| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause |
| */ |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <drivers/auth/auth_mod.h> |
| #include <plat/common/platform.h> |
| #if USE_TBBR_DEFS |
| #include <tools_share/tbbr_oid.h> |
| #else |
| #include <platform_oid.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Store a new non-volatile counter value. This implementation |
| * only allows updating of the platform's Trusted NV counter when a |
| * certificate protected by the Trusted NV counter is signed with |
| * the ROT key. This avoids a compromised secondary certificate from |
| * updating the platform's Trusted NV counter, which could lead to the |
| * platform becoming unusable. The function is suitable for all TBBR |
| * compliant platforms. |
| * |
| * Return: 0 = success, Otherwise = error |
| */ |
| int plat_set_nv_ctr2(void *cookie, const auth_img_desc_t *img_desc, |
| unsigned int nv_ctr) |
| { |
| int trusted_nv_ctr; |
| |
| assert(cookie != NULL); |
| assert(img_desc != NULL); |
| |
| trusted_nv_ctr = strcmp(cookie, TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Only update the Trusted NV Counter if the certificate |
| * has been signed with the ROT key. Non Trusted NV counter |
| * updates are unconditional. |
| */ |
| if (!trusted_nv_ctr || img_desc->parent == NULL) |
| return plat_set_nv_ctr(cookie, nv_ctr); |
| |
| /* |
| * Trusted certificates not signed with the ROT key are not |
| * allowed to update the Trusted NV Counter. |
| */ |
| return 1; |
| } |