Simon Glass | 759a0e7 | 2014-06-12 07:24:54 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | Verified Boot on the Beaglebone Black |
| 2 | ===================================== |
| 3 | |
| 4 | Introduction |
| 5 | ------------ |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Before reading this, please read verified-boot.txt and signature.txt. These |
| 8 | instructions are for mainline U-Boot from v2014.07 onwards. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | There is quite a bit of documentation in this directory describing how |
| 11 | verified boot works in U-Boot. There is also a test which runs through the |
| 12 | entire process of signing an image and running U-Boot (sandbox) to check it. |
| 13 | However, it might be useful to also have an example on a real board. |
| 14 | |
| 15 | Beaglebone Black is a fairly common board so seems to be a reasonable choice |
| 16 | for an example of how to enable verified boot using U-Boot. |
| 17 | |
| 18 | First a note that may to help avoid confusion. U-Boot and Linux both use |
| 19 | device tree. They may use the same device tree source, but it is seldom useful |
| 20 | for them to use the exact same binary from the same place. More typically, |
| 21 | U-Boot has its device tree packaged wtih it, and the kernel's device tree is |
| 22 | packaged with the kernel. In particular this is important with verified boot, |
| 23 | since U-Boot's device tree must be immutable. If it can be changed then the |
| 24 | public keys can be changed and verified boot is useless. An attacker can |
| 25 | simply generate a new key and put his public key into U-Boot so that |
| 26 | everything verifies. On the other hand the kernel's device tree typically |
| 27 | changes when the kernel changes, so it is useful to package an updated device |
| 28 | tree with the kernel binary. U-Boot supports the latter with its flexible FIT |
| 29 | format (Flat Image Tree). |
| 30 | |
| 31 | |
| 32 | Overview |
| 33 | -------- |
| 34 | |
| 35 | The steps are roughly as follows: |
| 36 | |
| 37 | 1. Build U-Boot for the board, with the verified boot options enabled. |
| 38 | |
| 39 | 2. Obtain a suitable Linux kernel |
| 40 | |
| 41 | 3. Create a Image Tree Source file (ITS) file describing how you want the |
| 42 | kernel to be packaged, compressed and signed. |
| 43 | |
| 44 | 4. Create a key pair |
| 45 | |
| 46 | 5. Sign the kernel |
| 47 | |
| 48 | 6. Put the public key into U-Boot's image |
| 49 | |
| 50 | 7. Put U-Boot and the kernel onto the board |
| 51 | |
| 52 | 8. Try it |
| 53 | |
| 54 | |
| 55 | Step 1: Build U-Boot |
| 56 | -------------------- |
| 57 | |
| 58 | a. Set up the environment variable to point to your toolchain. You will need |
| 59 | this for U-Boot and also for the kernel if you build it. For example if you |
| 60 | installed a Linaro version manually it might be something like: |
| 61 | |
| 62 | export CROSS_COMPILE=/opt/linaro/gcc-linaro-arm-linux-gnueabihf-4.8-2013.08_linux/bin/arm-linux-gnueabihf- |
| 63 | |
| 64 | or if you just installed gcc-arm-linux-gnueabi then it might be |
| 65 | |
| 66 | export CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabi- |
| 67 | |
| 68 | b. Configure and build U-Boot with verified boot enabled: |
| 69 | |
| 70 | export ARCH=arm |
| 71 | export UBOOT=/path/to/u-boot |
| 72 | cd $UBOOT |
| 73 | # You can add -j10 if you have 10 CPUs to make it faster |
| 74 | make O=b/am335x_boneblack_vboot am335x_boneblack_vboot_config all |
| 75 | export UOUT=$UBOOT/b/am335x_boneblack_vboot |
| 76 | |
| 77 | c. You will now have a U-Boot image: |
| 78 | |
| 79 | file b/am335x_boneblack_vboot/u-boot-dtb.img |
| 80 | b/am335x_boneblack_vboot/u-boot-dtb.img: u-boot legacy uImage, U-Boot 2014.07-rc2-00065-g2f69f8, Firmware/ARM, Firmware Image (Not compressed), 395375 bytes, Sat May 31 16:19:04 2014, Load Address: 0x80800000, Entry Point: 0x00000000, Header CRC: 0x0ABD6ACA, Data CRC: 0x36DEF7E4 |
| 81 | |
| 82 | |
| 83 | Step 2: Build Linux |
| 84 | -------------------- |
| 85 | |
| 86 | a. Find the kernel image ('Image') and device tree (.dtb) file you plan to |
| 87 | use. In our case it is am335x-boneblack.dtb and it is built with the kernel. |
| 88 | At the time of writing an SD Boot image can be obtained from here: |
| 89 | |
| 90 | http://www.elinux.org/Beagleboard:Updating_The_Software#Image_For_Booting_From_microSD |
| 91 | |
| 92 | You can write this to an SD card and then mount it to extract the kernel and |
| 93 | device tree files. |
| 94 | |
| 95 | You can also build a kernel. Instructions for this are are here: |
| 96 | |
| 97 | http://elinux.org/Building_BBB_Kernel |
| 98 | |
| 99 | or you can use your favourite search engine. Following these instructions |
| 100 | produces a kernel Image and device tree files. For the record the steps were: |
| 101 | |
| 102 | export KERNEL=/path/to/kernel |
| 103 | cd $KERNEL |
| 104 | git clone git://github.com/beagleboard/kernel.git . |
| 105 | git checkout v3.14 |
| 106 | ./patch.sh |
| 107 | cp configs/beaglebone kernel/arch/arm/configs/beaglebone_defconfig |
| 108 | cd kernel |
| 109 | make beaglebone_defconfig |
| 110 | make uImage dtbs # -j10 if you have 10 CPUs |
| 111 | export OKERNEL=$KERNEL/kernel/arch/arm/boot |
| 112 | |
| 113 | c. You now have the 'Image' and 'am335x-boneblack.dtb' files needed to boot. |
| 114 | |
| 115 | |
| 116 | Step 3: Create the ITS |
| 117 | ---------------------- |
| 118 | |
| 119 | Set up a directory for your work. |
| 120 | |
| 121 | export WORK=/path/to/dir |
| 122 | cd $WORK |
| 123 | |
| 124 | Put this into a file in that directory called sign.its: |
| 125 | |
| 126 | /dts-v1/; |
| 127 | |
| 128 | / { |
| 129 | description = "Beaglebone black"; |
| 130 | #address-cells = <1>; |
| 131 | |
| 132 | images { |
| 133 | kernel@1 { |
| 134 | data = /incbin/("Image.lzo"); |
| 135 | type = "kernel"; |
| 136 | arch = "arm"; |
| 137 | os = "linux"; |
| 138 | compression = "lzo"; |
| 139 | load = <0x80008000>; |
| 140 | entry = <0x80008000>; |
| 141 | hash@1 { |
| 142 | algo = "sha1"; |
| 143 | }; |
| 144 | }; |
| 145 | fdt@1 { |
| 146 | description = "beaglebone-black"; |
| 147 | data = /incbin/("am335x-boneblack.dtb"); |
| 148 | type = "flat_dt"; |
| 149 | arch = "arm"; |
| 150 | compression = "none"; |
| 151 | hash@1 { |
| 152 | algo = "sha1"; |
| 153 | }; |
| 154 | }; |
| 155 | }; |
| 156 | configurations { |
| 157 | default = "conf@1"; |
| 158 | conf@1 { |
| 159 | kernel = "kernel@1"; |
| 160 | fdt = "fdt@1"; |
| 161 | signature@1 { |
| 162 | algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; |
| 163 | key-name-hint = "dev"; |
| 164 | sign-images = "fdt", "kernel"; |
| 165 | }; |
| 166 | }; |
| 167 | }; |
| 168 | }; |
| 169 | |
| 170 | |
| 171 | The explanation for this is all in the documentation you have already read. |
| 172 | But briefly it packages a kernel and device tree, and provides a single |
| 173 | configuration to be signed with a key named 'dev'. The kernel is compressed |
| 174 | with LZO to make it smaller. |
| 175 | |
| 176 | |
| 177 | Step 4: Create a key pair |
| 178 | ------------------------- |
| 179 | |
| 180 | See signature.txt for details on this step. |
| 181 | |
| 182 | cd $WORK |
| 183 | mkdir keys |
| 184 | openssl genrsa -F4 -out keys/dev.key 2048 |
| 185 | openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key keys/dev.key -out keys/dev.crt |
| 186 | |
| 187 | Note: keys/dev.key contains your private key and is very secret. If anyone |
| 188 | gets access to that file they can sign kernels with it. Keep it secure. |
| 189 | |
| 190 | |
| 191 | Step 5: Sign the kernel |
| 192 | ----------------------- |
| 193 | |
| 194 | We need to use mkimage (which was built when you built U-Boot) to package the |
| 195 | Linux kernel into a FIT (Flat Image Tree, a flexible file format that U-Boot |
| 196 | can load) using the ITS file you just created. |
| 197 | |
| 198 | At the same time we must put the public key into U-Boot device tree, with the |
| 199 | 'required' property, which tells U-Boot that this key must be verified for the |
| 200 | image to be valid. You will make this key available to U-Boot for booting in |
| 201 | step 6. |
| 202 | |
| 203 | ln -s $OKERNEL/dts/am335x-boneblack.dtb |
| 204 | ln -s $OKERNEL/Image |
| 205 | ln -s $UOUT/u-boot-dtb.img |
| 206 | cp $UOUT/arch/arm/dts/am335x-boneblack.dtb am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb |
| 207 | lzop Image |
| 208 | $UOUT/tools/mkimage -f sign.its -K am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb -k keys -r image.fit |
| 209 | |
| 210 | You should see something like this: |
| 211 | |
| 212 | FIT description: Beaglebone black |
| 213 | Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 |
| 214 | Image 0 (kernel@1) |
| 215 | Description: unavailable |
| 216 | Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 |
| 217 | Type: Kernel Image |
| 218 | Compression: lzo compressed |
| 219 | Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7608.34 kB = 7.43 MB |
| 220 | Architecture: ARM |
| 221 | OS: Linux |
| 222 | Load Address: 0x80008000 |
| 223 | Entry Point: 0x80008000 |
| 224 | Hash algo: sha1 |
| 225 | Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988 |
| 226 | Image 1 (fdt@1) |
| 227 | Description: beaglebone-black |
| 228 | Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 |
| 229 | Type: Flat Device Tree |
| 230 | Compression: uncompressed |
| 231 | Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.81 kB = 0.03 MB |
| 232 | Architecture: ARM |
| 233 | Hash algo: sha1 |
| 234 | Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d |
| 235 | Default Configuration: 'conf@1' |
| 236 | Configuration 0 (conf@1) |
| 237 | Description: unavailable |
| 238 | Kernel: kernel@1 |
| 239 | FDT: fdt@1 |
| 240 | |
| 241 | |
| 242 | Now am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb contains the public key and image.fit contains |
| 243 | the signed kernel. Jump to step 6 if you like, or continue reading to increase |
| 244 | your understanding. |
| 245 | |
| 246 | You can also run fit_check_sign to check it: |
| 247 | |
| 248 | $UOUT/tools/fit_check_sign -f image.fit -k am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb |
| 249 | |
| 250 | which results in: |
| 251 | |
| 252 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:dev+ |
| 253 | ## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 7fc6ee469000 ... |
| 254 | Using 'conf@1' configuration |
| 255 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... |
| 256 | sha1,rsa2048:dev+ |
| 257 | OK |
| 258 | |
| 259 | Trying 'kernel@1' kernel subimage |
| 260 | Description: unavailable |
| 261 | Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 |
| 262 | Type: Kernel Image |
| 263 | Compression: lzo compressed |
| 264 | Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7608.34 kB = 7.43 MB |
| 265 | Architecture: ARM |
| 266 | OS: Linux |
| 267 | Load Address: 0x80008000 |
| 268 | Entry Point: 0x80008000 |
| 269 | Hash algo: sha1 |
| 270 | Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988 |
| 271 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... |
| 272 | sha1+ |
| 273 | OK |
| 274 | |
| 275 | Unimplemented compression type 4 |
| 276 | ## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 7fc6ee469000 ... |
| 277 | Using 'conf@1' configuration |
| 278 | Trying 'fdt@1' fdt subimage |
| 279 | Description: beaglebone-black |
| 280 | Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 |
| 281 | Type: Flat Device Tree |
| 282 | Compression: uncompressed |
| 283 | Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.81 kB = 0.03 MB |
| 284 | Architecture: ARM |
| 285 | Hash algo: sha1 |
| 286 | Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d |
| 287 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... |
| 288 | sha1+ |
| 289 | OK |
| 290 | |
| 291 | Loading Flat Device Tree ... OK |
| 292 | |
| 293 | ## Loading ramdisk from FIT Image at 7fc6ee469000 ... |
| 294 | Using 'conf@1' configuration |
| 295 | Could not find subimage node |
| 296 | |
| 297 | Signature check OK |
| 298 | |
| 299 | |
| 300 | At the top, you see "sha1,rsa2048:dev+". This means that it checked an RSA key |
| 301 | of size 2048 bits using SHA1 as the hash algorithm. The key name checked was |
| 302 | 'dev' and the '+' means that it verified. If it showed '-' that would be bad. |
| 303 | |
| 304 | Once the configuration is verified it is then possible to rely on the hashes |
| 305 | in each image referenced by that configuration. So fit_check_sign goes on to |
| 306 | load each of the images. We have a kernel and an FDT but no ramkdisk. In each |
| 307 | case fit_check_sign checks the hash and prints sha1+ meaning that the SHA1 |
| 308 | hash verified. This means that none of the images has been tampered with. |
| 309 | |
| 310 | There is a test in test/vboot which uses U-Boot's sandbox build to verify that |
| 311 | the above flow works. |
| 312 | |
| 313 | But it is fun to do this by hand, so you can load image.fit into a hex editor |
| 314 | like ghex, and change a byte in the kernel: |
| 315 | |
| 316 | $UOUT/tools/fit_info -f image.fit -n /images/kernel@1 -p data |
| 317 | NAME: kernel@1 |
| 318 | LEN: 7790938 |
| 319 | OFF: 168 |
| 320 | |
| 321 | This tells us that the kernel starts at byte offset 168 (decimal) in image.fit |
| 322 | and extends for about 7MB. Try changing a byte at 0x2000 (say) and run |
| 323 | fit_check_sign again. You should see something like: |
| 324 | |
| 325 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:dev+ |
| 326 | ## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 7f5a39571000 ... |
| 327 | Using 'conf@1' configuration |
| 328 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... |
| 329 | sha1,rsa2048:dev+ |
| 330 | OK |
| 331 | |
| 332 | Trying 'kernel@1' kernel subimage |
| 333 | Description: unavailable |
| 334 | Created: Sun Jun 1 13:09:21 2014 |
| 335 | Type: Kernel Image |
| 336 | Compression: lzo compressed |
| 337 | Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7608.34 kB = 7.43 MB |
| 338 | Architecture: ARM |
| 339 | OS: Linux |
| 340 | Load Address: 0x80008000 |
| 341 | Entry Point: 0x80008000 |
| 342 | Hash algo: sha1 |
| 343 | Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988 |
| 344 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... |
| 345 | sha1 error |
| 346 | Bad hash value for 'hash@1' hash node in 'kernel@1' image node |
| 347 | Bad Data Hash |
| 348 | |
| 349 | ## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 7f5a39571000 ... |
| 350 | Using 'conf@1' configuration |
| 351 | Trying 'fdt@1' fdt subimage |
| 352 | Description: beaglebone-black |
| 353 | Created: Sun Jun 1 13:09:21 2014 |
| 354 | Type: Flat Device Tree |
| 355 | Compression: uncompressed |
| 356 | Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.81 kB = 0.03 MB |
| 357 | Architecture: ARM |
| 358 | Hash algo: sha1 |
| 359 | Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d |
| 360 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... |
| 361 | sha1+ |
| 362 | OK |
| 363 | |
| 364 | Loading Flat Device Tree ... OK |
| 365 | |
| 366 | ## Loading ramdisk from FIT Image at 7f5a39571000 ... |
| 367 | Using 'conf@1' configuration |
| 368 | Could not find subimage node |
| 369 | |
| 370 | Signature check Bad (error 1) |
| 371 | |
| 372 | |
| 373 | It has detected the change in the kernel. |
| 374 | |
| 375 | You can also be sneaky and try to switch images, using the libfdt utilities |
| 376 | that come with dtc (package name is device-tree-compiler but you will need a |
| 377 | recent version like 1.4: |
| 378 | |
| 379 | dtc -v |
| 380 | Version: DTC 1.4.0 |
| 381 | |
| 382 | First we can check which nodes are actually hashed by the configuration: |
| 383 | |
| 384 | fdtget -l image.fit / |
| 385 | images |
| 386 | configurations |
| 387 | |
| 388 | fdtget -l image.fit /configurations |
| 389 | conf@1 |
| 390 | fdtget -l image.fit /configurations/conf@1 |
| 391 | signature@1 |
| 392 | |
| 393 | fdtget -p image.fit /configurations/conf@1/signature@1 |
| 394 | hashed-strings |
| 395 | hashed-nodes |
| 396 | timestamp |
| 397 | signer-version |
| 398 | signer-name |
| 399 | value |
| 400 | algo |
| 401 | key-name-hint |
| 402 | sign-images |
| 403 | |
| 404 | fdtget image.fit /configurations/conf@1/signature@1 hashed-nodes |
| 405 | / /configurations/conf@1 /images/fdt@1 /images/fdt@1/hash@1 /images/kernel@1 /images/kernel@1/hash@1 |
| 406 | |
| 407 | This gives us a bit of a look into the signature that mkimage added. Note you |
| 408 | can also use fdtdump to list the entire device tree. |
| 409 | |
| 410 | Say we want to change the kernel that this configuration uses |
| 411 | (/images/kernel@1). We could just put a new kernel in the image, but we will |
| 412 | need to change the hash to match. Let's simulate that by changing a byte of |
| 413 | the hash: |
| 414 | |
| 415 | fdtget -tx image.fit /images/kernel@1/hash@1 value |
| 416 | c9436464 6427e10f 423837e5 59898ef0 2c97b988 |
| 417 | fdtput -tx image.fit /images/kernel@1/hash@1 value c9436464 6427e10f 423837e5 59898ef0 2c97b981 |
| 418 | |
| 419 | Now check it again: |
| 420 | |
| 421 | $UOUT/tools/fit_check_sign -f image.fit -k am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb |
| 422 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:devrsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13 |
| 423 | rsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13 |
| 424 | - |
| 425 | Failed to verify required signature 'key-dev' |
| 426 | Signature check Bad (error 1) |
| 427 | |
| 428 | This time we don't even get as far as checking the images, since the |
| 429 | configuration signature doesn't match. We can't change any hashes without the |
| 430 | signature check noticing. The configuration is essentially locked. U-Boot has |
| 431 | a public key for which it requires a match, and will not permit the use of any |
| 432 | configuration that does not match that public key. The only way the |
| 433 | configuration will match is if it was signed by the matching private key. |
| 434 | |
| 435 | It would also be possible to add a new signature node that does match your new |
| 436 | configuration. But that won't work since you are not allowed to change the |
| 437 | configuration in any way. Try it with a fresh (valid) image if you like by |
| 438 | running the mkimage link again. Then: |
| 439 | |
| 440 | fdtput -p image.fit /configurations/conf@1/signature@2 value fred |
| 441 | $UOUT/tools/fit_check_sign -f image.fit -k am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb |
| 442 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... - |
| 443 | sha1,rsa2048:devrsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13 |
| 444 | rsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13 |
| 445 | - |
| 446 | Failed to verify required signature 'key-dev' |
| 447 | Signature check Bad (error 1) |
| 448 | |
| 449 | |
| 450 | Of course it would be possible to add an entirely new configuration and boot |
| 451 | with that, but it still needs to be signed, so it won't help. |
| 452 | |
| 453 | |
| 454 | 6. Put the public key into U-Boot's image |
| 455 | ----------------------------------------- |
| 456 | |
| 457 | Having confirmed that the signature is doing its job, let's try it out in |
| 458 | U-Boot on the board. U-Boot needs access to the public key corresponding to |
| 459 | the private key that you signed with so that it can verify any kernels that |
| 460 | you sign. |
| 461 | |
| 462 | cd $UBOOT |
| 463 | make O=b/am335x_boneblack_vboot EXT_DTB=${WORK}/am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb |
| 464 | |
| 465 | Here we are overrriding the normal device tree file with our one, which |
| 466 | contains the public key. |
| 467 | |
| 468 | Now you have a special U-Boot image with the public key. It can verify can |
| 469 | kernel that you sign with the private key as in step 5. |
| 470 | |
| 471 | If you like you can take a look at the public key information that mkimage |
| 472 | added to U-Boot's device tree: |
| 473 | |
| 474 | fdtget -p am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb /signature/key-dev |
| 475 | required |
| 476 | algo |
| 477 | rsa,r-squared |
| 478 | rsa,modulus |
| 479 | rsa,n0-inverse |
| 480 | rsa,num-bits |
| 481 | key-name-hint |
| 482 | |
| 483 | This has information about the key and some pre-processed values which U-Boot |
| 484 | can use to verify against it. These values are obtained from the public key |
| 485 | certificate by mkimage, but require quite a bit of code to generate. To save |
| 486 | code space in U-Boot, the information is extracted and written in raw form for |
| 487 | U-Boot to easily use. The same mechanism is used in Google's Chrome OS. |
| 488 | |
| 489 | Notice the 'required' property. This marks the key as required - U-Boot will |
| 490 | not boot any image that does not verify against this key. |
| 491 | |
| 492 | |
| 493 | 7. Put U-Boot and the kernel onto the board |
| 494 | ------------------------------------------- |
| 495 | |
| 496 | The method here varies depending on how you are booting. For this example we |
| 497 | are booting from an micro-SD card with two partitions, one for U-Boot and one |
| 498 | for Linux. Put it into your machine and write U-Boot and the kernel to it. |
| 499 | Here the card is /dev/sde: |
| 500 | |
| 501 | cd $WORK |
| 502 | export UDEV=/dev/sde1 # Change thes two lines to the correct device |
| 503 | export KDEV=/dev/sde2 |
| 504 | sudo mount $UDEV /mnt/tmp && sudo cp $UOUT/u-boot-dtb.img /mnt/tmp/u-boot.img && sleep 1 && sudo umount $UDEV |
| 505 | sudo mount $KDEV /mnt/tmp && sudo cp $WORK/image.fit /mnt/tmp/boot/image.fit && sleep 1 && sudo umount $KDEV |
| 506 | |
| 507 | |
| 508 | 8. Try it |
| 509 | --------- |
| 510 | |
| 511 | Boot the board using the commands below: |
| 512 | |
| 513 | setenv bootargs console=ttyO0,115200n8 quiet root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 ro rootfstype=ext4 rootwait |
| 514 | ext2load mmc 0:2 82000000 /boot/image.fit |
| 515 | bootm 82000000 |
| 516 | |
| 517 | You should then see something like this: |
| 518 | |
| 519 | U-Boot# setenv bootargs console=ttyO0,115200n8 quiet root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 ro rootfstype=ext4 rootwait |
| 520 | U-Boot# ext2load mmc 0:2 82000000 /boot/image.fit |
| 521 | 7824930 bytes read in 589 ms (12.7 MiB/s) |
| 522 | U-Boot# bootm 82000000 |
| 523 | ## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 82000000 ... |
| 524 | Using 'conf@1' configuration |
| 525 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:dev+ OK |
| 526 | Trying 'kernel@1' kernel subimage |
| 527 | Description: unavailable |
| 528 | Created: 2014-06-01 19:32:54 UTC |
| 529 | Type: Kernel Image |
| 530 | Compression: lzo compressed |
| 531 | Data Start: 0x820000a8 |
| 532 | Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7.4 MiB |
| 533 | Architecture: ARM |
| 534 | OS: Linux |
| 535 | Load Address: 0x80008000 |
| 536 | Entry Point: 0x80008000 |
| 537 | Hash algo: sha1 |
| 538 | Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988 |
| 539 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1+ OK |
| 540 | ## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 82000000 ... |
| 541 | Using 'conf@1' configuration |
| 542 | Trying 'fdt@1' fdt subimage |
| 543 | Description: beaglebone-black |
| 544 | Created: 2014-06-01 19:32:54 UTC |
| 545 | Type: Flat Device Tree |
| 546 | Compression: uncompressed |
| 547 | Data Start: 0x8276e2ec |
| 548 | Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.8 KiB |
| 549 | Architecture: ARM |
| 550 | Hash algo: sha1 |
| 551 | Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d |
| 552 | Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1+ OK |
| 553 | Booting using the fdt blob at 0x8276e2ec |
| 554 | Uncompressing Kernel Image ... OK |
| 555 | Loading Device Tree to 8fff5000, end 8ffffb3a ... OK |
| 556 | |
| 557 | Starting kernel ... |
| 558 | |
| 559 | [ 0.582377] omap_init_mbox: hwmod doesn't have valid attrs |
| 560 | [ 2.589651] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.0.auto: Failed to request rx1. |
| 561 | [ 2.595830] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.0.auto: musb_init_controller failed with status -517 |
| 562 | [ 2.606470] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.1.auto: Failed to request rx1. |
| 563 | [ 2.612723] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.1.auto: musb_init_controller failed with status -517 |
| 564 | [ 2.940808] drivers/rtc/hctosys.c: unable to open rtc device (rtc0) |
| 565 | [ 7.248889] libphy: PHY 4a101000.mdio:01 not found |
| 566 | [ 7.253995] net eth0: phy 4a101000.mdio:01 not found on slave 1 |
| 567 | systemd-fsck[83]: Angstrom: clean, 50607/218160 files, 306348/872448 blocks |
| 568 | |
| 569 | .---O---. |
| 570 | | | .-. o o |
| 571 | | | |-----.-----.-----.| | .----..-----.-----. |
| 572 | | | | __ | ---'| '--.| .-'| | | |
| 573 | | | | | | |--- || --'| | | ' | | | | |
| 574 | '---'---'--'--'--. |-----''----''--' '-----'-'-'-' |
| 575 | -' | |
| 576 | '---' |
| 577 | |
| 578 | The Angstrom Distribution beaglebone ttyO0 |
| 579 | |
| 580 | Angstrom v2012.12 - Kernel 3.14.1+ |
| 581 | |
| 582 | beaglebone login: |
| 583 | |
| 584 | At this point your kernel has been verified and you can be sure that it is one |
| 585 | that you signed. As an exercise, try changing image.fit as in step 5 and see |
| 586 | what happens. |
| 587 | |
| 588 | |
| 589 | Further Improvements |
| 590 | -------------------- |
| 591 | |
| 592 | Several of the steps here can be easily automated. In particular it would be |
| 593 | capital if signing and packaging a kernel were easy, perhaps a simple make |
| 594 | target in the kernel. |
| 595 | |
| 596 | Some mention of how to use multiple .dtb files in a FIT might be useful. |
| 597 | |
| 598 | U-Boot's verified boot mechanism has not had a robust and independent security |
| 599 | review. Such a review should look at the implementation and its resistance to |
| 600 | attacks. |
| 601 | |
| 602 | Perhaps the verified boot feature could could be integrated into the Amstrom |
| 603 | distribution. |
| 604 | |
| 605 | |
| 606 | Simon Glass |
| 607 | sjg@chromium.org |
| 608 | 2-June-14 |