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git01.mediatek.com / haproxy / 7bb21532f4d116c38f54bf81112133f57a2d3042 / . / src / ssl_sock.c
blob: fd0b41fd60867963f8974dc6d4517019099b609b [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* SSL/TLS transport layer over SOCK_STREAM sockets
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 EXCELIANCE, Emeric Brun <ebrun@exceliance.fr>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* Acknowledgement:
* We'd like to specially thank the Stud project authors for a very clean
* and well documented code which helped us understand how the OpenSSL API
* ought to be used in non-blocking mode. This is one difficult part which
* is not easy to get from the OpenSSL doc, and reading the Stud code made
* it much more obvious than the examples in the OpenSSL package. Keep up
* the good works, guys !
*
* Stud is an extremely efficient and scalable SSL/TLS proxy which combines
* particularly well with haproxy. For more info about this project, visit :
* https://github.com/bumptech/stud
*
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <ctype.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <common/buffer.h>
#include <common/compat.h>
#include <common/config.h>
#include <common/debug.h>
#include <common/errors.h>
#include <common/standard.h>
#include <common/ticks.h>
#include <common/time.h>
#include <ebsttree.h>
#include <types/global.h>
#include <types/ssl_sock.h>
#include <proto/acl.h>
#include <proto/arg.h>
#include <proto/connection.h>
#include <proto/fd.h>
#include <proto/freq_ctr.h>
#include <proto/frontend.h>
#include <proto/listener.h>
#include <proto/pattern.h>
#include <proto/server.h>
#include <proto/log.h>
#include <proto/proxy.h>
#include <proto/shctx.h>
#include <proto/ssl_sock.h>
#include <proto/task.h>
/* Warning, these are bits, not integers! */
#define SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE 0x00000001
#define SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE 0x00000002
#define SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED 0x00000004
#define SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT 0x00000008
/* bits 0xFFFF0000 are reserved to store verify errors */
/* Verify errors macros */
#define SSL_SOCK_CA_ERROR_TO_ST(e) (((e > 63) ? 63 : e) << (16))
#define SSL_SOCK_CAEDEPTH_TO_ST(d) (((d > 15) ? 15 : d) << (6+16))
#define SSL_SOCK_CRTERROR_TO_ST(e) (((e > 63) ? 63 : e) << (4+6+16))
#define SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CA_ERROR(s) ((s >> (16)) & 63)
#define SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CAEDEPTH(s) ((s >> (6+16)) & 15)
#define SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CRTERROR(s) ((s >> (4+6+16)) & 63)
/* server and bind verify method, it uses a global value as default */
enum {
SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_DEFAULT = 0,
SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED = 1,
SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_OPTIONAL = 2,
SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE = 3,
};
int sslconns = 0;
int totalsslconns = 0;
void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
{
struct connection *conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
(void)ret; /* shut gcc stupid warning */
BIO *write_bio;
if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
/* Disable renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) */
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED) {
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_RENEG;
}
}
if ((where & SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) == SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) {
if (!(conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE)) {
/* Long certificate chains optimz
If write and read bios are differents, we
consider that the buffering was activated,
so we rise the output buffer size from 4k
to 16k */
write_bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
if (write_bio != SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) {
BIO_set_write_buffer_size(write_bio, 16384);
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE;
}
}
}
}
/* Callback is called for each certificate of the chain during a verify
ok is set to 1 if preverify detect no error on current certificate.
Returns 0 to break the handshake, 1 otherwise. */
int ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x_store)
{
SSL *ssl;
struct connection *conn;
int err, depth;
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(x_store, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE;
if (ok) /* no errors */
return ok;
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x_store);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x_store);
/* check if CA error needs to be ignored */
if (depth > 0) {
if (!SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CA_ERROR(conn->xprt_st)) {
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CA_ERROR_TO_ST(err);
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CAEDEPTH_TO_ST(depth);
}
if (objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->ca_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) {
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
}
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_CA_FAIL;
return 0;
}
if (!SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CRTERROR(conn->xprt_st))
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CRTERROR_TO_ST(err);
/* check if certificate error needs to be ignored */
if (objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->crt_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) {
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
}
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_CRT_FAIL;
return 0;
}
/* Callback is called for ssl protocol analyse */
void ssl_sock_msgcbk(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
{
#ifdef TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
/* test heartbeat received (write_p is set to 0
for a received record) */
if ((content_type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) && (write_p == 0)) {
struct connection *conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
const unsigned char *p = buf;
unsigned int payload;
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT;
/* Check if this is a CVE-2014-0160 exploitation attempt. */
if (*p != TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
return;
if (len < 1 + 2 + 16) /* 1 type + 2 size + 0 payload + 16 padding */
goto kill_it;
payload = (p[1] * 256) + p[2];
if (3 + payload + 16 <= len)
return; /* OK no problem */
kill_it:
/* We have a clear heartbleed attack (CVE-2014-0160), the
* advertised payload is larger than the advertised packet
* length, so we have garbage in the buffer between the
* payload and the end of the buffer (p+len). We can't know
* if the SSL stack is patched, and we don't know if we can
* safely wipe out the area between p+3+len and payload.
* So instead, we prevent the response from being sent by
* setting the max_send_fragment to 0 and we report an SSL
* error, which will kill this connection. It will be reported
* above as SSL_ERROR_SSL while an other handshake failure with
* a heartbeat message will be reported as SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL.
*/
ssl->max_send_fragment = 0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return;
}
#endif
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
/* This callback is used so that the server advertises the list of
* negociable protocols for NPN.
*/
static int ssl_sock_advertise_npn_protos(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *len, void *arg)
{
struct bind_conf *conf = arg;
*data = (const unsigned char *)conf->npn_str;
*len = conf->npn_len;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
/* This callback is used so that the server advertises the list of
* negociable protocols for ALPN.
*/
static int ssl_sock_advertise_alpn_protos(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *server,
unsigned int server_len, void *arg)
{
struct bind_conf *conf = arg;
if (SSL_select_next_proto((unsigned char**) out, outlen, (const unsigned char *)conf->alpn_str,
conf->alpn_len, server, server_len) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
}
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
#endif
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
/* Sets the SSL ctx of <ssl> to match the advertised server name. Returns a
* warning when no match is found, which implies the default (first) cert
* will keep being used.
*/
static int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, struct bind_conf *s)
{
const char *servername;
const char *wildp = NULL;
struct ebmb_node *node, *n;
int i;
(void)al; /* shut gcc stupid warning */
servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
if (!servername) {
return (s->strict_sni ?
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL :
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK);
}
for (i = 0; i < trash.size; i++) {
if (!servername[i])
break;
trash.str[i] = tolower(servername[i]);
if (!wildp && (trash.str[i] == '.'))
wildp = &trash.str[i];
}
trash.str[i] = 0;
/* lookup in full qualified names */
node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_ctx, trash.str);
/* lookup a not neg filter */
for (n = node; n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) {
if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) {
node = n;
break;
}
}
if (!node && wildp) {
/* lookup in wildcards names */
node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_w_ctx, wildp);
}
if (!node || container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) {
return (s->strict_sni ?
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL :
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING);
}
/* switch ctx */
SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx);
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
#endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/* Loads Diffie-Hellman parameter from a file. Returns 1 if loaded, else -1
if an error occured, and 0 if parameter not found. */
int ssl_sock_load_dh_params(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
{
int ret = -1;
BIO *in;
DH *dh = NULL;
/* If not present, use parameters generated using 'openssl dhparam 1024 -C':
* -----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
* MIGHAoGBAJJAJDXDoS5E03MNjnjK36eOL1tRqVa/9NuOVlI+lpXmPjJQbP65EvKn
* fSLnG7VMhoCJO4KtG88zf393ltP7loGB2bofcDSr+x+XsxBM8yA/Zj6BmQt+CQ9s
* TF7hoOV+wXTT6ErZ5y5qx9pq6hLfKXwTGFT78hrE6HnCO7xgtPdTAgEC
* -----END DH PARAMETERS-----
*/
static const unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
0x92, 0x40, 0x24, 0x35, 0xC3, 0xA1, 0x2E, 0x44, 0xD3, 0x73, 0x0D, 0x8E,
0x78, 0xCA, 0xDF, 0xA7, 0x8E, 0x2F, 0x5B, 0x51, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xBF, 0xF4,
0xDB, 0x8E, 0x56, 0x52, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x95, 0xE6, 0x3E, 0x32, 0x50, 0x6C,
0xFE, 0xB9, 0x12, 0xF2, 0xA7, 0x7D, 0x22, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x4C, 0x86,
0x80, 0x89, 0x3B, 0x82, 0xAD, 0x1B, 0xCF, 0x33, 0x7F, 0x7F, 0x77, 0x96,
0xD3, 0xFB, 0x96, 0x81, 0x81, 0xD9, 0xBA, 0x1F, 0x70, 0x34, 0xAB, 0xFB,
0x1F, 0x97, 0xB3, 0x10, 0x4C, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x3F, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x81, 0x99,
0x0B, 0x7E, 0x09, 0x0F, 0x6C, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0xE1, 0xA0, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xC1,
0x74, 0xD3, 0xE8, 0x4A, 0xD9, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x6A, 0xC7, 0xDA, 0x6A, 0xEA,
0x12, 0xDF, 0x29, 0x7C, 0x13, 0x18, 0x54, 0xFB, 0xF2, 0x1A, 0xC4, 0xE8,
0x79, 0xC2, 0x3B, 0xBC, 0x60, 0xB4, 0xF7, 0x53,
};
static const unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
0x02,
};
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL)
goto end;
if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)
goto end;
dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback, ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
if (!dh) {
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ERR_clear_error();
dh = DH_new();
if (dh == NULL)
goto end;
dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
if (dh->p == NULL)
goto end;
dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
if (dh->g == NULL)
goto end;
ret = 0; /* DH params not found */
}
else
ret = 1;
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh);
end:
if (dh)
DH_free(dh);
if (in)
BIO_free(in);
return ret;
}
#endif
static int ssl_sock_add_cert_sni(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct bind_conf *s, char *name, int order)
{
struct sni_ctx *sc;
int wild = 0, neg = 0;
if (*name == '!') {
neg = 1;
name++;
}
if (*name == '*') {
wild = 1;
name++;
}
/* !* filter is a nop */
if (neg && wild)
return order;
if (*name) {
int j, len;
len = strlen(name);
sc = malloc(sizeof(struct sni_ctx) + len + 1);
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
sc->name.key[j] = tolower(name[j]);
sc->name.key[len] = 0;
sc->ctx = ctx;
sc->order = order++;
sc->neg = neg;
if (wild)
ebst_insert(&s->sni_w_ctx, &sc->name);
else
ebst_insert(&s->sni_ctx, &sc->name);
}
return order;
}
/* Loads a certificate key and CA chain from a file. Returns 0 on error, -1 if
* an early error happens and the caller must call SSL_CTX_free() by itelf.
*/
static int ssl_sock_load_cert_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, struct bind_conf *s, char **sni_filter, int fcount)
{
BIO *in;
X509 *x = NULL, *ca;
int i, err;
int ret = -1;
int order = 0;
X509_NAME *xname;
char *str;
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names;
#endif
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL)
goto end;
if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)
goto end;
x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback, ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
if (x == NULL)
goto end;
if (fcount) {
while (fcount--)
order = ssl_sock_add_cert_sni(ctx, s, sni_filter[fcount], order);
}
else {
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
names = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
if (names) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i);
if (name->type == GEN_DNS) {
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) {
order = ssl_sock_add_cert_sni(ctx, s, str, order);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
}
#endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */
xname = X509_get_subject_name(x);
i = -1;
while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(xname, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) {
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname, i);
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, entry->value) >= 0) {
order = ssl_sock_add_cert_sni(ctx, s, str, order);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
}
}
ret = 0; /* the caller must not free the SSL_CTX argument anymore */
if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x))
goto end;
if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
}
while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback, ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))) {
if (!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca)) {
X509_free(ca);
goto end;
}
}
err = ERR_get_error();
if (!err || (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)) {
/* we successfully reached the last cert in the file */
ret = 1;
}
ERR_clear_error();
end:
if (x)
X509_free(x);
if (in)
BIO_free(in);
return ret;
}
static int ssl_sock_load_cert_file(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **sni_filter, int fcount, char **err)
{
int ret;
SSL_CTX *ctx;
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
if (!ctx) {
memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context for cert '%s'.\n",
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
return 1;
}
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, path, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL private key from PEM file '%s'.\n",
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
return 1;
}
ret = ssl_sock_load_cert_chain_file(ctx, path, bind_conf, sni_filter, fcount);
if (ret <= 0) {
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL certificate from PEM file '%s'.\n",
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
if (ret < 0) /* serious error, must do that ourselves */
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
return 1;
}
if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx) <= 0) {
memprintf(err, "%sinconsistencies between private key and certificate loaded from PEM file '%s'.\n",
err && *err ? *err : "", path);
return 1;
}
/* we must not free the SSL_CTX anymore below, since it's already in
* the tree, so it will be discovered and cleaned in time.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
ret = ssl_sock_load_dh_params(ctx, path);
if (ret < 0) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "%sunable to load DH parameters from file '%s'.\n",
*err ? *err : "", path);
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
if (bind_conf->default_ctx) {
memprintf(err, "%sthis version of openssl cannot load multiple SSL certificates.\n",
err && *err ? *err : "");
return 1;
}
#endif
if (!bind_conf->default_ctx)
bind_conf->default_ctx = ctx;
return 0;
}
int ssl_sock_load_cert(char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **err)
{
struct dirent *de;
DIR *dir;
struct stat buf;
char *end;
char fp[MAXPATHLEN+1];
int cfgerr = 0;
if (!(dir = opendir(path)))
return ssl_sock_load_cert_file(path, bind_conf, curproxy, NULL, 0, err);
/* strip trailing slashes, including first one */
for (end = path + strlen(path) - 1; end >= path && *end == '/'; end--)
*end = 0;
while ((de = readdir(dir))) {
snprintf(fp, sizeof(fp), "%s/%s", path, de->d_name);
if (stat(fp, &buf) != 0) {
memprintf(err, "%sunable to stat SSL certificate from file '%s' : %s.\n",
err && *err ? *err : "", fp, strerror(errno));
cfgerr++;
continue;
}
if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode))
continue;
cfgerr += ssl_sock_load_cert_file(fp, bind_conf, curproxy, NULL, 0, err);
}
closedir(dir);
return cfgerr;
}
/* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot. The work is only
* done once. Zero is returned if the operation fails. No error is returned
* if the random is said as not implemented, because we expect that openssl
* will use another method once needed.
*/
static int ssl_initialize_random()
{
unsigned char random;
static int random_initialized = 0;
if (!random_initialized && RAND_bytes(&random, 1) != 0)
random_initialized = 1;
return random_initialized;
}
int ssl_sock_load_cert_list_file(char *file, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **err)
{
char thisline[LINESIZE];
FILE *f;
int linenum = 0;
int cfgerr = 0;
if ((f = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
memprintf(err, "cannot open file '%s' : %s", file, strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
while (fgets(thisline, sizeof(thisline), f) != NULL) {
int arg;
int newarg;
char *end;
char *args[MAX_LINE_ARGS + 1];
char *line = thisline;
linenum++;
end = line + strlen(line);
if (end-line == sizeof(thisline)-1 && *(end-1) != '\n') {
/* Check if we reached the limit and the last char is not \n.
* Watch out for the last line without the terminating '\n'!
*/
memprintf(err, "line %d too long in file '%s', limit is %d characters",
linenum, file, (int)sizeof(thisline)-1);
cfgerr = 1;
break;
}
arg = 0;
newarg = 1;
while (*line) {
if (*line == '#' || *line == '\n' || *line == '\r') {
/* end of string, end of loop */
*line = 0;
break;
}
else if (isspace(*line)) {
newarg = 1;
*line = 0;
}
else if (newarg) {
if (arg == MAX_LINE_ARGS) {
memprintf(err, "too many args on line %d in file '%s'.",
linenum, file);
cfgerr = 1;
break;
}
newarg = 0;
args[arg++] = line;
}
line++;
}
if (cfgerr)
break;
/* empty line */
if (!arg)
continue;
cfgerr = ssl_sock_load_cert_file(args[0], bind_conf, curproxy, &args[1], arg-1, err);
if (cfgerr) {
memprintf(err, "error processing line %d in file '%s' : %s", linenum, file, *err);
break;
}
}
fclose(f);
return cfgerr;
}
#ifndef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.7 */
#define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0
#endif
#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.7 */
#define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0
#define SSL_renegotiate_pending(arg) 0
#endif
#ifndef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.8 */
#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0
#endif
#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.8 */
#define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0
#endif
#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.9 */
#define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0
#endif
#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 /* needs OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 */
#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 0
#endif
#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 /* needs OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 */
#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 0
#endif
#ifndef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE /* needs OpenSSL >= 0.9.6 */
#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0
#endif
#ifndef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE /* needs OpenSSL >= 1.0.0 */
#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0
#endif
#ifndef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS /* needs OpenSSL >= 1.0.0 */
#define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0
#endif
int ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL_CTX *ctx, struct proxy *curproxy)
{
int cfgerr = 0;
int verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
int ssloptions =
SSL_OP_ALL | /* all known workarounds for bugs */
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 |
SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION |
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE |
SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE |
SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
int sslmode =
SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE |
SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER |
SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS;
/* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */
if (!ssl_initialize_random()) {
Alert("OpenSSL random data generator initialization failed.\n");
cfgerr++;
}
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3)
ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10)
ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11)
ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12)
ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS)
ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3)
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, SSLv3_server_method());
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10)
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_server_method());
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11)
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_1_server_method());
#endif
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12)
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_2_server_method());
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ssloptions);
SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, sslmode);
switch (bind_conf->verify) {
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE:
verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
break;
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_OPTIONAL:
verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
break;
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED:
verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
break;
}
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk);
if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) {
if (bind_conf->ca_file) {
/* load CAfile to verify */
if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, bind_conf->ca_file, NULL)) {
Alert("Proxy '%s': unable to load CA file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
curproxy->id, bind_conf->ca_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
cfgerr++;
}
/* set CA names fo client cert request, function returns void */
SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(bind_conf->ca_file));
}
else {
Alert("Proxy '%s': verify is enabled but no CA file specified for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
curproxy->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
cfgerr++;
}
#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
if (bind_conf->crl_file) {
X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
if (!store || !X509_STORE_load_locations(store, bind_conf->crl_file, NULL)) {
Alert("Proxy '%s': unable to configure CRL file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
curproxy->id, bind_conf->ca_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
cfgerr++;
}
else {
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
}
}
#endif
ERR_clear_error();
}
if (global.tune.ssllifetime)
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, global.tune.ssllifetime);
shared_context_set_cache(ctx);
if (bind_conf->ciphers &&
!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, bind_conf->ciphers)) {
Alert("Proxy '%s': unable to set SSL cipher list to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
curproxy->id, bind_conf->ciphers, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
cfgerr++;
}
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_infocbk);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_msgcbk);
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
if (bind_conf->npn_str)
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_advertise_npn_protos, bind_conf);
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
if (bind_conf->alpn_str)
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_advertise_alpn_protos, bind_conf);
#endif
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, bind_conf);
#endif
#if defined(SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
{
int i;
EC_KEY *ecdh;
i = OBJ_sn2nid(bind_conf->ecdhe ? bind_conf->ecdhe : ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE);
if (!i || ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(i)) == NULL)) {
Alert("Proxy '%s': unable to set elliptic named curve to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
curproxy->id, bind_conf->ecdhe ? bind_conf->ecdhe : ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE,
bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
cfgerr++;
}
else {
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh);
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
}
}
#endif
return cfgerr;
}
static int ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(const char *pattern, const char *hostname)
{
const char *pattern_wildcard, *pattern_left_label_end, *hostname_left_label_end;
size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
/* Trivial case */
if (strcmp(pattern, hostname) == 0)
return 1;
/* The rest of this logic is based on RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
* (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3) */
pattern_wildcard = NULL;
pattern_left_label_end = pattern;
while (*pattern_left_label_end != '.') {
switch (*pattern_left_label_end) {
case 0:
/* End of label not found */
return 0;
case '*':
/* If there is more than one wildcards */
if (pattern_wildcard)
return 0;
pattern_wildcard = pattern_left_label_end;
break;
}
pattern_left_label_end++;
}
/* If it's not trivial and there is no wildcard, it can't
* match */
if (!pattern_wildcard)
return 0;
/* Make sure all labels match except the leftmost */
hostname_left_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
if (!hostname_left_label_end
|| strcmp(pattern_left_label_end, hostname_left_label_end) != 0)
return 0;
/* Make sure the leftmost label of the hostname is long enough
* that the wildcard can match */
if (hostname_left_label_end - hostname < (pattern_left_label_end - pattern) - 1)
return 0;
/* Finally compare the string on either side of the
* wildcard */
prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
suffixlen = pattern_left_label_end - (pattern_wildcard + 1);
if ((prefixlen && (memcmp(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) != 0))
|| (suffixlen && (memcmp(pattern_wildcard + 1, hostname_left_label_end - suffixlen, suffixlen) != 0)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int ssl_sock_srv_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
SSL *ssl;
struct connection *conn;
char *servername;
int depth;
X509 *cert;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *alt_names;
int i;
X509_NAME *cert_subject;
char *str;
if (ok == 0)
return ok;
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
conn = (struct connection *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
servername = objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.verify_host;
/* We only need to verify the CN on the actual server cert,
* not the indirect CAs */
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
if (depth != 0)
return ok;
/* At this point, the cert is *not* OK unless we can find a
* hostname match */
ok = 0;
cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
/* It seems like this might happen if verify peer isn't set */
if (!cert)
return ok;
alt_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
if (alt_names) {
for (i = 0; !ok && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(alt_names); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(alt_names, i);
if (name->type == GEN_DNS) {
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.ia5) >= 0) {
#else
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) {
#endif
ok = ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(str, servername);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(alt_names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
}
cert_subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
i = -1;
while (!ok && (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(cert_subject, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) {
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(cert_subject, i);
if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, entry->value) >= 0) {
ok = ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(str, servername);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
}
return ok;
}
/* prepare ssl context from servers options. Returns an error count */
int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct server *srv, struct proxy *curproxy)
{
int cfgerr = 0;
int options =
SSL_OP_ALL | /* all known workarounds for bugs */
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 |
SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
int mode =
SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE |
SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER |
SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS;
int verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
/* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */
if (!ssl_initialize_random()) {
Alert("OpenSSL random data generator initialization failed.\n");
cfgerr++;
}
/* Initiate SSL context for current server */
srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = NULL;
if (srv->use_ssl)
srv->xprt = &ssl_sock;
if (srv->check.use_ssl)
srv->check_common.xprt = &ssl_sock;
srv->ssl_ctx.ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
if (!srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) {
Alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to allocate ssl context.\n",
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id,
srv->id);
cfgerr++;
return cfgerr;
}
if (srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) {
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
Alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to load SSL private key from PEM file '%s'.\n",
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id,
srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt);
cfgerr++;
}
else if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) <= 0) {
Alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to load ssl certificate from PEM file '%s'.\n",
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id,
srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt);
cfgerr++;
}
else if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) <= 0) {
Alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': inconsistencies between private key and certificate loaded from PEM file '%s'.\n",
proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id,
srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt);
cfgerr++;
}
}
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3)
options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10)
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11)
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12)
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS)
options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3)
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, SSLv3_client_method());
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10)
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, TLSv1_client_method());
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11)
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, TLSv1_1_client_method());
#endif
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12)
SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, TLSv1_2_client_method());
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_options(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, options);
SSL_CTX_set_mode(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, mode);
if (global.ssl_server_verify == SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_REQUIRED)
verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
switch (srv->ssl_ctx.verify) {
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE:
verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
break;
case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED:
verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
break;
}
SSL_CTX_set_verify(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx,
verify,
srv->ssl_ctx.verify_host ? ssl_sock_srv_verifycbk : NULL);
if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) {
if (srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file) {
/* load CAfile to verify */
if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file, NULL)) {
Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] unable to load CA file '%s'.\n",
curproxy->id, srv->id,
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file);
cfgerr++;
}
}
else {
if (global.ssl_server_verify == SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_REQUIRED)
Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] verify is enabled by default but no CA file specified. If you're running on a LAN where you're certain to trust the server's certificate, please set an explicit 'verify none' statement on the 'server' line, or use 'ssl-server-verify none' in the global section to disable server-side verifications by default.\n",
curproxy->id, srv->id,
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line);
else
Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] verify is enabled but no CA file specified.\n",
curproxy->id, srv->id,
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line);
cfgerr++;
}
#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
if (srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file) {
X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx);
if (!store || !X509_STORE_load_locations(store, srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file, NULL)) {
Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] unable to configure CRL file '%s'.\n",
curproxy->id, srv->id,
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file);
cfgerr++;
}
else {
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
}
}
#endif
}
if (global.tune.ssllifetime)
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, global.tune.ssllifetime);
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
if (srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers &&
!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers)) {
Alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] : unable to set SSL cipher list to '%s'.\n",
curproxy->id, srv->id,
srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers);
cfgerr++;
}
return cfgerr;
}
/* Walks down the two trees in bind_conf and prepares all certs. The pointer may
* be NULL, in which case nothing is done. Returns the number of errors
* encountered.
*/
int ssl_sock_prepare_all_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *px)
{
struct ebmb_node *node;
struct sni_ctx *sni;
int err = 0;
if (!bind_conf || !bind_conf->is_ssl)
return 0;
node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_ctx);
while (node) {
sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name);
if (!sni->order) /* only initialize the CTX on its first occurrence */
err += ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, sni->ctx, px);
node = ebmb_next(node);
}
node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx);
while (node) {
sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name);
if (!sni->order) /* only initialize the CTX on its first occurrence */
err += ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, sni->ctx, px);
node = ebmb_next(node);
}
return err;
}
/* Walks down the two trees in bind_conf and frees all the certs. The pointer may
* be NULL, in which case nothing is done. The default_ctx is nullified too.
*/
void ssl_sock_free_all_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
{
struct ebmb_node *node, *back;
struct sni_ctx *sni;
if (!bind_conf || !bind_conf->is_ssl)
return;
node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_ctx);
while (node) {
sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name);
back = ebmb_next(node);
ebmb_delete(node);
if (!sni->order) /* only free the CTX on its first occurrence */
SSL_CTX_free(sni->ctx);
free(sni);
node = back;
}
node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx);
while (node) {
sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name);
back = ebmb_next(node);
ebmb_delete(node);
if (!sni->order) /* only free the CTX on its first occurrence */
SSL_CTX_free(sni->ctx);
free(sni);
node = back;
}
bind_conf->default_ctx = NULL;
}
/*
* This function is called if SSL * context is not yet allocated. The function
* is designed to be called before any other data-layer operation and sets the
* handshake flag on the connection. It is safe to call it multiple times.
* It returns 0 on success and -1 in error case.
*/
static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
{
/* already initialized */
if (conn->xprt_ctx)
return 0;
if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn))
return 0;
if (global.maxsslconn && sslconns >= global.maxsslconn) {
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_TOO_MANY;
return -1;
}
/* If it is in client mode initiate SSL session
in connect state otherwise accept state */
if (objt_server(conn->target)) {
/* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.ctx);
if (!conn->xprt_ctx) {
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
return -1;
}
SSL_set_connect_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess)
SSL_set_session(conn->xprt_ctx, objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess);
/* set fd on SSL session context */
SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd);
/* set connection pointer */
SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn);
/* leave init state and start handshake */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
sslconns++;
totalsslconns++;
return 0;
}
else if (objt_listener(conn->target)) {
/* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->default_ctx);
if (!conn->xprt_ctx) {
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
return -1;
}
SSL_set_accept_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
/* set fd on SSL session context */
SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd);
/* set connection pointer */
SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn);
/* leave init state and start handshake */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
sslconns++;
totalsslconns++;
return 0;
}
/* don't know how to handle such a target */
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_TARGET;
return -1;
}
/* This is the callback which is used when an SSL handshake is pending. It
* updates the FD status if it wants some polling before being called again.
* It returns 0 if it fails in a fatal way or needs to poll to go further,
* otherwise it returns non-zero and removes itself from the connection's
* flags (the bit is provided in <flag> by the caller).
*/
int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsigned int flag)
{
int ret;
if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn))
return 0;
if (!conn->xprt_ctx)
goto out_error;
/* If we use SSL_do_handshake to process a reneg initiated by
* the remote peer, it sometimes returns SSL_ERROR_SSL.
* Usually SSL_write and SSL_read are used and process implicitly
* the reneg handshake.
* Here we use SSL_peek as a workaround for reneg.
*/
if ((conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED) && SSL_renegotiate_pending(conn->xprt_ctx)) {
char c;
ret = SSL_peek(conn->xprt_ctx, &c, 1);
if (ret <= 0) {
/* handshake may have not been completed, let's find why */
ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret);
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
/* SSL handshake needs to write, L4 connection may not be ready */
__conn_sock_stop_recv(conn);
__conn_sock_want_send(conn);
fd_cant_send(conn->t.sock.fd);
return 0;
}
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
/* handshake may have been completed but we have
* no more data to read.
*/
if (!SSL_renegotiate_pending(conn->xprt_ctx)) {
ret = 1;
goto reneg_ok;
}
/* SSL handshake needs to read, L4 connection is ready */
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
__conn_sock_stop_send(conn);
__conn_sock_want_recv(conn);
fd_cant_recv(conn->t.sock.fd);
return 0;
}
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) {
/* if errno is null, then connection was successfully established */
if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
if (!conn->err_code) {
if (!((SSL *)conn->xprt_ctx)->packet_length) {
if (!errno) {
if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
else
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EMPTY;
}
else {
if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
else
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_ABORT;
}
}
else {
if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
else
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
}
}
goto out_error;
}
else {
/* Fail on all other handshake errors */
/* Note: OpenSSL may leave unread bytes in the socket's
* buffer, causing an RST to be emitted upon close() on
* TCP sockets. We first try to drain possibly pending
* data to avoid this as much as possible.
*/
conn_drain(conn);
if (!conn->err_code)
conn->err_code = (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) ?
CO_ER_SSL_KILLED_HB : CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
goto out_error;
}
}
/* read some data: consider handshake completed */
goto reneg_ok;
}
ret = SSL_do_handshake(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (ret != 1) {
/* handshake did not complete, let's find why */
ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret);
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
/* SSL handshake needs to write, L4 connection may not be ready */
__conn_sock_stop_recv(conn);
__conn_sock_want_send(conn);
fd_cant_send(conn->t.sock.fd);
return 0;
}
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
/* SSL handshake needs to read, L4 connection is ready */
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
__conn_sock_stop_send(conn);
__conn_sock_want_recv(conn);
fd_cant_recv(conn->t.sock.fd);
return 0;
}
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) {
/* if errno is null, then connection was successfully established */
if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
if (!((SSL *)conn->xprt_ctx)->packet_length) {
if (!errno) {
if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
else
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EMPTY;
}
else {
if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
else
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_ABORT;
}
}
else {
if (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT)
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB;
else
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
}
goto out_error;
}
else {
/* Fail on all other handshake errors */
/* Note: OpenSSL may leave unread bytes in the socket's
* buffer, causing an RST to be emitted upon close() on
* TCP sockets. We first try to drain possibly pending
* data to avoid this as much as possible.
*/
conn_drain(conn);
if (!conn->err_code)
conn->err_code = (conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) ?
CO_ER_SSL_KILLED_HB : CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
goto out_error;
}
}
reneg_ok:
/* Handshake succeeded */
if (objt_server(conn->target)) {
if (!SSL_session_reused(conn->xprt_ctx)) {
/* check if session was reused, if not store current session on server for reuse */
if (objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess)
SSL_SESSION_free(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess);
objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = SSL_get1_session(conn->xprt_ctx);
}
}
/* The connection is now established at both layers, it's time to leave */
conn->flags &= ~(flag | CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN);
return 1;
out_error:
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ERR_clear_error();
/* free resumed session if exists */
if (objt_server(conn->target) && objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess) {
SSL_SESSION_free(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess);
objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = NULL;
}
/* Fail on all other handshake errors */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
if (!conn->err_code)
conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE;
return 0;
}
/* Receive up to <count> bytes from connection <conn>'s socket and store them
* into buffer <buf>. Only one call to recv() is performed, unless the
* buffer wraps, in which case a second call may be performed. The connection's
* flags are updated with whatever special event is detected (error, read0,
* empty). The caller is responsible for taking care of those events and
* avoiding the call if inappropriate. The function does not call the
* connection's polling update function, so the caller is responsible for this.
*/
static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int count)
{
int ret, done = 0;
int try;
if (!conn->xprt_ctx)
goto out_error;
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_HANDSHAKE)
/* a handshake was requested */
return 0;
/* let's realign the buffer to optimize I/O */
if (buffer_empty(buf))
buf->p = buf->data;
/* read the largest possible block. For this, we perform only one call
* to recv() unless the buffer wraps and we exactly fill the first hunk,
* in which case we accept to do it once again. A new attempt is made on
* EINTR too.
*/
while (count > 0) {
/* first check if we have some room after p+i */
try = buf->data + buf->size - (buf->p + buf->i);
/* otherwise continue between data and p-o */
if (try <= 0) {
try = buf->p - (buf->data + buf->o);
if (try <= 0)
break;
}
if (try > count)
try = count;
ret = SSL_read(conn->xprt_ctx, bi_end(buf), try);
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) {
/* CO_FL_ERROR may be set by ssl_sock_infocbk */
goto out_error;
}
if (ret > 0) {
buf->i += ret;
done += ret;
if (ret < try)
break;
count -= ret;
}
else if (ret == 0) {
ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret);
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN) {
/* error on protocol or underlying transport */
if ((ret != SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
|| (errno && (errno != EAGAIN)))
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ERR_clear_error();
}
goto read0;
}
else {
ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret);
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
/* handshake is running, and it needs to enable write */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS;
__conn_sock_want_send(conn);
break;
}
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
if (SSL_renegotiate_pending(conn->xprt_ctx)) {
/* handshake is running, and it may need to re-enable read */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS;
__conn_sock_want_recv(conn);
break;
}
/* we need to poll for retry a read later */
fd_cant_recv(conn->t.sock.fd);
break;
}
/* otherwise it's a real error */
goto out_error;
}
}
return done;
read0:
conn_sock_read0(conn);
return done;
out_error:
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ERR_clear_error();
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
return done;
}
/* Send all pending bytes from buffer <buf> to connection <conn>'s socket.
* <flags> may contain some CO_SFL_* flags to hint the system about other
* pending data for example, but this flag is ignored at the moment.
* Only one call to send() is performed, unless the buffer wraps, in which case
* a second call may be performed. The connection's flags are updated with
* whatever special event is detected (error, empty). The caller is responsible
* for taking care of those events and avoiding the call if inappropriate. The
* function does not call the connection's polling update function, so the caller
* is responsible for this.
*/
static int ssl_sock_from_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int flags)
{
int ret, try, done;
done = 0;
if (!conn->xprt_ctx)
goto out_error;
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_HANDSHAKE)
/* a handshake was requested */
return 0;
/* send the largest possible block. For this we perform only one call
* to send() unless the buffer wraps and we exactly fill the first hunk,
* in which case we accept to do it once again.
*/
while (buf->o) {
try = bo_contig_data(buf);
if (!(flags & CO_SFL_STREAMER) &&
!(conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED) &&
global.tune.ssl_max_record && try > global.tune.ssl_max_record) {
try = global.tune.ssl_max_record;
}
else {
/* we need to keep the information about the fact that
* we're not limiting the upcoming send(), because if it
* fails, we'll have to retry with at least as many data.
*/
conn->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED;
}
ret = SSL_write(conn->xprt_ctx, bo_ptr(buf), try);
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) {
/* CO_FL_ERROR may be set by ssl_sock_infocbk */
goto out_error;
}
if (ret > 0) {
conn->xprt_st &= ~SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED;
buf->o -= ret;
done += ret;
if (likely(buffer_empty(buf)))
/* optimize data alignment in the buffer */
buf->p = buf->data;
/* if the system buffer is full, don't insist */
if (ret < try)
break;
}
else {
ret = SSL_get_error(conn->xprt_ctx, ret);
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
if (SSL_renegotiate_pending(conn->xprt_ctx)) {
/* handshake is running, and it may need to re-enable write */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS;
__conn_sock_want_send(conn);
break;
}
/* we need to poll to retry a write later */
fd_cant_send(conn->t.sock.fd);
break;
}
else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
/* handshake is running, and it needs to enable read */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS;
__conn_sock_want_recv(conn);
break;
}
goto out_error;
}
}
return done;
out_error:
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ERR_clear_error();
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
return done;
}
static void ssl_sock_close(struct connection *conn) {
if (conn->xprt_ctx) {
SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
sslconns--;
}
}
/* This function tries to perform a clean shutdown on an SSL connection, and in
* any case, flags the connection as reusable if no handshake was in progress.
*/
static void ssl_sock_shutw(struct connection *conn, int clean)
{
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_HANDSHAKE)
return;
/* no handshake was in progress, try a clean ssl shutdown */
if (clean && (SSL_shutdown(conn->xprt_ctx) <= 0)) {
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* force flag on ssl to keep session in cache regardless shutdown result */
SSL_set_shutdown(conn->xprt_ctx, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN);
}
/* used for logging, may be changed for a sample fetch later */
const char *ssl_sock_get_cipher_name(struct connection *conn)
{
if (!conn->xprt && !conn->xprt_ctx)
return NULL;
return SSL_get_cipher_name(conn->xprt_ctx);
}
/* used for logging, may be changed for a sample fetch later */
const char *ssl_sock_get_proto_version(struct connection *conn)
{
if (!conn->xprt && !conn->xprt_ctx)
return NULL;
return SSL_get_version(conn->xprt_ctx);
}
/* Extract a serial from a cert, and copy it to a chunk.
* Returns 1 if serial is found and copied, 0 if no serial found and
* -1 if output is not large enough.
*/
static int
ssl_sock_get_serial(X509 *crt, struct chunk *out)
{
ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
serial = X509_get_serialNumber(crt);
if (!serial)
return 0;
if (out->size < serial->length)
return -1;
memcpy(out->str, serial->data, serial->length);
out->len = serial->length;
return 1;
}
/* Copy Date in ASN1_UTCTIME format in struct chunk out.
* Returns 1 if serial is found and copied, 0 if no valid time found
* and -1 if output is not large enough.
*/
static int
ssl_sock_get_time(ASN1_TIME *tm, struct chunk *out)
{
if (tm->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) {
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gentm = (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *)tm;
if (gentm->length < 12)
return 0;
if (gentm->data[0] != 0x32 || gentm->data[1] != 0x30)
return 0;
if (out->size < gentm->length-2)
return -1;
memcpy(out->str, gentm->data+2, gentm->length-2);
out->len = gentm->length-2;
return 1;
}
else if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
ASN1_UTCTIME *utctm = (ASN1_UTCTIME *)tm;
if (utctm->length < 10)
return 0;
if (utctm->data[0] >= 0x35)
return 0;
if (out->size < utctm->length)
return -1;
memcpy(out->str, utctm->data, utctm->length);
out->len = utctm->length;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Extract an entry from a X509_NAME and copy its value to an output chunk.
* Returns 1 if entry found, 0 if entry not found, or -1 if output not large enough.
*/
static int
ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(X509_NAME *a, const struct chunk *entry, int pos, struct chunk *out)
{
X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
int i, j, n;
int cur = 0;
const char *s;
char tmp[128];
out->len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) {
if (pos < 0)
j = (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)-1) - i;
else
j = i;
ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, j);
n = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object);
if ((n == NID_undef) || ((s = OBJ_nid2sn(n)) == NULL)) {
i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ne->object);
s = tmp;
}
if (chunk_strcasecmp(entry, s) != 0)
continue;
if (pos < 0)
cur--;
else
cur++;
if (cur != pos)
continue;
if (ne->value->length > out->size)
return -1;
memcpy(out->str, ne->value->data, ne->value->length);
out->len = ne->value->length;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Extract and format full DN from a X509_NAME and copy result into a chunk
* Returns 1 if dn entries exits, 0 if no dn entry found or -1 if output is not large enough.
*/
static int
ssl_sock_get_dn_oneline(X509_NAME *a, struct chunk *out)
{
X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
int i, n, ln;
int l = 0;
const char *s;
char *p;
char tmp[128];
out->len = 0;
p = out->str;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) {
ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i);
n = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object);
if ((n == NID_undef) || ((s = OBJ_nid2sn(n)) == NULL)) {
i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ne->object);
s = tmp;
}
ln = strlen(s);
l += 1 + ln + 1 + ne->value->length;
if (l > out->size)
return -1;
out->len = l;
*(p++)='/';
memcpy(p, s, ln);
p += ln;
*(p++)='=';
memcpy(p, ne->value->data, ne->value->length);
p += ne->value->length;
}
if (!out->len)
return 0;
return 1;
}
char *ssl_sock_get_version(struct connection *conn)
{
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
return NULL;
return (char *)SSL_get_version(conn->xprt_ctx);
}
/* returns common name, NULL terminated, from client certificate, or NULL if none */
char *ssl_sock_get_common_name(struct connection *conn)
{
X509 *crt = NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
struct chunk *cn_trash;
const char find_cn[] = "CN";
const struct chunk find_cn_chunk = {
.str = (char *)&find_cn,
.len = sizeof(find_cn)-1
};
char *result = NULL;
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
return NULL;
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
goto out;
name = X509_get_subject_name(crt);
if (!name)
goto out;
cn_trash = get_trash_chunk();
if (ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(name, &find_cn_chunk, 1, cn_trash) <= 0)
goto out;
cn_trash->str[cn_trash->len] = '\0';
result = cn_trash->str;
out:
if (crt)
X509_free(crt);
return result;
}
/* returns 1 if client passed a certificate, 0 if not */
int ssl_sock_get_cert_used(struct connection *conn)
{
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
return 0;
return SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE & conn->xprt_st ? 1 : 0;
}
/* returns result from SSL verify */
unsigned int ssl_sock_get_verify_result(struct connection *conn)
{
if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn))
return (unsigned int)X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
return (unsigned int)SSL_get_verify_result(conn->xprt_ctx);
}
/***** Below are some sample fetching functions for ACL/patterns *****/
/* boolean, returns true if client cert was present */
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_has_crt(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
smp->flags = 0;
smp->type = SMP_T_BOOL;
smp->data.uint = SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE & conn->xprt_st ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
/* binary, returns serial of certificate in a binary chunk.
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_x_serial(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0;
X509 *crt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
struct chunk *smp_trash;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (cert_peer)
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
else
crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
goto out;
smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
if (ssl_sock_get_serial(crt, smp_trash) <= 0)
goto out;
smp->data.str = *smp_trash;
smp->type = SMP_T_BIN;
ret = 1;
out:
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer && crt)
X509_free(crt);
return ret;
}
/* binary, returns the client certificate's SHA-1 fingerprint (SHA-1 hash of DER-encoded certificate) in a binary chunk.
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_x_sha1(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0;
X509 *crt = NULL;
const EVP_MD *digest;
int ret = 0;
struct chunk *smp_trash;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (cert_peer)
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
else
crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
goto out;
smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
digest = EVP_sha1();
X509_digest(crt, digest, (unsigned char *)smp_trash->str, (unsigned int *)&smp_trash->len);
smp->data.str = *smp_trash;
smp->type = SMP_T_BIN;
ret = 1;
out:
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer && crt)
X509_free(crt);
return ret;
}
/* string, returns certificate's notafter date in ASN1_UTCTIME format.
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0;
X509 *crt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
struct chunk *smp_trash;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (cert_peer)
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
else
crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
goto out;
smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_get_notAfter(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
goto out;
smp->data.str = *smp_trash;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
ret = 1;
out:
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer && crt)
X509_free(crt);
return ret;
}
/* string, returns a string of a formatted full dn \C=..\O=..\OU=.. \CN=.. of certificate's issuer
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_x_i_dn(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0;
X509 *crt = NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
int ret = 0;
struct chunk *smp_trash;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (cert_peer)
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
else
crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
goto out;
name = X509_get_issuer_name(crt);
if (!name)
goto out;
smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
if (args && args[0].type == ARGT_STR) {
int pos = 1;
if (args[1].type == ARGT_SINT)
pos = args[1].data.sint;
else if (args[1].type == ARGT_UINT)
pos =(int)args[1].data.uint;
if (ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(name, &args[0].data.str, pos, smp_trash) <= 0)
goto out;
}
else if (ssl_sock_get_dn_oneline(name, smp_trash) <= 0)
goto out;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->data.str = *smp_trash;
ret = 1;
out:
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer && crt)
X509_free(crt);
return ret;
}
/* string, returns notbefore date in ASN1_UTCTIME format.
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0;
X509 *crt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
struct chunk *smp_trash;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (cert_peer)
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
else
crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
goto out;
smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_get_notBefore(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
goto out;
smp->data.str = *smp_trash;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
ret = 1;
out:
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer && crt)
X509_free(crt);
return ret;
}
/* string, returns a string of a formatted full dn \C=..\O=..\OU=.. \CN=.. of certificate's subject
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_x_s_dn(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0;
X509 *crt = NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
int ret = 0;
struct chunk *smp_trash;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (cert_peer)
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
else
crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
goto out;
name = X509_get_subject_name(crt);
if (!name)
goto out;
smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
if (args && args[0].type == ARGT_STR) {
int pos = 1;
if (args[1].type == ARGT_SINT)
pos = args[1].data.sint;
else if (args[1].type == ARGT_UINT)
pos =(int)args[1].data.uint;
if (ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(name, &args[0].data.str, pos, smp_trash) <= 0)
goto out;
}
else if (ssl_sock_get_dn_oneline(name, smp_trash) <= 0)
goto out;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->data.str = *smp_trash;
ret = 1;
out:
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer && crt)
X509_free(crt);
return ret;
}
/* integer, returns true if current session use a client certificate */
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_c_used(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
X509 *crt;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate returns a ptr on allocated X509 struct */
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (crt) {
X509_free(crt);
}
smp->type = SMP_T_BOOL;
smp->data.uint = (crt != NULL);
return 1;
}
/* integer, returns the certificate version
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_x_version(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0;
X509 *crt;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (cert_peer)
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
else
crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
return 0;
smp->data.uint = (unsigned int)(1 + X509_get_version(crt));
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer)
X509_free(crt);
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
return 1;
}
/* string, returns the certificate's signature algorithm.
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_x_sig_alg(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0;
X509 *crt;
int nid;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (cert_peer)
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
else
crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
return 0;
nid = OBJ_obj2nid((ASN1_OBJECT *)(crt->cert_info->signature->algorithm));
smp->data.str.str = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!smp->data.str.str) {
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer)
X509_free(crt);
return 0;
}
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags |= SMP_F_CONST;
smp->data.str.len = strlen(smp->data.str.str);
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer)
X509_free(crt);
return 1;
}
/* string, returns the certificate's key algorithm.
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int cert_peer = (kw[4] == 'c') ? 1 : 0;
X509 *crt;
int nid;
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (cert_peer)
crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
else
crt = SSL_get_certificate(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!crt)
return 0;
nid = OBJ_obj2nid((ASN1_OBJECT *)(crt->cert_info->key->algor->algorithm));
smp->data.str.str = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!smp->data.str.str) {
/* SSL_get_peer_certificate increase X509 * ref count */
if (cert_peer)
X509_free(crt);
return 0;
}
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags |= SMP_F_CONST;
smp->data.str.len = strlen(smp->data.str.str);
if (cert_peer)
X509_free(crt);
return 1;
}
/* boolean, returns true if front conn. transport layer is SSL.
* This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th
* char is 'b'.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0;
struct connection *conn = objt_conn(l4->si[back_conn].end);
smp->type = SMP_T_BOOL;
smp->data.uint = (conn && conn->xprt == &ssl_sock);
return 1;
}
/* boolean, returns true if client present a SNI */
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_has_sni(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
struct connection *conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
smp->type = SMP_T_BOOL;
smp->data.uint = (conn && conn->xprt == &ssl_sock) &&
conn->xprt_ctx &&
SSL_get_servername(conn->xprt_ctx, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) != NULL;
return 1;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
/* string, returns the used cipher if front conn. transport layer is SSL.
* This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th
* char is 'b'.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0;
struct connection *conn;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[back_conn].end);
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
smp->data.str.str = (char *)SSL_get_cipher_name(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!smp->data.str.str)
return 0;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags |= SMP_F_CONST;
smp->data.str.len = strlen(smp->data.str.str);
return 1;
}
/* integer, returns the algoritm's keysize if front conn. transport layer
* is SSL.
* This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th
* char is 'b'.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0;
struct connection *conn;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[back_conn].end);
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!SSL_get_cipher_bits(conn->xprt_ctx, (int *)&smp->data.uint))
return 0;
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
return 1;
}
/* integer, returns the used keysize if front conn. transport layer is SSL.
* This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th
* char is 'b'.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_use_keysize(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0;
struct connection *conn;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[back_conn].end);
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
smp->data.uint = (unsigned int)SSL_get_cipher_bits(conn->xprt_ctx, NULL);
if (!smp->data.uint)
return 0;
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
return 1;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_npn(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct connection *conn;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
smp->data.str.str = NULL;
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(conn->xprt_ctx,
(const unsigned char **)&smp->data.str.str, (unsigned *)&smp->data.str.len);
if (!smp->data.str.str)
return 0;
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alpn(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct connection *conn;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
smp->data.str.str = NULL;
SSL_get0_alpn_selected(conn->xprt_ctx,
(const unsigned char **)&smp->data.str.str, (unsigned *)&smp->data.str.len);
if (!smp->data.str.str)
return 0;
return 1;
}
#endif
/* string, returns the used protocol if front conn. transport layer is SSL.
* This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th
* char is 'b'.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_protocol(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0;
struct connection *conn;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[back_conn].end);
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
smp->data.str.str = (char *)SSL_get_version(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!smp->data.str.str)
return 0;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
smp->data.str.len = strlen(smp->data.str.str);
return 1;
}
/* binary, returns the SSL session id if front conn. transport layer is SSL.
* This function is also usable on backend conn if the fetch keyword 5th
* char is 'b'.
*/
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL
int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
struct connection *conn;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
smp->type = SMP_T_BIN;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[back_conn].end);
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
sess = SSL_get_session(conn->xprt_ctx);
if (!sess)
return 0;
smp->data.str.str = (char *)SSL_SESSION_get_id(sess, (unsigned int *)&smp->data.str.len);
if (!smp->data.str.str || !&smp->data.str.len)
return 0;
return 1;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_sni(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
struct connection *conn;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
smp->data.str.str = (char *)SSL_get_servername(conn->xprt_ctx, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
if (!smp->data.str.str)
return 0;
smp->data.str.len = strlen(smp->data.str.str);
return 1;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_unique_id(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL
int back_conn = (kw[4] == 'b') ? 1 : 0;
struct connection *conn;
int finished_len;
struct chunk *finished_trash;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[back_conn].end);
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
finished_trash = get_trash_chunk();
if (!SSL_session_reused(conn->xprt_ctx))
finished_len = SSL_get_peer_finished(conn->xprt_ctx, finished_trash->str, finished_trash->size);
else
finished_len = SSL_get_finished(conn->xprt_ctx, finished_trash->str, finished_trash->size);
if (!finished_len)
return 0;
finished_trash->len = finished_len;
smp->data.str = *finished_trash;
smp->type = SMP_T_BIN;
return 1;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
/* integer, returns the first verify error in CA chain of client certificate chain. */
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_c_ca_err(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
smp->data.uint = (unsigned int)SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CA_ERROR(conn->xprt_st);
smp->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
/* integer, returns the depth of the first verify error in CA chain of client certificate chain. */
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_c_ca_err_depth(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
smp->data.uint = (unsigned int)SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CAEDEPTH(conn->xprt_st);
smp->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
/* integer, returns the first verify error on client certificate */
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_c_err(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
smp->data.uint = (unsigned int)SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CRTERROR(conn->xprt_st);
smp->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
/* integer, returns the verify result on client cert */
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_c_verify(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct connection *conn;
if (!l4)
return 0;
conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!conn || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
return 0;
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_CONNECTED)) {
smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
if (!conn->xprt_ctx)
return 0;
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
smp->data.uint = (unsigned int)SSL_get_verify_result(conn->xprt_ctx);
smp->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
/* parse the "ca-file" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_ca_file(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CAfile path", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if ((*args[cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.ca_base)
memprintf(&conf->ca_file, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[cur_arg + 1]);
else
memprintf(&conf->ca_file, "%s", args[cur_arg + 1]);
return 0;
}
/* parse the "ciphers" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_ciphers(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing cipher suite", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
free(conf->ciphers);
conf->ciphers = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]);
return 0;
}
/* parse the "crt" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_crt(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing certificate location", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if ((*args[cur_arg + 1] != '/' ) && global.crt_base) {
if ((strlen(global.crt_base) + 1 + strlen(args[cur_arg + 1]) + 1) > MAXPATHLEN) {
memprintf(err, "'%s' : path too long", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", global.crt_base, args[cur_arg + 1]);
if (ssl_sock_load_cert(path, conf, px, err) > 0)
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
return 0;
}
if (ssl_sock_load_cert(args[cur_arg + 1], conf, px, err) > 0)
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "crt-list" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_crt_list(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing certificate location", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if (ssl_sock_load_cert_list_file(args[cur_arg + 1], conf, px, err) > 0) {
memprintf(err, "'%s' : %s", args[cur_arg], *err);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
return 0;
}
/* parse the "crl-file" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_crl_file(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
#ifndef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support CRL verify", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#else
if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CRLfile path", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if ((*args[cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.ca_base)
memprintf(&conf->crl_file, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[cur_arg + 1]);
else
memprintf(&conf->crl_file, "%s", args[cur_arg + 1]);
return 0;
#endif
}
/* parse the "ecdhe" bind keyword keywords */
static int bind_parse_ecdhe(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090800fL
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (too old)", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#elif defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (disabled via OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#else
if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing named curve", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
conf->ecdhe = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]);
return 0;
#endif
}
/* parse the "crt_ignerr" and "ca_ignerr" bind keywords */
static int bind_parse_ignore_err(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
int code;
char *p = args[cur_arg + 1];
unsigned long long *ignerr = &conf->crt_ignerr;
if (!*p) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing error IDs list", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if (strcmp(args[cur_arg], "ca-ignore-err") == 0)
ignerr = &conf->ca_ignerr;
if (strcmp(p, "all") == 0) {
*ignerr = ~0ULL;
return 0;
}
while (p) {
code = atoi(p);
if ((code <= 0) || (code > 63)) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : ID '%d' out of range (1..63) in error IDs list '%s'",
args[cur_arg], code, args[cur_arg + 1]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
*ignerr |= 1ULL << code;
p = strchr(p, ',');
if (p)
p++;
}
return 0;
}
/* parse the "force-sslv3" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_force_sslv3(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "force-tlsv10" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_force_tlsv10(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "force-tlsv11" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_force_tlsv11(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11;
return 0;
#else
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support protocol TLSv1.1", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#endif
}
/* parse the "force-tlsv12" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_force_tlsv12(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12;
return 0;
#else
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support protocol TLSv1.2", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#endif
}
/* parse the "no-tls-tickets" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_no_tls_tickets(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "no-sslv3" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_no_sslv3(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "no-tlsv10" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_no_tlsv10(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "no-tlsv11" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_no_tlsv11(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "no-tlsv12" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_no_tlsv12(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
conf->ssl_options |= BC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "npn" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_npn(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
char *p1, *p2;
if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing the comma-delimited NPN protocol suite", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
free(conf->npn_str);
/* the NPN string is built as a suite of (<len> <name>)* */
conf->npn_len = strlen(args[cur_arg + 1]) + 1;
conf->npn_str = calloc(1, conf->npn_len);
memcpy(conf->npn_str + 1, args[cur_arg + 1], conf->npn_len);
/* replace commas with the name length */
p1 = conf->npn_str;
p2 = p1 + 1;
while (1) {
p2 = memchr(p1 + 1, ',', conf->npn_str + conf->npn_len - (p1 + 1));
if (!p2)
p2 = p1 + 1 + strlen(p1 + 1);
if (p2 - (p1 + 1) > 255) {
*p2 = '\0';
memprintf(err, "'%s' : NPN protocol name too long : '%s'", args[cur_arg], p1 + 1);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
*p1 = p2 - (p1 + 1);
p1 = p2;
if (!*p2)
break;
*(p2++) = '\0';
}
return 0;
#else
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support TLS NPN extension", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#endif
}
/* parse the "alpn" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_alpn(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
char *p1, *p2;
if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing the comma-delimited ALPN protocol suite", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
free(conf->alpn_str);
/* the ALPN string is built as a suite of (<len> <name>)* */
conf->alpn_len = strlen(args[cur_arg + 1]) + 1;
conf->alpn_str = calloc(1, conf->alpn_len);
memcpy(conf->alpn_str + 1, args[cur_arg + 1], conf->alpn_len);
/* replace commas with the name length */
p1 = conf->alpn_str;
p2 = p1 + 1;
while (1) {
p2 = memchr(p1 + 1, ',', conf->alpn_str + conf->alpn_len - (p1 + 1));
if (!p2)
p2 = p1 + 1 + strlen(p1 + 1);
if (p2 - (p1 + 1) > 255) {
*p2 = '\0';
memprintf(err, "'%s' : ALPN protocol name too long : '%s'", args[cur_arg], p1 + 1);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
*p1 = p2 - (p1 + 1);
p1 = p2;
if (!*p2)
break;
*(p2++) = '\0';
}
return 0;
#else
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support TLS ALPN extension", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#endif
}
/* parse the "ssl" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_ssl(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
struct listener *l;
conf->is_ssl = 1;
if (global.listen_default_ciphers && !conf->ciphers)
conf->ciphers = strdup(global.listen_default_ciphers);
list_for_each_entry(l, &conf->listeners, by_bind)
l->xprt = &ssl_sock;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "strict-sni" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_strict_sni(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
conf->strict_sni = 1;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "verify" bind keyword */
static int bind_parse_verify(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
{
if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing verify method", args[cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if (strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "none") == 0)
conf->verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE;
else if (strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "optional") == 0)
conf->verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_OPTIONAL;
else if (strcmp(args[cur_arg + 1], "required") == 0)
conf->verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
else {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : unknown verify method '%s', only 'none', 'optional', and 'required' are supported\n",
args[cur_arg], args[cur_arg + 1]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
return 0;
}
/************** "server" keywords ****************/
/* parse the "ca-file" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_ca_file(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CAfile path", args[*cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if ((*args[*cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.ca_base)
memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.ca_file, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]);
else
memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.ca_file, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]);
return 0;
}
/* parse the "check-ssl" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_check_ssl(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->check.use_ssl = 1;
if (global.connect_default_ciphers && !newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers)
newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers = strdup(global.connect_default_ciphers);
return 0;
}
/* parse the "ciphers" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_ciphers(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) {
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing cipher suite", args[*cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
free(newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers);
newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers = strdup(args[*cur_arg + 1]);
return 0;
}
/* parse the "crl-file" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_crl_file(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
#ifndef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support CRL verify", args[*cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#else
if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing CRLfile path", args[*cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if ((*args[*cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.ca_base)
memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.crl_file, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]);
else
memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.crl_file, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]);
return 0;
#endif
}
/* parse the "crt" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_crt(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing certificate file path", args[*cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if ((*args[*cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global.crt_base)
memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, "%s/%s", global.ca_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]);
else
memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]);
return 0;
}
/* parse the "force-sslv3" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_force_sslv3(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_SSLV3;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "force-tlsv10" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_force_tlsv10(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV10;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "force-tlsv11" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_force_tlsv11(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV11;
return 0;
#else
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support protocol TLSv1.1", args[*cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#endif
}
/* parse the "force-tlsv12" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_force_tlsv12(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_USE_TLSV12;
return 0;
#else
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : library does not support protocol TLSv1.2", args[*cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
#endif
}
/* parse the "no-sslv3" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_no_sslv3(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "no-tlsv10" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_no_tlsv10(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "no-tlsv11" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_no_tlsv11(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "no-tlsv12" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_no_tlsv12(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "no-tls-tickets" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_no_tls_tickets(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "send-proxy-v2-ssl" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_send_proxy_ssl(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2;
newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2_SSL;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "send-proxy-v2-ssl-cn" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_send_proxy_cn(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2;
newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2_SSL;
newsrv->pp_opts |= SRV_PP_V2_SSL_CN;
return 0;
}
/* parse the "ssl" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_ssl(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
newsrv->use_ssl = 1;
if (global.connect_default_ciphers && !newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers)
newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers = strdup(global.connect_default_ciphers);
return 0;
}
/* parse the "verify" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_verify(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing verify method", args[*cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
if (strcmp(args[*cur_arg + 1], "none") == 0)
newsrv->ssl_ctx.verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE;
else if (strcmp(args[*cur_arg + 1], "required") == 0)
newsrv->ssl_ctx.verify = SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
else {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : unknown verify method '%s', only 'none' and 'required' are supported\n",
args[*cur_arg], args[*cur_arg + 1]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
return 0;
}
/* parse the "verifyhost" server keyword */
static int srv_parse_verifyhost(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
{
if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) {
if (err)
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing hostname to verify against", args[*cur_arg]);
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
}
newsrv->ssl_ctx.verify_host = strdup(args[*cur_arg + 1]);
return 0;
}
/* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten.
* Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted.
*/
static struct sample_fetch_kw_list sample_fetch_keywords = {ILH, {
{ "ssl_bc", smp_fetch_ssl_fc, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
{ "ssl_bc_alg_keysize", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
{ "ssl_bc_cipher", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
{ "ssl_bc_protocol", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_protocol, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
{ "ssl_bc_unique_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_unique_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
{ "ssl_bc_use_keysize", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_use_keysize, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
{ "ssl_bc_session_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
{ "ssl_c_ca_err", smp_fetch_ssl_c_ca_err, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_ca_err_depth", smp_fetch_ssl_c_ca_err_depth, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_err", smp_fetch_ssl_c_err, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_i_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_x_i_dn, ARG2(0,STR,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_key_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_notafter", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_notbefore", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_sig_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_sig_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_s_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_x_s_dn, ARG2(0,STR,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_serial", smp_fetch_ssl_x_serial, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_sha1", smp_fetch_ssl_x_sha1, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_used", smp_fetch_ssl_c_used, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_verify", smp_fetch_ssl_c_verify, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_version", smp_fetch_ssl_x_version, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_f_i_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_x_i_dn, ARG2(0,STR,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_f_key_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_f_notafter", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_f_notbefore", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_f_sig_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_sig_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_f_s_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_x_s_dn, ARG2(0,STR,SINT), NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_f_serial", smp_fetch_ssl_x_serial, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_f_sha1", smp_fetch_ssl_x_sha1, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_f_version", smp_fetch_ssl_x_version, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc", smp_fetch_ssl_fc, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc_alg_keysize", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc_cipher", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc_has_crt", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_has_crt, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc_has_sni", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_has_sni, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
#ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
{ "ssl_fc_npn", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_npn, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
{ "ssl_fc_alpn", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alpn, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
#endif
{ "ssl_fc_protocol", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_protocol, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc_unique_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_unique_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc_use_keysize", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_use_keysize, 0, NULL, SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc_session_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc_sni", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_sni, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
}};
/* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten.
* Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted.
*/
static struct acl_kw_list acl_kws = {ILH, {
{ "ssl_fc_sni_end", "ssl_fc_sni", PAT_MATCH_END },
{ "ssl_fc_sni_reg", "ssl_fc_sni", PAT_MATCH_REG },
{ /* END */ },
}};
/* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten.
* Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted, doing so helps
* all code contributors.
* Optional keywords are also declared with a NULL ->parse() function so that
* the config parser can report an appropriate error when a known keyword was
* not enabled.
*/
static struct bind_kw_list bind_kws = { "SSL", { }, {
{ "alpn", bind_parse_alpn, 1 }, /* set ALPN supported protocols */
{ "ca-file", bind_parse_ca_file, 1 }, /* set CAfile to process verify on client cert */
{ "ca-ignore-err", bind_parse_ignore_err, 1 }, /* set error IDs to ignore on verify depth > 0 */
{ "ciphers", bind_parse_ciphers, 1 }, /* set SSL cipher suite */
{ "crl-file", bind_parse_crl_file, 1 }, /* set certificat revocation list file use on client cert verify */
{ "crt", bind_parse_crt, 1 }, /* load SSL certificates from this location */
{ "crt-ignore-err", bind_parse_ignore_err, 1 }, /* set error IDs to ingore on verify depth == 0 */
{ "crt-list", bind_parse_crt_list, 1 }, /* load a list of crt from this location */
{ "ecdhe", bind_parse_ecdhe, 1 }, /* defines named curve for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman */
{ "force-sslv3", bind_parse_force_sslv3, 0 }, /* force SSLv3 */
{ "force-tlsv10", bind_parse_force_tlsv10, 0 }, /* force TLSv10 */
{ "force-tlsv11", bind_parse_force_tlsv11, 0 }, /* force TLSv11 */
{ "force-tlsv12", bind_parse_force_tlsv12, 0 }, /* force TLSv12 */
{ "no-sslv3", bind_parse_no_sslv3, 0 }, /* disable SSLv3 */
{ "no-tlsv10", bind_parse_no_tlsv10, 0 }, /* disable TLSv10 */
{ "no-tlsv11", bind_parse_no_tlsv11, 0 }, /* disable TLSv11 */
{ "no-tlsv12", bind_parse_no_tlsv12, 0 }, /* disable TLSv12 */
{ "no-tls-tickets", bind_parse_no_tls_tickets, 0 }, /* disable session resumption tickets */
{ "ssl", bind_parse_ssl, 0 }, /* enable SSL processing */
{ "strict-sni", bind_parse_strict_sni, 0 }, /* refuse negotiation if sni doesn't match a certificate */
{ "verify", bind_parse_verify, 1 }, /* set SSL verify method */
{ "npn", bind_parse_npn, 1 }, /* set NPN supported protocols */
{ NULL, NULL, 0 },
}};
/* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten.
* Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted, doing so helps
* all code contributors.
* Optional keywords are also declared with a NULL ->parse() function so that
* the config parser can report an appropriate error when a known keyword was
* not enabled.
*/
static struct srv_kw_list srv_kws = { "SSL", { }, {
{ "ca-file", srv_parse_ca_file, 1, 0 }, /* set CAfile to process verify server cert */
{ "check-ssl", srv_parse_check_ssl, 0, 0 }, /* enable SSL for health checks */
{ "ciphers", srv_parse_ciphers, 1, 0 }, /* select the cipher suite */
{ "crl-file", srv_parse_crl_file, 1, 0 }, /* set certificate revocation list file use on server cert verify */
{ "crt", srv_parse_crt, 1, 0 }, /* set client certificate */
{ "force-sslv3", srv_parse_force_sslv3, 0, 0 }, /* force SSLv3 */
{ "force-tlsv10", srv_parse_force_tlsv10, 0, 0 }, /* force TLSv10 */
{ "force-tlsv11", srv_parse_force_tlsv11, 0, 0 }, /* force TLSv11 */
{ "force-tlsv12", srv_parse_force_tlsv12, 0, 0 }, /* force TLSv12 */
{ "no-sslv3", srv_parse_no_sslv3, 0, 0 }, /* disable SSLv3 */
{ "no-tlsv10", srv_parse_no_tlsv10, 0, 0 }, /* disable TLSv10 */
{ "no-tlsv11", srv_parse_no_tlsv11, 0, 0 }, /* disable TLSv11 */
{ "no-tlsv12", srv_parse_no_tlsv12, 0, 0 }, /* disable TLSv12 */
{ "no-tls-tickets", srv_parse_no_tls_tickets, 0, 0 }, /* disable session resumption tickets */
{ "send-proxy-v2-ssl", srv_parse_send_proxy_ssl, 0, 0 }, /* send PROXY protocol header v2 with SSL info */
{ "send-proxy-v2-ssl-cn", srv_parse_send_proxy_cn, 0, 0 }, /* send PROXY protocol header v2 with CN */
{ "ssl", srv_parse_ssl, 0, 0 }, /* enable SSL processing */
{ "verify", srv_parse_verify, 1, 0 }, /* set SSL verify method */
{ "verifyhost", srv_parse_verifyhost, 1, 0 }, /* require that SSL cert verifies for hostname */
{ NULL, NULL, 0, 0 },
}};
/* transport-layer operations for SSL sockets */
struct xprt_ops ssl_sock = {
.snd_buf = ssl_sock_from_buf,
.rcv_buf = ssl_sock_to_buf,
.rcv_pipe = NULL,
.snd_pipe = NULL,
.shutr = NULL,
.shutw = ssl_sock_shutw,
.close = ssl_sock_close,
.init = ssl_sock_init,
};
__attribute__((constructor))
static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)* cm;
#ifdef LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS
global.listen_default_ciphers = LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS;
#endif
#ifdef CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS
global.connect_default_ciphers = CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS;
#endif
if (global.listen_default_ciphers)
global.listen_default_ciphers = strdup(global.listen_default_ciphers);
if (global.connect_default_ciphers)
global.connect_default_ciphers = strdup(global.connect_default_ciphers);
SSL_library_init();
cm = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
sk_SSL_COMP_zero(cm);
sample_register_fetches(&sample_fetch_keywords);
acl_register_keywords(&acl_kws);
bind_register_keywords(&bind_kws);
srv_register_keywords(&srv_kws);
}
/*
* Local variables:
* c-indent-level: 8
* c-basic-offset: 8
* End:
*/