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Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +02001Secure Partition Manager
2************************
3
4.. contents::
5
6Acronyms
7========
8
9+--------+-----------------------------------+
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +020010| CoT | Chain of Trust |
11+--------+-----------------------------------+
Madhukar Pappireddya9859062021-02-28 14:01:34 -060012| DMA | Direct Memory Access |
13+--------+-----------------------------------+
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +020014| DTB | Device Tree Blob |
15+--------+-----------------------------------+
16| DTS | Device Tree Source |
17+--------+-----------------------------------+
18| EC | Execution Context |
19+--------+-----------------------------------+
20| FIP | Firmware Image Package |
21+--------+-----------------------------------+
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +020022| FF-A | Firmware Framework for Armv8-A |
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +020023+--------+-----------------------------------+
24| IPA | Intermediate Physical Address |
25+--------+-----------------------------------+
26| NWd | Normal World |
27+--------+-----------------------------------+
28| ODM | Original Design Manufacturer |
29+--------+-----------------------------------+
30| OEM | Original Equipment Manufacturer |
31+--------+-----------------------------------+
32| PA | Physical Address |
33+--------+-----------------------------------+
34| PE | Processing Element |
35+--------+-----------------------------------+
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +020036| PM | Power Management |
37+--------+-----------------------------------+
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +020038| PVM | Primary VM |
39+--------+-----------------------------------+
Madhukar Pappireddya9859062021-02-28 14:01:34 -060040| SMMU | System Memory Management Unit |
41+--------+-----------------------------------+
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +020042| SP | Secure Partition |
43+--------+-----------------------------------+
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +020044| SPD | Secure Payload Dispatcher |
45+--------+-----------------------------------+
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +020046| SPM | Secure Partition Manager |
47+--------+-----------------------------------+
48| SPMC | SPM Core |
49+--------+-----------------------------------+
50| SPMD | SPM Dispatcher |
51+--------+-----------------------------------+
52| SiP | Silicon Provider |
53+--------+-----------------------------------+
54| SWd | Secure World |
55+--------+-----------------------------------+
56| TLV | Tag-Length-Value |
57+--------+-----------------------------------+
58| TOS | Trusted Operating System |
59+--------+-----------------------------------+
60| VM | Virtual Machine |
61+--------+-----------------------------------+
62
63Foreword
64========
65
66Two implementations of a Secure Partition Manager co-exist in the TF-A codebase:
67
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +020068- SPM based on the FF-A specification `[1]`_.
69- SPM based on the MM interface to communicate with an S-EL0 partition `[2]`_.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +020070
71Both implementations differ in their architectures and only one can be selected
72at build time.
73
74This document:
75
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +020076- describes the FF-A implementation where the Secure Partition Manager
77 resides at EL3 and S-EL2 (or EL3 and S-EL1).
78- is not an architecture specification and it might provide assumptions
79 on sections mandated as implementation-defined in the specification.
80- covers the implications to TF-A used as a bootloader, and Hafnium
81 used as a reference code base for an S-EL2 secure firmware on
82 platforms implementing the FEAT_SEL2 (formerly Armv8.4 Secure EL2)
83 architecture extension.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +020084
85Terminology
86-----------
87
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +020088- The term Hypervisor refers to the NS-EL2 component managing Virtual Machines
89 (or partitions) in the normal world.
90- The term SPMC refers to the S-EL2 component managing secure partitions in
91 the secure world when the FEAT_SEL2 architecture extension is implemented.
92- Alternatively, SPMC can refer to an S-EL1 component, itself being a secure
93 partition and implementing the FF-A ABI on platforms not implementing the
94 FEAT_SEL2 architecture extension.
95- The term VM refers to a normal world Virtual Machine managed by an Hypervisor.
96- The term SP refers to a secure world "Virtual Machine" managed by an SPMC.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +020097
98Support for legacy platforms
99----------------------------
100
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200101In the implementation, the SPM is split into SPMD and SPMC components.
102The SPMD is located at EL3 and mainly relays FF-A messages from
103NWd (Hypervisor or OS kernel) to SPMC located either at S-EL1 or S-EL2.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200104
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200105Hence TF-A supports both cases where the SPMC is located either at:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200106
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200107- S-EL1 supporting platforms not implementing the FEAT_SEL2 architecture
108 extension. The SPMD relays the FF-A protocol from EL3 to S-EL1.
109- or S-EL2 supporting platforms implementing the FEAT_SEL2 architecture
110 extension. The SPMD relays the FF-A protocol from EL3 to S-EL2.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200111
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200112The same TF-A SPMD component is used to support both configurations.
113The SPMC exception level is a build time choice.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200114
115Sample reference stack
116======================
117
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200118The following diagram illustrates a possible configuration when the
119FEAT_SEL2 architecture extension is implemented, showing the SPMD
120and SPMC, one or multiple secure partitions, with an optional
121Hypervisor:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200122
123.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/ff-a-spm-sel2.png
124
125TF-A build options
126==================
127
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200128This section explains the TF-A build options involved in building with
129support for an FF-A based SPM where the SPMD is located at EL3 and the
130SPMC located at S-EL1 or S-EL2:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200131
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200132- **SPD=spmd**: this option selects the SPMD component to relay the FF-A
133 protocol from NWd to SWd back and forth. It is not possible to
134 enable another Secure Payload Dispatcher when this option is chosen.
135- **SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2**: this option adjusts the SPMC exception
136 level to being S-EL1 or S-EL2. It defaults to enabled (value 1) when
137 SPD=spmd is chosen.
138- **CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS**: this option permits saving (resp.
139 restoring) the EL2 system register context before entering (resp.
140 after leaving) the SPMC. It is mandatorily enabled when
141 ``SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2`` is enabled. The context save/restore routine
142 and exhaustive list of registers is visible at `[4]`_.
143- **SP_LAYOUT_FILE**: this option specifies a text description file
144 providing paths to SP binary images and manifests in DTS format
145 (see `Describing secure partitions`_). It
146 is required when ``SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2`` is enabled hence when multiple
147 secure partitions are to be loaded on behalf of the SPMC.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200148
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200149+---------------+----------------------+------------------+
150| | CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS | SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 |
151+---------------+----------------------+------------------+
152| SPMC at S-EL1 | 0 | 0 |
153+---------------+----------------------+------------------+
154| SPMC at S-EL2 | 1 | 1 (default when |
155| | | SPD=spmd) |
156+---------------+----------------------+------------------+
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200157
158Other combinations of such build options either break the build or are not
159supported.
160
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200161Notes:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200162
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200163- Only Arm's FVP platform is supported to use with the TF-A reference software
164 stack.
165- The reference software stack uses FEAT_PAuth (formerly Armv8.3-PAuth) and
166 FEAT_BTI (formerly Armv8.5-BTI) architecture extensions by default at EL3
167 and S-EL2.
168- The ``CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS`` option provides the generic support for
169 barely saving/restoring EL2 registers from an Arm arch perspective. As such
170 it is decoupled from the ``SPD=spmd`` option.
171- BL32 option is re-purposed to specify the SPMC image. It can specify either
172 the Hafnium binary path (built for the secure world) or the path to a TEE
173 binary implementing FF-A interfaces.
174- BL33 option can specify the TFTF binary or a normal world loader
175 such as U-Boot or the UEFI framework.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200176
177Sample TF-A build command line when SPMC is located at S-EL1
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200178(e.g. when the FEAT_EL2 architecture extension is not implemented):
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200179
180.. code:: shell
181
182 make \
183 CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- \
184 SPD=spmd \
185 SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2=0 \
186 BL32=<path-to-tee-binary> \
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200187 BL33=<path-to-bl33-binary> \
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200188 PLAT=fvp \
189 all fip
190
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200191Sample TF-A build command line for a FEAT_SEL2 enabled system where the SPMC is
192located at S-EL2:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200193
194.. code:: shell
195
196 make \
197 CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- \
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200198 PLAT=fvp \
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200199 SPD=spmd \
200 CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS=1 \
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200201 ARM_ARCH_MINOR=5 \
202 BRANCH_PROTECTION=1 \
203 CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1 \
204 BL32=<path-to-hafnium-binary> \
205 BL33=<path-to-bl33-binary> \
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200206 SP_LAYOUT_FILE=sp_layout.json \
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200207 all fip
208
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200209Same as above with enabling secure boot in addition:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200210
211.. code:: shell
212
213 make \
214 CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- \
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200215 PLAT=fvp \
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200216 SPD=spmd \
217 CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS=1 \
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200218 ARM_ARCH_MINOR=5 \
219 BRANCH_PROTECTION=1 \
220 CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1 \
221 BL32=<path-to-hafnium-binary> \
222 BL33=<path-to-bl33-binary> \
223 SP_LAYOUT_FILE=sp_layout.json \
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200224 MBEDTLS_DIR=<path-to-mbedtls-lib> \
225 TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1 \
226 COT=dualroot \
227 ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_rsa \
228 ROT_KEY=plat/arm/board/common/rotpk/arm_rotprivk_rsa.pem \
229 GENERATE_COT=1 \
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200230 all fip
231
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200232FVP model invocation
233====================
234
235The FVP command line needs the following options to exercise the S-EL2 SPMC:
236
237+---------------------------------------------------+------------------------------------+
238| - cluster0.has_arm_v8-5=1 | Implements FEAT_SEL2, FEAT_PAuth, |
239| - cluster1.has_arm_v8-5=1 | and FEAT_BTI. |
240+---------------------------------------------------+------------------------------------+
241| - pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_AIDR=2 | Parameters required for the |
242| - pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_IDR0=0x0046123B | SMMUv3.2 modeling. |
243| - pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_IDR1=0x00600002 | |
244| - pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_IDR3=0x1714 | |
245| - pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_IDR5=0xFFFF0472 | |
246| - pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_S_IDR1=0xA0000002 | |
247| - pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_S_IDR2=0 | |
248| - pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_S_IDR3=0 | |
249+---------------------------------------------------+------------------------------------+
250| - cluster0.has_branch_target_exception=1 | Implements FEAT_BTI. |
251| - cluster1.has_branch_target_exception=1 | |
252+---------------------------------------------------+------------------------------------+
253| - cluster0.restriction_on_speculative_execution=2 | Required by the EL2 context |
254| - cluster1.restriction_on_speculative_execution=2 | save/restore routine. |
255+---------------------------------------------------+------------------------------------+
256
257Sample FVP command line invocation:
258
259.. code:: shell
260
261 <path-to-fvp-model>/FVP_Base_RevC-2xAEMv8A -C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0
262 -C cluster0.NUM_CORES=4 -C cluster1.NUM_CORES=4 -C bp.secure_memory=1 \
263 -C bp.secureflashloader.fname=trusted-firmware-a/build/fvp/debug/bl1.bin \
264 -C bp.flashloader0.fname=trusted-firmware-a/build/fvp/debug/fip.bin \
265 -C bp.pl011_uart0.out_file=fvp-uart0.log -C bp.pl011_uart1.out_file=fvp-uart1.log \
266 -C bp.pl011_uart2.out_file=fvp-uart2.log \
267 -C cluster0.has_arm_v8-5=1 -C cluster1.has_arm_v8-5=1 -C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_AIDR=2 \
268 -C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_IDR0=0x0046123B -C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_IDR1=0x00600002 \
269 -C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_IDR3=0x1714 -C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_IDR5=0xFFFF0472 \
270 -C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_S_IDR1=0xA0000002 -C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_S_IDR2=0 \
271 -C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_S_IDR3=0 \
272 -C cluster0.has_branch_target_exception=1 \
273 -C cluster1.has_branch_target_exception=1 \
274 -C cluster0.restriction_on_speculative_execution=2 \
275 -C cluster1.restriction_on_speculative_execution=2
276
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200277Boot process
278============
279
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200280Loading Hafnium and secure partitions in the secure world
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200281---------------------------------------------------------
282
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200283TF-A BL2 is the bootlader for the SPMC and SPs in the secure world.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200284
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200285SPs may be signed by different parties (SiP, OEM/ODM, TOS vendor, etc.).
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200286Thus they are supplied as distinct signed entities within the FIP flash
287image. The FIP image itself is not signed hence this provides the ability
288to upgrade SPs in the field.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200289
290Booting through TF-A
291--------------------
292
293SP manifests
294~~~~~~~~~~~~
295
296An SP manifest describes SP attributes as defined in `[1]`_
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200297(partition manifest at virtual FF-A instance) in DTS format. It is
298represented as a single file associated with the SP. A sample is
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200299provided by `[5]`_. A binding document is provided by `[6]`_.
300
301Secure Partition packages
302~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
303
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200304Secure partitions are bundled as independent package files consisting
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200305of:
306
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200307- a header
308- a DTB
309- an image payload
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200310
311The header starts with a magic value and offset values to SP DTB and
312image payload. Each SP package is loaded independently by BL2 loader
313and verified for authenticity and integrity.
314
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200315The SP package identified by its UUID (matching FF-A uuid property) is
316inserted as a single entry into the FIP at end of the TF-A build flow
317as shown:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200318
319.. code:: shell
320
321 Trusted Boot Firmware BL2: offset=0x1F0, size=0x8AE1, cmdline="--tb-fw"
322 EL3 Runtime Firmware BL31: offset=0x8CD1, size=0x13000, cmdline="--soc-fw"
323 Secure Payload BL32 (Trusted OS): offset=0x1BCD1, size=0x15270, cmdline="--tos-fw"
324 Non-Trusted Firmware BL33: offset=0x30F41, size=0x92E0, cmdline="--nt-fw"
325 HW_CONFIG: offset=0x3A221, size=0x2348, cmdline="--hw-config"
326 TB_FW_CONFIG: offset=0x3C569, size=0x37A, cmdline="--tb-fw-config"
327 SOC_FW_CONFIG: offset=0x3C8E3, size=0x48, cmdline="--soc-fw-config"
328 TOS_FW_CONFIG: offset=0x3C92B, size=0x427, cmdline="--tos-fw-config"
329 NT_FW_CONFIG: offset=0x3CD52, size=0x48, cmdline="--nt-fw-config"
330 B4B5671E-4A90-4FE1-B81F-FB13DAE1DACB: offset=0x3CD9A, size=0xC168, cmdline="--blob"
331 D1582309-F023-47B9-827C-4464F5578FC8: offset=0x48F02, size=0xC168, cmdline="--blob"
332
333.. uml:: ../resources/diagrams/plantuml/fip-secure-partitions.puml
334
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200335Describing secure partitions
336~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200337
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200338A json-formatted description file is passed to the build flow specifying paths
339to the SP binary image and associated DTS partition manifest file. The latter
340is processed by the dtc compiler to generate a DTB fed into the SP package.
341This file also specifies the SP owner (as an optional field) identifying the
342signing domain in case of dual root CoT.
343The SP owner can either be the silicon or the platform provider. The
344corresponding "owner" field value can either take the value of "SiP" or "Plat".
345In absence of "owner" field, it defaults to "SiP" owner.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200346
347.. code:: shell
348
349 {
350 "tee1" : {
351 "image": "tee1.bin",
Manish Pandey77870962020-08-12 17:06:25 +0100352 "pm": "tee1.dts",
353 "owner": "SiP"
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200354 },
355
356 "tee2" : {
357 "image": "tee2.bin",
Manish Pandey77870962020-08-12 17:06:25 +0100358 "pm": "tee2.dts",
359 "owner": "Plat"
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200360 }
361 }
362
363SPMC manifest
364~~~~~~~~~~~~~
365
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200366This manifest contains the SPMC *attribute* node consumed by the SPMD at boot
367time. It implements `[1]`_ (SP manifest at physical FF-A instance) and serves
368two different cases:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200369
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200370- The SPMC resides at S-EL1: the SPMC manifest is used by the SPMD to setup a
371 SP that co-resides with the SPMC and executes at S-EL1 or Secure Supervisor
372 mode.
373- The SPMC resides at S-EL2: the SPMC manifest is used by the SPMD to setup
374 the environment required by the SPMC to run at S-EL2. SPs run at S-EL1 or
375 S-EL0.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200376
377.. code:: shell
378
379 attribute {
380 spmc_id = <0x8000>;
381 maj_ver = <0x1>;
382 min_ver = <0x0>;
383 exec_state = <0x0>;
384 load_address = <0x0 0x6000000>;
385 entrypoint = <0x0 0x6000000>;
386 binary_size = <0x60000>;
387 };
388
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200389- *spmc_id* defines the endpoint ID value that SPMC can query through
390 ``FFA_ID_GET``.
391- *maj_ver/min_ver*. SPMD checks provided version versus its internal
392 version and aborts if not matching.
393- *exec_state* defines the SPMC execution state (AArch64 or AArch32).
394 Notice Hafnium used as a SPMC only supports AArch64.
395- *load_address* and *binary_size* are mostly used to verify secondary
396 entry points fit into the loaded binary image.
397- *entrypoint* defines the cold boot primary core entry point used by
398 SPMD (currently matches ``BL32_BASE``) to enter the SPMC.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200399
400Other nodes in the manifest are consumed by Hafnium in the secure world.
401A sample can be found at [7]:
402
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200403- The *hypervisor* node describes SPs. *is_ffa_partition* boolean attribute
404 indicates a FF-A compliant SP. The *load_address* field specifies the load
405 address at which TF-A loaded the SP package.
406- *cpus* node provide the platform topology and allows MPIDR to VMPIDR mapping.
407 Note the primary core is declared first, then secondary core are declared
408 in reverse order.
409- The *memory* node provides platform information on the ranges of memory
410 available to the SPMC.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200411
412SPMC boot
413~~~~~~~~~
414
415The SPMC is loaded by BL2 as the BL32 image.
416
417The SPMC manifest is loaded by BL2 as the ``TOS_FW_CONFIG`` image.
418
419BL2 passes the SPMC manifest address to BL31 through a register.
420
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200421At boot time, the SPMD in BL31 runs from the primary core, initializes the core
422contexts and launches the SPMC (BL32) passing the SPMC manifest address through
423a register.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200424
425Loading of SPs
426~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
427
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200428At boot time, BL2 loads SPs sequentially in addition to the SPMC as depicted
429below:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200430
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200431.. uml:: ../resources/diagrams/plantuml/bl2-loading-sp.puml
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200432
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200433Note this boot flow is an implementation sample on Arm's FVP platform.
434Platforms not using TF-A's *Firmware CONFiguration* framework would adjust to a
435different implementation.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200436
437Secure boot
438~~~~~~~~~~~
439
440The SP content certificate is inserted as a separate FIP item so that BL2 loads SPMC,
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200441SPMC manifest, secure partitions and verifies them for authenticity and integrity.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200442Refer to TBBR specification `[3]`_.
443
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200444The multiple-signing domain feature (in current state dual signing domain `[8]`_) allows
445the use of two root keys namely S-ROTPK and NS-ROTPK:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200446
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200447- SPMC (BL32) and SPMC manifest are signed by the SiP using the S-ROTPK.
448- BL33 may be signed by the OEM using NS-ROTPK.
449- An SP may be signed either by SiP (using S-ROTPK) or by OEM (using NS-ROTPK).
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200450
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200451Also refer to `Describing secure partitions`_ and `TF-A build options`_ sections.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200452
453Hafnium in the secure world
454===========================
455
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200456General considerations
457----------------------
458
459Build platform for the secure world
460~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
461
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200462In the Hafnium reference implementation specific code parts are only relevant to
463the secure world. Such portions are isolated in architecture specific files
464and/or enclosed by a ``SECURE_WORLD`` macro.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200465
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200466Secure partitions CPU scheduling
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200467~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
468
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200469The FF-A v1.0 specification `[1]`_ provides two ways to relinquinsh CPU time to
470secure partitions. For this a VM (Hypervisor or OS kernel), or SP invokes one of:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200471
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200472- the FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ interface.
473- the FFA_RUN interface.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200474
475Platform topology
476~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
477
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200478The *execution-ctx-count* SP manifest field can take the value of one or the
479total number of PEs. The FF-A v1.0 specification `[1]`_ recommends the
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200480following SP types:
481
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200482- Pinned MP SPs: an execution context matches a physical PE. MP SPs must
483 implement the same number of ECs as the number of PEs in the platform.
484- Migratable UP SPs: a single execution context can run and be migrated on any
485 physical PE. Such SP declares a single EC in its SP manifest. An UP SP can
486 receive a direct message request originating from any physical core targeting
487 the single execution context.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200488
489Parsing SP partition manifests
490------------------------------
491
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200492Hafnium consumes SP manifests as defined in `[1]`_ and `SP manifests`_.
493Note the current implementation may not implement all optional fields.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200494
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200495The SP manifest may contain memory and device regions nodes. In case of
496an S-EL2 SPMC:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200497
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200498- Memory regions are mapped in the SP EL1&0 Stage-2 translation regime at
499 load time (or EL1&0 Stage-1 for an S-EL1 SPMC). A memory region node can
500 specify RX/TX buffer regions in which case it is not necessary for an SP
501 to explicitly invoke the ``FFA_RXTX_MAP`` interface.
502- Device regions are mapped in the SP EL1&0 Stage-2 translation regime (or
503 EL1&0 Stage-1 for an S-EL1 SPMC) as peripherals and possibly allocate
504 additional resources (e.g. interrupts).
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200505
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200506For the S-EL2 SPMC, base addresses for memory and device region nodes are IPAs
507provided the SPMC identity maps IPAs to PAs within SP EL1&0 Stage-2 translation
508regime.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200509
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200510Note: in the current implementation both VTTBR_EL2 and VSTTBR_EL2 point to the
511same set of page tables. It is still open whether two sets of page tables shall
512be provided per SP. The memory region node as defined in the specification
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200513provides a memory security attribute hinting to map either to the secure or
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200514non-secure EL1&0 Stage-2 table if it exists.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200515
516Passing boot data to the SP
517---------------------------
518
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200519In `[1]`_ , the "Protocol for passing data" section defines a method for passing
520boot data to SPs (not currently implemented).
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200521
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200522Provided that the whole secure partition package image (see
523`Secure Partition packages`_) is mapped to the SP secure EL1&0 Stage-2
524translation regime, an SP can access its own manifest DTB blob and extract its
525partition manifest properties.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200526
527SP Boot order
528-------------
529
530SP manifests provide an optional boot order attribute meant to resolve
531dependencies such as an SP providing a service required to properly boot
532another SP.
533
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200534It is possible for an SP to call into another SP through a direct request
535provided the latter SP has already been booted.
536
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200537Boot phases
538-----------
539
540Primary core boot-up
541~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
542
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200543Upon boot-up, BL31 hands over to the SPMC (BL32) on the primary boot physical
544core. The SPMC performs its platform initializations and registers the SPMC
545secondary physical core entry point physical address by the use of the
546FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER interface (SMC invocation from the SPMC to the SPMD
547at secure physical FF-A instance). This interface is implementation-defined in
548context of FF-A v1.0.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200549
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200550The SPMC then creates secure partitions based on SP packages and manifests. Each
551secure partition is launched in sequence (`SP Boot order`_) on their "primary"
552execution context. If the primary boot physical core linear id is N, an MP SP is
553started using EC[N] on PE[N] (see `Platform topology`_). If the partition is a
554UP SP, it is started using its unique EC0 on PE[N].
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200555
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200556The SP primary EC (or the EC used when the partition is booted as described
557above):
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200558
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200559- Performs the overall SP boot time initialization, and in case of a MP SP,
560 prepares the SP environment for other execution contexts.
561- In the case of a MP SP, it invokes the FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER at secure
562 virtual FF-A instance (SMC invocation from SP to SPMC) to provide the IPA
563 entry point for other execution contexts.
564- Exits through ``FFA_MSG_WAIT`` to indicate successful initialization or
565 ``FFA_ERROR`` in case of failure.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200566
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200567Secondary cores boot-up
568~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200569
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200570Once the system is started and NWd brought up, a secondary physical core is
571woken up by the ``PSCI_CPU_ON`` service invocation. The TF-A SPD hook mechanism
572calls into the SPMD on the newly woken up physical core. Then the SPMC is
573entered at the secondary physical core entry point.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200574
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200575In the current implementation, the first SP is resumed on the coresponding EC
576(the virtual CPU which matches the physical core). The implication is that the
577first SP must be a MP SP.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200578
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200579In a linux based system, once secure and normal worlds are booted but prior to
580a NWd FF-A driver has been loaded:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200581
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200582- The first SP has initialized all its ECs in response to primary core boot up
583 (at system initialization) and secondary core boot up (as a result of linux
584 invoking PSCI_CPU_ON for all secondary cores).
585- Other SPs have their first execution context initialized as a result of secure
586 world initialization on the primary boot core. Other ECs for those SPs have to
587 be run first through ffa_run to complete their initialization (which results
588 in the EC completing with FFA_MSG_WAIT).
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200589
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200590Refer to `Power management`_ for further details.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200591
592Mandatory interfaces
593--------------------
594
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200595The following interfaces are exposed to SPs:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200596
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200597- ``FFA_VERSION``
598- ``FFA_FEATURES``
599- ``FFA_RX_RELEASE``
600- ``FFA_RXTX_MAP``
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200601- ``FFA_RXTX_UNMAP`` (not implemented)
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200602- ``FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET``
603- ``FFA_ID_GET``
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200604- ``FFA_MSG_WAIT``
605- ``FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ``
606- ``FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP``
607- ``FFA_MEM_DONATE``
608- ``FFA_MEM_LEND``
609- ``FFA_MEM_SHARE``
610- ``FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_REQ``
611- ``FFA_MEM_RETRIEVE_RESP``
612- ``FFA_MEM_RELINQUISH``
613- ``FFA_MEM_RECLAIM``
614- ``FFA_SECONDARY_EP_REGISTER``
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200615
616FFA_VERSION
617~~~~~~~~~~~
618
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200619``FFA_VERSION`` requires a *requested_version* parameter from the caller.
620The returned value depends on the caller:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200621
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200622- Hypervisor or OS kernel in NS-EL1/EL2: the SPMD returns the SPMC version
623 specified in the SPMC manifest.
624- SP: the SPMC returns its own implemented version.
625- SPMC at S-EL1/S-EL2: the SPMD returns its own implemented version.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200626
627FFA_FEATURES
628~~~~~~~~~~~~
629
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200630FF-A features supported by the SPMC may be discovered by secure partitions at
631boot (that is prior to NWd is booted) or run-time.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200632
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200633The SPMC calling FFA_FEATURES at secure physical FF-A instance always get
634FFA_SUCCESS from the SPMD.
635
636The request made by an Hypervisor or OS kernel is forwarded to the SPMC and
637the response relayed back to the NWd.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200638
639FFA_RXTX_MAP/FFA_RXTX_UNMAP
640~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
641
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200642When invoked from a secure partition FFA_RXTX_MAP maps the provided send and
643receive buffers described by their IPAs to the SP EL1&0 Stage-2 translation
644regime as secure buffers in the MMU descriptors.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200645
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200646When invoked from the Hypervisor or OS kernel, the buffers are mapped into the
647SPMC EL2 Stage-1 translation regime and marked as NS buffers in the MMU
648descriptors.
649
650Note:
651
652- FFA_RXTX_UNMAP is not implemented.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200653
654FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET
655~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
656
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200657Partition info get call can originate:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200658
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200659- from SP to SPMC
660- from Hypervisor or OS kernel to SPMC. The request is relayed by the SPMD.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200661
662FFA_ID_GET
663~~~~~~~~~~
664
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200665The FF-A id space is split into a non-secure space and secure space:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200666
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200667- FF-A ID with bit 15 clear relates to VMs.
668- FF-A ID with bit 15 set related to SPs.
669- FF-A IDs 0, 0xffff, 0x8000 are assigned respectively to the Hypervisor, SPMD
670 and SPMC.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200671
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200672The SPMD returns:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200673
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200674- The default zero value on invocation from the Hypervisor.
675- The ``spmc_id`` value specified in the SPMC manifest on invocation from
676 the SPMC (see `SPMC manifest`_)
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200677
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200678This convention helps the SPMC to determine the origin and destination worlds in
679an FF-A ABI invocation. In particular the SPMC shall filter unauthorized
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200680transactions in its world switch routine. It must not be permitted for a VM to
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200681use a secure FF-A ID as origin world by spoofing:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200682
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200683- A VM-to-SP direct request/response shall set the origin world to be non-secure
684 (FF-A ID bit 15 clear) and destination world to be secure (FF-A ID bit 15
685 set).
686- Similarly, an SP-to-SP direct request/response shall set the FF-A ID bit 15
687 for both origin and destination IDs.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200688
689An incoming direct message request arriving at SPMD from NWd is forwarded to
690SPMC without a specific check. The SPMC is resumed through eret and "knows" the
691message is coming from normal world in this specific code path. Thus the origin
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200692endpoint ID must be checked by SPMC for being a normal world ID.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200693
694An SP sending a direct message request must have bit 15 set in its origin
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200695endpoint ID and this can be checked by the SPMC when the SP invokes the ABI.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200696
697The SPMC shall reject the direct message if the claimed world in origin endpoint
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200698ID is not consistent:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200699
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200700- It is either forwarded by SPMD and thus origin endpoint ID must be a "normal
701 world ID",
702- or initiated by an SP and thus origin endpoint ID must be a "secure world ID".
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200703
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200704
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200705FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ/FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP
706~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200707
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200708This is a mandatory interface for secure partitions consisting in direct request
709and responses with the following rules:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200710
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200711- An SP can send a direct request to another SP.
712- An SP can receive a direct request from another SP.
713- An SP can send a direct response to another SP.
714- An SP cannot send a direct request to an Hypervisor or OS kernel.
715- An Hypervisor or OS kernel can send a direct request to an SP.
716- An SP can send a direct response to an Hypervisor or OS kernel.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200717
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200718SPMC-SPMD direct requests/responses
719-----------------------------------
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200720
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200721Implementation-defined FF-A IDs are allocated to the SPMC and SPMD.
722Using those IDs in source/destination fields of a direct request/response
723permits SPMD to SPMC communication and either way.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200724
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200725- SPMC to SPMD direct request/response uses SMC conduit.
726- SPMD to SPMC direct request/response uses ERET conduit.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200727
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200728PE MMU configuration
729--------------------
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200730
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200731With secure virtualization enabled, two IPA spaces are output from the secure
732EL1&0 Stage-1 translation (secure and non-secure). The EL1&0 Stage-2 translation
733hardware is fed by:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200734
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200735- A single secure IPA space when the SP EL1&0 Stage-1 MMU is disabled.
736- Two IPA spaces (secure and non-secure) when the SP EL1&0 Stage-1 MMU is
737 enabled.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200738
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200739``VTCR_EL2`` and ``VSTCR_EL2`` provide configuration bits for controlling the
740NS/S IPA translations.
741``VSTCR_EL2.SW`` = 0, ``VSTCR_EL2.SA`` = 0,``VTCR_EL2.NSW`` = 0, ``VTCR_EL2.NSA`` = 1:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200742
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200743- Stage-2 translations for the NS IPA space access the NS PA space.
744- Stage-2 translation table walks for the NS IPA space are to the secure PA space.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200745
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200746Secure and non-secure IPA regions use the same set of Stage-2 page tables within
747a SP.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200748
749Interrupt management
750--------------------
751
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200752GIC ownership
753~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200754
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200755The SPMC owns the GIC configuration. Secure and non-secure interrupts are
756trapped at S-EL2. The SPMC manages interrupt resources and allocates interrupt
757IDs based on SP manifests. The SPMC acknowledges physical interrupts and injects
758virtual interrupts by setting the use of vIRQ/vFIQ bits before resuming a SP.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200759
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200760Non-secure interrupt handling
761~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200762
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200763The following illustrate the scenarios of non secure physical interrupts trapped
764by the SPMC:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200765
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200766- The SP handles a managed exit operation:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200767
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200768.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/ffa-ns-interrupt-handling-managed-exit.png
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200769
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200770- The SP is pre-empted without managed exit:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200771
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200772.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/ffa-ns-interrupt-handling-sp-preemption.png
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200773
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200774Secure interrupt handling
775~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200776
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200777The current implementation does not support handling of secure interrupts
778trapped by the SPMC at S-EL2. This is work in progress planned for future
779releases.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200780
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200781Power management
782----------------
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200783
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200784In platforms with or without secure virtualization:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200785
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200786- The NWd owns the platform PM policy.
787- The Hypervisor or OS kernel is the component initiating PSCI service calls.
788- The EL3 PSCI library is in charge of the PM coordination and control
789 (eventually writing to platform registers).
790- While coordinating PM events, the PSCI library calls backs into the Secure
791 Payload Dispatcher for events the latter has statically registered to.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200792
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200793When using the SPMD as a Secure Payload Dispatcher:
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200794
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200795- A power management event is relayed through the SPD hook to the SPMC.
796- In the current implementation only cpu on (svc_on_finish) and cpu off
797 (svc_off) hooks are registered.
798- The behavior for the cpu on event is described in `Secondary cores boot-up`_.
799 The SPMC is entered through its secondary physical core entry point.
800- The cpu off event occurs when the NWd calls PSCI_CPU_OFF. The method by which
801 the PM event is conveyed to the SPMC is implementation-defined in context of
802 FF-A v1.0 (`SPMC-SPMD direct requests/responses`_). It consists in a SPMD-to-SPMC
803 direct request/response conveying the PM event details and SPMC response.
804 The SPMD performs a synchronous entry into the SPMC. The SPMC is entered and
805 updates its internal state to reflect the physical core is being turned off.
806 In the current implementation no SP is resumed as a consequence. This behavior
807 ensures a minimal support for CPU hotplug e.g. when initiated by the NWd linux
808 userspace.
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200809
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200810SMMUv3 support in Hafnium
811=========================
Madhukar Pappireddya9859062021-02-28 14:01:34 -0600812
813An SMMU is analogous to an MMU in a CPU. It performs address translations for
814Direct Memory Access (DMA) requests from system I/O devices.
815The responsibilities of an SMMU include:
816
817- Translation: Incoming DMA requests are translated from bus address space to
818 system physical address space using translation tables compliant to
819 Armv8/Armv7 VMSA descriptor format.
820- Protection: An I/O device can be prohibited from read, write access to a
821 memory region or allowed.
822- Isolation: Traffic from each individial device can be independently managed.
823 The devices are differentiated from each other using unique translation
824 tables.
825
826The following diagram illustrates a typical SMMU IP integrated in a SoC with
827several I/O devices along with Interconnect and Memory system.
828
829.. image:: ../resources/diagrams/MMU-600.png
830
831SMMU has several versions including SMMUv1, SMMUv2 and SMMUv3. Hafnium provides
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200832support for SMMUv3 driver in both normal and secure world. A brief introduction
Madhukar Pappireddya9859062021-02-28 14:01:34 -0600833of SMMUv3 functionality and the corresponding software support in Hafnium is
834provided here.
835
836SMMUv3 features
837---------------
838
839- SMMUv3 provides Stage1, Stage2 translation as well as nested (Stage1 + Stage2)
840 translation support. It can either bypass or abort incoming translations as
841 well.
842- Traffic (memory transactions) from each upstream I/O peripheral device,
843 referred to as Stream, can be independently managed using a combination of
844 several memory based configuration structures. This allows the SMMUv3 to
845 support a large number of streams with each stream assigned to a unique
846 translation context.
847- Support for Armv8.1 VMSA where the SMMU shares the translation tables with
848 a Processing Element. AArch32(LPAE) and AArch64 translation table format
849 are supported by SMMUv3.
850- SMMUv3 offers non-secure stream support with secure stream support being
851 optional. Logically, SMMUv3 behaves as if there is an indepdendent SMMU
852 instance for secure and non-secure stream support.
853- It also supports sub-streams to differentiate traffic from a virtualized
854 peripheral associated with a VM/SP.
855- Additionally, SMMUv3.2 provides support for PEs implementing Armv8.4-A
856 extensions. Consequently, SPM depends on Secure EL2 support in SMMUv3.2
857 for providing Secure Stage2 translation support to upstream peripheral
858 devices.
859
860SMMUv3 Programming Interfaces
861-----------------------------
862
863SMMUv3 has three software interfaces that are used by the Hafnium driver to
864configure the behaviour of SMMUv3 and manage the streams.
865
866- Memory based data strutures that provide unique translation context for
867 each stream.
868- Memory based circular buffers for command queue and event queue.
869- A large number of SMMU configuration registers that are memory mapped during
870 boot time by Hafnium driver. Except a few registers, all configuration
871 registers have independent secure and non-secure versions to configure the
872 behaviour of SMMUv3 for translation of secure and non-secure streams
873 respectively.
874
875Peripheral device manifest
876--------------------------
877
878Currently, SMMUv3 driver in Hafnium only supports dependent peripheral devices.
879These devices are dependent on PE endpoint to initiate and receive memory
880management transactions on their behalf. The acccess to the MMIO regions of
881any such device is assigned to the endpoint during boot. Moreover, SMMUv3 driver
882uses the same stage 2 translations for the device as those used by partition
883manager on behalf of the PE endpoint. This ensures that the peripheral device
884has the same visibility of the physical address space as the endpoint. The
885device node of the corresponding partition manifest (refer to `[1]`_ section 3.2
886) must specify these additional properties for each peripheral device in the
887system :
888
889- smmu-id: This field helps to identify the SMMU instance that this device is
890 upstream of.
891- stream-ids: List of stream IDs assigned to this device.
892
893.. code:: shell
894
895 smmuv3-testengine {
896 base-address = <0x00000000 0x2bfe0000>;
897 pages-count = <32>;
898 attributes = <0x3>;
899 smmu-id = <0>;
900 stream-ids = <0x0 0x1>;
901 interrupts = <0x2 0x3>, <0x4 0x5>;
902 exclusive-access;
903 };
904
905SMMUv3 driver limitations
906-------------------------
907
908The primary design goal for the Hafnium SMMU driver is to support secure
909streams.
910
911- Currently, the driver only supports Stage2 translations. No support for
912 Stage1 or nested translations.
913- Supports only AArch64 translation format.
914- No support for features such as PCI Express (PASIDs, ATS, PRI), MSI, RAS,
915 Fault handling, Performance Monitor Extensions, Event Handling, MPAM.
916- No support for independent peripheral devices.
917
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200918References
919==========
920
921.. _[1]:
922
Olivier Deprez9938c132021-04-21 11:22:23 +0200923[1] `Arm Firmware Framework for Armv8-A <https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0077/latest>`__
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200924
925.. _[2]:
926
Madhukar Pappireddy86350ae2020-07-29 09:37:25 -0500927[2] :ref:`Secure Partition Manager using MM interface<Secure Partition Manager (MM)>`
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200928
929.. _[3]:
930
931[3] `Trusted Boot Board Requirements
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200932Client <https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0006/d/>`__
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200933
934.. _[4]:
935
936[4] https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context.S#n45
937
938.. _[5]:
939
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200940[5] https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git/tree/spm/cactus/plat/arm/fvp/fdts/cactus.dts
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200941
942.. _[6]:
943
Olivier Deprez9938c132021-04-21 11:22:23 +0200944[6] https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/components/ffa-manifest-binding.html
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200945
946.. _[7]:
947
948[7] https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_spmc_manifest.dts
949
950.. _[8]:
951
Olivier Deprez5e0a73f2021-04-30 14:42:24 +0200952[8] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2020-February/000296.html
Olivier Deprezecb2fe52020-04-02 15:38:02 +0200953
954--------------
955
Olivier Deprez9938c132021-04-21 11:22:23 +0200956*Copyright (c) 2020-2021, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*