| SPMC threat model |
| ***************** |
| |
| ************************ |
| Introduction |
| ************************ |
| This document provides a threat model for the TF-A `Secure Partition Manager`_ |
| (SPM) implementation or more generally the S-EL2 reference firmware running on |
| systems implementing the FEAT_SEL2 (formerly Armv8.4 Secure EL2) architecture |
| extension. The SPM implementation is based on the `Arm Firmware Framework for |
| Armv8-A`_ specification. |
| |
| In brief, the broad FF-A specification and S-EL2 firmware implementation |
| provide: |
| |
| - Isolation of mutually mistrusting SW components, or endpoints in the FF-A |
| terminology. |
| - Distinct sandboxes in the secure world called secure partitions. This permits |
| isolation of services from multiple vendors. |
| - A standard protocol for communication and memory sharing between FF-A |
| endpoints. |
| - Mutual isolation of the normal world and the secure world (e.g. a Trusted OS |
| is prevented to map an arbitrary NS physical memory region such as the kernel |
| or the Hypervisor). |
| |
| ************************ |
| Target of Evaluation |
| ************************ |
| In this threat model, the target of evaluation is the S-EL2 firmware or the |
| ``Secure Partition Manager Core`` component (SPMC). |
| The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the `Generic TF-A threat model`_. |
| |
| The scope for this threat model is: |
| |
| - The TF-A implementation for the S-EL2 SPMC based on the Hafnium hypervisor |
| running in the secure world of TrustZone (at S-EL2 exception level). |
| The threat model is not related to the normal world Hypervisor or VMs. |
| The S-EL1 SPMC solution is not covered. |
| - The implementation complies with the FF-A v1.0 specification. |
| - Secure partitions are statically provisioned at boot time. |
| - Focus on the run-time part of the life-cycle (no specific emphasis on boot |
| time, factory firmware provisioning, firmware udpate etc.) |
| - Not covering advanced or invasive physical attacks such as decapsulation, |
| FIB etc. |
| - Assumes secure boot or in particular TF-A trusted boot (TBBR or dual CoT) is |
| enabled. An attacker cannot boot arbitrary images that are not approved by the |
| SiP or platform providers. |
| |
| Data Flow Diagram |
| ====================== |
| Figure 1 shows a high-level data flow diagram for the SPM split into an SPMD |
| component at EL3 and an SPMC component at S-EL2. The SPMD mostly acts as a |
| relayer/pass-through between the normal world and the secure world. It is |
| assumed to expose small attack surface. |
| |
| A description of each diagram element is given in Table 1. In the diagram, the |
| red broken lines indicate trust boundaries. |
| |
| Components outside of the broken lines are considered untrusted. |
| |
| .. uml:: ../resources/diagrams/plantuml/spm_dfd.puml |
| :caption: Figure 1: SPMC Data Flow Diagram |
| |
| .. table:: Table 1: SPMC Data Flow Diagram Description |
| |
| +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | Diagram Element | Description | |
| +=====================+========================================================+ |
| | ``DF1`` | SP to SPMC communication. FF-A function invocation or | |
| | | implementation-defined Hypervisor call. | |
| +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``DF2`` | SPMC to SPMD FF-A call. | |
| +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``DF3`` | SPMD to NS forwarding. | |
| +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``DF4`` | SP to SP FF-A direct message request/response. | |
| | | Note as a matter of simplifying the diagram | |
| | | the SP to SP communication happens through the SPMC | |
| | | (SP1 performs a direct message request to the | |
| | | SPMC targeting SP2 as destination. And similarly for | |
| | | the direct message response from SP2 to SP1). | |
| +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``DF5`` | HW control. | |
| +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``DF6`` | Bootloader image loading. | |
| +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``DF7`` | External memory access. | |
| +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| ********************* |
| Threat Analysis |
| ********************* |
| |
| This threat model follows a similar methodology to the `Generic TF-A threat model`_. |
| The following sections define: |
| |
| - Trust boundaries |
| - Assets |
| - Theat agents |
| - Threat types |
| |
| Trust boundaries |
| ============================ |
| |
| - Normal world is untrusted. |
| - Secure world and normal world are separate trust boundaries. |
| - EL3 monitor, SPMD and SPMC are trusted. |
| - Bootloaders (in particular BL1/BL2 if using TF-A) and run-time BL31 are |
| implicitely trusted by the usage of secure boot. |
| - EL3 monitor, SPMD, SPMC do not trust SPs. |
| |
| .. figure:: ../resources/diagrams/spm-threat-model-trust-boundaries.png |
| |
| Figure 2: Trust boundaries |
| |
| Assets |
| ============================ |
| |
| The following assets are identified: |
| |
| - SPMC state. |
| - SP state. |
| - Information exchange between endpoints (partition messages). |
| - SPMC secrets (e.g. pointer authentication key when enabled) |
| - SP secrets (e.g. application keys). |
| - Scheduling cycles. |
| - Shared memory. |
| |
| Threat Agents |
| ============================ |
| |
| The following threat agents are identified: |
| |
| - NS-Endpoint identifies a non-secure endpoint: normal world client at NS-EL2 |
| (Hypervisor) or NS-EL1 (VM or OS kernel). |
| - S-Endpoint identifies a secure endpoint typically a secure partition. |
| - Hardware attacks (non-invasive) requiring a physical access to the device, |
| such as bus probing or DRAM stress. |
| |
| Threat types |
| ============================ |
| |
| The following threat categories as exposed in the `Generic TF-A threat model`_ |
| are re-used: |
| |
| - Spoofing |
| - Tampering |
| - Repudiation |
| - Information disclosure |
| - Denial of service |
| - Elevation of privileges |
| |
| Similarly this threat model re-uses the same threat risk ratings. The risk |
| analysis is evaluated based on the environment being ``Server`` or ``Mobile``. |
| |
| Threat Assessment |
| ============================ |
| |
| The following threats are identified by applying STRIDE analysis on each diagram |
| element of the data flow diagram. |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 01 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **An endpoint impersonates the sender or receiver | |
| | | FF-A ID in a direct request/response invocation.** | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMD, SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | SP state | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Spoofing | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------++----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | Critical(5) | Critical(5) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------++----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | Critical(5) | Critical(5) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------++----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | Critical(25) | Critical(25) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this threat. | |
| | | The guidance below is left for a system integrator | |
| | | to implemented as necessary. | |
| | | The SPMC must enforce checks in the direct message | |
| | | request/response interfaces such an endpoint cannot| |
| | | spoof the origin and destination worlds (e.g. a NWd| |
| | | originated message directed to the SWd cannot use a| |
| | | SWd ID as the sender ID). | |
| | | Additionally a software component residing in the | |
| | | SPMC can be added for the purpose of direct | |
| | | request/response filtering. | |
| | | It can be configured with the list of known IDs | |
| | | and about which interaction can occur between one | |
| | | and another endpoint (e.g. which NWd endpoint ID | |
| | | sends a direct request to which SWd endpoint ID). | |
| | | This component checks the sender/receiver fields | |
| | | for a legitimate communication between endpoints. | |
| | | A similar component can exist in the OS kernel | |
| | | driver, or Hypervisor although it remains untrusted| |
| | | by the SPMD/SPMC. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 02 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **Tampering with memory shared between an endpoint | |
| | | and the SPMC.** | |
| | | A malicious endpoint may attempt tampering with its| |
| | | RX/TX buffer contents while the SPMC is processing | |
| | | it (TOCTOU). | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF1, DF3, DF4, DF7 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | Shared memory, Information exchange | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Tampering | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | High (4) | High (4) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | High (4) | High (4) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | High (16) | High (16) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | In context of FF-A v1.0 this is the case of sharing| |
| | | the RX/TX buffer pair and usage in the | |
| | | PARTITION_INFO_GET or mem sharing primitives. | |
| | | The SPMC must copy the contents of the TX buffer | |
| | | to an internal temporary buffer before processing | |
| | | its contents. The SPMC must implement hardened | |
| | | input validation on data transmitted through the TX| |
| | | buffer by an untrusted endpoint. | |
| | | The TF-A SPMC mitigates this threat by enforcing | |
| | | checks on data transmitted through RX/TX buffers. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 03 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **An endpoint may tamper with its own state or the | |
| | | state of another endpoint.** | |
| | | A malicious endpoint may attempt violating: | |
| | | - its own or another SP state by using an unusual | |
| | | combination (or out-of-order) FF-A function | |
| | | invocations. | |
| | | This can also be an endpoint emitting | |
| | | FF-A function invocations to another endpoint while| |
| | | the latter in not in a state to receive it (e.g. a | |
| | | SP sends a direct request to the normal world early| |
| | | while the normal world is not booted yet). | |
| | | - the SPMC state itself by employing unexpected | |
| | | transitions in FF-A memory sharing, direct requests| |
| | | and responses, or handling of interrupts. | |
| | | This can be led by random stimuli injection or | |
| | | fuzzing. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMD, SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | SP state, SPMC state | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Tampering | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | High (4) | High (4) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | Medium (3) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | High (12) | High (12) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | The SPMC may be vulnerable to invalid state | |
| | | transitions for itself or while handling an SP | |
| | | state. The FF-A v1.1 specification provides a | |
| | | guidance on those state transitions (run-time | |
| | | model). The TF-A SPMC will be hardened in future | |
| | | releases to follow this guidance. | |
| | | Additionally The TF-A SPMC mitigates the threat by | |
| | | runs of the Arm `FF-A ACS`_ compliance test suite. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 04 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | *An attacker may attempt injecting errors by the | |
| | | use of external DRAM stress techniques.** | |
| | | A malicious agent may attempt toggling an SP | |
| | | Stage-2 MMU descriptor bit within the page tables | |
| | | that the SPMC manages. This can happen in Rowhammer| |
| | | types of attack. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF7 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | SP or SPMC state | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | Hardware attack | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Tampering | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | High (4) | High (4) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | Low (2) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | Medium (8) | High (12) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | The TF-A SPMC does not provide mitigations to this | |
| | | type of attack. It can be addressed by the use of | |
| | | dedicated HW circuity or hardening at the chipset | |
| | | or platform level left to the integrator. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 05 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **Protection of the SPMC from a DMA capable device | |
| | | upstream to an SMMU.** | |
| | | A device may attempt to tamper with the internal | |
| | | SPMC code/data sections. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF5 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | SPMC or SP state | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Tampering, Elevation of privileges | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | High (4) | High (4) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | Medium (3) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | High (12) | High (12) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | A platform may prefer assigning boot time, | |
| | | statically alocated memory regions through the SMMU| |
| | | configuration and page tables. The FF-A v1.1 | |
| | | specification provisions this capability through | |
| | | static DMA isolation. | |
| | | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this threat. | |
| | | It will adopt the static DMA isolation approach in | |
| | | a future release. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 06 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **Replay fragments of past communication between | |
| | | endpoints.** | |
| | | A malicious endpoint may replay a message exchange | |
| | | that occured between two legitimate endpoint as | |
| | | a matter of triggering a malfunction or extracting | |
| | | secrets from the receiving endpoint. In particular | |
| | | the memory sharing operation with fragmented | |
| | | messages between an endpoint and the SPMC may be | |
| | | replayed by a malicious agent as a matter of | |
| | | getting access or gaining permissions to a memory | |
| | | region which does not belong to this agent. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF2, DF3 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | Information exchange | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Repdudiation | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | Medium (3) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | High (4) | High (4) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | High (12) | High (12) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this threat. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 07 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **A malicious endpoint may attempt to extract data | |
| | | or state information by the use of invalid or | |
| | | incorrect input arguments.** | |
| | | Lack of input parameter validation or side effects | |
| | | of maliciously forged input parameters might affect| |
| | | the SPMC. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMD, SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | SP secrets, SPMC secrets, SP state, SPMC state | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Information discolure | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | High (4) | High (4) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | Medium (3) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | High (12) | High (12) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | Secure Partitions must follow security standards | |
| | | and best practises as a way to mitigate the risk | |
| | | of common vulnerabilities to be exploited. | |
| | | The use of software (canaries) or hardware | |
| | | hardening techniques (XN, WXN, BTI, pointer | |
| | | authentication, MTE) helps detecting and stopping | |
| | | an exploitation early. | |
| | | The TF-A SPMC mitigates this threat by implementing| |
| | | stack protector, pointer authentication, BTI, XN, | |
| | | WXN, security hardening techniques. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 08 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **A malicious endpoint may forge a direct message | |
| | | request such that it reveals the internal state of | |
| | | another endpoint through the direct message | |
| | | response.** | |
| | | The secure partition or SPMC replies to a partition| |
| | | message by a direct message response with | |
| | | information which may reveal its internal state | |
| | | (.e.g. partition message response outside of | |
| | | allowed bounds). | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | SPMC or SP state | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Information discolure | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | Medium (3) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | Low (2) | Low (2) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | Medium (6) | Medium (6) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | For the specific case of direct requests targetting| |
| | | the SPMC, the latter is hardened to prevent | |
| | | its internal state or the state of an SP to be | |
| | | revealed through a direct message response. | |
| | | Further FF-A v1.1 guidance about run time models | |
| | | and partition states will be implemented in future | |
| | | TF-A SPMC releases. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 09 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **Probing the FF-A communication between | |
| | | endpoints.** | |
| | | SPMC and SPs are typically loaded to external | |
| | | memory (protected by a TrustZone memory | |
| | | controller). A malicious agent may use non invasive| |
| | | methods to probe the external memory bus and | |
| | | extract the traffic between an SP and the SPMC or | |
| | | among SPs when shared buffers are held in external | |
| | | memory. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF7 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | SP/SPMC state, SP/SPMC secrets | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | Hardware attack | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Information disclosure | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | Medium (3) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | Low (2) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | Medium (6) | Medium (9) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | It is expected the platform or chipset provides | |
| | | guarantees in protecting the DRAM contents. | |
| | | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this class of | |
| | | attack and this is left to the integrator. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 10 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **A malicious agent may attempt revealing the SPMC | |
| | | state or secrets by the use of software-based cache| |
| | | side-channel attack techniques.** | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF7 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | SP or SPMC state | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Information disclosure | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | Medium (3) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | Low (2) | Low (2) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | Medium (6) | Medium (6) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | From an integration perspective it is assumed | |
| | | platforms consuming the SPMC component at S-EL2 | |
| | | (hence implementing the Armv8.4 FEAT_SEL2 | |
| | | architecture extension) implement mitigations to | |
| | | Spectre, Meltdown or other cache timing | |
| | | side-channel type of attacks. | |
| | | The TF-A SPMC implements one mitigation (barrier | |
| | | preventing speculation past exeception returns). | |
| | | The SPMC may be hardened further with SW | |
| | | mitigations (e.g. speculation barriers) for the | |
| | | cases not covered in HW. Usage of hardened | |
| | | compilers and appropriate options, code inspection | |
| | | are recommended ways to mitigate Spectre types of | |
| | | attacks. For non-hardened cores, the usage of | |
| | | techniques such a kernel page table isolation can | |
| | | help mitigating Meltdown type of attacks. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ID | 11 | |
| +========================+====================================================+ |
| | ``Threat`` | **A malicious endpoint may attempt flooding the | |
| | | SPMC with requests targetting a service within an | |
| | | endpoint such that it denies another endpoint to | |
| | | access this service.** | |
| | | Similarly, the malicious endpoint may target a | |
| | | a service within an endpoint such that the latter | |
| | | is unable to request services from another | |
| | | endpoint. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Diagram Elements`` | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4 | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Affected TF-A | SPMC | |
| | Components`` | | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Assets`` | SPMC state | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Agent`` | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| | ``Threat Type`` | Denial of service | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Application`` | ``Server`` | ``Mobile`` | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Impact`` | Medium (3) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Likelihood`` | Medium (3) | Medium (3) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Total Risk Rating`` | Medium (9) | Medium (9) | | |
| +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+ |
| | ``Mitigations`` | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this threat. | |
| | | Bounding the time for operations to complete can | |
| | | be achieved by the usage of a trusted watchdog. | |
| | | Other quality of service monitoring can be achieved| |
| | | in the SPMC such as counting a number of operations| |
| | | in a limited timeframe. | |
| +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| -------------- |
| |
| *Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* |
| |
| .. _Arm Firmware Framework for Armv8-A: https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0077/latest |
| .. _Secure Partition Manager: ../components/secure-partition-manager.html |
| .. _Generic TF-A threat model: ./threat_model.html#threat-analysis |
| .. _FF-A ACS: https://github.com/ARM-software/ff-a-acs/releases |