Paul Beesley | 236d246 | 2019-03-05 17:19:37 +0000 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | Security Center |
| 2 | =============== |
| 3 | |
Joel Hutton | 9e60563 | 2019-02-25 15:18:56 +0000 | [diff] [blame] | 4 | Security Disclosures |
| 5 | -------------------- |
| 6 | |
| 7 | We disclose all security vulnerabilities we find or are advised about that are |
| 8 | relevant for ARM Trusted Firmware (TF). We encourage responsible disclosure of |
| 9 | vulnerabilities and inform users as best we can about all possible issues. |
| 10 | |
| 11 | We disclose TF vulnerabilities as Security Advisories. These are listed at the |
| 12 | bottom of this page and announced as issues in the `GitHub issue tracker`_ with |
| 13 | the "security-advisory" tag. You can receive notification emails for these by |
| 14 | watching that project. |
| 15 | |
| 16 | Found a Security Issue? |
| 17 | ----------------------- |
| 18 | |
| 19 | Although we try to keep TF secure, we can only do so with the help of the |
| 20 | community of developers and security researchers. |
| 21 | |
| 22 | If you think you have found a security vulnerability, please *do not* report it |
| 23 | in the `GitHub issue tracker`_. Instead send an email to |
| 24 | trusted-firmware-security@arm.com |
| 25 | |
| 26 | Please include: |
| 27 | |
| 28 | * Trusted Firmware version (or commit) affected |
| 29 | |
| 30 | * A description of the concern or vulnerability |
| 31 | |
| 32 | * Details on how to replicate the vulnerability, including: |
| 33 | |
| 34 | - Configuration details |
| 35 | |
| 36 | - Proof of concept exploit code |
| 37 | |
| 38 | - Any additional software or tools required |
| 39 | |
| 40 | We recommend using `this PGP/GPG key`_ for encrypting the information. This key |
| 41 | is also available at http://keyserver.pgp.com and LDAP port 389 of the same |
| 42 | server. The fingerprint for this key is: |
| 43 | |
| 44 | :: |
| 45 | |
| 46 | 1309 2C19 22B4 8E87 F17B FE5C 3AB7 EFCB 45A0 DFD0 |
| 47 | |
| 48 | If you would like replies to be encrypted, please provide your public key. |
| 49 | |
| 50 | Please give us the time to respond to you and fix the vulnerability before going |
| 51 | public. We do our best to respond and fix any issues quickly. We also need to |
| 52 | ensure providers of products that use TF have a chance to consider the |
| 53 | implications of the vulnerability and its remedy. |
| 54 | |
| 55 | Afterwards, we encourage you to write-up your findings about the TF source code. |
| 56 | |
| 57 | Attribution |
| 58 | ----------- |
| 59 | |
| 60 | We will name and thank you in the ``change-log.rst`` distributed with the source |
| 61 | code and in any published security advisory. |
| 62 | |
| 63 | Security Advisories |
| 64 | ------------------- |
| 65 | |
| 66 | +-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 67 | | ID | Title | |
| 68 | +===========+==================================================================+ |
| 69 | | `TFV-1`_ | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy of unexpectedly | |
| 70 | | | large data into secure memory | |
| 71 | +-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 72 | | `TFV-2`_ | Enabled secure self-hosted invasive debug interface can allow | |
| 73 | | | normal world to panic secure world | |
| 74 | +-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 75 | | `TFV-3`_ | RO memory is always executable at AArch64 Secure EL1 | |
| 76 | +-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 77 | | `TFV-4`_ | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy or | |
| 78 | | | authentication of unexpected data in secure memory in AArch32 | |
| 79 | | | state | |
| 80 | +-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 81 | | `TFV-5`_ | Not initializing or saving/restoring PMCR_EL0 can leak secure | |
| 82 | | | world timing information | |
| 83 | +-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 84 | | `TFV-6`_ | Arm Trusted Firmware exposure to speculative processor | |
| 85 | | | vulnerabilities using cache timing side-channels | |
| 86 | +-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 87 | | `TFV-7`_ | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to cache speculation vulnerability | |
| 88 | | | Variant 4 | |
| 89 | +-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 90 | | `TFV-8`_ | Not saving x0 to x3 registers can leak information from one | |
| 91 | | | Normal World SMC client to another | |
| 92 | +-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 93 | |
| 94 | .. _GitHub issue tracker: https://github.com/ARM-software/tf-issues/issues |
Joel Hutton | 0f79fb1 | 2019-02-26 16:23:54 +0000 | [diff] [blame] | 95 | .. _this PGP/GPG key: security-reporting.asc |
| 96 | .. _TFV-1: ./security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-1.rst |
| 97 | .. _TFV-2: ./security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-2.rst |
| 98 | .. _TFV-3: ./security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-3.rst |
| 99 | .. _TFV-4: ./security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-4.rst |
| 100 | .. _TFV-5: ./security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-5.rst |
| 101 | .. _TFV-6: ./security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-6.rst |
| 102 | .. _TFV-7: ./security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-7.rst |
| 103 | .. _TFV-8: ./security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-8.rst |