDs to ingore on verify depth == 0 */ |
| { "crt-list", bind_parse_crt_list, 1 }, /* load a list of crt from this location */ |
| { "ecdhe", bind_parse_ecdhe, 1 }, /* defines named curve for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman */ |
| { "force-sslv3", bind_parse_force_sslv3, 0 }, /* force SSLv3 */ |
| { "force-tlsv10", bind_parse_force_tlsv10, 0 }, /* force TLSv10 */ |
| { "force-tlsv11", bind_parse_force_tlsv11, 0 }, /* force TLSv11 */ |
| { "force-tlsv12", bind_parse_force_tlsv12, 0 }, /* force TLSv12 */ |
| { "generate-certificates", bind_parse_generate_certs, 0 }, /* enable the server certificates generation */ |
| { "no-sslv3", bind_parse_no_sslv3, 0 }, /* disable SSLv3 */ |
| { "no-tlsv10", bind_parse_no_tlsv10, 0 }, /* disable TLSv10 */ |
| { "no-tlsv11", bind_parse_no_tlsv11, 0 }, /* disable TLSv11 */ |
| { "no-tlsv12", bind_parse_no_tlsv12, 0 }, /* disable TLSv12 */ |
| { "no-tls-tickets", bind_parse_no_tls_tickets, 0 }, /* disable session resumption tickets */ |
| { "ssl", bind_parse_ssl, 0 }, /* enable SSL processing */ |
| { "strict-sni", bind_parse_strict_sni, 0 }, /* refuse negotiation if sni doesn't match a certificate */ |
| { "tls-ticket-keys", bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys, 1 }, /* set file to load TLS ticket keys from */ |
| { "verify", bind_parse_verify, 1 }, /* set SSL verify method */ |
| { "npn", bind_parse_npn, 1 }, /* set NPN supported protocols */ |
| { NULL, NULL, 0 }, |
| }}; |
| |
| /* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten. |
| * Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted, doing so helps |
| * all code contributors. |
| * Optional keywords are also declared with a NULL ->parse() function so that |
| * the config parser can report an appropriate error when a known keyword was |
| * not enabled. |
| */ |
| static struct srv_kw_list srv_kws = { "SSL", { }, { |
| { "ca-file", srv_parse_ca_file, 1, 0 }, /* set CAfile to process verify server cert */ |
| { "check-ssl", srv_parse_check_ssl, 0, 0 }, /* enable SSL for health checks */ |
| { "ciphers", srv_parse_ciphers, 1, 0 }, /* select the cipher suite */ |
| { "crl-file", srv_parse_crl_file, 1, 0 }, /* set certificate revocation list file use on server cert verify */ |
| { "crt", srv_parse_crt, 1, 0 }, /* set client certificate */ |
| { "force-sslv3", srv_parse_force_sslv3, 0, 0 }, /* force SSLv3 */ |
| { "force-tlsv10", srv_parse_force_tlsv10, 0, 0 }, /* force TLSv10 */ |
| { "force-tlsv11", srv_parse_force_tlsv11, 0, 0 }, /* force TLSv11 */ |
| { "force-tlsv12", srv_parse_force_tlsv12, 0, 0 }, /* force TLSv12 */ |
| { "no-ssl-reuse", srv_parse_no_ssl_reuse, 0, 0 }, /* disable session reuse */ |
| { "no-sslv3", srv_parse_no_sslv3, 0, 0 }, /* disable SSLv3 */ |
| { "no-tlsv10", srv_parse_no_tlsv10, 0, 0 }, /* disable TLSv10 */ |
| { "no-tlsv11", srv_parse_no_tlsv11, 0, 0 }, /* disable TLSv11 */ |
| { "no-tlsv12", srv_parse_no_tlsv12, 0, 0 }, /* disable TLSv12 */ |
| { "no-tls-tickets", srv_parse_no_tls_tickets, 0, 0 }, /* disable session resumption tickets */ |
| { "send-proxy-v2-ssl", srv_parse_send_proxy_ssl, 0, 0 }, /* send PROXY protocol header v2 with SSL info */ |
| { "send-proxy-v2-ssl-cn", srv_parse_send_proxy_cn, 0, 0 }, /* send PROXY protocol header v2 with CN */ |
| { "sni", srv_parse_sni, 1, 0 }, /* send SNI extension */ |
| { "ssl", srv_parse_ssl, 0, 0 }, /* enable SSL processing */ |
| { "verify", srv_parse_verify, 1, 0 }, /* set SSL verify method */ |
| { "verifyhost", srv_parse_verifyhost, 1, 0 }, /* require that SSL cert verifies for hostname */ |
| { NULL, NULL, 0, 0 }, |
| }}; |
| |
| static struct cfg_kw_list cfg_kws = {ILH, { |
| { CFG_GLOBAL, "ssl-default-bind-options", ssl_parse_default_bind_options }, |
| { CFG_GLOBAL, "ssl-default-server-options", ssl_parse_default_server_options }, |
| { 0, NULL, NULL }, |
| }}; |
| |
| /* transport-layer operations for SSL sockets */ |
| struct xprt_ops ssl_sock = { |
| .snd_buf = ssl_sock_from_buf, |
| .rcv_buf = ssl_sock_to_buf, |
| .rcv_pipe = NULL, |
| .snd_pipe = NULL, |
| .shutr = NULL, |
| .shutw = ssl_sock_shutw, |
| .close = ssl_sock_close, |
| .init = ssl_sock_init, |
| }; |
| |
| #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) |
| |
| static void ssl_sock_sctl_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) |
| { |
| if (ptr) { |
| chunk_destroy(ptr); |
| free(ptr); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| __attribute__((constructor)) |
| static void __ssl_sock_init(void) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)* cm; |
| |
| #ifdef LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS |
| global.listen_default_ciphers = LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS; |
| #endif |
| #ifdef CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS |
| global.connect_default_ciphers = CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS; |
| #endif |
| if (global.listen_default_ciphers) |
| global.listen_default_ciphers = strdup(global.listen_default_ciphers); |
| if (global.connect_default_ciphers) |
| global.connect_default_ciphers = strdup(global.connect_default_ciphers); |
| global.listen_default_ssloptions = BC_SSL_O_NONE; |
| global.connect_default_ssloptions = SRV_SSL_O_NONE; |
| |
| SSL_library_init(); |
| cm = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); |
| sk_SSL_COMP_zero(cm); |
| #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) |
| sctl_ex_index = SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_sctl_free_func); |
| #endif |
| sample_register_fetches(&sample_fetch_keywords); |
| acl_register_keywords(&acl_kws); |
| bind_register_keywords(&bind_kws); |
| srv_register_keywords(&srv_kws); |
| cfg_register_keywords(&cfg_kws); |
| |
| global.ssl_session_max_cost = SSL_SESSION_MAX_COST; |
| global.ssl_handshake_max_cost = SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAX_COST; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| ssl_dh_ptr_index = SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| __attribute__((destructor)) |
| static void __ssl_sock_deinit(void) |
| { |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| lru64_destroy(ssl_ctx_lru_tree); |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (local_dh_1024) { |
| DH_free(local_dh_1024); |
| local_dh_1024 = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (local_dh_2048) { |
| DH_free(local_dh_2048); |
| local_dh_2048 = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (local_dh_4096) { |
| DH_free(local_dh_4096); |
| local_dh_4096 = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (global_dh) { |
| DH_free(global_dh); |
| global_dh = NULL; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| ERR_remove_state(0); |
| ERR_free_strings(); |
| |
| EVP_cleanup(); |
| |
| #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L |
| CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Local variables: |
| * c-indent-level: 8 |
| * c-basic-offset: 8 |
| * End: |
| */ |