| |
| /* |
| * SSL/TLS transport layer over SOCK_STREAM sockets |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2012 EXCELIANCE, Emeric Brun <ebrun@exceliance.fr> |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
| * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License |
| * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version |
| * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. |
| * |
| * Acknowledgement: |
| * We'd like to specially thank the Stud project authors for a very clean |
| * and well documented code which helped us understand how the OpenSSL API |
| * ought to be used in non-blocking mode. This is one difficult part which |
| * is not easy to get from the OpenSSL doc, and reading the Stud code made |
| * it much more obvious than the examples in the OpenSSL package. Keep up |
| * the good works, guys ! |
| * |
| * Stud is an extremely efficient and scalable SSL/TLS proxy which combines |
| * particularly well with haproxy. For more info about this project, visit : |
| * https://github.com/bumptech/stud |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| /* Note: do NOT include openssl/xxx.h here, do it in openssl-compat.h */ |
| #define _GNU_SOURCE |
| #include <ctype.h> |
| #include <dirent.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <fcntl.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| |
| #include <sys/socket.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <netdb.h> |
| #include <netinet/tcp.h> |
| |
| #include <import/lru.h> |
| #include <import/xxhash.h> |
| |
| #include <common/buffer.h> |
| #include <common/chunk.h> |
| #include <common/compat.h> |
| #include <common/config.h> |
| #include <common/debug.h> |
| #include <common/errors.h> |
| #include <common/initcall.h> |
| #include <common/openssl-compat.h> |
| #include <common/standard.h> |
| #include <common/ticks.h> |
| #include <common/time.h> |
| #include <common/base64.h> |
| |
| #include <ebpttree.h> |
| #include <ebsttree.h> |
| |
| #include <types/applet.h> |
| #include <types/cli.h> |
| #include <types/global.h> |
| #include <types/ssl_sock.h> |
| #include <types/stats.h> |
| |
| #include <proto/acl.h> |
| #include <proto/arg.h> |
| #include <proto/channel.h> |
| #include <proto/connection.h> |
| #include <proto/cli.h> |
| #include <proto/fd.h> |
| #include <proto/freq_ctr.h> |
| #include <proto/frontend.h> |
| #include <proto/http_rules.h> |
| #include <proto/listener.h> |
| #include <proto/pattern.h> |
| #include <proto/proto_tcp.h> |
| #include <proto/http_ana.h> |
| #include <proto/server.h> |
| #include <proto/stream_interface.h> |
| #include <proto/log.h> |
| #include <proto/proxy.h> |
| #include <proto/shctx.h> |
| #include <proto/ssl_ckch.h> |
| #include <proto/ssl_crtlist.h> |
| #include <proto/ssl_sock.h> |
| #include <proto/ssl_utils.h> |
| #include <proto/stream.h> |
| #include <proto/task.h> |
| #include <proto/vars.h> |
| |
| /* ***** READ THIS before adding code here! ***** |
| * |
| * Due to API incompatibilities between multiple OpenSSL versions and their |
| * derivatives, it's often tempting to add macros to (re-)define certain |
| * symbols. Please do not do this here, and do it in common/openssl-compat.h |
| * exclusively so that the whole code consistently uses the same macros. |
| * |
| * Whenever possible if a macro is missing in certain versions, it's better |
| * to conditionally define it in openssl-compat.h than using lots of ifdefs. |
| */ |
| |
| int sslconns = 0; |
| int totalsslconns = 0; |
| int nb_engines = 0; |
| |
| static struct eb_root cert_issuer_tree = EB_ROOT; /* issuers tree from "issuers-chain-path" */ |
| |
| struct global_ssl global_ssl = { |
| #ifdef LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS |
| .listen_default_ciphers = LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS, |
| #endif |
| #ifdef CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS |
| .connect_default_ciphers = CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS, |
| #endif |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| #ifdef LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES |
| .listen_default_ciphersuites = LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES, |
| #endif |
| #ifdef CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES |
| .connect_default_ciphersuites = CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES, |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| .listen_default_ssloptions = BC_SSL_O_NONE, |
| .connect_default_ssloptions = SRV_SSL_O_NONE, |
| |
| .listen_default_sslmethods.flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL, |
| .listen_default_sslmethods.min = CONF_TLSV_NONE, |
| .listen_default_sslmethods.max = CONF_TLSV_NONE, |
| .connect_default_sslmethods.flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL, |
| .connect_default_sslmethods.min = CONF_TLSV_NONE, |
| .connect_default_sslmethods.max = CONF_TLSV_NONE, |
| |
| #ifdef DEFAULT_SSL_MAX_RECORD |
| .max_record = DEFAULT_SSL_MAX_RECORD, |
| #endif |
| .default_dh_param = SSL_DEFAULT_DH_PARAM, |
| .ctx_cache = DEFAULT_SSL_CTX_CACHE, |
| .capture_cipherlist = 0, |
| .extra_files = SSL_GF_ALL, |
| }; |
| |
| static BIO_METHOD *ha_meth; |
| |
| DECLARE_STATIC_POOL(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, "ssl_sock_ctx_pool", sizeof(struct ssl_sock_ctx)); |
| |
| static struct task *ssl_sock_io_cb(struct task *, void *, unsigned short); |
| static int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsigned int flag); |
| |
| /* Methods to implement OpenSSL BIO */ |
| static int ha_ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num) |
| { |
| struct buffer tmpbuf; |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| int ret; |
| |
| ctx = BIO_get_data(h); |
| tmpbuf.size = num; |
| tmpbuf.area = (void *)(uintptr_t)buf; |
| tmpbuf.data = num; |
| tmpbuf.head = 0; |
| ret = ctx->xprt->snd_buf(ctx->conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, &tmpbuf, num, 0); |
| if (ret == 0 && !(ctx->conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH))) { |
| BIO_set_retry_write(h); |
| ret = -1; |
| } else if (ret == 0) |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(h); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int ha_ssl_gets(BIO *h, char *buf, int size) |
| { |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int ha_ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str) |
| { |
| |
| return ha_ssl_write(h, str, strlen(str)); |
| } |
| |
| static int ha_ssl_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size) |
| { |
| struct buffer tmpbuf; |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| int ret; |
| |
| ctx = BIO_get_data(h); |
| tmpbuf.size = size; |
| tmpbuf.area = buf; |
| tmpbuf.data = 0; |
| tmpbuf.head = 0; |
| ret = ctx->xprt->rcv_buf(ctx->conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, &tmpbuf, size, 0); |
| if (ret == 0 && !(ctx->conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH))) { |
| BIO_set_retry_read(h); |
| ret = -1; |
| } else if (ret == 0) |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(h); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static long ha_ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| switch (cmd) { |
| case BIO_CTRL_DUP: |
| case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: |
| ret = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int ha_ssl_new(BIO *h) |
| { |
| BIO_set_init(h, 1); |
| BIO_set_data(h, NULL); |
| BIO_clear_flags(h, ~0); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ha_ssl_free(BIO *data) |
| { |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #if defined(USE_THREAD) && (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) |
| |
| static HA_RWLOCK_T *ssl_rwlocks; |
| |
| |
| unsigned long ssl_id_function(void) |
| { |
| return (unsigned long)tid; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_locking_function(int mode, int n, const char * file, int line) |
| { |
| if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) { |
| if (mode & CRYPTO_READ) |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SSL_LOCK, &ssl_rwlocks[n]); |
| else |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SSL_LOCK, &ssl_rwlocks[n]); |
| } |
| else { |
| if (mode & CRYPTO_READ) |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SSL_LOCK, &ssl_rwlocks[n]); |
| else |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_LOCK, &ssl_rwlocks[n]); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_locking_init(void) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| ssl_rwlocks = malloc(sizeof(HA_RWLOCK_T)*CRYPTO_num_locks()); |
| if (!ssl_rwlocks) |
| return -1; |
| |
| for (i = 0 ; i < CRYPTO_num_locks() ; i++) |
| HA_RWLOCK_INIT(&ssl_rwlocks[i]); |
| |
| CRYPTO_set_id_callback(ssl_id_function); |
| CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(ssl_locking_function); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| __decl_hathreads(HA_SPINLOCK_T ckch_lock); |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * deduplicate cafile (and crlfile) |
| */ |
| struct cafile_entry { |
| X509_STORE *ca_store; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list; |
| struct ebmb_node node; |
| char path[0]; |
| }; |
| |
| static struct eb_root cafile_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE; |
| |
| static X509_STORE* ssl_store_get0_locations_file(char *path) |
| { |
| struct ebmb_node *eb; |
| |
| eb = ebst_lookup(&cafile_tree, path); |
| if (eb) { |
| struct cafile_entry *ca_e; |
| ca_e = ebmb_entry(eb, struct cafile_entry, node); |
| return ca_e->ca_store; |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_store_load_locations_file(char *path) |
| { |
| if (ssl_store_get0_locations_file(path) == NULL) { |
| struct cafile_entry *ca_e; |
| X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new(); |
| if (X509_STORE_load_locations(store, path, NULL)) { |
| int pathlen; |
| pathlen = strlen(path); |
| ca_e = calloc(1, sizeof(*ca_e) + pathlen + 1); |
| if (ca_e) { |
| memcpy(ca_e->path, path, pathlen + 1); |
| ca_e->ca_store = store; |
| ebst_insert(&cafile_tree, &ca_e->node); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| X509_STORE_free(store); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* mimic what X509_STORE_load_locations do with store_ctx */ |
| static int ssl_set_cert_crl_file(X509_STORE *store_ctx, char *path) |
| { |
| X509_STORE *store; |
| store = ssl_store_get0_locations_file(path); |
| if (store_ctx && store) { |
| int i; |
| X509_OBJECT *obj; |
| STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *objs = X509_STORE_get0_objects(store); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(objs); i++) { |
| obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(objs, i); |
| switch (X509_OBJECT_get_type(obj)) { |
| case X509_LU_X509: |
| X509_STORE_add_cert(store_ctx, X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(obj)); |
| break; |
| case X509_LU_CRL: |
| X509_STORE_add_crl(store_ctx, X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj)); |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations substitute, internally call X509_STORE_load_locations */ |
| static int ssl_set_verify_locations_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *path) |
| { |
| X509_STORE *store_ctx = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); |
| return ssl_set_cert_crl_file(store_ctx, path); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| Extract CA_list from CA_file already in tree. |
| Duplicate ca_name is tracking with ebtree. It's simplify openssl compatibility. |
| Return a shared ca_list: SSL_dup_CA_list must be used before set it on SSL_CTX. |
| */ |
| static STACK_OF(X509_NAME)* ssl_get_client_ca_file(char *path) |
| { |
| struct ebmb_node *eb; |
| struct cafile_entry *ca_e; |
| |
| eb = ebst_lookup(&cafile_tree, path); |
| if (!eb) |
| return NULL; |
| ca_e = ebmb_entry(eb, struct cafile_entry, node); |
| |
| if (ca_e->ca_list == NULL) { |
| int i; |
| unsigned long key; |
| struct eb_root ca_name_tree = EB_ROOT; |
| struct eb64_node *node, *back; |
| struct { |
| struct eb64_node node; |
| X509_NAME *xname; |
| } *ca_name; |
| STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *objs; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *skn; |
| X509 *x; |
| X509_NAME *xn; |
| |
| skn = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); |
| /* take x509 from cafile_tree */ |
| objs = X509_STORE_get0_objects(ca_e->ca_store); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(objs); i++) { |
| x = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(sk_X509_OBJECT_value(objs, i)); |
| if (!x) |
| continue; |
| xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); |
| if (!xn) |
| continue; |
| /* Check for duplicates. */ |
| key = X509_NAME_hash(xn); |
| for (node = eb64_lookup(&ca_name_tree, key), ca_name = NULL; |
| node && ca_name == NULL; |
| node = eb64_next(node)) { |
| ca_name = container_of(node, typeof(*ca_name), node); |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn, ca_name->xname) != 0) |
| ca_name = NULL; |
| } |
| /* find a duplicate */ |
| if (ca_name) |
| continue; |
| ca_name = calloc(1, sizeof *ca_name); |
| xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); |
| if (!ca_name || |
| !xn || |
| !sk_X509_NAME_push(skn, xn)) { |
| free(ca_name); |
| X509_NAME_free(xn); |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(skn, X509_NAME_free); |
| sk_X509_NAME_free(skn); |
| skn = NULL; |
| break; |
| } |
| ca_name->node.key = key; |
| ca_name->xname = xn; |
| eb64_insert(&ca_name_tree, &ca_name->node); |
| } |
| ca_e->ca_list = skn; |
| /* remove temporary ca_name tree */ |
| node = eb64_first(&ca_name_tree); |
| while (node) { |
| ca_name = container_of(node, typeof(*ca_name), node); |
| back = eb64_next(node); |
| eb64_delete(node); |
| free(ca_name); |
| node = back; |
| } |
| } |
| return ca_e->ca_list; |
| } |
| |
| struct pool_head *pool_head_ssl_capture = NULL; |
| int ssl_capture_ptr_index = -1; |
| static int ssl_app_data_index = -1; |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| struct list tlskeys_reference = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tlskeys_reference); |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| unsigned int openssl_engines_initialized; |
| struct list openssl_engines = LIST_HEAD_INIT(openssl_engines); |
| struct ssl_engine_list { |
| struct list list; |
| ENGINE *e; |
| }; |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| static int ssl_dh_ptr_index = -1; |
| static DH *global_dh = NULL; |
| static DH *local_dh_1024 = NULL; |
| static DH *local_dh_2048 = NULL; |
| static DH *local_dh_4096 = NULL; |
| static DH *ssl_get_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen); |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME && !defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES) |
| /* X509V3 Extensions that will be added on generated certificates */ |
| #define X509V3_EXT_SIZE 5 |
| static char *x509v3_ext_names[X509V3_EXT_SIZE] = { |
| "basicConstraints", |
| "nsComment", |
| "subjectKeyIdentifier", |
| "authorityKeyIdentifier", |
| "keyUsage", |
| }; |
| static char *x509v3_ext_values[X509V3_EXT_SIZE] = { |
| "CA:FALSE", |
| "\"OpenSSL Generated Certificate\"", |
| "hash", |
| "keyid,issuer:always", |
| "nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment" |
| }; |
| /* LRU cache to store generated certificate */ |
| static struct lru64_head *ssl_ctx_lru_tree = NULL; |
| static unsigned int ssl_ctx_lru_seed = 0; |
| static unsigned int ssl_ctx_serial; |
| __decl_rwlock(ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| |
| #endif // SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| |
| #if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL |
| /* The order here matters for picking a default context, |
| * keep the most common keytype at the bottom of the list |
| */ |
| const char *SSL_SOCK_KEYTYPE_NAMES[] = { |
| "dsa", |
| "ecdsa", |
| "rsa" |
| }; |
| #endif |
| |
| static struct shared_context *ssl_shctx = NULL; /* ssl shared session cache */ |
| static struct eb_root *sh_ssl_sess_tree; /* ssl shared session tree */ |
| |
| /* Dedicated callback functions for heartbeat and clienthello. |
| */ |
| #ifdef TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT |
| static void ssl_sock_parse_heartbeat(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version, |
| int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, |
| SSL *ssl); |
| #endif |
| static void ssl_sock_parse_clienthello(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version, |
| int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, |
| SSL *ssl); |
| |
| /* List head of all registered SSL/TLS protocol message callbacks. */ |
| struct list ssl_sock_msg_callbacks = LIST_HEAD_INIT(ssl_sock_msg_callbacks); |
| |
| /* Registers the function <func> in order to be called on SSL/TLS protocol |
| * message processing. It will return 0 if the function <func> is not set |
| * or if it fails to allocate memory. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(ssl_sock_msg_callback_func func) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_msg_callback *cbk; |
| |
| if (!func) |
| return 0; |
| |
| cbk = calloc(1, sizeof(*cbk)); |
| if (!cbk) { |
| ha_alert("out of memory in ssl_sock_register_msg_callback().\n"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| cbk->func = func; |
| |
| LIST_ADDQ(&ssl_sock_msg_callbacks, &cbk->list); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Used to register dedicated SSL/TLS protocol message callbacks. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_register_msg_callbacks(void) |
| { |
| #ifdef TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT |
| if (!ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(ssl_sock_parse_heartbeat)) |
| return ERR_ABORT; |
| #endif |
| if (global_ssl.capture_cipherlist > 0) { |
| if (!ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(ssl_sock_parse_clienthello)) |
| return ERR_ABORT; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Used to free all SSL/TLS protocol message callbacks that were |
| * registered by using ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(). |
| */ |
| static void ssl_sock_unregister_msg_callbacks(void) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_msg_callback *cbk, *cbkback; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_safe(cbk, cbkback, &ssl_sock_msg_callbacks, list) { |
| LIST_DEL(&cbk->list); |
| free(cbk); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| SSL *ssl_sock_get_ssl_object(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return ((struct ssl_sock_ctx *)(conn->xprt_ctx))->ssl; |
| } |
| /* |
| * This function gives the detail of the SSL error. It is used only |
| * if the debug mode and the verbose mode are activated. It dump all |
| * the SSL error until the stack was empty. |
| */ |
| static forceinline void ssl_sock_dump_errors(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| unsigned long ret; |
| |
| if (unlikely(global.mode & MODE_DEBUG)) { |
| while(1) { |
| ret = ERR_get_error(); |
| if (ret == 0) |
| return; |
| fprintf(stderr, "fd[%04x] OpenSSL error[0x%lx] %s: %s\n", |
| (unsigned short)conn->handle.fd, ret, |
| ERR_func_error_string(ret), ERR_reason_error_string(ret)); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| int ssl_init_single_engine(const char *engine_id, const char *def_algorithms) |
| { |
| int err_code = ERR_ABORT; |
| ENGINE *engine; |
| struct ssl_engine_list *el; |
| |
| /* grab the structural reference to the engine */ |
| engine = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id); |
| if (engine == NULL) { |
| ha_alert("ssl-engine %s: failed to get structural reference\n", engine_id); |
| goto fail_get; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { |
| /* the engine couldn't initialise, release it */ |
| ha_alert("ssl-engine %s: failed to initialize\n", engine_id); |
| goto fail_init; |
| } |
| |
| if (ENGINE_set_default_string(engine, def_algorithms) == 0) { |
| ha_alert("ssl-engine %s: failed on ENGINE_set_default_string\n", engine_id); |
| goto fail_set_method; |
| } |
| |
| el = calloc(1, sizeof(*el)); |
| el->e = engine; |
| LIST_ADD(&openssl_engines, &el->list); |
| nb_engines++; |
| if (global_ssl.async) |
| global.ssl_used_async_engines = nb_engines; |
| return 0; |
| |
| fail_set_method: |
| /* release the functional reference from ENGINE_init() */ |
| ENGINE_finish(engine); |
| |
| fail_init: |
| /* release the structural reference from ENGINE_by_id() */ |
| ENGINE_free(engine); |
| |
| fail_get: |
| return err_code; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| /* |
| * openssl async fd handler |
| */ |
| void ssl_async_fd_handler(int fd) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = fdtab[fd].owner; |
| |
| /* fd is an async enfine fd, we must stop |
| * to poll this fd until it is requested |
| */ |
| fd_stop_recv(fd); |
| fd_cant_recv(fd); |
| |
| /* crypto engine is available, let's notify the associated |
| * connection that it can pursue its processing. |
| */ |
| ssl_sock_io_cb(NULL, ctx, 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * openssl async delayed SSL_free handler |
| */ |
| void ssl_async_fd_free(int fd) |
| { |
| SSL *ssl = fdtab[fd].owner; |
| OSSL_ASYNC_FD all_fd[32]; |
| size_t num_all_fds = 0; |
| int i; |
| |
| /* We suppose that the async job for a same SSL * |
| * are serialized. So if we are awake it is |
| * because the running job has just finished |
| * and we can remove all async fds safely |
| */ |
| SSL_get_all_async_fds(ssl, NULL, &num_all_fds); |
| if (num_all_fds > 32) { |
| send_log(NULL, LOG_EMERG, "haproxy: openssl returns too many async fds. It seems a bug. Process may crash\n"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_get_all_async_fds(ssl, all_fd, &num_all_fds); |
| for (i=0 ; i < num_all_fds ; i++) |
| fd_remove(all_fd[i]); |
| |
| /* Now we can safely call SSL_free, no more pending job in engines */ |
| SSL_free(ssl); |
| _HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&sslconns, 1); |
| _HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&jobs, 1); |
| } |
| /* |
| * function used to manage a returned SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC |
| * and enable/disable polling for async fds |
| */ |
| static inline void ssl_async_process_fds(struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx) |
| { |
| OSSL_ASYNC_FD add_fd[32]; |
| OSSL_ASYNC_FD del_fd[32]; |
| SSL *ssl = ctx->ssl; |
| size_t num_add_fds = 0; |
| size_t num_del_fds = 0; |
| int i; |
| |
| SSL_get_changed_async_fds(ssl, NULL, &num_add_fds, NULL, |
| &num_del_fds); |
| if (num_add_fds > 32 || num_del_fds > 32) { |
| send_log(NULL, LOG_EMERG, "haproxy: openssl returns too many async fds. It seems a bug. Process may crash\n"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_get_changed_async_fds(ssl, add_fd, &num_add_fds, del_fd, &num_del_fds); |
| |
| /* We remove unused fds from the fdtab */ |
| for (i=0 ; i < num_del_fds ; i++) |
| fd_remove(del_fd[i]); |
| |
| /* We add new fds to the fdtab */ |
| for (i=0 ; i < num_add_fds ; i++) { |
| fd_insert(add_fd[i], ctx, ssl_async_fd_handler, tid_bit); |
| } |
| |
| num_add_fds = 0; |
| SSL_get_all_async_fds(ssl, NULL, &num_add_fds); |
| if (num_add_fds > 32) { |
| send_log(NULL, LOG_EMERG, "haproxy: openssl returns too many async fds. It seems a bug. Process may crash\n"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* We activate the polling for all known async fds */ |
| SSL_get_all_async_fds(ssl, add_fd, &num_add_fds); |
| for (i=0 ; i < num_add_fds ; i++) { |
| fd_want_recv(add_fd[i]); |
| /* To ensure that the fd cache won't be used |
| * We'll prefer to catch a real RD event |
| * because handling an EAGAIN on this fd will |
| * result in a context switch and also |
| * some engines uses a fd in blocking mode. |
| */ |
| fd_cant_recv(add_fd[i]); |
| } |
| |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) |
| /* |
| * This function returns the number of seconds elapsed |
| * since the Epoch, 1970-01-01 00:00:00 +0000 (UTC) and the |
| * date presented un ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME. |
| * |
| * In parsing error case, it returns -1. |
| */ |
| static long asn1_generalizedtime_to_epoch(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d) |
| { |
| long epoch; |
| char *p, *end; |
| const unsigned short month_offset[12] = { |
| 0, 31, 59, 90, 120, 151, 181, 212, 243, 273, 304, 334 |
| }; |
| int year, month; |
| |
| if (!d || (d->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) return -1; |
| |
| p = (char *)d->data; |
| end = p + d->length; |
| |
| if (end - p < 4) return -1; |
| year = 1000 * (p[0] - '0') + 100 * (p[1] - '0') + 10 * (p[2] - '0') + p[3] - '0'; |
| p += 4; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| month = 10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0'; |
| if (month < 1 || month > 12) return -1; |
| /* Compute the number of seconds since 1 jan 1970 and the beginning of current month |
| We consider leap years and the current month (<marsh or not) */ |
| epoch = ( ((year - 1970) * 365) |
| + ((year - (month < 3)) / 4 - (year - (month < 3)) / 100 + (year - (month < 3)) / 400) |
| - ((1970 - 1) / 4 - (1970 - 1) / 100 + (1970 - 1) / 400) |
| + month_offset[month-1] |
| ) * 24 * 60 * 60; |
| p += 2; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| /* Add the number of seconds of completed days of current month */ |
| epoch += (10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0' - 1) * 24 * 60 * 60; |
| p += 2; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| /* Add the completed hours of the current day */ |
| epoch += (10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0') * 60 * 60; |
| p += 2; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| /* Add the completed minutes of the current hour */ |
| epoch += (10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0') * 60; |
| p += 2; |
| if (p == end) return -1; |
| /* Test if there is available seconds */ |
| if (p[0] < '0' || p[0] > '9') |
| goto nosec; |
| if (end - p < 2) return -1; |
| /* Add the seconds of the current minute */ |
| epoch += 10 * (p[0] - '0') + p[1] - '0'; |
| p += 2; |
| if (p == end) return -1; |
| /* Ignore seconds float part if present */ |
| if (p[0] == '.') { |
| do { |
| if (++p == end) return -1; |
| } while (p[0] >= '0' && p[0] <= '9'); |
| } |
| |
| nosec: |
| if (p[0] == 'Z') { |
| if (end - p != 1) return -1; |
| return epoch; |
| } |
| else if (p[0] == '+') { |
| if (end - p != 5) return -1; |
| /* Apply timezone offset */ |
| return epoch - ((10 * (p[1] - '0') + p[2] - '0') * 60 * 60 + (10 * (p[3] - '0') + p[4] - '0')) * 60; |
| } |
| else if (p[0] == '-') { |
| if (end - p != 5) return -1; |
| /* Apply timezone offset */ |
| return epoch + ((10 * (p[1] - '0') + p[2] - '0') * 60 * 60 + (10 * (p[3] - '0') + p[4] - '0')) * 60; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * struct alignment works here such that the key.key is the same as key_data |
| * Do not change the placement of key_data |
| */ |
| struct certificate_ocsp { |
| struct ebmb_node key; |
| unsigned char key_data[OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH]; |
| struct buffer response; |
| long expire; |
| }; |
| |
| struct ocsp_cbk_arg { |
| int is_single; |
| int single_kt; |
| union { |
| struct certificate_ocsp *s_ocsp; |
| /* |
| * m_ocsp will have multiple entries dependent on key type |
| * Entry 0 - DSA |
| * Entry 1 - ECDSA |
| * Entry 2 - RSA |
| */ |
| struct certificate_ocsp *m_ocsp[SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES]; |
| }; |
| }; |
| |
| static struct eb_root cert_ocsp_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE; |
| |
| /* This function starts to check if the OCSP response (in DER format) contained |
| * in chunk 'ocsp_response' is valid (else exits on error). |
| * If 'cid' is not NULL, it will be compared to the OCSP certificate ID |
| * contained in the OCSP Response and exits on error if no match. |
| * If it's a valid OCSP Response: |
| * If 'ocsp' is not NULL, the chunk is copied in the OCSP response's container |
| * pointed by 'ocsp'. |
| * If 'ocsp' is NULL, the function looks up into the OCSP response's |
| * containers tree (using as index the ASN1 form of the OCSP Certificate ID extracted |
| * from the response) and exits on error if not found. Finally, If an OCSP response is |
| * already present in the container, it will be overwritten. |
| * |
| * Note: OCSP response containing more than one OCSP Single response is not |
| * considered valid. |
| * |
| * Returns 0 on success, 1 in error case. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response(struct buffer *ocsp_response, |
| struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp, |
| OCSP_CERTID *cid, char **err) |
| { |
| OCSP_RESPONSE *resp; |
| OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL; |
| OCSP_SINGLERESP *sr; |
| OCSP_CERTID *id; |
| unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) ocsp_response->area; |
| int rc , count_sr; |
| ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *revtime, *thisupd, *nextupd = NULL; |
| int reason; |
| int ret = 1; |
| |
| resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, |
| ocsp_response->data); |
| if (!resp) { |
| memprintf(err, "Unable to parse OCSP response"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| rc = OCSP_response_status(resp); |
| if (rc != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP response status not successful"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp); |
| if (!bs) { |
| memprintf(err, "Failed to get basic response from OCSP Response"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| count_sr = OCSP_resp_count(bs); |
| if (count_sr > 1) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP response ignored because contains multiple single responses (%d)", count_sr); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| sr = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0); |
| if (!sr) { |
| memprintf(err, "Failed to get OCSP single response"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| id = (OCSP_CERTID*)OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(sr); |
| |
| rc = OCSP_single_get0_status(sr, &reason, &revtime, &thisupd, &nextupd); |
| if (rc != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD && rc != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: certificate status is unknown"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (!nextupd) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: missing nextupdate"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| rc = OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, OCSP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_SKEW, -1); |
| if (!rc) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: no longer valid."); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (cid) { |
| if (OCSP_id_cmp(id, cid)) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Certificate ID does not match certificate and issuer"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!ocsp) { |
| unsigned char key[OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| |
| rc = i2d_OCSP_CERTID(id, NULL); |
| if (!rc) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Unable to encode Certificate ID"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (rc > OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Certificate ID too long"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| p = key; |
| memset(key, 0, OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH); |
| i2d_OCSP_CERTID(id, &p); |
| ocsp = (struct certificate_ocsp *)ebmb_lookup(&cert_ocsp_tree, key, OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH); |
| if (!ocsp) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP single response: Certificate ID does not match any certificate or issuer"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* According to comments on "chunk_dup", the |
| previous chunk buffer will be freed */ |
| if (!chunk_dup(&ocsp->response, ocsp_response)) { |
| memprintf(err, "OCSP response: Memory allocation error"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| ocsp->expire = asn1_generalizedtime_to_epoch(nextupd) - OCSP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_SKEW; |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| out: |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| if (bs) |
| OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs); |
| |
| if (resp) |
| OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| /* |
| * External function use to update the OCSP response in the OCSP response's |
| * containers tree. The chunk 'ocsp_response' must contain the OCSP response |
| * to update in DER format. |
| * |
| * Returns 0 on success, 1 in error case. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_update_ocsp_response(struct buffer *ocsp_response, char **err) |
| { |
| return ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response(ocsp_response, NULL, NULL, err); |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| static int ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) |
| { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref; |
| union tls_sess_key *keys; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| int head; |
| int i; |
| int ret = -1; /* error by default */ |
| |
| conn = SSL_get_ex_data(s, ssl_app_data_index); |
| ref = __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->keys_ref; |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock); |
| |
| keys = ref->tlskeys; |
| head = ref->tls_ticket_enc_index; |
| |
| if (enc) { |
| memcpy(key_name, keys[head].name, 16); |
| |
| if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (ref->key_size_bits == 128) { |
| |
| if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, keys[head].key_128.aes_key, iv)) |
| goto end; |
| |
| HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[head].key_128.hmac_key, 16, TLS_TICKET_HASH_FUNCT(), NULL); |
| ret = 1; |
| } |
| else if (ref->key_size_bits == 256 ) { |
| |
| if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, keys[head].key_256.aes_key, iv)) |
| goto end; |
| |
| HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[head].key_256.hmac_key, 32, TLS_TICKET_HASH_FUNCT(), NULL); |
| ret = 1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| for (i = 0; i < TLS_TICKETS_NO; i++) { |
| if (!memcmp(key_name, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].name, 16)) |
| goto found; |
| } |
| ret = 0; |
| goto end; |
| |
| found: |
| if (ref->key_size_bits == 128) { |
| HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].key_128.hmac_key, 16, TLS_TICKET_HASH_FUNCT(), NULL); |
| if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].key_128.aes_key, iv)) |
| goto end; |
| /* 2 for key renewal, 1 if current key is still valid */ |
| ret = i ? 2 : 1; |
| } |
| else if (ref->key_size_bits == 256) { |
| HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].key_256.hmac_key, 32, TLS_TICKET_HASH_FUNCT(), NULL); |
| if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, keys[(head + i) % TLS_TICKETS_NO].key_256.aes_key, iv)) |
| goto end; |
| /* 2 for key renewal, 1 if current key is still valid */ |
| ret = i ? 2 : 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| end: |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_ref_lookup(const char *filename) |
| { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(ref, &tlskeys_reference, list) |
| if (ref->filename && strcmp(filename, ref->filename) == 0) |
| return ref; |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_ref_lookupid(int unique_id) |
| { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(ref, &tlskeys_reference, list) |
| if (ref->unique_id == unique_id) |
| return ref; |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Update the key into ref: if keysize doesn't |
| * match existing ones, this function returns -1 |
| * else it returns 0 on success. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_update_tlskey_ref(struct tls_keys_ref *ref, |
| struct buffer *tlskey) |
| { |
| if (ref->key_size_bits == 128) { |
| if (tlskey->data != sizeof(struct tls_sess_key_128)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| else if (ref->key_size_bits == 256) { |
| if (tlskey->data != sizeof(struct tls_sess_key_256)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| else |
| return -1; |
| |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock); |
| memcpy((char *) (ref->tlskeys + ((ref->tls_ticket_enc_index + 2) % TLS_TICKETS_NO)), |
| tlskey->area, tlskey->data); |
| ref->tls_ticket_enc_index = (ref->tls_ticket_enc_index + 1) % TLS_TICKETS_NO; |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_sock_update_tlskey(char *filename, struct buffer *tlskey, char **err) |
| { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref = tlskeys_ref_lookup(filename); |
| |
| if(!ref) { |
| memprintf(err, "Unable to locate the referenced filename: %s", filename); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (ssl_sock_update_tlskey_ref(ref, tlskey) < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "Invalid key size"); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* This function finalize the configuration parsing. Its set all the |
| * automatic ids. It's called just after the basic checks. It returns |
| * 0 on success otherwise ERR_*. |
| */ |
| static int tlskeys_finalize_config(void) |
| { |
| int i = 0; |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref, *ref2, *ref3; |
| struct list tkr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tkr); |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(ref, &tlskeys_reference, list) { |
| if (ref->unique_id == -1) { |
| /* Look for the first free id. */ |
| while (1) { |
| list_for_each_entry(ref2, &tlskeys_reference, list) { |
| if (ref2->unique_id == i) { |
| i++; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (&ref2->list == &tlskeys_reference) |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* Uses the unique id and increment it for the next entry. */ |
| ref->unique_id = i; |
| i++; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* This sort the reference list by id. */ |
| list_for_each_entry_safe(ref, ref2, &tlskeys_reference, list) { |
| LIST_DEL(&ref->list); |
| list_for_each_entry(ref3, &tkr, list) { |
| if (ref->unique_id < ref3->unique_id) { |
| LIST_ADDQ(&ref3->list, &ref->list); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (&ref3->list == &tkr) |
| LIST_ADDQ(&tkr, &ref->list); |
| } |
| |
| /* swap root */ |
| LIST_ADD(&tkr, &tlskeys_reference); |
| LIST_DEL(&tkr); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB */ |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP |
| int ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(int evp_keytype) |
| { |
| switch (evp_keytype) { |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA: |
| return 2; |
| case EVP_PKEY_DSA: |
| return 0; |
| case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Callback used to set OCSP status extension content in server hello. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_ocsp_stapling_cbk(SSL *ssl, void *arg) |
| { |
| struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp; |
| struct ocsp_cbk_arg *ocsp_arg; |
| char *ssl_buf; |
| EVP_PKEY *ssl_pkey; |
| int key_type; |
| int index; |
| |
| ocsp_arg = arg; |
| |
| ssl_pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl); |
| if (!ssl_pkey) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| |
| key_type = EVP_PKEY_base_id(ssl_pkey); |
| |
| if (ocsp_arg->is_single && ocsp_arg->single_kt == key_type) |
| ocsp = ocsp_arg->s_ocsp; |
| else { |
| /* For multiple certs per context, we have to find the correct OCSP response based on |
| * the certificate type |
| */ |
| index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(key_type); |
| |
| if (index < 0) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| |
| ocsp = ocsp_arg->m_ocsp[index]; |
| |
| } |
| |
| if (!ocsp || |
| !ocsp->response.area || |
| !ocsp->response.data || |
| (ocsp->expire < now.tv_sec)) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| |
| ssl_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(ocsp->response.data); |
| if (!ssl_buf) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| |
| memcpy(ssl_buf, ocsp->response.area, ocsp->response.data); |
| SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, ssl_buf, ocsp->response.data); |
| |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| #if ((defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) || defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) |
| /* |
| * This function enables the handling of OCSP status extension on 'ctx' if a |
| * ocsp_response buffer was found in the cert_key_and_chain. To enable OCSP |
| * status extension, the issuer's certificate is mandatory. It should be |
| * present in ckch->ocsp_issuer. |
| * |
| * In addition, the ckch->ocsp_reponse buffer is loaded as a DER format of an |
| * OCSP response. If file is empty or content is not a valid OCSP response, |
| * OCSP status extension is enabled but OCSP response is ignored (a warning is |
| * displayed). |
| * |
| * Returns 1 if no ".ocsp" file found, 0 if OCSP status extension is |
| * successfully enabled, or -1 in other error case. |
| */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| static int ssl_sock_load_ocsp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| { |
| X509 *x, *issuer; |
| OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL; |
| int i, ret = -1; |
| struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp = NULL, *iocsp; |
| char *warn = NULL; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| void (*callback) (void); |
| |
| |
| x = ckch->cert; |
| if (!x) |
| goto out; |
| |
| issuer = ckch->ocsp_issuer; |
| /* take issuer from chain over ocsp_issuer, is what is done historicaly */ |
| if (chain) { |
| /* check if one of the certificate of the chain is the issuer */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { |
| X509 *ti = sk_X509_value(chain, i); |
| if (X509_check_issued(ti, x) == X509_V_OK) { |
| issuer = ti; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| if (!issuer) |
| goto out; |
| |
| cid = OCSP_cert_to_id(0, x, issuer); |
| if (!cid) |
| goto out; |
| |
| i = i2d_OCSP_CERTID(cid, NULL); |
| if (!i || (i > OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| ocsp = calloc(1, sizeof(*ocsp)); |
| if (!ocsp) |
| goto out; |
| |
| p = ocsp->key_data; |
| i2d_OCSP_CERTID(cid, &p); |
| |
| iocsp = (struct certificate_ocsp *)ebmb_insert(&cert_ocsp_tree, &ocsp->key, OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH); |
| if (iocsp == ocsp) |
| ocsp = NULL; |
| |
| #ifndef SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb |
| # define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cb) \ |
| *cb = (void (*) (void))ctx->tlsext_status_cb; |
| #endif |
| SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, &callback); |
| |
| if (!callback) { |
| struct ocsp_cbk_arg *cb_arg = calloc(1, sizeof(*cb_arg)); |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
| |
| cb_arg->is_single = 1; |
| cb_arg->s_ocsp = iocsp; |
| |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| cb_arg->single_kt = EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_ocsp_stapling_cbk); |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, cb_arg); |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * If the ctx has a status CB, then we have previously set an OCSP staple for this ctx |
| * Update that cb_arg with the new cert's staple |
| */ |
| struct ocsp_cbk_arg *cb_arg; |
| struct certificate_ocsp *tmp_ocsp; |
| int index; |
| int key_type; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
| |
| #ifdef SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_arg |
| SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG, 0, &cb_arg); |
| #else |
| cb_arg = ctx->tlsext_status_arg; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * The following few lines will convert cb_arg from a single ocsp to multi ocsp |
| * the order of operations below matter, take care when changing it |
| */ |
| tmp_ocsp = cb_arg->s_ocsp; |
| index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(cb_arg->single_kt); |
| cb_arg->s_ocsp = NULL; |
| cb_arg->m_ocsp[index] = tmp_ocsp; |
| cb_arg->is_single = 0; |
| cb_arg->single_kt = 0; |
| |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| key_type = EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| |
| index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(key_type); |
| if (index >= 0 && !cb_arg->m_ocsp[index]) |
| cb_arg->m_ocsp[index] = iocsp; |
| |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| warn = NULL; |
| if (ssl_sock_load_ocsp_response(ckch->ocsp_response, ocsp, cid, &warn)) { |
| memprintf(&warn, "Loading: %s. Content will be ignored", warn ? warn : "failure"); |
| ha_warning("%s.\n", warn); |
| } |
| |
| out: |
| if (cid) |
| OCSP_CERTID_free(cid); |
| |
| if (ocsp) |
| free(ocsp); |
| |
| if (warn) |
| free(warn); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_ocsp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| { |
| return SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(ctx, (const uint8_t *)ckch->ocsp_response->area, ckch->ocsp_response->data); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) |
| |
| #define CT_EXTENSION_TYPE 18 |
| |
| int sctl_ex_index = -1; |
| |
| int ssl_sock_sctl_add_cbk(SSL *ssl, unsigned ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *add_arg) |
| { |
| struct buffer *sctl = add_arg; |
| |
| *out = (unsigned char *) sctl->area; |
| *outlen = sctl->data; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_sock_sctl_parse_cbk(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *parse_arg) |
| { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_load_sctl(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct buffer *sctl) |
| { |
| int ret = -1; |
| |
| if (!SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(ctx, CT_EXTENSION_TYPE, ssl_sock_sctl_add_cbk, NULL, sctl, ssl_sock_sctl_parse_cbk, NULL)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, sctl_ex_index, sctl); |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| out: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index); |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| BIO *write_bio; |
| (void)ret; /* shut gcc stupid warning */ |
| |
| #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION |
| /* Please note that BoringSSL defines this macro to zero so don't |
| * change this to #if and do not assign a default value to this macro! |
| */ |
| if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) { |
| /* Disable renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) */ |
| if ((conn->flags & (CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN | CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_EARLY_DATA)) == 0) { |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR; |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_RENEG; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if ((where & SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) == SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) { |
| if (!(ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE)) { |
| /* Long certificate chains optimz |
| If write and read bios are different, we |
| consider that the buffering was activated, |
| so we rise the output buffer size from 4k |
| to 16k */ |
| write_bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); |
| if (write_bio != SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) { |
| BIO_set_write_buffer_size(write_bio, 16384); |
| ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Callback is called for each certificate of the chain during a verify |
| ok is set to 1 if preverify detect no error on current certificate. |
| Returns 0 to break the handshake, 1 otherwise. */ |
| int ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x_store) |
| { |
| SSL *ssl; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| int err, depth; |
| |
| ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(x_store, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); |
| conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index); |
| |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| |
| ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE; |
| |
| if (ok) /* no errors */ |
| return ok; |
| |
| depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x_store); |
| err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x_store); |
| |
| /* check if CA error needs to be ignored */ |
| if (depth > 0) { |
| if (!SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CA_ERROR(ctx->xprt_st)) { |
| ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CA_ERROR_TO_ST(err); |
| ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CAEDEPTH_TO_ST(depth); |
| } |
| |
| if (err < 64 && __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->ca_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) { |
| ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn); |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_CA_FAIL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_SOCK_ST_TO_CRTERROR(ctx->xprt_st)) |
| ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_CRTERROR_TO_ST(err); |
| |
| /* check if certificate error needs to be ignored */ |
| if (err < 64 && __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->crt_ignerr & (1ULL << err)) { |
| ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn); |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_CRT_FAIL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT |
| static void ssl_sock_parse_heartbeat(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version, |
| int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, |
| SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| /* test heartbeat received (write_p is set to 0 |
| for a received record) */ |
| if ((content_type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) && (write_p == 0)) { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| unsigned int payload; |
| |
| ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT; |
| |
| /* Check if this is a CVE-2014-0160 exploitation attempt. */ |
| if (*p != TLS1_HB_REQUEST) |
| return; |
| |
| if (len < 1 + 2 + 16) /* 1 type + 2 size + 0 payload + 16 padding */ |
| goto kill_it; |
| |
| payload = (p[1] * 256) + p[2]; |
| if (3 + payload + 16 <= len) |
| return; /* OK no problem */ |
| kill_it: |
| /* We have a clear heartbleed attack (CVE-2014-0160), the |
| * advertised payload is larger than the advertised packet |
| * length, so we have garbage in the buffer between the |
| * payload and the end of the buffer (p+len). We can't know |
| * if the SSL stack is patched, and we don't know if we can |
| * safely wipe out the area between p+3+len and payload. |
| * So instead, we prevent the response from being sent by |
| * setting the max_send_fragment to 0 and we report an SSL |
| * error, which will kill this connection. It will be reported |
| * above as SSL_ERROR_SSL while an other handshake failure with |
| * a heartbeat message will be reported as SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. |
| */ |
| ssl->max_send_fragment = 0; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static void ssl_sock_parse_clienthello(struct connection *conn, int write_p, int version, |
| int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, |
| SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| struct ssl_capture *capture; |
| unsigned char *msg; |
| unsigned char *end; |
| size_t rec_len; |
| |
| /* This function is called for "from client" and "to server" |
| * connections. The combination of write_p == 0 and content_type == 22 |
| * is only available during "from client" connection. |
| */ |
| |
| /* "write_p" is set to 0 is the bytes are received messages, |
| * otherwise it is set to 1. |
| */ |
| if (write_p != 0) |
| return; |
| |
| /* content_type contains the type of message received or sent |
| * according with the SSL/TLS protocol spec. This message is |
| * encoded with one byte. The value 256 (two bytes) is used |
| * for designing the SSL/TLS record layer. According with the |
| * rfc6101, the expected message (other than 256) are: |
| * - change_cipher_spec(20) |
| * - alert(21) |
| * - handshake(22) |
| * - application_data(23) |
| * - (255) |
| * We are interessed by the handshake and specially the client |
| * hello. |
| */ |
| if (content_type != 22) |
| return; |
| |
| /* The message length is at least 4 bytes, containing the |
| * message type and the message length. |
| */ |
| if (len < 4) |
| return; |
| |
| /* First byte of the handshake message id the type of |
| * message. The known types are: |
| * - hello_request(0) |
| * - client_hello(1) |
| * - server_hello(2) |
| * - certificate(11) |
| * - server_key_exchange (12) |
| * - certificate_request(13) |
| * - server_hello_done(14) |
| * We are interested by the client hello. |
| */ |
| msg = (unsigned char *)buf; |
| if (msg[0] != 1) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Next three bytes are the length of the message. The total length |
| * must be this decoded length + 4. If the length given as argument |
| * is not the same, we abort the protocol dissector. |
| */ |
| rec_len = (msg[1] << 16) + (msg[2] << 8) + msg[3]; |
| if (len < rec_len + 4) |
| return; |
| msg += 4; |
| end = msg + rec_len; |
| if (end < msg) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Expect 2 bytes for protocol version (1 byte for major and 1 byte |
| * for minor, the random, composed by 4 bytes for the unix time and |
| * 28 bytes for unix payload. So we jump 1 + 1 + 4 + 28. |
| */ |
| msg += 1 + 1 + 4 + 28; |
| if (msg > end) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Next, is session id: |
| * if present, we have to jump by length + 1 for the size information |
| * if not present, we have to jump by 1 only |
| */ |
| if (msg[0] > 0) |
| msg += msg[0]; |
| msg += 1; |
| if (msg > end) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Next two bytes are the ciphersuite length. */ |
| if (msg + 2 > end) |
| return; |
| rec_len = (msg[0] << 8) + msg[1]; |
| msg += 2; |
| if (msg + rec_len > end || msg + rec_len < msg) |
| return; |
| |
| capture = pool_alloc_dirty(pool_head_ssl_capture); |
| if (!capture) |
| return; |
| /* Compute the xxh64 of the ciphersuite. */ |
| capture->xxh64 = XXH64(msg, rec_len, 0); |
| |
| /* Capture the ciphersuite. */ |
| capture->ciphersuite_len = (global_ssl.capture_cipherlist < rec_len) ? |
| global_ssl.capture_cipherlist : rec_len; |
| memcpy(capture->ciphersuite, msg, capture->ciphersuite_len); |
| |
| SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, ssl_capture_ptr_index, capture); |
| } |
| |
| /* Callback is called for ssl protocol analyse */ |
| void ssl_sock_msgcbk(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index); |
| struct ssl_sock_msg_callback *cbk; |
| |
| /* Try to call all callback functions that were registered by using |
| * ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(). |
| */ |
| list_for_each_entry(cbk, &ssl_sock_msg_callbacks, list) { |
| cbk->func(conn, write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
| static int ssl_sock_srv_select_protos(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, |
| const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, |
| void *arg) |
| { |
| struct server *srv = arg; |
| |
| if (SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, (unsigned char *)srv->ssl_ctx.npn_str, |
| srv->ssl_ctx.npn_len) == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
| /* This callback is used so that the server advertises the list of |
| * negotiable protocols for NPN. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_advertise_npn_protos(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, |
| unsigned int *len, void *arg) |
| { |
| struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = arg; |
| |
| *data = (const unsigned char *)conf->npn_str; |
| *len = conf->npn_len; |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| /* This callback is used so that the server advertises the list of |
| * negotiable protocols for ALPN. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_advertise_alpn_protos(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, |
| unsigned char *outlen, |
| const unsigned char *server, |
| unsigned int server_len, void *arg) |
| { |
| struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = arg; |
| |
| if (SSL_select_next_proto((unsigned char**) out, outlen, (const unsigned char *)conf->alpn_str, |
| conf->alpn_len, server, server_len) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) { |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| } |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| #ifndef SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES |
| |
| /* Create a X509 certificate with the specified servername and serial. This |
| * function returns a SSL_CTX object or NULL if an error occurs. */ |
| static SSL_CTX * |
| ssl_sock_do_create_cert(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| X509 *cacert = bind_conf->ca_sign_cert; |
| EVP_PKEY *capkey = bind_conf->ca_sign_pkey; |
| SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL; |
| X509 *newcrt = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| SSL *tmp_ssl = NULL; |
| CONF *ctmp = NULL; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| const EVP_MD *digest; |
| X509V3_CTX ctx; |
| unsigned int i; |
| int key_type; |
| |
| /* Get the private key of the default certificate and use it */ |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L) |
| pkey = SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(bind_conf->default_ctx); |
| #else |
| tmp_ssl = SSL_new(bind_conf->default_ctx); |
| if (tmp_ssl) |
| pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(tmp_ssl); |
| #endif |
| if (!pkey) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Create the certificate */ |
| if (!(newcrt = X509_new())) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Set version number for the certificate (X509v3) and the serial |
| * number */ |
| if (X509_set_version(newcrt, 2L) != 1) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(newcrt), _HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&ssl_ctx_serial, 1)); |
| |
| /* Set duration for the certificate */ |
| if (!X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(newcrt), (long)-60*60*24) || |
| !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(newcrt),(long)60*60*24*365)) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* set public key in the certificate */ |
| if (X509_set_pubkey(newcrt, pkey) != 1) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Set issuer name from the CA */ |
| if (!(name = X509_get_subject_name(cacert))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (X509_set_issuer_name(newcrt, name) != 1) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Set the subject name using the same, but the CN */ |
| name = X509_NAME_dup(name); |
| if (X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, |
| (const unsigned char *)servername, |
| -1, -1, 0) != 1) { |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| } |
| if (X509_set_subject_name(newcrt, name) != 1) { |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| } |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| |
| /* Add x509v3 extensions as specified */ |
| ctmp = NCONF_new(NULL); |
| X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, cacert, newcrt, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| for (i = 0; i < X509V3_EXT_SIZE; i++) { |
| X509_EXTENSION *ext; |
| |
| if (!(ext = X509V3_EXT_nconf(ctmp, &ctx, x509v3_ext_names[i], x509v3_ext_values[i]))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!X509_add_ext(newcrt, ext, -1)) { |
| X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| } |
| X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); |
| } |
| |
| /* Sign the certificate with the CA private key */ |
| |
| key_type = EVP_PKEY_base_id(capkey); |
| |
| if (key_type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) |
| digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| else if (key_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
| digest = EVP_sha256(); |
| else if (key_type == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
| digest = EVP_sha256(); |
| else { |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) |
| int nid; |
| |
| if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(capkey, &nid) <= 0) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!(digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| #else |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| if (!(X509_sign(newcrt, capkey, digest))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| /* Create and set the new SSL_CTX */ |
| if (!(ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()))) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey)) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ssl_ctx, newcrt)) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx)) |
| goto mkcert_error; |
| |
| if (newcrt) X509_free(newcrt); |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ssl_ctx, ssl_get_tmp_dh); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) |
| { |
| const char *ecdhe = (bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe ? bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe : ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE); |
| EC_KEY *ecc; |
| int nid; |
| |
| if ((nid = OBJ_sn2nid(ecdhe)) == NID_undef) |
| goto end; |
| if (!(ecc = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))) |
| goto end; |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl_ctx, ecc); |
| EC_KEY_free(ecc); |
| } |
| #endif |
| end: |
| return ssl_ctx; |
| |
| mkcert_error: |
| if (ctmp) NCONF_free(ctmp); |
| if (tmp_ssl) SSL_free(tmp_ssl); |
| if (ssl_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx); |
| if (newcrt) X509_free(newcrt); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX * |
| ssl_sock_create_cert(struct connection *conn, const char *servername, unsigned int key) |
| { |
| struct bind_conf *bind_conf = __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf; |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| |
| return ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, bind_conf, ctx->ssl); |
| } |
| |
| /* Do a lookup for a certificate in the LRU cache used to store generated |
| * certificates and immediately assign it to the SSL session if not null. */ |
| SSL_CTX * |
| ssl_sock_assign_generated_cert(unsigned int key, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| struct lru64 *lru = NULL; |
| |
| if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) { |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| lru = lru64_lookup(key, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, bind_conf->ca_sign_cert, 0); |
| if (lru && lru->domain) { |
| if (ssl) |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, (SSL_CTX *)lru->data); |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| return (SSL_CTX *)lru->data; |
| } |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Same as <ssl_sock_assign_generated_cert> but without SSL session. This |
| * function is not thread-safe, it should only be used to check if a certificate |
| * exists in the lru cache (with no warranty it will not be removed by another |
| * thread). It is kept for backward compatibility. */ |
| SSL_CTX * |
| ssl_sock_get_generated_cert(unsigned int key, struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| return ssl_sock_assign_generated_cert(key, bind_conf, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* Set a certificate int the LRU cache used to store generated |
| * certificate. Return 0 on success, otherwise -1 */ |
| int |
| ssl_sock_set_generated_cert(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, unsigned int key, struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| struct lru64 *lru = NULL; |
| |
| if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) { |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| lru = lru64_get(key, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, bind_conf->ca_sign_cert, 0); |
| if (!lru) { |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (lru->domain && lru->data) |
| lru->free((SSL_CTX *)lru->data); |
| lru64_commit(lru, ssl_ctx, bind_conf->ca_sign_cert, 0, (void (*)(void *))SSL_CTX_free); |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Compute the key of the certificate. */ |
| unsigned int |
| ssl_sock_generated_cert_key(const void *data, size_t len) |
| { |
| return XXH32(data, len, ssl_ctx_lru_seed); |
| } |
| |
| /* Generate a cert and immediately assign it to the SSL session so that the cert's |
| * refcount is maintained regardless of the cert's presence in the LRU cache. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssl_sock_generate_certificate(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| X509 *cacert = bind_conf->ca_sign_cert; |
| SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL; |
| struct lru64 *lru = NULL; |
| unsigned int key; |
| |
| key = ssl_sock_generated_cert_key(servername, strlen(servername)); |
| if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) { |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| lru = lru64_get(key, ssl_ctx_lru_tree, cacert, 0); |
| if (lru && lru->domain) |
| ssl_ctx = (SSL_CTX *)lru->data; |
| if (!ssl_ctx && lru) { |
| ssl_ctx = ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, bind_conf, ssl); |
| lru64_commit(lru, ssl_ctx, cacert, 0, (void (*)(void *))SSL_CTX_free); |
| } |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ssl_ctx); |
| HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(SSL_GEN_CERTS_LOCK, &ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| else { |
| ssl_ctx = ssl_sock_do_create_cert(servername, bind_conf, ssl); |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ssl_ctx); |
| /* No LRU cache, this CTX will be released as soon as the session dies */ |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| static int |
| ssl_sock_generate_certificate_from_conn(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| unsigned int key; |
| struct connection *conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index); |
| |
| if (conn_get_dst(conn)) { |
| key = ssl_sock_generated_cert_key(conn->dst, get_addr_len(conn->dst)); |
| if (ssl_sock_assign_generated_cert(key, bind_conf, ssl)) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* !defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES */ |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL) |
| |
| static void ctx_set_SSLv3_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) |
| { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 |
| c == SET_SERVER ? SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, SSLv3_server_method()) |
| : SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, SSLv3_client_method()); |
| #endif |
| } |
| static void ctx_set_TLSv10_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { |
| c == SET_SERVER ? SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_server_method()) |
| : SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_client_method()); |
| } |
| static void ctx_set_TLSv11_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 |
| c == SET_SERVER ? SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_1_server_method()) |
| : SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_1_client_method()); |
| #endif |
| } |
| static void ctx_set_TLSv12_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 |
| c == SET_SERVER ? SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_2_server_method()) |
| : SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(ctx, TLSv1_2_client_method()); |
| #endif |
| } |
| /* TLSv1.2 is the last supported version in this context. */ |
| static void ctx_set_TLSv13_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) {} |
| /* Unusable in this context. */ |
| static void ssl_set_SSLv3_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {} |
| static void ssl_set_TLSv10_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {} |
| static void ssl_set_TLSv11_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {} |
| static void ssl_set_TLSv12_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {} |
| static void ssl_set_TLSv13_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) {} |
| #else /* openssl >= 1.1.0 */ |
| |
| static void ctx_set_SSLv3_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, SSL3_VERSION) |
| : SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, SSL3_VERSION); |
| } |
| static void ssl_set_SSLv3_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) { |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, SSL3_VERSION) |
| : SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, SSL3_VERSION); |
| } |
| static void ctx_set_TLSv10_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_VERSION) |
| : SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_VERSION); |
| } |
| static void ssl_set_TLSv10_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) { |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_VERSION) |
| : SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_VERSION); |
| } |
| static void ctx_set_TLSv11_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_1_VERSION) |
| : SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_1_VERSION); |
| } |
| static void ssl_set_TLSv11_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) { |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_1_VERSION) |
| : SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_1_VERSION); |
| } |
| static void ctx_set_TLSv12_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION) |
| : SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION); |
| } |
| static void ssl_set_TLSv12_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) { |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION) |
| : SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION); |
| } |
| static void ctx_set_TLSv13_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION) |
| : SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION); |
| #endif |
| } |
| static void ssl_set_TLSv13_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) { |
| #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 |
| c == SET_MAX ? SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_3_VERSION) |
| : SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_3_VERSION); |
| #endif |
| } |
| #endif |
| static void ctx_set_None_func(SSL_CTX *ctx, set_context_func c) { } |
| static void ssl_set_None_func(SSL *ssl, set_context_func c) { } |
| |
| struct methodVersions methodVersions[] = { |
| {0, 0, ctx_set_None_func, ssl_set_None_func, "NONE"}, /* CONF_TLSV_NONE */ |
| {SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, MC_SSL_O_NO_SSLV3, ctx_set_SSLv3_func, ssl_set_SSLv3_func, "SSLv3"}, /* CONF_SSLV3 */ |
| {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, MC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV10, ctx_set_TLSv10_func, ssl_set_TLSv10_func, "TLSv1.0"}, /* CONF_TLSV10 */ |
| {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, MC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV11, ctx_set_TLSv11_func, ssl_set_TLSv11_func, "TLSv1.1"}, /* CONF_TLSV11 */ |
| {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, MC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV12, ctx_set_TLSv12_func, ssl_set_TLSv12_func, "TLSv1.2"}, /* CONF_TLSV12 */ |
| {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3, MC_SSL_O_NO_TLSV13, ctx_set_TLSv13_func, ssl_set_TLSv13_func, "TLSv1.3"}, /* CONF_TLSV13 */ |
| }; |
| |
| static void ssl_sock_switchctx_set(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(ctx), ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk); |
| SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, SSL_dup_CA_list(SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(ctx))); |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ctx); |
| } |
| |
| #if ((HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) || defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)) |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *priv) |
| { |
| struct bind_conf *s = priv; |
| (void)al; /* shut gcc stupid warning */ |
| |
| if (SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) || s->generate_certs) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| static int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) |
| { |
| SSL *ssl = ctx->ssl; |
| #else |
| static int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *arg) |
| { |
| #endif |
| struct connection *conn; |
| struct bind_conf *s; |
| const uint8_t *extension_data; |
| size_t extension_len; |
| int has_rsa_sig = 0, has_ecdsa_sig = 0; |
| |
| char *wildp = NULL; |
| const uint8_t *servername; |
| size_t servername_len; |
| struct ebmb_node *node, *n, *node_ecdsa = NULL, *node_rsa = NULL, *node_anonymous = NULL; |
| int allow_early = 0; |
| int i; |
| |
| conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index); |
| s = __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf; |
| |
| if (s->ssl_conf.early_data) |
| allow_early = 1; |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| if (SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, |
| &extension_data, &extension_len)) { |
| #else |
| if (SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(ssl, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, &extension_data, &extension_len)) { |
| #endif |
| /* |
| * The server_name extension was given too much extensibility when it |
| * was written, so parsing the normal case is a bit complex. |
| */ |
| size_t len; |
| if (extension_len <= 2) |
| goto abort; |
| /* Extract the length of the supplied list of names. */ |
| len = (*extension_data++) << 8; |
| len |= *extension_data++; |
| if (len + 2 != extension_len) |
| goto abort; |
| /* |
| * The list in practice only has a single element, so we only consider |
| * the first one. |
| */ |
| if (len == 0 || *extension_data++ != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) |
| goto abort; |
| extension_len = len - 1; |
| /* Now we can finally pull out the byte array with the actual hostname. */ |
| if (extension_len <= 2) |
| goto abort; |
| len = (*extension_data++) << 8; |
| len |= *extension_data++; |
| if (len == 0 || len + 2 > extension_len || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name |
| || memchr(extension_data, 0, len) != NULL) |
| goto abort; |
| servername = extension_data; |
| servername_len = len; |
| } else { |
| #if (!defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES) |
| if (s->generate_certs && ssl_sock_generate_certificate_from_conn(s, ssl)) { |
| goto allow_early; |
| } |
| #endif |
| /* without SNI extension, is the default_ctx (need SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) */ |
| if (!s->strict_sni) { |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx); |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| goto allow_early; |
| } |
| goto abort; |
| } |
| |
| /* extract/check clientHello information */ |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| if (SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, &extension_data, &extension_len)) { |
| #else |
| if (SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(ssl, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, &extension_data, &extension_len)) { |
| #endif |
| uint8_t sign; |
| size_t len; |
| if (extension_len < 2) |
| goto abort; |
| len = (*extension_data++) << 8; |
| len |= *extension_data++; |
| if (len + 2 != extension_len) |
| goto abort; |
| if (len % 2 != 0) |
| goto abort; |
| for (; len > 0; len -= 2) { |
| extension_data++; /* hash */ |
| sign = *extension_data++; |
| switch (sign) { |
| case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: |
| has_rsa_sig = 1; |
| break; |
| case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: |
| has_ecdsa_sig = 1; |
| break; |
| default: |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (has_ecdsa_sig && has_rsa_sig) |
| break; |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* without TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms extension (< TLSv1.2) */ |
| has_rsa_sig = 1; |
| } |
| if (has_ecdsa_sig) { /* in very rare case: has ecdsa sign but not a ECDSA cipher */ |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
| size_t len; |
| const uint8_t *cipher_suites; |
| has_ecdsa_sig = 0; |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| len = ctx->cipher_suites_len; |
| cipher_suites = ctx->cipher_suites; |
| #else |
| len = SSL_client_hello_get0_ciphers(ssl, &cipher_suites); |
| #endif |
| if (len % 2 != 0) |
| goto abort; |
| for (; len != 0; len -= 2, cipher_suites += 2) { |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| uint16_t cipher_suite = (cipher_suites[0] << 8) | cipher_suites[1]; |
| cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); |
| #else |
| cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(ssl, cipher_suites); |
| #endif |
| if (cipher && SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(cipher) == NID_auth_ecdsa) { |
| has_ecdsa_sig = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < trash.size && i < servername_len; i++) { |
| trash.area[i] = tolower(servername[i]); |
| if (!wildp && (trash.area[i] == '.')) |
| wildp = &trash.area[i]; |
| } |
| trash.area[i] = 0; |
| |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { |
| if (i == 0) /* lookup in full qualified names */ |
| node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_ctx, trash.area); |
| else if (i == 1 && wildp) /* lookup in wildcards names */ |
| node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_w_ctx, wildp); |
| else |
| break; |
| for (n = node; n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) { |
| /* lookup a not neg filter */ |
| if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) { |
| switch(container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->kinfo.sig) { |
| case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: |
| if (!node_ecdsa) |
| node_ecdsa = n; |
| break; |
| case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: |
| if (!node_rsa) |
| node_rsa = n; |
| break; |
| default: /* TLSEXT_signature_anonymous|dsa */ |
| if (!node_anonymous) |
| node_anonymous = n; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| /* select by key_signature priority order */ |
| node = (has_ecdsa_sig && node_ecdsa) ? node_ecdsa |
| : ((has_rsa_sig && node_rsa) ? node_rsa |
| : (node_anonymous ? node_anonymous |
| : (node_ecdsa ? node_ecdsa /* no ecdsa signature case (< TLSv1.2) */ |
| : node_rsa /* no rsa signature case (far far away) */ |
| ))); |
| if (node) { |
| /* switch ctx */ |
| struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->conf; |
| ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx); |
| if (conf) { |
| methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.min].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MIN); |
| methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.max].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MAX); |
| if (conf->early_data) |
| allow_early = 1; |
| } |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| goto allow_early; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| #if (!defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES) |
| if (s->generate_certs && ssl_sock_generate_certificate(trash.area, s, ssl)) { |
| /* switch ctx done in ssl_sock_generate_certificate */ |
| goto allow_early; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (!s->strict_sni) { |
| /* no certificate match, is the default_ctx */ |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx); |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| } |
| allow_early: |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| if (allow_early) |
| SSL_set_early_data_enabled(ssl, 1); |
| #else |
| if (!allow_early) |
| SSL_set_max_early_data(ssl, 0); |
| #endif |
| return 1; |
| abort: |
| /* abort handshake (was SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL) */ |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| return ssl_select_cert_error; |
| #else |
| *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| #else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */ |
| |
| /* Sets the SSL ctx of <ssl> to match the advertised server name. Returns a |
| * warning when no match is found, which implies the default (first) cert |
| * will keep being used. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *priv) |
| { |
| const char *servername; |
| const char *wildp = NULL; |
| struct ebmb_node *node, *n; |
| struct bind_conf *s = priv; |
| int i; |
| (void)al; /* shut gcc stupid warning */ |
| |
| servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); |
| if (!servername) { |
| #if (!defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES) |
| if (s->generate_certs && ssl_sock_generate_certificate_from_conn(s, ssl)) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| #endif |
| if (s->strict_sni) |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx); |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < trash.size; i++) { |
| if (!servername[i]) |
| break; |
| trash.area[i] = tolower(servername[i]); |
| if (!wildp && (trash.area[i] == '.')) |
| wildp = &trash.area[i]; |
| } |
| trash.area[i] = 0; |
| |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| node = NULL; |
| /* lookup in full qualified names */ |
| for (n = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_ctx, trash.area); n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) { |
| /* lookup a not neg filter */ |
| if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) { |
| node = n; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!node && wildp) { |
| /* lookup in wildcards names */ |
| for (n = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_w_ctx, wildp); n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) { |
| /* lookup a not neg filter */ |
| if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) { |
| node = n; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| if (!node) { |
| #if (!defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES) |
| if (s->generate_certs && ssl_sock_generate_certificate(servername, s, ssl)) { |
| /* switch ctx done in ssl_sock_generate_certificate */ |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (s->strict_sni) { |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| } |
| ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, s->default_ctx); |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| /* switch ctx */ |
| ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx); |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| #endif /* (!) OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */ |
| #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */ |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| |
| static DH * ssl_get_dh_1024(void) |
| { |
| static unsigned char dh1024_p[]={ |
| 0xFA,0xF9,0x2A,0x22,0x2A,0xA7,0x7F,0xE1,0x67,0x4E,0x53,0xF7, |
| 0x56,0x13,0xC3,0xB1,0xE3,0x29,0x6B,0x66,0x31,0x6A,0x7F,0xB3, |
| 0xC2,0x68,0x6B,0xCB,0x1D,0x57,0x39,0x1D,0x1F,0xFF,0x1C,0xC9, |
| 0xA6,0xA4,0x98,0x82,0x31,0x5D,0x25,0xFF,0x8A,0xE0,0x73,0x96, |
| 0x81,0xC8,0x83,0x79,0xC1,0x5A,0x04,0xF8,0x37,0x0D,0xA8,0x3D, |
| 0xAE,0x74,0xBC,0xDB,0xB6,0xA4,0x75,0xD9,0x71,0x8A,0xA0,0x17, |
| 0x9E,0x2D,0xC8,0xA8,0xDF,0x2C,0x5F,0x82,0x95,0xF8,0x92,0x9B, |
| 0xA7,0x33,0x5F,0x89,0x71,0xC8,0x2D,0x6B,0x18,0x86,0xC4,0x94, |
| 0x22,0xA5,0x52,0x8D,0xF6,0xF6,0xD2,0x37,0x92,0x0F,0xA5,0xCC, |
| 0xDB,0x7B,0x1D,0x3D,0xA1,0x31,0xB7,0x80,0x8F,0x0B,0x67,0x5E, |
| 0x36,0xA5,0x60,0x0C,0xF1,0x95,0x33,0x8B, |
| }; |
| static unsigned char dh1024_g[]={ |
| 0x02, |
| }; |
| |
| BIGNUM *p; |
| BIGNUM *g; |
| DH *dh = DH_new(); |
| if (dh) { |
| p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof dh1024_p, NULL); |
| g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof dh1024_g, NULL); |
| |
| if (!p || !g) { |
| DH_free(dh); |
| dh = NULL; |
| } else { |
| DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g); |
| } |
| } |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| static DH *ssl_get_dh_2048(void) |
| { |
| static unsigned char dh2048_p[]={ |
| 0xEC,0x86,0xF8,0x70,0xA0,0x33,0x16,0xEC,0x05,0x1A,0x73,0x59, |
| 0xCD,0x1F,0x8B,0xF8,0x29,0xE4,0xD2,0xCF,0x52,0xDD,0xC2,0x24, |
| 0x8D,0xB5,0x38,0x9A,0xFB,0x5C,0xA4,0xE4,0xB2,0xDA,0xCE,0x66, |
| 0x50,0x74,0xA6,0x85,0x4D,0x4B,0x1D,0x30,0xB8,0x2B,0xF3,0x10, |
| 0xE9,0xA7,0x2D,0x05,0x71,0xE7,0x81,0xDF,0x8B,0x59,0x52,0x3B, |
| 0x5F,0x43,0x0B,0x68,0xF1,0xDB,0x07,0xBE,0x08,0x6B,0x1B,0x23, |
| 0xEE,0x4D,0xCC,0x9E,0x0E,0x43,0xA0,0x1E,0xDF,0x43,0x8C,0xEC, |
| 0xBE,0xBE,0x90,0xB4,0x51,0x54,0xB9,0x2F,0x7B,0x64,0x76,0x4E, |
| 0x5D,0xD4,0x2E,0xAE,0xC2,0x9E,0xAE,0x51,0x43,0x59,0xC7,0x77, |
| 0x9C,0x50,0x3C,0x0E,0xED,0x73,0x04,0x5F,0xF1,0x4C,0x76,0x2A, |
| 0xD8,0xF8,0xCF,0xFC,0x34,0x40,0xD1,0xB4,0x42,0x61,0x84,0x66, |
| 0x42,0x39,0x04,0xF8,0x68,0xB2,0x62,0xD7,0x55,0xED,0x1B,0x74, |
| 0x75,0x91,0xE0,0xC5,0x69,0xC1,0x31,0x5C,0xDB,0x7B,0x44,0x2E, |
| 0xCE,0x84,0x58,0x0D,0x1E,0x66,0x0C,0xC8,0x44,0x9E,0xFD,0x40, |
| 0x08,0x67,0x5D,0xFB,0xA7,0x76,0x8F,0x00,0x11,0x87,0xE9,0x93, |
| 0xF9,0x7D,0xC4,0xBC,0x74,0x55,0x20,0xD4,0x4A,0x41,0x2F,0x43, |
| 0x42,0x1A,0xC1,0xF2,0x97,0x17,0x49,0x27,0x37,0x6B,0x2F,0x88, |
| 0x7E,0x1C,0xA0,0xA1,0x89,0x92,0x27,0xD9,0x56,0x5A,0x71,0xC1, |
| 0x56,0x37,0x7E,0x3A,0x9D,0x05,0xE7,0xEE,0x5D,0x8F,0x82,0x17, |
| 0xBC,0xE9,0xC2,0x93,0x30,0x82,0xF9,0xF4,0xC9,0xAE,0x49,0xDB, |
| 0xD0,0x54,0xB4,0xD9,0x75,0x4D,0xFA,0x06,0xB8,0xD6,0x38,0x41, |
| 0xB7,0x1F,0x77,0xF3, |
| }; |
| static unsigned char dh2048_g[]={ |
| 0x02, |
| }; |
| |
| BIGNUM *p; |
| BIGNUM *g; |
| DH *dh = DH_new(); |
| if (dh) { |
| p = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof dh2048_p, NULL); |
| g = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof dh2048_g, NULL); |
| |
| if (!p || !g) { |
| DH_free(dh); |
| dh = NULL; |
| } else { |
| DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g); |
| } |
| } |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| static DH *ssl_get_dh_4096(void) |
| { |
| static unsigned char dh4096_p[]={ |
| 0xDE,0x16,0x94,0xCD,0x99,0x58,0x07,0xF1,0xF7,0x32,0x96,0x11, |
| 0x04,0x82,0xD4,0x84,0x72,0x80,0x99,0x06,0xCA,0xF0,0xA3,0x68, |
| 0x07,0xCE,0x64,0x50,0xE7,0x74,0x45,0x20,0x80,0x5E,0x4D,0xAD, |
| 0xA5,0xB6,0xED,0xFA,0x80,0x6C,0x3B,0x35,0xC4,0x9A,0x14,0x6B, |
| 0x32,0xBB,0xFD,0x1F,0x17,0x8E,0xB7,0x1F,0xD6,0xFA,0x3F,0x7B, |
| 0xEE,0x16,0xA5,0x62,0x33,0x0D,0xED,0xBC,0x4E,0x58,0xE5,0x47, |
| 0x4D,0xE9,0xAB,0x8E,0x38,0xD3,0x6E,0x90,0x57,0xE3,0x22,0x15, |
| 0x33,0xBD,0xF6,0x43,0x45,0xB5,0x10,0x0A,0xBE,0x2C,0xB4,0x35, |
| 0xB8,0x53,0x8D,0xAD,0xFB,0xA7,0x1F,0x85,0x58,0x41,0x7A,0x79, |
| 0x20,0x68,0xB3,0xE1,0x3D,0x08,0x76,0xBF,0x86,0x0D,0x49,0xE3, |
| 0x82,0x71,0x8C,0xB4,0x8D,0x81,0x84,0xD4,0xE7,0xBE,0x91,0xDC, |
| 0x26,0x39,0x48,0x0F,0x35,0xC4,0xCA,0x65,0xE3,0x40,0x93,0x52, |
| 0x76,0x58,0x7D,0xDD,0x51,0x75,0xDC,0x69,0x61,0xBF,0x47,0x2C, |
| 0x16,0x68,0x2D,0xC9,0x29,0xD3,0xE6,0xC0,0x99,0x48,0xA0,0x9A, |
| 0xC8,0x78,0xC0,0x6D,0x81,0x67,0x12,0x61,0x3F,0x71,0xBA,0x41, |
| 0x1F,0x6C,0x89,0x44,0x03,0xBA,0x3B,0x39,0x60,0xAA,0x28,0x55, |
| 0x59,0xAE,0xB8,0xFA,0xCB,0x6F,0xA5,0x1A,0xF7,0x2B,0xDD,0x52, |
| 0x8A,0x8B,0xE2,0x71,0xA6,0x5E,0x7E,0xD8,0x2E,0x18,0xE0,0x66, |
| 0xDF,0xDD,0x22,0x21,0x99,0x52,0x73,0xA6,0x33,0x20,0x65,0x0E, |
| 0x53,0xE7,0x6B,0x9B,0xC5,0xA3,0x2F,0x97,0x65,0x76,0xD3,0x47, |
| 0x23,0x77,0x12,0xB6,0x11,0x7B,0x24,0xED,0xF1,0xEF,0xC0,0xE2, |
| 0xA3,0x7E,0x67,0x05,0x3E,0x96,0x4D,0x45,0xC2,0x18,0xD1,0x73, |
| 0x9E,0x07,0xF3,0x81,0x6E,0x52,0x63,0xF6,0x20,0x76,0xB9,0x13, |
| 0xD2,0x65,0x30,0x18,0x16,0x09,0x16,0x9E,0x8F,0xF1,0xD2,0x10, |
| 0x5A,0xD3,0xD4,0xAF,0x16,0x61,0xDA,0x55,0x2E,0x18,0x5E,0x14, |
| 0x08,0x54,0x2E,0x2A,0x25,0xA2,0x1A,0x9B,0x8B,0x32,0xA9,0xFD, |
| 0xC2,0x48,0x96,0xE1,0x80,0xCA,0xE9,0x22,0x17,0xBB,0xCE,0x3E, |
| 0x9E,0xED,0xC7,0xF1,0x1F,0xEC,0x17,0x21,0xDC,0x7B,0x82,0x48, |
| 0x8E,0xBB,0x4B,0x9D,0x5B,0x04,0x04,0xDA,0xDB,0x39,0xDF,0x01, |
| 0x40,0xC3,0xAA,0x26,0x23,0x89,0x75,0xC6,0x0B,0xD0,0xA2,0x60, |
| 0x6A,0xF1,0xCC,0x65,0x18,0x98,0x1B,0x52,0xD2,0x74,0x61,0xCC, |
| 0xBD,0x60,0xAE,0xA3,0xA0,0x66,0x6A,0x16,0x34,0x92,0x3F,0x41, |
| 0x40,0x31,0x29,0xC0,0x2C,0x63,0xB2,0x07,0x8D,0xEB,0x94,0xB8, |
| 0xE8,0x47,0x92,0x52,0x93,0x6A,0x1B,0x7E,0x1A,0x61,0xB3,0x1B, |
| 0xF0,0xD6,0x72,0x9B,0xF1,0xB0,0xAF,0xBF,0x3E,0x65,0xEF,0x23, |
| 0x1D,0x6F,0xFF,0x70,0xCD,0x8A,0x4C,0x8A,0xA0,0x72,0x9D,0xBE, |
| 0xD4,0xBB,0x24,0x47,0x4A,0x68,0xB5,0xF5,0xC6,0xD5,0x7A,0xCD, |
| 0xCA,0x06,0x41,0x07,0xAD,0xC2,0x1E,0xE6,0x54,0xA7,0xAD,0x03, |
| 0xD9,0x12,0xC1,0x9C,0x13,0xB1,0xC9,0x0A,0x43,0x8E,0x1E,0x08, |
| 0xCE,0x50,0x82,0x73,0x5F,0xA7,0x55,0x1D,0xD9,0x59,0xAC,0xB5, |
| 0xEA,0x02,0x7F,0x6C,0x5B,0x74,0x96,0x98,0x67,0x24,0xA3,0x0F, |
| 0x15,0xFC,0xA9,0x7D,0x3E,0x67,0xD1,0x70,0xF8,0x97,0xF3,0x67, |
| 0xC5,0x8C,0x88,0x44,0x08,0x02,0xC7,0x2B, |
| }; |
| static unsigned char dh4096_g[]={ |
| 0x02, |
| }; |
| |
| BIGNUM *p; |
| BIGNUM *g; |
| DH *dh = DH_new(); |
| if (dh) { |
| p = BN_bin2bn(dh4096_p, sizeof dh4096_p, NULL); |
| g = BN_bin2bn(dh4096_g, sizeof dh4096_g, NULL); |
| |
| if (!p || !g) { |
| DH_free(dh); |
| dh = NULL; |
| } else { |
| DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g); |
| } |
| } |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns Diffie-Hellman parameters matching the private key length |
| but not exceeding global_ssl.default_dh_param */ |
| static DH *ssl_get_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen) |
| { |
| DH *dh = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl); |
| int type; |
| |
| type = pkey ? EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey) : EVP_PKEY_NONE; |
| |
| /* The keylen supplied by OpenSSL can only be 512 or 1024. |
| See ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() in ssl/s3_srvr.c |
| */ |
| if (type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { |
| keylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); |
| } |
| |
| if (keylen > global_ssl.default_dh_param) { |
| keylen = global_ssl.default_dh_param; |
| } |
| |
| if (keylen >= 4096) { |
| dh = local_dh_4096; |
| } |
| else if (keylen >= 2048) { |
| dh = local_dh_2048; |
| } |
| else { |
| dh = local_dh_1024; |
| } |
| |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| static DH * ssl_sock_get_dh_from_file(const char *filename) |
| { |
| DH *dh = NULL; |
| BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); |
| |
| if (in == NULL) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (BIO_read_filename(in, filename) <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| |
| dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| |
| end: |
| if (in) |
| BIO_free(in); |
| |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| return dh; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_sock_load_global_dh_param_from_file(const char *filename) |
| { |
| global_dh = ssl_sock_get_dh_from_file(filename); |
| |
| if (global_dh) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* This function allocates a sni_ctx and adds it to the ckch_inst */ |
| static int ckch_inst_add_cert_sni(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst, |
| struct bind_conf *s, struct ssl_bind_conf *conf, |
| struct pkey_info kinfo, char *name, int order) |
| { |
| struct sni_ctx *sc; |
| int wild = 0, neg = 0; |
| |
| if (*name == '!') { |
| neg = 1; |
| name++; |
| } |
| if (*name == '*') { |
| wild = 1; |
| name++; |
| } |
| /* !* filter is a nop */ |
| if (neg && wild) |
| return order; |
| if (*name) { |
| int j, len; |
| len = strlen(name); |
| for (j = 0; j < len && j < trash.size; j++) |
| trash.area[j] = tolower(name[j]); |
| if (j >= trash.size) |
| return -1; |
| trash.area[j] = 0; |
| |
| sc = malloc(sizeof(struct sni_ctx) + len + 1); |
| if (!sc) |
| return -1; |
| memcpy(sc->name.key, trash.area, len + 1); |
| SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); |
| sc->ctx = ctx; |
| sc->conf = conf; |
| sc->kinfo = kinfo; |
| sc->order = order++; |
| sc->neg = neg; |
| sc->wild = wild; |
| sc->name.node.leaf_p = NULL; |
| sc->ckch_inst = ckch_inst; |
| LIST_ADDQ(&ckch_inst->sni_ctx, &sc->by_ckch_inst); |
| } |
| return order; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Insert the sni_ctxs that are listed in the ckch_inst, in the bind_conf's sni_ctx tree |
| * This function can't return an error. |
| * |
| * *CAUTION*: The caller must lock the sni tree if called in multithreading mode |
| */ |
| void ssl_sock_load_cert_sni(struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst, struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| |
| struct sni_ctx *sc0, *sc0b, *sc1; |
| struct ebmb_node *node; |
| int def = 0; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_safe(sc0, sc0b, &ckch_inst->sni_ctx, by_ckch_inst) { |
| |
| /* ignore if sc0 was already inserted in a tree */ |
| if (sc0->name.node.leaf_p) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* Check for duplicates. */ |
| if (sc0->wild) |
| node = ebst_lookup(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx, (char *)sc0->name.key); |
| else |
| node = ebst_lookup(&bind_conf->sni_ctx, (char *)sc0->name.key); |
| |
| for (; node; node = ebmb_next_dup(node)) { |
| sc1 = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name); |
| if (sc1->ctx == sc0->ctx && sc1->conf == sc0->conf |
| && sc1->neg == sc0->neg && sc1->wild == sc0->wild) { |
| /* it's a duplicate, we should remove and free it */ |
| LIST_DEL(&sc0->by_ckch_inst); |
| SSL_CTX_free(sc0->ctx); |
| free(sc0); |
| sc0 = NULL; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* if duplicate, ignore the insertion */ |
| if (!sc0) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (sc0->wild) |
| ebst_insert(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx, &sc0->name); |
| else |
| ebst_insert(&bind_conf->sni_ctx, &sc0->name); |
| |
| /* replace the default_ctx if required with the first ctx */ |
| if (ckch_inst->is_default && !def) { |
| SSL_CTX_free(bind_conf->default_ctx); |
| SSL_CTX_up_ref(sc0->ctx); |
| bind_conf->default_ctx = sc0->ctx; |
| def = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * tree used to store the ckchs ordered by filename/bundle name |
| */ |
| struct eb_root ckchs_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE; |
| |
| /* tree of crtlist (crt-list/directory) */ |
| struct eb_root crtlists_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE; |
| |
| /* Loads Diffie-Hellman parameter from a ckchs to an SSL_CTX. |
| * If there is no DH parameter available in the ckchs, the global |
| * DH parameter is loaded into the SSL_CTX and if there is no |
| * DH parameter available in ckchs nor in global, the default |
| * DH parameters are applied on the SSL_CTX. |
| * Returns a bitfield containing the flags: |
| * ERR_FATAL in any fatal error case |
| * ERR_ALERT if a reason of the error is availabine in err |
| * ERR_WARN if a warning is available into err |
| * The value 0 means there is no error nor warning and |
| * the operation succeed. |
| */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| static int ssl_sock_load_dh_params(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch, |
| const char *path, char **err) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| DH *dh = NULL; |
| |
| if (ckch && ckch->dh) { |
| dh = ckch->dh; |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load the DH parameter specified in '%s'", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| #if defined(SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto) |
| SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1); |
| memprintf(err, "%s, SSL library will use an automatically generated DH parameter.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| #else |
| memprintf(err, "%s, DH ciphers won't be available.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| #endif |
| ret |= ERR_WARN; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl_dh_ptr_index >= 0) { |
| /* store a pointer to the DH params to avoid complaining about |
| ssl-default-dh-param not being set for this SSL_CTX */ |
| SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index, dh); |
| } |
| } |
| else if (global_dh) { |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, global_dh)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to use the global DH parameter for certificate '%s'", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| #if defined(SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto) |
| SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1); |
| memprintf(err, "%s, SSL library will use an automatically generated DH parameter.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| #else |
| memprintf(err, "%s, DH ciphers won't be available.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| #endif |
| ret |= ERR_WARN; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| if (global_ssl.default_dh_param <= 1024) { |
| /* we are limited to DH parameter of 1024 bits anyway */ |
| if (local_dh_1024 == NULL) |
| local_dh_1024 = ssl_get_dh_1024(); |
| |
| if (local_dh_1024 == NULL) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load default 1024 bits DH parameter for certificate '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| ret |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, local_dh_1024)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load default 1024 bits DH parameter for certificate '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| #if defined(SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto) |
| SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1); |
| memprintf(err, "%s, SSL library will use an automatically generated DH parameter.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| #else |
| memprintf(err, "%s, DH ciphers won't be available.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| #endif |
| ret |= ERR_WARN; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, ssl_get_tmp_dh); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| end: |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Loads the info in ckch into ctx |
| * Returns a bitfield containing the flags: |
| * ERR_FATAL in any fatal error case |
| * ERR_ALERT if the reason of the error is available in err |
| * ERR_WARN if a warning is available into err |
| * The value 0 means there is no error nor warning and |
| * the operation succeed. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_put_ckch_into_ctx(const char *path, const struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch, SSL_CTX *ctx, char **err) |
| { |
| int errcode = 0; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *find_chain = NULL; |
| |
| if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, ckch->key) <= 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL private key into SSL Context '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| return errcode; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, ckch->cert)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL certificate into SSL Context '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (ckch->chain) { |
| find_chain = ckch->chain; |
| } else { |
| /* Find Certificate Chain in global */ |
| struct issuer_chain *issuer; |
| issuer = ssl_get0_issuer_chain(ckch->cert); |
| if (issuer) |
| find_chain = issuer->chain; |
| } |
| |
| /* Load all certs from chain, except Root, in the ssl_ctx */ |
| if (find_chain) { |
| int i; |
| X509 *ca; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(find_chain); i++) { |
| ca = sk_X509_value(find_chain, i); |
| /* skip self issued (Root CA) */ |
| if (global_ssl.skip_self_issued_ca && !X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(ca), X509_get_issuer_name(ca))) |
| continue; |
| /* |
| SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert could be used with openssl >= 1.0.2 |
| Used SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert for compat (aka SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert) |
| */ |
| X509_up_ref(ca); |
| if (!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca)) { |
| X509_free(ca); |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load chain certificate into SSL Context '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| /* store a NULL pointer to indicate we have not yet loaded |
| a custom DH param file */ |
| if (ssl_dh_ptr_index >= 0) { |
| SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| errcode |= ssl_sock_load_dh_params(ctx, ckch, path, err); |
| if (errcode & ERR_CODE) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load DH parameters from file '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) |
| if (sctl_ex_index >= 0 && ckch->sctl) { |
| if (ssl_sock_load_sctl(ctx, ckch->sctl) < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%s '%s.sctl' is present but cannot be read or parsed'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if ((defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) || defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) |
| /* Load OCSP Info into context */ |
| if (ckch->ocsp_response) { |
| if (ssl_sock_load_ocsp(ctx, ckch, find_chain) < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%s '%s.ocsp' is present and activates OCSP but it is impossible to compute the OCSP certificate ID (maybe the issuer could not be found)'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| end: |
| return errcode; |
| } |
| |
| #if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_populate_sni_keytypes_hplr(const char *str, struct eb_root *sni_keytypes, int key_index) |
| { |
| struct sni_keytype *s_kt = NULL; |
| struct ebmb_node *node; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < trash.size; i++) { |
| if (!str[i]) |
| break; |
| trash.area[i] = tolower(str[i]); |
| } |
| trash.area[i] = 0; |
| node = ebst_lookup(sni_keytypes, trash.area); |
| if (!node) { |
| /* CN not found in tree */ |
| s_kt = malloc(sizeof(struct sni_keytype) + i + 1); |
| /* Using memcpy here instead of strncpy. |
| * strncpy will cause sig_abrt errors under certain versions of gcc with -O2 |
| * See: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=60792 |
| */ |
| if (!s_kt) |
| return -1; |
| |
| memcpy(s_kt->name.key, trash.area, i+1); |
| s_kt->keytypes = 0; |
| ebst_insert(sni_keytypes, &s_kt->name); |
| } else { |
| /* CN found in tree */ |
| s_kt = container_of(node, struct sni_keytype, name); |
| } |
| |
| /* Mark that this CN has the keytype of key_index via keytypes mask */ |
| s_kt->keytypes |= 1<<key_index; |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| #if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL |
| |
| /* |
| * Take a ckch_store which contains a multi-certificate bundle. |
| * Group these certificates into a set of SSL_CTX* |
| * based on shared and unique CN and SAN entries. Add these SSL_CTX* to the SNI tree. |
| * |
| * This will allow the user to explicitly group multiple cert/keys for a single purpose |
| * |
| * Returns a bitfield containing the flags: |
| * ERR_FATAL in any fatal error case |
| * ERR_ALERT if the reason of the error is available in err |
| * ERR_WARN if a warning is available into err |
| * |
| */ |
| int ckch_inst_new_load_multi_store(const char *path, struct ckch_store *ckchs, |
| struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_conf, |
| char **sni_filter, int fcount, struct ckch_inst **ckchi, char **err) |
| { |
| int i = 0, n = 0; |
| struct cert_key_and_chain *certs_and_keys; |
| struct eb_root sni_keytypes_map = EB_ROOT; |
| struct ebmb_node *node; |
| struct ebmb_node *next; |
| /* Array of SSL_CTX pointers corresponding to each possible combo |
| * of keytypes |
| */ |
| struct key_combo_ctx key_combos[SSL_SOCK_POSSIBLE_KT_COMBOS] = { {0} }; |
| int errcode = 0; |
| X509_NAME *xname = NULL; |
| char *str = NULL; |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names = NULL; |
| #endif |
| struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst; |
| |
| *ckchi = NULL; |
| |
| if (!ckchs || !ckchs->ckch || !ckchs->multi) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL certificate file '%s' file does not exist.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| ckch_inst = ckch_inst_new(); |
| if (!ckch_inst) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context for cert '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| certs_and_keys = ckchs->ckch; |
| |
| /* Process each ckch and update keytypes for each CN/SAN |
| * for example, if CN/SAN www.a.com is associated with |
| * certs with keytype 0 and 2, then at the end of the loop, |
| * www.a.com will have: |
| * keyindex = 0 | 1 | 4 = 5 |
| */ |
| for (n = 0; n < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; n++) { |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ckch_valid(&certs_and_keys[n])) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (fcount) { |
| for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) { |
| ret = ssl_sock_populate_sni_keytypes_hplr(sni_filter[i], &sni_keytypes_map, n); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* A lot of the following code is OpenSSL boilerplate for processing CN's and SAN's, |
| * so the line that contains logic is marked via comments |
| */ |
| xname = X509_get_subject_name(certs_and_keys[n].cert); |
| i = -1; |
| while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(xname, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) { |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname, i); |
| ASN1_STRING *value; |
| value = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry); |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, value) >= 0) { |
| /* Important line is here */ |
| ret = ssl_sock_populate_sni_keytypes_hplr(str, &sni_keytypes_map, n); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| str = NULL; |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Do the above logic for each SAN */ |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| names = X509_get_ext_d2i(certs_and_keys[n].cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
| if (names) { |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) { |
| GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i); |
| |
| if (name->type == GEN_DNS) { |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) { |
| /* Important line is here */ |
| ret = ssl_sock_populate_sni_keytypes_hplr(str, &sni_keytypes_map, n); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| str = NULL; |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */ |
| } |
| |
| /* If no files found, return error */ |
| if (eb_is_empty(&sni_keytypes_map)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL certificate file '%s' file does not exist.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* We now have a map of CN/SAN to keytypes that are loaded in |
| * Iterate through the map to create the SSL_CTX's (if needed) |
| * and add each CTX to the SNI tree |
| * |
| * Some math here: |
| * There are 2^n - 1 possible combinations, each unique |
| * combination is denoted by the key in the map. Each key |
| * has a value between 1 and 2^n - 1. Conveniently, the array |
| * of SSL_CTX* is sized 2^n. So, we can simply use the i'th |
| * entry in the array to correspond to the unique combo (key) |
| * associated with i. This unique key combo (i) will be associated |
| * with combos[i-1] |
| */ |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&sni_keytypes_map); |
| while (node) { |
| SSL_CTX *cur_ctx; |
| char cur_file[MAXPATHLEN+1]; |
| const struct pkey_info kinfo = { .sig = TLSEXT_signature_anonymous, .bits = 0 }; |
| |
| str = (char *)container_of(node, struct sni_keytype, name)->name.key; |
| i = container_of(node, struct sni_keytype, name)->keytypes; |
| cur_ctx = key_combos[i-1].ctx; |
| |
| if (cur_ctx == NULL) { |
| /* need to create SSL_CTX */ |
| cur_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()); |
| if (cur_ctx == NULL) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* Load all required certs/keys/chains/OCSPs info into SSL_CTX */ |
| for (n = 0; n < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; n++) { |
| if (i & (1<<n)) { |
| /* Key combo contains ckch[n] */ |
| snprintf(cur_file, MAXPATHLEN+1, "%s.%s", path, SSL_SOCK_KEYTYPE_NAMES[n]); |
| errcode |= ssl_sock_put_ckch_into_ctx(cur_file, &certs_and_keys[n], cur_ctx, err); |
| if (errcode & ERR_CODE) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Update key_combos */ |
| key_combos[i-1].ctx = cur_ctx; |
| } |
| |
| /* Update SNI Tree */ |
| |
| key_combos[i-1].order = ckch_inst_add_cert_sni(cur_ctx, ckch_inst, bind_conf, ssl_conf, |
| kinfo, str, key_combos[i-1].order); |
| if (key_combos[i-1].order < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to create a sni context.\n", err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| node = ebmb_next(node); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Mark a default context if none exists, using the ctx that has the most shared keys */ |
| if (!bind_conf->default_ctx) { |
| for (i = SSL_SOCK_POSSIBLE_KT_COMBOS - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| if (key_combos[i].ctx) { |
| bind_conf->default_ctx = key_combos[i].ctx; |
| bind_conf->default_ssl_conf = ssl_conf; |
| ckch_inst->is_default = 1; |
| SSL_CTX_up_ref(bind_conf->default_ctx); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ckch_inst->bind_conf = bind_conf; |
| ckch_inst->ssl_conf = ssl_conf; |
| ckch_inst->ckch_store = ckchs; |
| |
| end: |
| |
| if (names) |
| sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free); |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&sni_keytypes_map); |
| while (node) { |
| next = ebmb_next(node); |
| ebmb_delete(node); |
| free(ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_keytype, name)); |
| node = next; |
| } |
| |
| /* we need to free the ctx since we incremented the refcount where it's used */ |
| for (i = 0; i < SSL_SOCK_POSSIBLE_KT_COMBOS; i++) { |
| if (key_combos[i].ctx) |
| SSL_CTX_free(key_combos[i].ctx); |
| } |
| |
| if (errcode & ERR_CODE && ckch_inst) { |
| if (ckch_inst->is_default) { |
| SSL_CTX_free(bind_conf->default_ctx); |
| bind_conf->default_ctx = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ckch_inst_free(ckch_inst); |
| ckch_inst = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| *ckchi = ckch_inst; |
| return errcode; |
| } |
| #else |
| /* This is a dummy, that just logs an error and returns error */ |
| int ckch_inst_new_load_multi_store(const char *path, struct ckch_store *ckchs, |
| struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_conf, |
| char **sni_filter, int fcount, struct ckch_inst **ckchi, char **err) |
| { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to stat SSL certificate from file '%s' : %s.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path, strerror(errno)); |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* #if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL: Support for loading multiple certs into a single SSL_CTX */ |
| |
| /* |
| * This function allocate a ckch_inst and create its snis |
| * |
| * Returns a bitfield containing the flags: |
| * ERR_FATAL in any fatal error case |
| * ERR_ALERT if the reason of the error is available in err |
| * ERR_WARN if a warning is available into err |
| */ |
| int ckch_inst_new_load_store(const char *path, struct ckch_store *ckchs, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, |
| struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_conf, char **sni_filter, int fcount, struct ckch_inst **ckchi, char **err) |
| { |
| SSL_CTX *ctx; |
| int i; |
| int order = 0; |
| X509_NAME *xname; |
| char *str; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
| struct pkey_info kinfo = { .sig = TLSEXT_signature_anonymous, .bits = 0 }; |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names; |
| #endif |
| struct cert_key_and_chain *ckch; |
| struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst = NULL; |
| int errcode = 0; |
| |
| *ckchi = NULL; |
| |
| if (!ckchs || !ckchs->ckch) |
| return ERR_FATAL; |
| |
| ckch = ckchs->ckch; |
| |
| ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()); |
| if (!ctx) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context for cert '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| errcode |= ssl_sock_put_ckch_into_ctx(path, ckch, ctx, err); |
| if (errcode & ERR_CODE) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ckch_inst = ckch_inst_new(); |
| if (!ckch_inst) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to allocate SSL context for cert '%s'.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", path); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ckch->cert); |
| if (pkey) { |
| kinfo.bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); |
| switch(EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) { |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA: |
| kinfo.sig = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; |
| break; |
| case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
| kinfo.sig = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; |
| break; |
| case EVP_PKEY_DSA: |
| kinfo.sig = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; |
| break; |
| } |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| } |
| |
| if (fcount) { |
| while (fcount--) { |
| order = ckch_inst_add_cert_sni(ctx, ckch_inst, bind_conf, ssl_conf, kinfo, sni_filter[fcount], order); |
| if (order < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to create a sni context.\n", err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| names = X509_get_ext_d2i(ckch->cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
| if (names) { |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) { |
| GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i); |
| if (name->type == GEN_DNS) { |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) { |
| order = ckch_inst_add_cert_sni(ctx, ckch_inst, bind_conf, ssl_conf, kinfo, str, order); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| if (order < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to create a sni context.\n", err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free); |
| } |
| #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */ |
| xname = X509_get_subject_name(ckch->cert); |
| i = -1; |
| while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(xname, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) { |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname, i); |
| ASN1_STRING *value; |
| |
| value = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry); |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, value) >= 0) { |
| order = ckch_inst_add_cert_sni(ctx, ckch_inst, bind_conf, ssl_conf, kinfo, str, order); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| if (order < 0) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to create a sni context.\n", err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| /* we must not free the SSL_CTX anymore below, since it's already in |
| * the tree, so it will be discovered and cleaned in time. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifndef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| if (bind_conf->default_ctx) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sthis version of openssl cannot load multiple SSL certificates.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| errcode |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (!bind_conf->default_ctx) { |
| bind_conf->default_ctx = ctx; |
| bind_conf->default_ssl_conf = ssl_conf; |
| ckch_inst->is_default = 1; |
| SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* everything succeed, the ckch instance can be used */ |
| ckch_inst->bind_conf = bind_conf; |
| ckch_inst->ssl_conf = ssl_conf; |
| ckch_inst->ckch_store = ckchs; |
| |
| SSL_CTX_free(ctx); /* we need to free the ctx since we incremented the refcount where it's used */ |
| |
| *ckchi = ckch_inst; |
| return errcode; |
| |
| error: |
| /* free the allocated sni_ctxs */ |
| if (ckch_inst) { |
| if (ckch_inst->is_default) |
| SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| |
| ckch_inst_free(ckch_inst); |
| ckch_inst = NULL; |
| } |
| SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| |
| return errcode; |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns a set of ERR_* flags possibly with an error in <err>. */ |
| static int ssl_sock_load_ckchs(const char *path, struct ckch_store *ckchs, |
| struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_conf, |
| char **sni_filter, int fcount, struct ckch_inst **ckch_inst, char **err) |
| { |
| int errcode = 0; |
| |
| /* we found the ckchs in the tree, we can use it directly */ |
| if (ckchs->multi) |
| errcode |= ckch_inst_new_load_multi_store(path, ckchs, bind_conf, ssl_conf, sni_filter, fcount, ckch_inst, err); |
| else |
| errcode |= ckch_inst_new_load_store(path, ckchs, bind_conf, ssl_conf, sni_filter, fcount, ckch_inst, err); |
| |
| if (errcode & ERR_CODE) |
| return errcode; |
| |
| ssl_sock_load_cert_sni(*ckch_inst, bind_conf); |
| |
| /* succeed, add the instance to the ckch_store's list of instance */ |
| LIST_ADDQ(&ckchs->ckch_inst, &((*ckch_inst)->by_ckchs)); |
| return errcode; |
| } |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| /* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot. The work is only |
| * done once. Zero is returned if the operation fails. No error is returned |
| * if the random is said as not implemented, because we expect that openssl |
| * will use another method once needed. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_initialize_random() |
| { |
| unsigned char random; |
| static int random_initialized = 0; |
| |
| if (!random_initialized && RAND_bytes(&random, 1) != 0) |
| random_initialized = 1; |
| |
| return random_initialized; |
| } |
| |
| /* Load a crt-list file, this is done in 2 parts: |
| * - store the content of the file in a crtlist structure with crtlist_entry structures |
| * - generate the instances by iterating on entries in the crtlist struct |
| * |
| * Nothing is locked there, this function is used in the configuration parser. |
| * |
| * Returns a set of ERR_* flags possibly with an error in <err>. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_load_cert_list_file(char *file, int dir, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct proxy *curproxy, char **err) |
| { |
| struct crtlist *crtlist = NULL; |
| struct ebmb_node *eb; |
| struct crtlist_entry *entry = NULL; |
| struct bind_conf_list *bind_conf_node = NULL; |
| int cfgerr = 0; |
| char *end; |
| |
| bind_conf_node = malloc(sizeof(*bind_conf_node)); |
| if (!bind_conf_node) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sCan't alloc memory!\n", err && *err ? *err : ""); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_FATAL | ERR_ALERT; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| bind_conf_node->next = NULL; |
| bind_conf_node->bind_conf = bind_conf; |
| |
| /* strip trailing slashes, including first one */ |
| for (end = file + strlen(file) - 1; end >= file && *end == '/'; end--) |
| *end = 0; |
| |
| /* look for an existing crtlist or create one */ |
| eb = ebst_lookup(&crtlists_tree, file); |
| if (eb) { |
| crtlist = ebmb_entry(eb, struct crtlist, node); |
| } else { |
| /* load a crt-list OR a directory */ |
| if (dir) |
| cfgerr |= crtlist_load_cert_dir(file, bind_conf, &crtlist, err); |
| else |
| cfgerr |= crtlist_parse_file(file, bind_conf, curproxy, &crtlist, err); |
| |
| if (!(cfgerr & ERR_CODE)) |
| ebst_insert(&crtlists_tree, &crtlist->node); |
| } |
| |
| if (cfgerr & ERR_CODE) { |
| cfgerr |= ERR_FATAL | ERR_ALERT; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* generates ckch instance from the crtlist_entry */ |
| list_for_each_entry(entry, &crtlist->ord_entries, by_crtlist) { |
| struct ckch_store *store; |
| struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst = NULL; |
| |
| store = entry->node.key; |
| cfgerr |= ssl_sock_load_ckchs(store->path, store, bind_conf, entry->ssl_conf, entry->filters, entry->fcount, &ckch_inst, err); |
| if (cfgerr & ERR_CODE) { |
| memprintf(err, "error processing line %d in file '%s' : %s", entry->linenum, file, *err); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| LIST_ADDQ(&entry->ckch_inst, &ckch_inst->by_crtlist_entry); |
| ckch_inst->crtlist_entry = entry; |
| } |
| |
| /* add the bind_conf to the list */ |
| bind_conf_node->next = crtlist->bind_conf; |
| crtlist->bind_conf = bind_conf_node; |
| |
| return cfgerr; |
| error: |
| { |
| struct crtlist_entry *lastentry; |
| struct ckch_inst *inst, *s_inst; |
| |
| lastentry = entry; /* which entry we tried to generate last */ |
| if (lastentry) { |
| list_for_each_entry(entry, &crtlist->ord_entries, by_crtlist) { |
| if (entry == lastentry) /* last entry we tried to generate, no need to go further */ |
| break; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_safe(inst, s_inst, &entry->ckch_inst, by_crtlist_entry) { |
| |
| /* this was not generated for this bind_conf, skip */ |
| if (inst->bind_conf != bind_conf) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* free the sni_ctx and instance */ |
| ckch_inst_free(inst); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| free(bind_conf_node); |
| } |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns a set of ERR_* flags possibly with an error in <err>. */ |
| int ssl_sock_load_cert(char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, char **err) |
| { |
| struct stat buf; |
| char fp[MAXPATHLEN+1]; |
| int cfgerr = 0; |
| struct ckch_store *ckchs; |
| struct ckch_inst *ckch_inst = NULL; |
| |
| if ((ckchs = ckchs_lookup(path))) { |
| /* we found the ckchs in the tree, we can use it directly */ |
| return ssl_sock_load_ckchs(path, ckchs, bind_conf, NULL, NULL, 0, &ckch_inst, err); |
| } |
| if (stat(path, &buf) == 0) { |
| if (S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode) == 0) { |
| ckchs = ckchs_load_cert_file(path, 0, err); |
| if (!ckchs) |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| |
| return ssl_sock_load_ckchs(path, ckchs, bind_conf, NULL, NULL, 0, &ckch_inst, err); |
| } else { |
| return ssl_sock_load_cert_list_file(path, 1, bind_conf, bind_conf->frontend, err); |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* stat failed, could be a bundle */ |
| if (global_ssl.extra_files & SSL_GF_BUNDLE) { |
| /* try to load a bundle if it is permitted */ |
| ckchs = ckchs_load_cert_file(path, 1, err); |
| if (!ckchs) |
| return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| cfgerr |= ssl_sock_load_ckchs(path, ckchs, bind_conf, NULL, NULL, 0, &ckch_inst, err); |
| } else { |
| memprintf(err, "%sunable to stat SSL certificate from file '%s' : %s.\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", fp, strerror(errno)); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| /* Create an initial CTX used to start the SSL connection before switchctx */ |
| static int |
| ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| long options = |
| SSL_OP_ALL | /* all known workarounds for bugs */ |
| SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | |
| SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION | |
| SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE | |
| SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE | |
| SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | |
| SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA | |
| SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE; |
| long mode = |
| SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE | |
| SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER | |
| SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS | |
| SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS; |
| struct tls_version_filter *conf_ssl_methods = &bind_conf->ssl_conf.ssl_methods; |
| int i, min, max, hole; |
| int flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL; |
| int cfgerr = 0; |
| const int default_min_ver = CONF_TLSV12; |
| |
| ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()); |
| bind_conf->initial_ctx = ctx; |
| |
| if (conf_ssl_methods->flags && (conf_ssl_methods->min || conf_ssl_methods->max)) |
| ha_warning("Proxy '%s': no-sslv3/no-tlsv1x are ignored for bind '%s' at [%s:%d]. " |
| "Use only 'ssl-min-ver' and 'ssl-max-ver' to fix.\n", |
| bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| else |
| flags = conf_ssl_methods->flags; |
| |
| min = conf_ssl_methods->min; |
| max = conf_ssl_methods->max; |
| |
| /* default minimum is TLSV12, */ |
| if (!min) { |
| if (!max || (max >= default_min_ver)) { |
| min = default_min_ver; |
| } else { |
| ha_warning("Proxy '%s': Ambiguous configuration for bind '%s' at [%s:%d]: the ssl-min-ver value is not configured and the ssl-max-ver value is lower than the default ssl-min-ver value (%s). " |
| "Setting the ssl-min-ver to %s. Use 'ssl-min-ver' to fix this.\n", |
| bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line, methodVersions[default_min_ver].name, methodVersions[max].name); |
| min = max; |
| } |
| } |
| /* Real min and max should be determinate with configuration and openssl's capabilities */ |
| if (min) |
| flags |= (methodVersions[min].flag - 1); |
| if (max) |
| flags |= ~((methodVersions[max].flag << 1) - 1); |
| /* find min, max and holes */ |
| min = max = CONF_TLSV_NONE; |
| hole = 0; |
| for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++) |
| /* version is in openssl && version not disable in configuration */ |
| if (methodVersions[i].option && !(flags & methodVersions[i].flag)) { |
| if (min) { |
| if (hole) { |
| ha_warning("Proxy '%s': SSL/TLS versions range not contiguous for bind '%s' at [%s:%d]. " |
| "Hole find for %s. Use only 'ssl-min-ver' and 'ssl-max-ver' to fix.\n", |
| bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line, |
| methodVersions[hole].name); |
| hole = 0; |
| } |
| max = i; |
| } |
| else { |
| min = max = i; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| if (min) |
| hole = i; |
| } |
| if (!min) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s': all SSL/TLS versions are disabled for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr += 1; |
| } |
| /* save real min/max in bind_conf */ |
| conf_ssl_methods->min = min; |
| conf_ssl_methods->max = max; |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL) |
| /* Keep force-xxx implementation as it is in older haproxy. It's a |
| precautionary measure to avoid any surprise with older openssl version. */ |
| if (min == max) |
| methodVersions[min].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_SERVER); |
| else |
| for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++) |
| if (flags & methodVersions[i].flag) |
| options |= methodVersions[i].option; |
| #else /* openssl >= 1.1.0 */ |
| /* set the max_version is required to cap TLS version or activate new TLS (v1.3) */ |
| methodVersions[min].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_MIN); |
| methodVersions[max].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_MAX); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS) |
| options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_PREF_CLIE_CIPH) |
| options &= ~SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE; |
| |
| #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION |
| options |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION; |
| #endif |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options); |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| if (global_ssl.async) |
| mode |= SSL_MODE_ASYNC; |
| #endif |
| SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, mode); |
| if (global_ssl.life_time) |
| SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, global_ssl.life_time); |
| |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk); |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk); |
| #elif defined(SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) |
| if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.early_data) |
| SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY); |
| SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk, NULL); |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk); |
| #else |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk); |
| #endif |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, bind_conf); |
| #endif |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static inline void sh_ssl_sess_free_blocks(struct shared_block *first, struct shared_block *block) |
| { |
| if (first == block) { |
| struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess = (struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *)first->data; |
| if (first->len > 0) |
| sh_ssl_sess_tree_delete(sh_ssl_sess); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* return first block from sh_ssl_sess */ |
| static inline struct shared_block *sh_ssl_sess_first_block(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess) |
| { |
| return (struct shared_block *)((unsigned char *)sh_ssl_sess - ((struct shared_block *)NULL)->data); |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* store a session into the cache |
| * s_id : session id padded with zero to SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH |
| * data: asn1 encoded session |
| * data_len: asn1 encoded session length |
| * Returns 1 id session was stored (else 0) |
| */ |
| static int sh_ssl_sess_store(unsigned char *s_id, unsigned char *data, int data_len) |
| { |
| struct shared_block *first; |
| struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess, *oldsh_ssl_sess; |
| |
| first = shctx_row_reserve_hot(ssl_shctx, NULL, data_len + sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr)); |
| if (!first) { |
| /* Could not retrieve enough free blocks to store that session */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* STORE the key in the first elem */ |
| sh_ssl_sess = (struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *)first->data; |
| memcpy(sh_ssl_sess->key_data, s_id, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH); |
| first->len = sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr); |
| |
| /* it returns the already existing node |
| or current node if none, never returns null */ |
| oldsh_ssl_sess = sh_ssl_sess_tree_insert(sh_ssl_sess); |
| if (oldsh_ssl_sess != sh_ssl_sess) { |
| /* NOTE: Row couldn't be in use because we lock read & write function */ |
| /* release the reserved row */ |
| shctx_row_dec_hot(ssl_shctx, first); |
| /* replace the previous session already in the tree */ |
| sh_ssl_sess = oldsh_ssl_sess; |
| /* ignore the previous session data, only use the header */ |
| first = sh_ssl_sess_first_block(sh_ssl_sess); |
| shctx_row_inc_hot(ssl_shctx, first); |
| first->len = sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr); |
| } |
| |
| if (shctx_row_data_append(ssl_shctx, first, NULL, data, data_len) < 0) { |
| shctx_row_dec_hot(ssl_shctx, first); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| shctx_row_dec_hot(ssl_shctx, first); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL callback used when a new session is created while connecting to a server */ |
| static int ssl_sess_new_srv_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index); |
| struct server *s; |
| |
| s = __objt_server(conn->target); |
| |
| if (!(s->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_REUSE)) { |
| int len; |
| unsigned char *ptr; |
| |
| len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
| if (s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr && s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].allocated_size >= len) { |
| ptr = s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr; |
| } else { |
| free(s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr); |
| ptr = s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = malloc(len); |
| s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].allocated_size = len; |
| } |
| if (s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) { |
| s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].size = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, |
| &ptr); |
| } |
| } else { |
| free(s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr); |
| s->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* SSL callback used on new session creation */ |
| int sh_ssl_sess_new_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) |
| { |
| unsigned char encsess[SHSESS_MAX_DATA_LEN]; /* encoded session */ |
| unsigned char encid[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; /* encoded id */ |
| unsigned char *p; |
| int data_len; |
| unsigned int sid_length; |
| const unsigned char *sid_data; |
| |
| /* Session id is already stored in to key and session id is known |
| * so we don't store it to keep size. |
| * note: SSL_SESSION_set1_id is using |
| * a memcpy so we need to use a different pointer |
| * than sid_data or sid_ctx_data to avoid valgrind |
| * complaining. |
| */ |
| |
| sid_data = SSL_SESSION_get_id(sess, &sid_length); |
| |
| /* copy value in an other buffer */ |
| memcpy(encid, sid_data, sid_length); |
| |
| /* pad with 0 */ |
| if (sid_length < SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) |
| memset(encid + sid_length, 0, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH-sid_length); |
| |
| /* force length to zero to avoid ASN1 encoding */ |
| SSL_SESSION_set1_id(sess, encid, 0); |
| |
| /* force length to zero to avoid ASN1 encoding */ |
| SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(sess, (const unsigned char *)SHCTX_APPNAME, 0); |
| |
| /* check if buffer is large enough for the ASN1 encoded session */ |
| data_len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
| if (data_len > SHSESS_MAX_DATA_LEN) |
| goto err; |
| |
| p = encsess; |
| |
| /* process ASN1 session encoding before the lock */ |
| i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); |
| |
| |
| shctx_lock(ssl_shctx); |
| /* store to cache */ |
| sh_ssl_sess_store(encid, encsess, data_len); |
| shctx_unlock(ssl_shctx); |
| err: |
| /* reset original length values */ |
| SSL_SESSION_set1_id(sess, encid, sid_length); |
| SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(sess, (const unsigned char *)SHCTX_APPNAME, strlen(SHCTX_APPNAME)); |
| |
| return 0; /* do not increment session reference count */ |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL callback used on lookup an existing session cause none found in internal cache */ |
| SSL_SESSION *sh_ssl_sess_get_cb(SSL *ssl, __OPENSSL_110_CONST__ unsigned char *key, int key_len, int *do_copy) |
| { |
| struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess; |
| unsigned char data[SHSESS_MAX_DATA_LEN], *p; |
| unsigned char tmpkey[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| struct shared_block *first; |
| |
| global.shctx_lookups++; |
| |
| /* allow the session to be freed automatically by openssl */ |
| *do_copy = 0; |
| |
| /* tree key is zeros padded sessionid */ |
| if (key_len < SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
| memcpy(tmpkey, key, key_len); |
| memset(tmpkey + key_len, 0, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - key_len); |
| key = tmpkey; |
| } |
| |
| /* lock cache */ |
| shctx_lock(ssl_shctx); |
| |
| /* lookup for session */ |
| sh_ssl_sess = sh_ssl_sess_tree_lookup(key); |
| if (!sh_ssl_sess) { |
| /* no session found: unlock cache and exit */ |
| shctx_unlock(ssl_shctx); |
| global.shctx_misses++; |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* sh_ssl_sess (shared_block->data) is at the end of shared_block */ |
| first = sh_ssl_sess_first_block(sh_ssl_sess); |
| |
| shctx_row_data_get(ssl_shctx, first, data, sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr), first->len-sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr)); |
| |
| shctx_unlock(ssl_shctx); |
| |
| /* decode ASN1 session */ |
| p = data; |
| sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, first->len-sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr)); |
| /* Reset session id and session id contenxt */ |
| if (sess) { |
| SSL_SESSION_set1_id(sess, key, key_len); |
| SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(sess, (const unsigned char *)SHCTX_APPNAME, strlen(SHCTX_APPNAME)); |
| } |
| |
| return sess; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* SSL callback used to signal session is no more used in internal cache */ |
| void sh_ssl_sess_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess) |
| { |
| struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr *sh_ssl_sess; |
| unsigned char tmpkey[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned int sid_length; |
| const unsigned char *sid_data; |
| (void)ctx; |
| |
| sid_data = SSL_SESSION_get_id(sess, &sid_length); |
| /* tree key is zeros padded sessionid */ |
| if (sid_length < SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
| memcpy(tmpkey, sid_data, sid_length); |
| memset(tmpkey+sid_length, 0, SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - sid_length); |
| sid_data = tmpkey; |
| } |
| |
| shctx_lock(ssl_shctx); |
| |
| /* lookup for session */ |
| sh_ssl_sess = sh_ssl_sess_tree_lookup(sid_data); |
| if (sh_ssl_sess) { |
| /* free session */ |
| sh_ssl_sess_tree_delete(sh_ssl_sess); |
| } |
| |
| /* unlock cache */ |
| shctx_unlock(ssl_shctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* Set session cache mode to server and disable openssl internal cache. |
| * Set shared cache callbacks on an ssl context. |
| * Shared context MUST be firstly initialized */ |
| void ssl_set_shctx(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (const unsigned char *)SHCTX_APPNAME, strlen(SHCTX_APPNAME)); |
| |
| if (!ssl_shctx) { |
| SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER | |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL | |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR); |
| |
| /* Set callbacks */ |
| SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, sh_ssl_sess_new_cb); |
| SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, sh_ssl_sess_get_cb); |
| SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, sh_ssl_sess_remove_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function applies the SSL configuration on a SSL_CTX |
| * It returns an error code and fills the <err> buffer |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_conf, SSL_CTX *ctx, char **err) |
| { |
| struct proxy *curproxy = bind_conf->frontend; |
| int cfgerr = 0; |
| int verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| struct ssl_bind_conf __maybe_unused *ssl_conf_cur; |
| const char *conf_ciphers; |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| const char *conf_ciphersuites; |
| #endif |
| const char *conf_curves = NULL; |
| |
| if (ssl_conf) { |
| struct tls_version_filter *conf_ssl_methods = &ssl_conf->ssl_methods; |
| int i, min, max; |
| int flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL; |
| |
| /* Real min and max should be determinate with configuration and openssl's capabilities */ |
| min = conf_ssl_methods->min ? conf_ssl_methods->min : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ssl_methods.min; |
| max = conf_ssl_methods->max ? conf_ssl_methods->max : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ssl_methods.max; |
| if (min) |
| flags |= (methodVersions[min].flag - 1); |
| if (max) |
| flags |= ~((methodVersions[max].flag << 1) - 1); |
| min = max = CONF_TLSV_NONE; |
| for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++) |
| if (methodVersions[i].option && !(flags & methodVersions[i].flag)) { |
| if (min) |
| max = i; |
| else |
| min = max = i; |
| } |
| /* save real min/max */ |
| conf_ssl_methods->min = min; |
| conf_ssl_methods->max = max; |
| if (!min) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': all SSL/TLS versions are disabled for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", bind_conf->frontend->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| switch ((ssl_conf && ssl_conf->verify) ? ssl_conf->verify : bind_conf->ssl_conf.verify) { |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| break; |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_OPTIONAL: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; |
| break; |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; |
| break; |
| } |
| SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, ssl_sock_bind_verifycbk); |
| if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) { |
| char *ca_file = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ca_file) ? ssl_conf->ca_file : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ca_file; |
| char *ca_verify_file = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ca_verify_file) ? ssl_conf->ca_verify_file : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ca_verify_file; |
| char *crl_file = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->crl_file) ? ssl_conf->crl_file : bind_conf->ssl_conf.crl_file; |
| if (ca_file || ca_verify_file) { |
| /* set CAfile to verify */ |
| if (ca_file && !ssl_set_verify_locations_file(ctx, ca_file)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set CA file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, ca_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| if (ca_verify_file && !ssl_set_verify_locations_file(ctx, ca_verify_file)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set CA-no-names file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, ca_verify_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| if (ca_file && !((ssl_conf && ssl_conf->no_ca_names) || bind_conf->ssl_conf.no_ca_names)) { |
| /* set CA names for client cert request, function returns void */ |
| SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_dup_CA_list(ssl_get_client_ca_file(ca_file))); |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': verify is enabled but no CA file specified for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK |
| if (crl_file) { |
| X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); |
| |
| if (!ssl_set_cert_crl_file(store, crl_file)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to configure CRL file '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, crl_file, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| else { |
| X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| } |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| if(bind_conf->keys_ref) { |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ctx, ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set callback for TLS ticket validation for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| ssl_set_shctx(ctx); |
| conf_ciphers = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ciphers) ? ssl_conf->ciphers : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ciphers; |
| if (conf_ciphers && |
| !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, conf_ciphers)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set SSL cipher list to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, conf_ciphers, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| conf_ciphersuites = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ciphersuites) ? ssl_conf->ciphersuites : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ciphersuites; |
| if (conf_ciphersuites && |
| !SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ctx, conf_ciphersuites)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set TLS 1.3 cipher suites to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, conf_ciphersuites, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| /* If tune.ssl.default-dh-param has not been set, |
| neither has ssl-default-dh-file and no static DH |
| params were in the certificate file. */ |
| if (global_ssl.default_dh_param == 0 && |
| global_dh == NULL && |
| (ssl_dh_ptr_index == -1 || |
| SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_dh_ptr_index) == NULL)) { |
| /* default to dh-param 2048 */ |
| global_ssl.default_dh_param = 2048; |
| } |
| |
| if (global_ssl.default_dh_param >= 1024) { |
| if (local_dh_1024 == NULL) { |
| local_dh_1024 = ssl_get_dh_1024(); |
| } |
| if (global_ssl.default_dh_param >= 2048) { |
| if (local_dh_2048 == NULL) { |
| local_dh_2048 = ssl_get_dh_2048(); |
| } |
| if (global_ssl.default_dh_param >= 4096) { |
| if (local_dh_4096 == NULL) { |
| local_dh_4096 = ssl_get_dh_4096(); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_infocbk); |
| #if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L |
| SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_msgcbk); |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
| ssl_conf_cur = NULL; |
| if (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->npn_str) |
| ssl_conf_cur = ssl_conf; |
| else if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.npn_str) |
| ssl_conf_cur = &bind_conf->ssl_conf; |
| if (ssl_conf_cur) |
| SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_advertise_npn_protos, ssl_conf_cur); |
| #endif |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| ssl_conf_cur = NULL; |
| if (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->alpn_str) |
| ssl_conf_cur = ssl_conf; |
| else if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.alpn_str) |
| ssl_conf_cur = &bind_conf->ssl_conf; |
| if (ssl_conf_cur) |
| SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_advertise_alpn_protos, ssl_conf_cur); |
| #endif |
| #if ((HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) |
| conf_curves = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->curves) ? ssl_conf->curves : bind_conf->ssl_conf.curves; |
| if (conf_curves) { |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(ctx, conf_curves)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set SSL curves list to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, conf_curves, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| (void)SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1); |
| } |
| #endif |
| #if defined(SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) |
| if (!conf_curves) { |
| int i; |
| EC_KEY *ecdh; |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| const char *ecdhe = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ecdhe) ? ssl_conf->ecdhe : |
| (bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe ? bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe : |
| NULL); |
| |
| if (ecdhe == NULL) { |
| (void)SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1); |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| #else |
| const char *ecdhe = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ecdhe) ? ssl_conf->ecdhe : |
| (bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe ? bind_conf->ssl_conf.ecdhe : |
| ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE); |
| #endif |
| |
| i = OBJ_sn2nid(ecdhe); |
| if (!i || ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(i)) == NULL)) { |
| memprintf(err, "%sProxy '%s': unable to set elliptic named curve to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| err && *err ? *err : "", curproxy->id, ecdhe, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| cfgerr |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; |
| } |
| else { |
| SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh); |
| EC_KEY_free(ecdh); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(const char *pattern, const char *hostname) |
| { |
| const char *pattern_wildcard, *pattern_left_label_end, *hostname_left_label_end; |
| size_t prefixlen, suffixlen; |
| |
| /* Trivial case */ |
| if (strcmp(pattern, hostname) == 0) |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* The rest of this logic is based on RFC 6125, section 6.4.3 |
| * (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3) */ |
| |
| pattern_wildcard = NULL; |
| pattern_left_label_end = pattern; |
| while (*pattern_left_label_end != '.') { |
| switch (*pattern_left_label_end) { |
| case 0: |
| /* End of label not found */ |
| return 0; |
| case '*': |
| /* If there is more than one wildcards */ |
| if (pattern_wildcard) |
| return 0; |
| pattern_wildcard = pattern_left_label_end; |
| break; |
| } |
| pattern_left_label_end++; |
| } |
| |
| /* If it's not trivial and there is no wildcard, it can't |
| * match */ |
| if (!pattern_wildcard) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Make sure all labels match except the leftmost */ |
| hostname_left_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.'); |
| if (!hostname_left_label_end |
| || strcmp(pattern_left_label_end, hostname_left_label_end) != 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Make sure the leftmost label of the hostname is long enough |
| * that the wildcard can match */ |
| if (hostname_left_label_end - hostname < (pattern_left_label_end - pattern) - 1) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Finally compare the string on either side of the |
| * wildcard */ |
| prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern; |
| suffixlen = pattern_left_label_end - (pattern_wildcard + 1); |
| if ((prefixlen && (memcmp(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) != 0)) |
| || (suffixlen && (memcmp(pattern_wildcard + 1, hostname_left_label_end - suffixlen, suffixlen) != 0))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_sock_srv_verifycbk(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| SSL *ssl; |
| struct connection *conn; |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ssl_ctx; |
| const char *servername; |
| const char *sni; |
| |
| int depth; |
| X509 *cert; |
| STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *alt_names; |
| int i; |
| X509_NAME *cert_subject; |
| char *str; |
| |
| if (ok == 0) |
| return ok; |
| |
| ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); |
| conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index); |
| ssl_ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| |
| /* We're checking if the provided hostnames match the desired one. The |
| * desired hostname comes from the SNI we presented if any, or if not |
| * provided then it may have been explicitly stated using a "verifyhost" |
| * directive. If neither is set, we don't care about the name so the |
| * verification is OK. |
| */ |
| servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl_ctx->ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); |
| sni = servername; |
| if (!servername) { |
| servername = __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.verify_host; |
| if (!servername) |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| /* We only need to verify the CN on the actual server cert, |
| * not the indirect CAs */ |
| depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); |
| if (depth != 0) |
| return ok; |
| |
| /* At this point, the cert is *not* OK unless we can find a |
| * hostname match */ |
| ok = 0; |
| |
| cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); |
| /* It seems like this might happen if verify peer isn't set */ |
| if (!cert) |
| return ok; |
| |
| alt_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
| if (alt_names) { |
| for (i = 0; !ok && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(alt_names); i++) { |
| GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(alt_names, i); |
| if (name->type == GEN_DNS) { |
| #if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.ia5) >= 0) { |
| #else |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, name->d.dNSName) >= 0) { |
| #endif |
| ok = ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(str, servername); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(alt_names, GENERAL_NAME_free); |
| } |
| |
| cert_subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert); |
| i = -1; |
| while (!ok && (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(cert_subject, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) { |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(cert_subject, i); |
| ASN1_STRING *value; |
| value = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry); |
| if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&str, value) >= 0) { |
| ok = ssl_sock_srv_hostcheck(str, servername); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* report the mismatch and indicate if SNI was used or not */ |
| if (!ok && !conn->err_code) |
| conn->err_code = sni ? CO_ER_SSL_MISMATCH_SNI : CO_ER_SSL_MISMATCH; |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| /* prepare ssl context from servers options. Returns an error count */ |
| int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct server *srv) |
| { |
| struct proxy *curproxy = srv->proxy; |
| int cfgerr = 0; |
| long options = |
| SSL_OP_ALL | /* all known workarounds for bugs */ |
| SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | |
| SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION; |
| long mode = |
| SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE | |
| SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER | |
| SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS | |
| SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS; |
| int verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| struct tls_version_filter *conf_ssl_methods = &srv->ssl_ctx.methods; |
| int i, min, max, hole; |
| int flags = MC_SSL_O_ALL; |
| |
| /* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */ |
| if (!ssl_initialize_random()) { |
| ha_alert("OpenSSL random data generator initialization failed.\n"); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| |
| /* Automatic memory computations need to know we use SSL there */ |
| global.ssl_used_backend = 1; |
| |
| /* Initiate SSL context for current server */ |
| if (!srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess) { |
| if ((srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = calloc(1, global.nbthread*sizeof(*srv->ssl_ctx.reused_sess))) == NULL) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] out of memory.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line); |
| cfgerr++; |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| } |
| if (srv->use_ssl == 1) |
| srv->xprt = &ssl_sock; |
| |
| ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method()); |
| if (!ctx) { |
| ha_alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to allocate ssl context.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, |
| srv->id); |
| cfgerr++; |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| if (conf_ssl_methods->flags && (conf_ssl_methods->min || conf_ssl_methods->max)) |
| ha_warning("config : %s '%s': no-sslv3/no-tlsv1x are ignored for server '%s'. " |
| "Use only 'ssl-min-ver' and 'ssl-max-ver' to fix.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, srv->id); |
| else |
| flags = conf_ssl_methods->flags; |
| |
| /* Real min and max should be determinate with configuration and openssl's capabilities */ |
| if (conf_ssl_methods->min) |
| flags |= (methodVersions[conf_ssl_methods->min].flag - 1); |
| if (conf_ssl_methods->max) |
| flags |= ~((methodVersions[conf_ssl_methods->max].flag << 1) - 1); |
| |
| /* find min, max and holes */ |
| min = max = CONF_TLSV_NONE; |
| hole = 0; |
| for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++) |
| /* version is in openssl && version not disable in configuration */ |
| if (methodVersions[i].option && !(flags & methodVersions[i].flag)) { |
| if (min) { |
| if (hole) { |
| ha_warning("config : %s '%s': SSL/TLS versions range not contiguous for server '%s'. " |
| "Hole find for %s. Use only 'ssl-min-ver' and 'ssl-max-ver' to fix.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| methodVersions[hole].name); |
| hole = 0; |
| } |
| max = i; |
| } |
| else { |
| min = max = i; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| if (min) |
| hole = i; |
| } |
| if (!min) { |
| ha_alert("config : %s '%s': all SSL/TLS versions are disabled for server '%s'.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, srv->id); |
| cfgerr += 1; |
| } |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL) |
| /* Keep force-xxx implementation as it is in older haproxy. It's a |
| precautionary measure to avoid any surprise with older openssl version. */ |
| if (min == max) |
| methodVersions[min].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_CLIENT); |
| else |
| for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++) |
| if (flags & methodVersions[i].flag) |
| options |= methodVersions[i].option; |
| #else /* openssl >= 1.1.0 */ |
| /* set the max_version is required to cap TLS version or activate new TLS (v1.3) */ |
| methodVersions[min].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_MIN); |
| methodVersions[max].ctx_set_version(ctx, SET_MAX); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.options & SRV_SSL_O_NO_TLS_TICKETS) |
| options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; |
| SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options); |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| if (global_ssl.async) |
| mode |= SSL_MODE_ASYNC; |
| #endif |
| SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, mode); |
| srv->ssl_ctx.ctx = ctx; |
| |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) { |
| if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { |
| ha_alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to load SSL private key from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, |
| srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| else if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) <= 0) { |
| ha_alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': unable to load ssl certificate from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, |
| srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| else if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) <= 0) { |
| ha_alert("config : %s '%s', server '%s': inconsistencies between private key and certificate loaded from PEM file '%s'.\n", |
| proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, |
| srv->id, srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (global.ssl_server_verify == SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_REQUIRED) |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; |
| switch (srv->ssl_ctx.verify) { |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_NONE: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| break; |
| case SSL_SOCK_VERIFY_REQUIRED: |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; |
| break; |
| } |
| SSL_CTX_set_verify(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, |
| verify, |
| (srv->ssl_ctx.verify_host || (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) ? ssl_sock_srv_verifycbk : NULL); |
| if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) { |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file) { |
| /* set CAfile to verify */ |
| if (!ssl_set_verify_locations_file(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file)) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] unable to set CA file '%s'.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| if (global.ssl_server_verify == SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_REQUIRED) |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] verify is enabled by default but no CA file specified. If you're running on a LAN where you're certain to trust the server's certificate, please set an explicit 'verify none' statement on the 'server' line, or use 'ssl-server-verify none' in the global section to disable server-side verifications by default.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line); |
| else |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] verify is enabled but no CA file specified.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file) { |
| X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx); |
| |
| if (!ssl_set_cert_crl_file(store, srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file)) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] unable to configure CRL file '%s'.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| else { |
| X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE); |
| SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, ssl_sess_new_srv_cb); |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers && |
| !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers)) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] : unable to set SSL cipher list to '%s'.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites && |
| !SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites)) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] : unable to set TLS 1.3 cipher suites to '%s'.\n", |
| curproxy->id, srv->id, |
| srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites); |
| cfgerr++; |
| } |
| #endif |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.npn_str) |
| SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_srv_select_protos, srv); |
| #endif |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str) |
| SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx, (unsigned char *)srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str, srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_len); |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| return cfgerr; |
| } |
| |
| /* Walks down the two trees in bind_conf and prepares all certs. The pointer may |
| * be NULL, in which case nothing is done. Returns the number of errors |
| * encountered. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_prepare_all_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| struct ebmb_node *node; |
| struct sni_ctx *sni; |
| int err = 0; |
| int errcode = 0; |
| char *errmsg = NULL; |
| |
| /* Automatic memory computations need to know we use SSL there */ |
| global.ssl_used_frontend = 1; |
| |
| /* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */ |
| if (!ssl_initialize_random()) { |
| ha_alert("OpenSSL random data generator initialization failed.\n"); |
| err++; |
| } |
| /* Create initial_ctx used to start the ssl connection before do switchctx */ |
| if (!bind_conf->initial_ctx) { |
| err += ssl_sock_initial_ctx(bind_conf); |
| /* It should not be necessary to call this function, but it's |
| necessary first to check and move all initialisation related |
| to initial_ctx in ssl_sock_initial_ctx. */ |
| errcode |= ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, NULL, bind_conf->initial_ctx, &errmsg); |
| } |
| if (bind_conf->default_ctx) |
| errcode |= ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, bind_conf->default_ssl_conf, bind_conf->default_ctx, &errmsg); |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_ctx); |
| while (node) { |
| sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name); |
| if (!sni->order && sni->ctx != bind_conf->default_ctx) |
| /* only initialize the CTX on its first occurrence and |
| if it is not the default_ctx */ |
| errcode |= ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, sni->conf, sni->ctx, &errmsg); |
| node = ebmb_next(node); |
| } |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx); |
| while (node) { |
| sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name); |
| if (!sni->order && sni->ctx != bind_conf->default_ctx) { |
| /* only initialize the CTX on its first occurrence and |
| if it is not the default_ctx */ |
| errcode |= ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(bind_conf, sni->conf, sni->ctx, &errmsg); |
| } |
| node = ebmb_next(node); |
| } |
| |
| if (errcode & ERR_WARN) { |
| ha_warning("%s", errmsg); |
| } else if (errcode & ERR_CODE) { |
| ha_alert("%s", errmsg); |
| err++; |
| } |
| |
| free(errmsg); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Prepares all the contexts for a bind_conf and allocates the shared SSL |
| * context if needed. Returns < 0 on error, 0 on success. The warnings and |
| * alerts are directly emitted since the rest of the stack does it below. |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_prepare_bind_conf(struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| struct proxy *px = bind_conf->frontend; |
| int alloc_ctx; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (!bind_conf->is_ssl) { |
| if (bind_conf->default_ctx) { |
| ha_warning("Proxy '%s': A certificate was specified but SSL was not enabled on bind '%s' at [%s:%d] (use 'ssl').\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!bind_conf->default_ctx) { |
| if (bind_conf->strict_sni && !bind_conf->generate_certs) { |
| ha_warning("Proxy '%s': no SSL certificate specified for bind '%s' at [%s:%d], ssl connections will fail (use 'crt').\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| } |
| else { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s': no SSL certificate specified for bind '%s' at [%s:%d] (use 'crt').\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!ssl_shctx && global.tune.sslcachesize) { |
| alloc_ctx = shctx_init(&ssl_shctx, global.tune.sslcachesize, |
| sizeof(struct sh_ssl_sess_hdr) + SHSESS_BLOCK_MIN_SIZE, -1, |
| sizeof(*sh_ssl_sess_tree), |
| ((global.nbthread > 1) || (!global_ssl.private_cache && (global.nbproc > 1))) ? 1 : 0); |
| if (alloc_ctx <= 0) { |
| if (alloc_ctx == SHCTX_E_INIT_LOCK) |
| ha_alert("Unable to initialize the lock for the shared SSL session cache. You can retry using the global statement 'tune.ssl.force-private-cache' but it could increase CPU usage due to renegotiations if nbproc > 1.\n"); |
| else |
| ha_alert("Unable to allocate SSL session cache.\n"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| /* free block callback */ |
| ssl_shctx->free_block = sh_ssl_sess_free_blocks; |
| /* init the root tree within the extra space */ |
| sh_ssl_sess_tree = (void *)ssl_shctx + sizeof(struct shared_context); |
| *sh_ssl_sess_tree = EB_ROOT_UNIQUE; |
| } |
| err = 0; |
| /* initialize all certificate contexts */ |
| err += ssl_sock_prepare_all_ctx(bind_conf); |
| |
| /* initialize CA variables if the certificates generation is enabled */ |
| err += ssl_sock_load_ca(bind_conf); |
| |
| return -err; |
| } |
| |
| /* release ssl context allocated for servers. */ |
| void ssl_sock_free_srv_ctx(struct server *srv) |
| { |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str) |
| free(srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str); |
| #endif |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.npn_str) |
| free(srv->ssl_ctx.npn_str); |
| #endif |
| if (srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) |
| SSL_CTX_free(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* Walks down the two trees in bind_conf and frees all the certs. The pointer may |
| * be NULL, in which case nothing is done. The default_ctx is nullified too. |
| */ |
| void ssl_sock_free_all_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| struct ebmb_node *node, *back; |
| struct sni_ctx *sni; |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_ctx); |
| while (node) { |
| sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name); |
| back = ebmb_next(node); |
| ebmb_delete(node); |
| SSL_CTX_free(sni->ctx); |
| if (!sni->order) { /* only free the CTX conf on its first occurrence */ |
| ssl_sock_free_ssl_conf(sni->conf); |
| free(sni->conf); |
| sni->conf = NULL; |
| } |
| free(sni); |
| node = back; |
| } |
| |
| node = ebmb_first(&bind_conf->sni_w_ctx); |
| while (node) { |
| sni = ebmb_entry(node, struct sni_ctx, name); |
| back = ebmb_next(node); |
| ebmb_delete(node); |
| SSL_CTX_free(sni->ctx); |
| if (!sni->order) { /* only free the SSL conf its first occurrence */ |
| ssl_sock_free_ssl_conf(sni->conf); |
| free(sni->conf); |
| sni->conf = NULL; |
| } |
| free(sni); |
| node = back; |
| } |
| SSL_CTX_free(bind_conf->initial_ctx); |
| bind_conf->initial_ctx = NULL; |
| SSL_CTX_free(bind_conf->default_ctx); |
| bind_conf->default_ctx = NULL; |
| bind_conf->default_ssl_conf = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Destroys all the contexts for a bind_conf. This is used during deinit(). */ |
| void ssl_sock_destroy_bind_conf(struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| ssl_sock_free_ca(bind_conf); |
| ssl_sock_free_all_ctx(bind_conf); |
| ssl_sock_free_ssl_conf(&bind_conf->ssl_conf); |
| free(bind_conf->ca_sign_file); |
| free(bind_conf->ca_sign_pass); |
| if (bind_conf->keys_ref && !--bind_conf->keys_ref->refcount) { |
| free(bind_conf->keys_ref->filename); |
| free(bind_conf->keys_ref->tlskeys); |
| LIST_DEL(&bind_conf->keys_ref->list); |
| free(bind_conf->keys_ref); |
| } |
| bind_conf->keys_ref = NULL; |
| bind_conf->ca_sign_pass = NULL; |
| bind_conf->ca_sign_file = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Load CA cert file and private key used to generate certificates */ |
| int |
| ssl_sock_load_ca(struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| struct proxy *px = bind_conf->frontend; |
| FILE *fp; |
| X509 *cacert = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *capkey = NULL; |
| int err = 0; |
| |
| if (!bind_conf->generate_certs) |
| return err; |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME && !defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES) |
| if (global_ssl.ctx_cache) { |
| ssl_ctx_lru_tree = lru64_new(global_ssl.ctx_cache); |
| } |
| ssl_ctx_lru_seed = (unsigned int)time(NULL); |
| ssl_ctx_serial = now_ms; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (!bind_conf->ca_sign_file) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s': cannot enable certificate generation, " |
| "no CA certificate File configured at [%s:%d].\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| goto load_error; |
| } |
| |
| /* read in the CA certificate */ |
| if (!(fp = fopen(bind_conf->ca_sign_file, "r"))) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s': Failed to read CA certificate file '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->ca_sign_file, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| goto load_error; |
| } |
| if (!(cacert = PEM_read_X509(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s': Failed to read CA certificate file '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->ca_sign_file, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| goto read_error; |
| } |
| rewind(fp); |
| if (!(capkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, bind_conf->ca_sign_pass))) { |
| ha_alert("Proxy '%s': Failed to read CA private key file '%s' at [%s:%d].\n", |
| px->id, bind_conf->ca_sign_file, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line); |
| goto read_error; |
| } |
| |
| fclose (fp); |
| bind_conf->ca_sign_cert = cacert; |
| bind_conf->ca_sign_pkey = capkey; |
| return err; |
| |
| read_error: |
| fclose (fp); |
| if (capkey) EVP_PKEY_free(capkey); |
| if (cacert) X509_free(cacert); |
| load_error: |
| bind_conf->generate_certs = 0; |
| err++; |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Release CA cert and private key used to generate certificated */ |
| void |
| ssl_sock_free_ca(struct bind_conf *bind_conf) |
| { |
| if (bind_conf->ca_sign_pkey) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(bind_conf->ca_sign_pkey); |
| if (bind_conf->ca_sign_cert) |
| X509_free(bind_conf->ca_sign_cert); |
| bind_conf->ca_sign_pkey = NULL; |
| bind_conf->ca_sign_cert = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function is called if SSL * context is not yet allocated. The function |
| * is designed to be called before any other data-layer operation and sets the |
| * handshake flag on the connection. It is safe to call it multiple times. |
| * It returns 0 on success and -1 in error case. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn, void **xprt_ctx) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| /* already initialized */ |
| if (*xprt_ctx) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ctx = pool_alloc(ssl_sock_ctx_pool); |
| if (!ctx) { |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| ctx->wait_event.tasklet = tasklet_new(); |
| if (!ctx->wait_event.tasklet) { |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| pool_free(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, ctx); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| ctx->wait_event.tasklet->process = ssl_sock_io_cb; |
| ctx->wait_event.tasklet->context = ctx; |
| ctx->wait_event.events = 0; |
| ctx->sent_early_data = 0; |
| ctx->early_buf = BUF_NULL; |
| ctx->conn = conn; |
| ctx->subs = NULL; |
| ctx->xprt_st = 0; |
| ctx->xprt_ctx = NULL; |
| |
| /* Only work with sockets for now, this should be adapted when we'll |
| * add QUIC support. |
| */ |
| ctx->xprt = xprt_get(XPRT_RAW); |
| if (ctx->xprt->init) { |
| if (ctx->xprt->init(conn, &ctx->xprt_ctx) != 0) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (global.maxsslconn && sslconns >= global.maxsslconn) { |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_TOO_MANY; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If it is in client mode initiate SSL session |
| in connect state otherwise accept state */ |
| if (objt_server(conn->target)) { |
| int may_retry = 1; |
| |
| retry_connect: |
| /* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */ |
| ctx->ssl = SSL_new(__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.ctx); |
| if (!ctx->ssl) { |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc(NULL); |
| goto retry_connect; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ctx->bio = BIO_new(ha_meth); |
| if (!ctx->bio) { |
| SSL_free(ctx->ssl); |
| ctx->ssl = NULL; |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc(NULL); |
| goto retry_connect; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| BIO_set_data(ctx->bio, ctx); |
| SSL_set_bio(ctx->ssl, ctx->bio, ctx->bio); |
| |
| /* set connection pointer */ |
| if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ctx->ssl, ssl_app_data_index, conn)) { |
| SSL_free(ctx->ssl); |
| ctx->ssl = NULL; |
| conn->xprt_ctx = NULL; |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc(NULL); |
| goto retry_connect; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_set_connect_state(ctx->ssl); |
| if (__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) { |
| const unsigned char *ptr = __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr; |
| SSL_SESSION *sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &ptr, __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].size); |
| if (sess && !SSL_set_session(ctx->ssl, sess)) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
| free(__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr); |
| __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL; |
| } else if (sess) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* leave init state and start handshake */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN; |
| |
| _HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sslconns, 1); |
| _HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&totalsslconns, 1); |
| *xprt_ctx = ctx; |
| /* Start the handshake */ |
| tasklet_wakeup(ctx->wait_event.tasklet); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else if (objt_listener(conn->target)) { |
| int may_retry = 1; |
| |
| retry_accept: |
| /* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */ |
| ctx->ssl = SSL_new(__objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->initial_ctx); |
| if (!ctx->ssl) { |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc(NULL); |
| goto retry_accept; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ctx->bio = BIO_new(ha_meth); |
| if (!ctx->bio) { |
| SSL_free(ctx->ssl); |
| ctx->ssl = NULL; |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc(NULL); |
| goto retry_accept; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| BIO_set_data(ctx->bio, ctx); |
| SSL_set_bio(ctx->ssl, ctx->bio, ctx->bio); |
| |
| /* set connection pointer */ |
| if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ctx->ssl, ssl_app_data_index, conn)) { |
| SSL_free(ctx->ssl); |
| ctx->ssl = NULL; |
| if (may_retry--) { |
| pool_gc(NULL); |
| goto retry_accept; |
| } |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| if (__objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->ssl_conf.early_data) { |
| b_alloc(&ctx->early_buf); |
| SSL_set_max_early_data(ctx->ssl, |
| /* Only allow early data if we managed to allocate |
| * a buffer. |
| */ |
| (!b_is_null(&ctx->early_buf)) ? |
| global.tune.bufsize - global.tune.maxrewrite : 0); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| SSL_set_accept_state(ctx->ssl); |
| |
| /* leave init state and start handshake */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN; |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS; |
| #endif |
| |
| _HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sslconns, 1); |
| _HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&totalsslconns, 1); |
| *xprt_ctx = ctx; |
| /* Start the handshake */ |
| tasklet_wakeup(ctx->wait_event.tasklet); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* don't know how to handle such a target */ |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_TARGET; |
| err: |
| if (ctx && ctx->wait_event.tasklet) |
| tasklet_free(ctx->wait_event.tasklet); |
| pool_free(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, ctx); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* This is the callback which is used when an SSL handshake is pending. It |
| * updates the FD status if it wants some polling before being called again. |
| * It returns 0 if it fails in a fatal way or needs to poll to go further, |
| * otherwise it returns non-zero and removes itself from the connection's |
| * flags (the bit is provided in <flag> by the caller). |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_handshake(struct connection *conn, unsigned int flag) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!conn->xprt_ctx) |
| goto out_error; |
| |
| #if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L |
| /* |
| * Check if we have early data. If we do, we have to read them |
| * before SSL_do_handshake() is called, And there's no way to |
| * detect early data, except to try to read them |
| */ |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS) { |
| size_t read_data = 0; |
| |
| while (1) { |
| ret = SSL_read_early_data(ctx->ssl, |
| b_tail(&ctx->early_buf), b_room(&ctx->early_buf), |
| &read_data); |
| if (ret == SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR) |
| goto check_error; |
| if (read_data > 0) { |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_EARLY_DATA; |
| b_add(&ctx->early_buf, read_data); |
| } |
| if (ret == SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH) { |
| conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS; |
| if (!b_data(&ctx->early_buf)) |
| b_free(&ctx->early_buf); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| /* If we use SSL_do_handshake to process a reneg initiated by |
| * the remote peer, it sometimes returns SSL_ERROR_SSL. |
| * Usually SSL_write and SSL_read are used and process implicitly |
| * the reneg handshake. |
| * Here we use SSL_peek as a workaround for reneg. |
| */ |
| if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN) && SSL_renegotiate_pending(ctx->ssl)) { |
| char c; |
| |
| ret = SSL_peek(ctx->ssl, &c, 1); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| /* handshake may have not been completed, let's find why */ |
| ret = SSL_get_error(ctx->ssl, ret); |
| |
| if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { |
| /* SSL handshake needs to write, L4 connection may not be ready */ |
| if (!(ctx->wait_event.events & SUB_RETRY_SEND)) |
| ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_SEND, &ctx->wait_event); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { |
| /* handshake may have been completed but we have |
| * no more data to read. |
| */ |
| if (!SSL_renegotiate_pending(ctx->ssl)) { |
| ret = 1; |
| goto reneg_ok; |
| } |
| /* SSL handshake needs to read, L4 connection is ready */ |
| if (!(ctx->wait_event.events & SUB_RETRY_RECV)) |
| ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_RECV, &ctx->wait_event); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC) { |
| ssl_async_process_fds(ctx); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) { |
| /* if errno is null, then connection was successfully established */ |
| if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN) |
| conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN; |
| if (!conn->err_code) { |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) |
| /* do not handle empty handshakes in BoringSSL or LibreSSL */ |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| #else |
| int empty_handshake; |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) |
| /* use SSL_get_state() in OpenSSL >= 1.1.0; SSL_state() is broken */ |
| OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE state = SSL_get_state((SSL *)ctx->ssl); |
| empty_handshake = state == TLS_ST_BEFORE; |
| #else |
| /* access packet_length directly in OpenSSL <= 1.0.2; SSL_state() is broken */ |
| empty_handshake = !ctx->ssl->packet_length; |
| #endif |
| if (empty_handshake) { |
| if (!errno) { |
| if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EMPTY; |
| } |
| else { |
| if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_ABORT; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| } |
| #endif /* BoringSSL or LibreSSL */ |
| } |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| else { |
| /* Fail on all other handshake errors */ |
| /* Note: OpenSSL may leave unread bytes in the socket's |
| * buffer, causing an RST to be emitted upon close() on |
| * TCP sockets. We first try to drain possibly pending |
| * data to avoid this as much as possible. |
| */ |
| conn_sock_drain(conn); |
| if (!conn->err_code) |
| conn->err_code = (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) ? |
| CO_ER_SSL_KILLED_HB : CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| } |
| /* read some data: consider handshake completed */ |
| goto reneg_ok; |
| } |
| ret = SSL_do_handshake(ctx->ssl); |
| check_error: |
| if (ret != 1) { |
| /* handshake did not complete, let's find why */ |
| ret = SSL_get_error(ctx->ssl, ret); |
| |
| if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { |
| /* SSL handshake needs to write, L4 connection may not be ready */ |
| if (!(ctx->wait_event.events & SUB_RETRY_SEND)) |
| ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_SEND, &ctx->wait_event); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { |
| /* SSL handshake needs to read, L4 connection is ready */ |
| if (!(ctx->wait_event.events & SUB_RETRY_RECV)) |
| ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, |
| SUB_RETRY_RECV, &ctx->wait_event); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC) { |
| ssl_async_process_fds(ctx); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) { |
| /* if errno is null, then connection was successfully established */ |
| if (!errno && conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN) |
| conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN; |
| if (!conn->err_code) { |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) |
| /* do not handle empty handshakes in BoringSSL or LibreSSL */ |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| #else |
| int empty_handshake; |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) |
| /* use SSL_get_state() in OpenSSL >= 1.1.0; SSL_state() is broken */ |
| OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE state = SSL_get_state(ctx->ssl); |
| empty_handshake = state == TLS_ST_BEFORE; |
| #else |
| /* access packet_length directly in OpenSSL <= 1.0.2; SSL_state() is broken */ |
| empty_handshake = !ctx->ssl->packet_length; |
| #endif |
| if (empty_handshake) { |
| if (!errno) { |
| if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EMPTY; |
| } |
| else { |
| if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_ABORT; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| if (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HB; |
| else |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| } |
| #endif /* BoringSSL or LibreSSL */ |
| } |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| else { |
| /* Fail on all other handshake errors */ |
| /* Note: OpenSSL may leave unread bytes in the socket's |
| * buffer, causing an RST to be emitted upon close() on |
| * TCP sockets. We first try to drain possibly pending |
| * data to avoid this as much as possible. |
| */ |
| conn_sock_drain(conn); |
| if (!conn->err_code) |
| conn->err_code = (ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_RECV_HEARTBEAT) ? |
| CO_ER_SSL_KILLED_HB : CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| } |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| else { |
| /* |
| * If the server refused the early data, we have to send a |
| * 425 to the client, as we no longer have the data to sent |
| * them again. |
| */ |
| if ((conn->flags & CO_FL_EARLY_DATA) && (objt_server(conn->target))) { |
| if (SSL_get_early_data_status(ctx->ssl) == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) { |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_EARLY_FAILED; |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| reneg_ok: |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| /* ASYNC engine API doesn't support moving read/write |
| * buffers. So we disable ASYNC mode right after |
| * the handshake to avoid buffer overflow. |
| */ |
| if (global_ssl.async) |
| SSL_clear_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); |
| #endif |
| /* Handshake succeeded */ |
| if (!SSL_session_reused(ctx->ssl)) { |
| if (objt_server(conn->target)) { |
| update_freq_ctr(&global.ssl_be_keys_per_sec, 1); |
| if (global.ssl_be_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr > global.ssl_be_keys_max) |
| global.ssl_be_keys_max = global.ssl_be_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr; |
| } |
| else { |
| update_freq_ctr(&global.ssl_fe_keys_per_sec, 1); |
| if (global.ssl_fe_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr > global.ssl_fe_keys_max) |
| global.ssl_fe_keys_max = global.ssl_fe_keys_per_sec.curr_ctr; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* The connection is now established at both layers, it's time to leave */ |
| conn->flags &= ~(flag | CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN); |
| return 1; |
| |
| out_error: |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn); |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| /* free resumed session if exists */ |
| if (objt_server(conn->target) && __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr) { |
| free(__objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr); |
| __objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess[tid].ptr = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Fail on all other handshake errors */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR; |
| if (!conn->err_code) |
| conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_HANDSHAKE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Called from the upper layer, to subscribe <es> to events <event_type>. The |
| * event subscriber <es> is not allowed to change from a previous call as long |
| * as at least one event is still subscribed. The <event_type> must only be a |
| * combination of SUB_RETRY_RECV and SUB_RETRY_SEND. It always returns 0, |
| * unless the transport layer was already released. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_subscribe(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, int event_type, struct wait_event *es) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx; |
| |
| if (!ctx) |
| return -1; |
| |
| BUG_ON(event_type & ~(SUB_RETRY_SEND|SUB_RETRY_RECV)); |
| BUG_ON(ctx->subs && ctx->subs != es); |
| |
| ctx->subs = es; |
| es->events |= event_type; |
| |
| /* we may have to subscribe to lower layers for new events */ |
| event_type &= ~ctx->wait_event.events; |
| if (event_type && !(conn->flags & CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS)) |
| ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, event_type, &ctx->wait_event); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Called from the upper layer, to unsubscribe <es> from events <event_type>. |
| * The <es> pointer is not allowed to differ from the one passed to the |
| * subscribe() call. It always returns zero. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_unsubscribe(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, int event_type, struct wait_event *es) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx; |
| |
| BUG_ON(event_type & ~(SUB_RETRY_SEND|SUB_RETRY_RECV)); |
| BUG_ON(ctx->subs && ctx->subs != es); |
| |
| es->events &= ~event_type; |
| if (!es->events) |
| ctx->subs = NULL; |
| |
| /* If we subscribed, and we're not doing the handshake, |
| * then we subscribed because the upper layer asked for it, |
| * as the upper layer is no longer interested, we can |
| * unsubscribe too. |
| */ |
| event_type &= ctx->wait_event.events; |
| if (event_type && !(ctx->conn->flags & CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS)) |
| conn_unsubscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, event_type, &ctx->wait_event); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Use the provided XPRT as an underlying XPRT, and provide the old one. |
| * Returns 0 on success, and non-zero on failure. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_add_xprt(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, void *toadd_ctx, const struct xprt_ops *toadd_ops, void **oldxprt_ctx, const struct xprt_ops **oldxprt_ops) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx; |
| |
| if (oldxprt_ops != NULL) |
| *oldxprt_ops = ctx->xprt; |
| if (oldxprt_ctx != NULL) |
| *oldxprt_ctx = ctx->xprt_ctx; |
| ctx->xprt = toadd_ops; |
| ctx->xprt_ctx = toadd_ctx; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Remove the specified xprt. If if it our underlying XPRT, remove it and |
| * return 0, otherwise just call the remove_xprt method from the underlying |
| * XPRT. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_remove_xprt(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, void *toremove_ctx, const struct xprt_ops *newops, void *newctx) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx; |
| |
| if (ctx->xprt_ctx == toremove_ctx) { |
| ctx->xprt_ctx = newctx; |
| ctx->xprt = newops; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return (ctx->xprt->remove_xprt(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, toremove_ctx, newops, newctx)); |
| } |
| |
| static struct task *ssl_sock_io_cb(struct task *t, void *context, unsigned short state) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = context; |
| |
| /* First if we're doing an handshake, try that */ |
| if (ctx->conn->flags & CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS) |
| ssl_sock_handshake(ctx->conn, CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS); |
| /* If we had an error, or the handshake is done and I/O is available, |
| * let the upper layer know. |
| * If no mux was set up yet, then call conn_create_mux() |
| * we can't be sure conn_fd_handler() will be called again. |
| */ |
| if ((ctx->conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) || |
| !(ctx->conn->flags & CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS)) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| int woke = 0; |
| |
| /* On error, wake any waiter */ |
| if (ctx->subs) { |
| tasklet_wakeup(ctx->subs->tasklet); |
| ctx->subs->events = 0; |
| woke = 1; |
| ctx->subs = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we're the first xprt for the connection, let the |
| * upper layers know. If we have no mux, create it, |
| * and once we have a mux, call its wake method if we didn't |
| * woke a tasklet already. |
| */ |
| if (ctx->conn->xprt_ctx == ctx) { |
| if (!ctx->conn->mux) |
| ret = conn_create_mux(ctx->conn); |
| if (ret >= 0 && !woke && ctx->conn->mux && ctx->conn->mux->wake) |
| ctx->conn->mux->wake(ctx->conn); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| /* If we have early data and somebody wants to receive, let them */ |
| else if (b_data(&ctx->early_buf) && ctx->subs && |
| ctx->subs->events & SUB_RETRY_RECV) { |
| tasklet_wakeup(ctx->subs->tasklet); |
| ctx->subs->events &= ~SUB_RETRY_RECV; |
| if (!ctx->subs->events) |
| ctx->subs = NULL; |
| } |
| #endif |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Receive up to <count> bytes from connection <conn>'s socket and store them |
| * into buffer <buf>. Only one call to recv() is performed, unless the |
| * buffer wraps, in which case a second call may be performed. The connection's |
| * flags are updated with whatever special event is detected (error, read0, |
| * empty). The caller is responsible for taking care of those events and |
| * avoiding the call if inappropriate. The function does not call the |
| * connection's polling update function, so the caller is responsible for this. |
| */ |
| static size_t ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, struct buffer *buf, size_t count, int flags) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx; |
| ssize_t ret; |
| size_t try, done = 0; |
| |
| if (!ctx) |
| goto out_error; |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| if (b_data(&ctx->early_buf)) { |
| try = b_contig_space(buf); |
| if (try > b_data(&ctx->early_buf)) |
| try = b_data(&ctx->early_buf); |
| memcpy(b_tail(buf), b_head(&ctx->early_buf), try); |
| b_add(buf, try); |
| b_del(&ctx->early_buf, try); |
| if (b_data(&ctx->early_buf) == 0) |
| b_free(&ctx->early_buf); |
| return try; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_WAIT_XPRT | CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS)) |
| /* a handshake was requested */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* read the largest possible block. For this, we perform only one call |
| * to recv() unless the buffer wraps and we exactly fill the first hunk, |
| * in which case we accept to do it once again. A new attempt is made on |
| * EINTR too. |
| */ |
| while (count > 0) { |
| |
| try = b_contig_space(buf); |
| if (!try) |
| break; |
| |
| if (try > count) |
| try = count; |
| |
| ret = SSL_read(ctx->ssl, b_tail(buf), try); |
| |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) { |
| /* CO_FL_ERROR may be set by ssl_sock_infocbk */ |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| if (ret > 0) { |
| b_add(buf, ret); |
| done += ret; |
| count -= ret; |
| } |
| else { |
| ret = SSL_get_error(ctx->ssl, ret); |
| if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { |
| /* handshake is running, and it needs to enable write */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS; |
| ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_SEND, &ctx->wait_event); |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| /* Async mode can be re-enabled, because we're leaving data state.*/ |
| if (global_ssl.async) |
| SSL_set_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); |
| #endif |
| break; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { |
| if (SSL_renegotiate_pending(ctx->ssl)) { |
| ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, |
| SUB_RETRY_RECV, |
| &ctx->wait_event); |
| /* handshake is running, and it may need to re-enable read */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS; |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| /* Async mode can be re-enabled, because we're leaving data state.*/ |
| if (global_ssl.async) |
| SSL_set_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); |
| #endif |
| break; |
| } |
| break; |
| } else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN) |
| goto read0; |
| /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure to clear the error |
| * stack before shutting down the connection for |
| * reading. */ |
| if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL && (!errno || errno == EAGAIN)) |
| goto clear_ssl_error; |
| /* otherwise it's a real error */ |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| } |
| leave: |
| return done; |
| |
| clear_ssl_error: |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn); |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| read0: |
| conn_sock_read0(conn); |
| goto leave; |
| |
| out_error: |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR; |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn); |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| goto leave; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Send up to <count> pending bytes from buffer <buf> to connection <conn>'s |
| * socket. <flags> may contain some CO_SFL_* flags to hint the system about |
| * other pending data for example, but this flag is ignored at the moment. |
| * Only one call to send() is performed, unless the buffer wraps, in which case |
| * a second call may be performed. The connection's flags are updated with |
| * whatever special event is detected (error, empty). The caller is responsible |
| * for taking care of those events and avoiding the call if inappropriate. The |
| * function does not call the connection's polling update function, so the caller |
| * is responsible for this. The buffer's output is not adjusted, it's up to the |
| * caller to take care of this. It's up to the caller to update the buffer's |
| * contents based on the return value. |
| */ |
| static size_t ssl_sock_from_buf(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, const struct buffer *buf, size_t count, int flags) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx; |
| ssize_t ret; |
| size_t try, done; |
| |
| done = 0; |
| |
| if (!ctx) |
| goto out_error; |
| |
| if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_WAIT_XPRT | CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS)) |
| /* a handshake was requested */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* send the largest possible block. For this we perform only one call |
| * to send() unless the buffer wraps and we exactly fill the first hunk, |
| * in which case we accept to do it once again. |
| */ |
| while (count) { |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| size_t written_data; |
| #endif |
| |
| try = b_contig_data(buf, done); |
| if (try > count) |
| try = count; |
| |
| if (!(flags & CO_SFL_STREAMER) && |
| !(ctx->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED) && |
| global_ssl.max_record && try > global_ssl.max_record) { |
| try = global_ssl.max_record; |
| } |
| else { |
| /* we need to keep the information about the fact that |
| * we're not limiting the upcoming send(), because if it |
| * fails, we'll have to retry with at least as many data. |
| */ |
| ctx->xprt_st |= SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED; |
| } |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ctx->ssl) && conn_is_back(conn)) { |
| unsigned int max_early; |
| |
| if (objt_listener(conn->target)) |
| max_early = SSL_get_max_early_data(ctx->ssl); |
| else { |
| if (SSL_get0_session(ctx->ssl)) |
| max_early = SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(SSL_get0_session(ctx->ssl)); |
| else |
| max_early = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (try + ctx->sent_early_data > max_early) { |
| try -= (try + ctx->sent_early_data) - max_early; |
| if (try <= 0) { |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN; |
| tasklet_wakeup(ctx->wait_event.tasklet); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| ret = SSL_write_early_data(ctx->ssl, b_peek(buf, done), try, &written_data); |
| if (ret == 1) { |
| ret = written_data; |
| ctx->sent_early_data += ret; |
| if (objt_server(conn->target)) { |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN | CO_FL_EARLY_DATA; |
| /* Initiate the handshake, now */ |
| tasklet_wakeup(ctx->wait_event.tasklet); |
| } |
| |
| } |
| |
| } else |
| #endif |
| ret = SSL_write(ctx->ssl, b_peek(buf, done), try); |
| |
| if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) { |
| /* CO_FL_ERROR may be set by ssl_sock_infocbk */ |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| if (ret > 0) { |
| /* A send succeeded, so we can consider ourself connected */ |
| conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4L6; |
| ctx->xprt_st &= ~SSL_SOCK_SEND_UNLIMITED; |
| count -= ret; |
| done += ret; |
| } |
| else { |
| ret = SSL_get_error(ctx->ssl, ret); |
| |
| if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { |
| if (SSL_renegotiate_pending(ctx->ssl)) { |
| /* handshake is running, and it may need to re-enable write */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS; |
| ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, SUB_RETRY_SEND, &ctx->wait_event); |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| /* Async mode can be re-enabled, because we're leaving data state.*/ |
| if (global_ssl.async) |
| SSL_set_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); |
| #endif |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { |
| /* handshake is running, and it needs to enable read */ |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS; |
| ctx->xprt->subscribe(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, |
| SUB_RETRY_RECV, |
| &ctx->wait_event); |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| /* Async mode can be re-enabled, because we're leaving data state.*/ |
| if (global_ssl.async) |
| SSL_set_mode(ctx->ssl, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); |
| #endif |
| break; |
| } |
| goto out_error; |
| } |
| } |
| leave: |
| return done; |
| |
| out_error: |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn); |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR; |
| goto leave; |
| } |
| |
| static void ssl_sock_close(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx) { |
| |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx; |
| |
| |
| if (ctx) { |
| if (ctx->wait_event.events != 0) |
| ctx->xprt->unsubscribe(ctx->conn, ctx->xprt_ctx, |
| ctx->wait_event.events, |
| &ctx->wait_event); |
| if (ctx->subs) { |
| ctx->subs->events = 0; |
| tasklet_wakeup(ctx->subs->tasklet); |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->xprt->close) |
| ctx->xprt->close(conn, ctx->xprt_ctx); |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) |
| if (global_ssl.async) { |
| OSSL_ASYNC_FD all_fd[32], afd; |
| size_t num_all_fds = 0; |
| int i; |
| |
| SSL_get_all_async_fds(ctx->ssl, NULL, &num_all_fds); |
| if (num_all_fds > 32) { |
| send_log(NULL, LOG_EMERG, "haproxy: openssl returns too many async fds. It seems a bug. Process may crash\n"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_get_all_async_fds(ctx->ssl, all_fd, &num_all_fds); |
| |
| /* If an async job is pending, we must try to |
| to catch the end using polling before calling |
| SSL_free */ |
| if (num_all_fds && SSL_waiting_for_async(ctx->ssl)) { |
| for (i=0 ; i < num_all_fds ; i++) { |
| /* switch on an handler designed to |
| * handle the SSL_free |
| */ |
| afd = all_fd[i]; |
| fdtab[afd].iocb = ssl_async_fd_free; |
| fdtab[afd].owner = ctx->ssl; |
| fd_want_recv(afd); |
| /* To ensure that the fd cache won't be used |
| * and we'll catch a real RD event. |
| */ |
| fd_cant_recv(afd); |
| } |
| tasklet_free(ctx->wait_event.tasklet); |
| pool_free(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, ctx); |
| _HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&jobs, 1); |
| return; |
| } |
| /* Else we can remove the fds from the fdtab |
| * and call SSL_free. |
| * note: we do a fd_remove and not a delete |
| * because the fd is owned by the engine. |
| * the engine is responsible to close |
| */ |
| for (i=0 ; i < num_all_fds ; i++) |
| fd_remove(all_fd[i]); |
| } |
| #endif |
| SSL_free(ctx->ssl); |
| b_free(&ctx->early_buf); |
| tasklet_free(ctx->wait_event.tasklet); |
| pool_free(ssl_sock_ctx_pool, ctx); |
| _HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&sslconns, 1); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* This function tries to perform a clean shutdown on an SSL connection, and in |
| * any case, flags the connection as reusable if no handshake was in progress. |
| */ |
| static void ssl_sock_shutw(struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, int clean) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx; |
| |
| if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_WAIT_XPRT | CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS)) |
| return; |
| if (!clean) |
| /* don't sent notify on SSL_shutdown */ |
| SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx->ssl, 1); |
| /* no handshake was in progress, try a clean ssl shutdown */ |
| if (SSL_shutdown(ctx->ssl) <= 0) { |
| /* Clear openssl global errors stack */ |
| ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn); |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* used for ppv2 pkey algo (can be used for logging) */ |
| int ssl_sock_get_pkey_algo(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *out) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| X509 *crt; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(ctx->ssl); |
| if (!crt) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return cert_get_pkey_algo(crt, out); |
| } |
| |
| /* used for ppv2 cert signature (can be used for logging) */ |
| const char *ssl_sock_get_cert_sig(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| __OPENSSL_110_CONST__ ASN1_OBJECT *algorithm; |
| X509 *crt; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return NULL; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| crt = SSL_get_certificate(ctx->ssl); |
| if (!crt) |
| return NULL; |
| X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorithm, NULL, NULL, X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(crt)); |
| return OBJ_nid2sn(OBJ_obj2nid(algorithm)); |
| } |
| |
| /* used for ppv2 authority */ |
| const char *ssl_sock_get_sni(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return NULL; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| return SSL_get_servername(ctx->ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); |
| #else |
| return NULL; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* used for logging/ppv2, may be changed for a sample fetch later */ |
| const char *ssl_sock_get_cipher_name(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return NULL; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| return SSL_get_cipher_name(ctx->ssl); |
| } |
| |
| /* used for logging/ppv2, may be changed for a sample fetch later */ |
| const char *ssl_sock_get_proto_version(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return NULL; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| return SSL_get_version(ctx->ssl); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_sock_set_alpn(struct connection *conn, const unsigned char *alpn, int len) |
| { |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| SSL_set_alpn_protos(ctx->ssl, alpn, len); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* Sets advertised SNI for outgoing connections. Please set <hostname> to NULL |
| * to disable SNI. |
| */ |
| void ssl_sock_set_servername(struct connection *conn, const char *hostname) |
| { |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| char *prev_name; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| |
| /* if the SNI changes, we must destroy the reusable context so that a |
| * new connection will present a new SNI. As an optimization we could |
| * later imagine having a small cache of ssl_ctx to hold a few SNI per |
| * server. |
| */ |
| prev_name = (char *)SSL_get_servername(ctx->ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); |
| if ((!prev_name && hostname) || |
| (prev_name && (!hostname || strcmp(hostname, prev_name) != 0))) |
| SSL_set_session(ctx->ssl, NULL); |
| |
| SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ctx->ssl, hostname); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* Extract peer certificate's common name into the chunk dest |
| * Returns |
| * the len of the extracted common name |
| * or 0 if no CN found in DN |
| * or -1 on error case (i.e. no peer certificate) |
| */ |
| int ssl_sock_get_remote_common_name(struct connection *conn, |
| struct buffer *dest) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| const char find_cn[] = "CN"; |
| const struct buffer find_cn_chunk = { |
| .area = (char *)&find_cn, |
| .data = sizeof(find_cn)-1 |
| }; |
| int result = -1; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| goto out; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ctx->ssl); |
| if (!crt) |
| goto out; |
| |
| name = X509_get_subject_name(crt); |
| if (!name) |
| goto out; |
| |
| result = ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(name, &find_cn_chunk, 1, dest); |
| out: |
| if (crt) |
| X509_free(crt); |
| |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| /* returns 1 if client passed a certificate for this session, 0 if not */ |
| int ssl_sock_get_cert_used_sess(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| X509 *crt = NULL; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return 0; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| |
| /* SSL_get_peer_certificate, it increase X509 * ref count */ |
| crt = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ctx->ssl); |
| if (!crt) |
| return 0; |
| |
| X509_free(crt); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* returns 1 if client passed a certificate for this connection, 0 if not */ |
| int ssl_sock_get_cert_used_conn(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return 0; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| return SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_VERIFY_DONE & ctx->xprt_st ? 1 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* returns result from SSL verify */ |
| unsigned int ssl_sock_get_verify_result(struct connection *conn) |
| { |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx; |
| |
| if (!ssl_sock_is_ssl(conn)) |
| return (unsigned int)X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION; |
| ctx = conn->xprt_ctx; |
| return (unsigned int)SSL_get_verify_result(ctx->ssl); |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns the application layer protocol name in <str> and <len> when known. |
| * Zero is returned if the protocol name was not found, otherwise non-zero is |
| * returned. The string is allocated in the SSL context and doesn't have to be |
| * freed by the caller. NPN is also checked if available since older versions |
| * of openssl (1.0.1) which are more common in field only support this one. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_sock_get_alpn(const struct connection *conn, void *xprt_ctx, const char **str, int *len) |
| { |
| #if defined(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) || \ |
| defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
| struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx = xprt_ctx; |
| if (!ctx) |
| return 0; |
| |
| *str = NULL; |
| |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation |
| SSL_get0_alpn_selected(ctx->ssl, (const unsigned char **)str, (unsigned *)len); |
| if (*str) |
| return 1; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
| SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(ctx->ssl, (const unsigned char **)str, (unsigned *)len); |
| if (*str) |
| return 1; |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* "issuers-chain-path" load chain certificate in global */ |
| int ssl_load_global_issuer_from_BIO(BIO *in, char *fp, char **err) |
| { |
| X509 *ca; |
| X509_NAME *name = NULL; |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; |
| struct issuer_chain *issuer; |
| struct eb64_node *node; |
| char *path; |
| u64 key; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { |
| if (chain == NULL) { |
| chain = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(ca, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
| name = X509_get_subject_name(ca); |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_push(chain, ca)) { |
| X509_free(ca); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!chain) { |
| memprintf(err, "unable to load issuers-chain %s : pem certificate not found.\n", fp); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (!skid) { |
| memprintf(err, "unable to load issuers-chain %s : SubjectKeyIdentifier not found.\n", fp); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (!name) { |
| memprintf(err, "unable to load issuers-chain %s : SubjectName not found.\n", fp); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| key = XXH64(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(skid), ASN1_STRING_length(skid), 0); |
| for (node = eb64_lookup(&cert_issuer_tree, key); node; node = eb64_next(node)) { |
| issuer = container_of(node, typeof(*issuer), node); |
| if (!X509_NAME_cmp(name, X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(issuer->chain, 0)))) { |
| memprintf(err, "duplicate issuers-chain %s: %s already in store\n", fp, issuer->path); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| issuer = calloc(1, sizeof *issuer); |
| path = strdup(fp); |
| if (!issuer || !path) { |
| free(issuer); |
| free(path); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| issuer->node.key = key; |
| issuer->path = path; |
| issuer->chain = chain; |
| chain = NULL; |
| eb64_insert(&cert_issuer_tree, &issuer->node); |
| ret = 1; |
| end: |
| if (skid) |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(skid); |
| if (chain) |
| sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| struct issuer_chain* ssl_get0_issuer_chain(X509 *cert) |
| { |
| AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid; |
| struct issuer_chain *issuer = NULL; |
| |
| akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
| if (akid) { |
| struct eb64_node *node; |
| u64 hk; |
| hk = XXH64(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(akid->keyid), ASN1_STRING_length(akid->keyid), 0); |
| for (node = eb64_lookup(&cert_issuer_tree, hk); node; node = eb64_next(node)) { |
| struct issuer_chain *ti = container_of(node, typeof(*issuer), node); |
| if (X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(ti->chain, 0), cert) == X509_V_OK) { |
| issuer = ti; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); |
| } |
| return issuer; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_free_global_issuers(void) |
| { |
| struct eb64_node *node, *back; |
| struct issuer_chain *issuer; |
| |
| node = eb64_first(&cert_issuer_tree); |
| while (node) { |
| issuer = container_of(node, typeof(*issuer), node); |
| back = eb64_next(node); |
| eb64_delete(node); |
| free(issuer->path); |
| sk_X509_pop_free(issuer->chain, X509_free); |
| free(issuer); |
| node = back; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| static int ssl_check_async_engine_count(void) { |
| int err_code = 0; |
| |
| if (global_ssl.async && (openssl_engines_initialized > 32)) { |
| ha_alert("ssl-mode-async only supports a maximum of 32 engines.\n"); |
| err_code = ERR_ABORT; |
| } |
| return err_code; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* This function is used with TLS ticket keys management. It permits to browse |
| * each reference. The variable <getnext> must contain the current node, |
| * <end> point to the root node. |
| */ |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| static inline |
| struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_list_get_next(struct tls_keys_ref *getnext, struct list *end) |
| { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref = getnext; |
| |
| while (1) { |
| |
| /* Get next list entry. */ |
| ref = LIST_NEXT(&ref->list, struct tls_keys_ref *, list); |
| |
| /* If the entry is the last of the list, return NULL. */ |
| if (&ref->list == end) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return ref; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static inline |
| struct tls_keys_ref *tlskeys_ref_lookup_ref(const char *reference) |
| { |
| int id; |
| char *error; |
| |
| /* If the reference starts by a '#', this is numeric id. */ |
| if (reference[0] == '#') { |
| /* Try to convert the numeric id. If the conversion fails, the lookup fails. */ |
| id = strtol(reference + 1, &error, 10); |
| if (*error != '\0') |
| return NULL; |
| |
| /* Perform the unique id lookup. */ |
| return tlskeys_ref_lookupid(id); |
| } |
| |
| /* Perform the string lookup. */ |
| return tlskeys_ref_lookup(reference); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| |
| static int cli_io_handler_tlskeys_files(struct appctx *appctx); |
| |
| static inline int cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries(struct appctx *appctx) { |
| return cli_io_handler_tlskeys_files(appctx); |
| } |
| |
| /* dumps all tls keys. Relies on cli.i0 (non-null = only list file names), cli.i1 |
| * (next index to be dumped), and cli.p0 (next key reference). |
| */ |
| static int cli_io_handler_tlskeys_files(struct appctx *appctx) { |
| |
| struct stream_interface *si = appctx->owner; |
| |
| switch (appctx->st2) { |
| case STAT_ST_INIT: |
| /* Display the column headers. If the message cannot be sent, |
| * quit the function with returning 0. The function is called |
| * later and restart at the state "STAT_ST_INIT". |
| */ |
| chunk_reset(&trash); |
| |
| if (appctx->io_handler == cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries) |
| chunk_appendf(&trash, "# id secret\n"); |
| else |
| chunk_appendf(&trash, "# id (file)\n"); |
| |
| if (ci_putchk(si_ic(si), &trash) == -1) { |
| si_rx_room_blk(si); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Now, we start the browsing of the references lists. |
| * Note that the following call to LIST_ELEM return bad pointer. The only |
| * available field of this pointer is <list>. It is used with the function |
| * tlskeys_list_get_next() for retruning the first available entry |
| */ |
| if (appctx->ctx.cli.p0 == NULL) { |
| appctx->ctx.cli.p0 = LIST_ELEM(&tlskeys_reference, struct tls_keys_ref *, list); |
| appctx->ctx.cli.p0 = tlskeys_list_get_next(appctx->ctx.cli.p0, &tlskeys_reference); |
| } |
| |
| appctx->st2 = STAT_ST_LIST; |
| /* fall through */ |
| |
| case STAT_ST_LIST: |
| while (appctx->ctx.cli.p0) { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref = appctx->ctx.cli.p0; |
| |
| chunk_reset(&trash); |
| if (appctx->io_handler == cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries && appctx->ctx.cli.i1 == 0) |
| chunk_appendf(&trash, "# "); |
| |
| if (appctx->ctx.cli.i1 == 0) |
| chunk_appendf(&trash, "%d (%s)\n", ref->unique_id, ref->filename); |
| |
| if (appctx->io_handler == cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries) { |
| int head; |
| |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock); |
| head = ref->tls_ticket_enc_index; |
| while (appctx->ctx.cli.i1 < TLS_TICKETS_NO) { |
| struct buffer *t2 = get_trash_chunk(); |
| |
| chunk_reset(t2); |
| /* should never fail here because we dump only a key in the t2 buffer */ |
| if (ref->key_size_bits == 128) { |
| t2->data = a2base64((char *)(ref->tlskeys + (head + 2 + appctx->ctx.cli.i1) % TLS_TICKETS_NO), |
| sizeof(struct tls_sess_key_128), |
| t2->area, t2->size); |
| chunk_appendf(&trash, "%d.%d %s\n", ref->unique_id, appctx->ctx.cli.i1, |
| t2->area); |
| } |
| else if (ref->key_size_bits == 256) { |
| t2->data = a2base64((char *)(ref->tlskeys + (head + 2 + appctx->ctx.cli.i1) % TLS_TICKETS_NO), |
| sizeof(struct tls_sess_key_256), |
| t2->area, t2->size); |
| chunk_appendf(&trash, "%d.%d %s\n", ref->unique_id, appctx->ctx.cli.i1, |
| t2->area); |
| } |
| else { |
| /* This case should never happen */ |
| chunk_appendf(&trash, "%d.%d <unknown>\n", ref->unique_id, appctx->ctx.cli.i1); |
| } |
| |
| if (ci_putchk(si_ic(si), &trash) == -1) { |
| /* let's try again later from this stream. We add ourselves into |
| * this stream's users so that it can remove us upon termination. |
| */ |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock); |
| si_rx_room_blk(si); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| appctx->ctx.cli.i1++; |
| } |
| HA_RWLOCK_RDUNLOCK(TLSKEYS_REF_LOCK, &ref->lock); |
| appctx->ctx.cli.i1 = 0; |
| } |
| if (ci_putchk(si_ic(si), &trash) == -1) { |
| /* let's try again later from this stream. We add ourselves into |
| * this stream's users so that it can remove us upon termination. |
| */ |
| si_rx_room_blk(si); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (appctx->ctx.cli.i0 == 0) /* don't display everything if not necessary */ |
| break; |
| |
| /* get next list entry and check the end of the list */ |
| appctx->ctx.cli.p0 = tlskeys_list_get_next(appctx->ctx.cli.p0, &tlskeys_reference); |
| } |
| |
| appctx->st2 = STAT_ST_FIN; |
| /* fall through */ |
| |
| default: |
| appctx->st2 = STAT_ST_FIN; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* sets cli.i0 to non-zero if only file lists should be dumped */ |
| static int cli_parse_show_tlskeys(char **args, char *payload, struct appctx *appctx, void *private) |
| { |
| /* no parameter, shows only file list */ |
| if (!*args[2]) { |
| appctx->ctx.cli.i0 = 1; |
| appctx->io_handler = cli_io_handler_tlskeys_files; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (args[2][0] == '*') { |
| /* list every TLS ticket keys */ |
| appctx->ctx.cli.i0 = 1; |
| } else { |
| appctx->ctx.cli.p0 = tlskeys_ref_lookup_ref(args[2]); |
| if (!appctx->ctx.cli.p0) |
| return cli_err(appctx, "'show tls-keys' unable to locate referenced filename\n"); |
| } |
| appctx->io_handler = cli_io_handler_tlskeys_entries; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int cli_parse_set_tlskeys(char **args, char *payload, struct appctx *appctx, void *private) |
| { |
| struct tls_keys_ref *ref; |
| int ret; |
| |
| /* Expect two parameters: the filename and the new new TLS key in encoding */ |
| if (!*args[3] || !*args[4]) |
| return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl tls-key' expects a filename and the new TLS key in base64 encoding.\n"); |
| |
| ref = tlskeys_ref_lookup_ref(args[3]); |
| if (!ref) |
| return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl tls-key' unable to locate referenced filename\n"); |
| |
| ret = base64dec(args[4], strlen(args[4]), trash.area, trash.size); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl tls-key' received invalid base64 encoded TLS key.\n"); |
| |
| trash.data = ret; |
| if (ssl_sock_update_tlskey_ref(ref, &trash) < 0) |
| return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl tls-key' received a key of wrong size.\n"); |
| |
| return cli_msg(appctx, LOG_INFO, "TLS ticket key updated!\n"); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static int cli_parse_set_ocspresponse(char **args, char *payload, struct appctx *appctx, void *private) |
| { |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) |
| char *err = NULL; |
| int i, j, ret; |
| |
| if (!payload) |
| payload = args[3]; |
| |
| /* Expect one parameter: the new response in base64 encoding */ |
| if (!*payload) |
| return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl ocsp-response' expects response in base64 encoding.\n"); |
| |
| /* remove \r and \n from the payload */ |
| for (i = 0, j = 0; payload[i]; i++) { |
| if (payload[i] == '\r' || payload[i] == '\n') |
| continue; |
| payload[j++] = payload[i]; |
| } |
| payload[j] = 0; |
| |
| ret = base64dec(payload, j, trash.area, trash.size); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return cli_err(appctx, "'set ssl ocsp-response' received invalid base64 encoded response.\n"); |
| |
| trash.data = ret; |
| if (ssl_sock_update_ocsp_response(&trash, &err)) { |
| if (err) |
| return cli_dynerr(appctx, memprintf(&err, "%s.\n", err)); |
| else |
| return cli_err(appctx, "Failed to update OCSP response.\n"); |
| } |
| |
| return cli_msg(appctx, LOG_INFO, "OCSP Response updated!\n"); |
| #else |
| return cli_err(appctx, "HAProxy was compiled against a version of OpenSSL that doesn't support OCSP stapling.\n"); |
| #endif |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* register cli keywords */ |
| static struct cli_kw_list cli_kws = {{ },{ |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| { { "show", "tls-keys", NULL }, "show tls-keys [id|*]: show tls keys references or dump tls ticket keys when id specified", cli_parse_show_tlskeys, NULL }, |
| { { "set", "ssl", "tls-key", NULL }, "set ssl tls-key [id|keyfile] <tlskey>: set the next TLS key for the <id> or <keyfile> listener to <tlskey>", cli_parse_set_tlskeys, NULL }, |
| #endif |
| { { "set", "ssl", "ocsp-response", NULL }, NULL, cli_parse_set_ocspresponse, NULL }, |
| { { NULL }, NULL, NULL, NULL } |
| }}; |
| |
| INITCALL1(STG_REGISTER, cli_register_kw, &cli_kws); |
| |
| /* transport-layer operations for SSL sockets */ |
| struct xprt_ops ssl_sock = { |
| .snd_buf = ssl_sock_from_buf, |
| .rcv_buf = ssl_sock_to_buf, |
| .subscribe = ssl_subscribe, |
| .unsubscribe = ssl_unsubscribe, |
| .remove_xprt = ssl_remove_xprt, |
| .add_xprt = ssl_add_xprt, |
| .rcv_pipe = NULL, |
| .snd_pipe = NULL, |
| .shutr = NULL, |
| .shutw = ssl_sock_shutw, |
| .close = ssl_sock_close, |
| .init = ssl_sock_init, |
| .prepare_bind_conf = ssl_sock_prepare_bind_conf, |
| .destroy_bind_conf = ssl_sock_destroy_bind_conf, |
| .prepare_srv = ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx, |
| .destroy_srv = ssl_sock_free_srv_ctx, |
| .get_alpn = ssl_sock_get_alpn, |
| .name = "SSL", |
| }; |
| |
| enum act_return ssl_action_wait_for_hs(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px, |
| struct session *sess, struct stream *s, int flags) |
| { |
| struct connection *conn; |
| struct conn_stream *cs; |
| |
| conn = objt_conn(sess->origin); |
| cs = objt_cs(s->si[0].end); |
| |
| if (conn && cs) { |
| if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS)) { |
| cs->flags |= CS_FL_WAIT_FOR_HS; |
| s->req.flags |= CF_READ_NULL; |
| return ACT_RET_YIELD; |
| } |
| } |
| return (ACT_RET_CONT); |
| } |
| |
| static enum act_parse_ret ssl_parse_wait_for_hs(const char **args, int *orig_arg, struct proxy *px, struct act_rule *rule, char **err) |
| { |
| rule->action_ptr = ssl_action_wait_for_hs; |
| |
| return ACT_RET_PRS_OK; |
| } |
| |
| static struct action_kw_list http_req_actions = {ILH, { |
| { "wait-for-handshake", ssl_parse_wait_for_hs }, |
| { /* END */ } |
| }}; |
| |
| INITCALL1(STG_REGISTER, http_req_keywords_register, &http_req_actions); |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) |
| |
| static void ssl_sock_sctl_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) |
| { |
| if (ptr) { |
| chunk_destroy(ptr); |
| free(ptr); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| static void ssl_sock_capture_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) |
| { |
| pool_free(pool_head_ssl_capture, ptr); |
| } |
| |
| __attribute__((constructor)) |
| static void __ssl_sock_init(void) |
| { |
| #if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP) && !defined(SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)) |
| STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)* cm; |
| int n; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers) |
| global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers = strdup(global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers); |
| if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers) |
| global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers); |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) |
| if (global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites) |
| global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites = strdup(global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites); |
| if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites) |
| global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites); |
| #endif |
| |
| xprt_register(XPRT_SSL, &ssl_sock); |
| #if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L |
| SSL_library_init(); |
| #endif |
| #if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP) && !defined(SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)) |
| cm = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); |
| n = sk_SSL_COMP_num(cm); |
| while (n--) { |
| (void) sk_SSL_COMP_pop(cm); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(USE_THREAD) && (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) |
| ssl_locking_init(); |
| #endif |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) |
| sctl_ex_index = SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_sctl_free_func); |
| #endif |
| ssl_app_data_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| ssl_capture_ptr_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_capture_free_func); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); |
| hap_register_post_check(ssl_check_async_engine_count); |
| #endif |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB && TLS_TICKETS_NO > 0) |
| hap_register_post_check(tlskeys_finalize_config); |
| #endif |
| |
| global.ssl_session_max_cost = SSL_SESSION_MAX_COST; |
| global.ssl_handshake_max_cost = SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAX_COST; |
| |
| hap_register_post_deinit(ssl_free_global_issuers); |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| ssl_dh_ptr_index = SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| hap_register_post_deinit(ssl_free_dh); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| hap_register_post_deinit(ssl_free_engines); |
| #endif |
| /* Load SSL string for the verbose & debug mode. */ |
| ERR_load_SSL_strings(); |
| ha_meth = BIO_meth_new(0x666, "ha methods"); |
| BIO_meth_set_write(ha_meth, ha_ssl_write); |
| BIO_meth_set_read(ha_meth, ha_ssl_read); |
| BIO_meth_set_ctrl(ha_meth, ha_ssl_ctrl); |
| BIO_meth_set_create(ha_meth, ha_ssl_new); |
| BIO_meth_set_destroy(ha_meth, ha_ssl_free); |
| BIO_meth_set_puts(ha_meth, ha_ssl_puts); |
| BIO_meth_set_gets(ha_meth, ha_ssl_gets); |
| |
| HA_SPIN_INIT(&ckch_lock); |
| |
| /* Try to register dedicated SSL/TLS protocol message callbacks for |
| * heartbleed attack (CVE-2014-0160) and clienthello. |
| */ |
| hap_register_post_check(ssl_sock_register_msg_callbacks); |
| |
| /* Try to free all callbacks that were registered by using |
| * ssl_sock_register_msg_callback(). |
| */ |
| hap_register_post_deinit(ssl_sock_unregister_msg_callbacks); |
| } |
| |
| /* Compute and register the version string */ |
| static void ssl_register_build_options() |
| { |
| char *ptr = NULL; |
| int i; |
| |
| memprintf(&ptr, "Built with OpenSSL version : " |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL |
| "BoringSSL"); |
| #else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */ |
| OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT |
| "\nRunning on OpenSSL version : %s%s", |
| OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION), |
| ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ^ OpenSSL_version_num()) >> 8) ? " (VERSIONS DIFFER!)" : ""); |
| #endif |
| memprintf(&ptr, "%s\nOpenSSL library supports TLS extensions : " |
| #if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L |
| "no (library version too old)" |
| #elif defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) |
| "no (disabled via OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)" |
| #else |
| "yes" |
| #endif |
| "", ptr); |
| |
| memprintf(&ptr, "%s\nOpenSSL library supports SNI : " |
| #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME |
| "yes" |
| #else |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| "no (because of OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)" |
| #else |
| "no (version might be too old, 0.9.8f min needed)" |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| "", ptr); |
| |
| memprintf(&ptr, "%s\nOpenSSL library supports :", ptr); |
| for (i = CONF_TLSV_MIN; i <= CONF_TLSV_MAX; i++) |
| if (methodVersions[i].option) |
| memprintf(&ptr, "%s %s", ptr, methodVersions[i].name); |
| |
| hap_register_build_opts(ptr, 1); |
| } |
| |
| INITCALL0(STG_REGISTER, ssl_register_build_options); |
| |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| void ssl_free_engines(void) { |
| struct ssl_engine_list *wl, *wlb; |
| /* free up engine list */ |
| list_for_each_entry_safe(wl, wlb, &openssl_engines, list) { |
| ENGINE_finish(wl->e); |
| ENGINE_free(wl->e); |
| LIST_DEL(&wl->list); |
| free(wl); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| void ssl_free_dh(void) { |
| if (local_dh_1024) { |
| DH_free(local_dh_1024); |
| local_dh_1024 = NULL; |
| } |
| if (local_dh_2048) { |
| DH_free(local_dh_2048); |
| local_dh_2048 = NULL; |
| } |
| if (local_dh_4096) { |
| DH_free(local_dh_4096); |
| local_dh_4096 = NULL; |
| } |
| if (global_dh) { |
| DH_free(global_dh); |
| global_dh = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| __attribute__((destructor)) |
| static void __ssl_sock_deinit(void) |
| { |
| #if (defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME && !defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES) |
| if (ssl_ctx_lru_tree) { |
| lru64_destroy(ssl_ctx_lru_tree); |
| HA_RWLOCK_DESTROY(&ssl_ctx_lru_rwlock); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) |
| ERR_remove_state(0); |
| ERR_free_strings(); |
| |
| EVP_cleanup(); |
| #endif |
| |
| #if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) && (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) |
| CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); |
| #endif |
| BIO_meth_free(ha_meth); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Local variables: |
| * c-indent-level: 8 |
| * c-basic-offset: 8 |
| * End: |
| */ |