blob: e12eae79fc162886c68a251487dd2e9c9b9fdfa3 [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <arch_helpers.h>
#include <arch_features.h>
#include <bl31/bl31.h>
#include <common/debug.h>
#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
#include <context.h>
#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
#include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub.h>
#include <lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.h>
#include <lib/spinlock.h>
#include <lib/utils.h>
#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h>
#include <plat/common/common_def.h>
#include <plat/common/platform.h>
#include <platform_def.h>
#include <services/rmmd_svc.h>
#include <smccc_helpers.h>
#include <lib/extensions/sve.h>
#include "rmmd_initial_context.h"
#include "rmmd_private.h"
/*******************************************************************************
* RMM boot failure flag
******************************************************************************/
static bool rmm_boot_failed;
/*******************************************************************************
* RMM context information.
******************************************************************************/
rmmd_rmm_context_t rmm_context[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
/*******************************************************************************
* RMM entry point information. Discovered on the primary core and reused
* on secondary cores.
******************************************************************************/
static entry_point_info_t *rmm_ep_info;
/*******************************************************************************
* Static function declaration.
******************************************************************************/
static int32_t rmm_init(void);
/*******************************************************************************
* This function takes an RMM context pointer and performs a synchronous entry
* into it.
******************************************************************************/
uint64_t rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(rmmd_rmm_context_t *rmm_ctx)
{
uint64_t rc;
assert(rmm_ctx != NULL);
cm_set_context(&(rmm_ctx->cpu_ctx), REALM);
/* Restore the realm context assigned above */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(REALM);
cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(REALM);
cm_set_next_eret_context(REALM);
/* Enter RMM */
rc = rmmd_rmm_enter(&rmm_ctx->c_rt_ctx);
/*
* Save realm context. EL1 and EL2 Non-secure
* contexts will be restored before exiting to
* Non-secure world, therefore there is no need
* to clear EL1 and EL2 context registers.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(REALM);
cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(REALM);
return rc;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function returns to the place where rmmd_rmm_sync_entry() was
* called originally.
******************************************************************************/
__dead2 void rmmd_rmm_sync_exit(uint64_t rc)
{
rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx = &rmm_context[plat_my_core_pos()];
/* Get context of the RMM in use by this CPU. */
assert(cm_get_context(REALM) == &(ctx->cpu_ctx));
/*
* The RMMD must have initiated the original request through a
* synchronous entry into RMM. Jump back to the original C runtime
* context with the value of rc in x0;
*/
rmmd_rmm_exit(ctx->c_rt_ctx, rc);
panic();
}
static void rmm_el2_context_init(el2_sysregs_t *regs)
{
regs->ctx_regs[CTX_SPSR_EL2 >> 3] = REALM_SPSR_EL2;
regs->ctx_regs[CTX_SCTLR_EL2 >> 3] = SCTLR_EL2_RES1;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Realm world.
******************************************************************************/
static void manage_extensions_realm(cpu_context_t *ctx)
{
#if ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS
/*
* Enable SVE and FPU in realm context when it is enabled for NS.
* Realm manager must ensure that the SVE and FPU register
* contexts are properly managed.
*/
sve_enable(ctx);
#else
/*
* Disable SVE and FPU in realm context when it is disabled for NS.
*/
sve_disable(ctx);
#endif /* ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS */
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Jump to the RMM for the first time.
******************************************************************************/
static int32_t rmm_init(void)
{
long rc;
rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx = &rmm_context[plat_my_core_pos()];
INFO("RMM init start.\n");
/* Enable architecture extensions */
manage_extensions_realm(&ctx->cpu_ctx);
/* Initialize RMM EL2 context. */
rmm_el2_context_init(&ctx->cpu_ctx.el2_sysregs_ctx);
rc = rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(ctx);
if (rc != E_RMM_BOOT_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("RMM init failed: %ld\n", rc);
/* Mark the boot as failed for all the CPUs */
rmm_boot_failed = true;
return 0;
}
INFO("RMM init end.\n");
return 1;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Load and read RMM manifest, setup RMM.
******************************************************************************/
int rmmd_setup(void)
{
size_t shared_buf_size __unused;
uintptr_t shared_buf_base;
uint32_t ep_attr;
unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
rmmd_rmm_context_t *rmm_ctx = &rmm_context[linear_id];
struct rmm_manifest *manifest;
int rc;
/* Make sure RME is supported. */
assert(get_armv9_2_feat_rme_support() != 0U);
rmm_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(REALM);
if (rmm_ep_info == NULL) {
WARN("No RMM image provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting "
"device without RMM initialization. SMCs destined for "
"RMM will return SMC_UNK\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
/* Under no circumstances will this parameter be 0 */
assert(rmm_ep_info->pc == RMM_BASE);
/* Initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */
ep_attr = EP_REALM;
if ((read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) != 0U) {
ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG;
}
SET_PARAM_HEAD(rmm_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr);
rmm_ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL2,
MODE_SP_ELX,
DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
shared_buf_size =
plat_rmmd_get_el3_rmm_shared_mem(&shared_buf_base);
assert((shared_buf_size == SZ_4K) &&
((void *)shared_buf_base != NULL));
/* Load the boot manifest at the beginning of the shared area */
manifest = (struct rmm_manifest *)shared_buf_base;
rc = plat_rmmd_load_manifest(manifest);
if (rc != 0) {
ERROR("Error loading RMM Boot Manifest (%i)\n", rc);
return rc;
}
flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)shared_buf_base, shared_buf_size);
/*
* Prepare coldboot arguments for RMM:
* arg0: This CPUID (primary processor).
* arg1: Version for this Boot Interface.
* arg2: PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT.
* arg3: Base address for the EL3 <-> RMM shared area. The boot
* manifest will be stored at the beginning of this area.
*/
rmm_ep_info->args.arg0 = linear_id;
rmm_ep_info->args.arg1 = RMM_EL3_INTERFACE_VERSION;
rmm_ep_info->args.arg2 = PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT;
rmm_ep_info->args.arg3 = shared_buf_base;
/* Initialise RMM context with this entry point information */
cm_setup_context(&rmm_ctx->cpu_ctx, rmm_ep_info);
INFO("RMM setup done.\n");
/* Register init function for deferred init. */
bl31_register_rmm_init(&rmm_init);
return 0;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Forward SMC to the other security state
******************************************************************************/
static uint64_t rmmd_smc_forward(uint32_t src_sec_state,
uint32_t dst_sec_state, uint64_t x0,
uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3,
uint64_t x4, void *handle)
{
cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(dst_sec_state);
/* Save incoming security state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(src_sec_state);
cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(src_sec_state);
/* Restore outgoing security state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(dst_sec_state);
cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(dst_sec_state);
cm_set_next_eret_context(dst_sec_state);
/*
* As per SMCCCv1.2, we need to preserve x4 to x7 unless
* being used as return args. Hence we differentiate the
* onward and backward path. Support upto 8 args in the
* onward path and 4 args in return path.
* Register x4 will be preserved by RMM in case it is not
* used in return path.
*/
if (src_sec_state == NON_SECURE) {
SMC_RET8(ctx, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4,
SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5),
SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6),
SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7));
}
SMC_RET5(ctx, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4);
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function handles all SMCs in the range reserved for RMI. Each call is
* either forwarded to the other security state or handled by the RMM dispatcher
******************************************************************************/
uint64_t rmmd_rmi_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2,
uint64_t x3, uint64_t x4, void *cookie,
void *handle, uint64_t flags)
{
uint32_t src_sec_state;
/* If RMM failed to boot, treat any RMI SMC as unknown */
if (rmm_boot_failed) {
WARN("RMMD: Failed to boot up RMM. Ignoring RMI call\n");
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
src_sec_state = caller_sec_state(flags);
/* RMI must not be invoked by the Secure world */
if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE) {
WARN("RMMD: RMI invoked by secure world.\n");
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
/*
* Forward an RMI call from the Normal world to the Realm world as it
* is.
*/
if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_NON_SECURE) {
VERBOSE("RMMD: RMI call from non-secure world.\n");
return rmmd_smc_forward(NON_SECURE, REALM, smc_fid,
x1, x2, x3, x4, handle);
}
if (src_sec_state != SMC_FROM_REALM) {
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
switch (smc_fid) {
case RMM_RMI_REQ_COMPLETE: {
uint64_t x5 = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5);
return rmmd_smc_forward(REALM, NON_SECURE, x1,
x2, x3, x4, x5, handle);
}
default:
WARN("RMMD: Unsupported RMM call 0x%08x\n", smc_fid);
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This cpu has been turned on. Enter RMM to initialise R-EL2. Entry into RMM
* is done after initialising minimal architectural state that guarantees safe
* execution.
******************************************************************************/
static void *rmmd_cpu_on_finish_handler(const void *arg)
{
long rc;
uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx = &rmm_context[linear_id];
if (rmm_boot_failed) {
/* RMM Boot failed on a previous CPU. Abort. */
ERROR("RMM Failed to initialize. Ignoring for CPU%d\n",
linear_id);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Prepare warmboot arguments for RMM:
* arg0: This CPUID.
* arg1 to arg3: Not used.
*/
rmm_ep_info->args.arg0 = linear_id;
rmm_ep_info->args.arg1 = 0ULL;
rmm_ep_info->args.arg2 = 0ULL;
rmm_ep_info->args.arg3 = 0ULL;
/* Initialise RMM context with this entry point information */
cm_setup_context(&ctx->cpu_ctx, rmm_ep_info);
/* Enable architecture extensions */
manage_extensions_realm(&ctx->cpu_ctx);
/* Initialize RMM EL2 context. */
rmm_el2_context_init(&ctx->cpu_ctx.el2_sysregs_ctx);
rc = rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(ctx);
if (rc != E_RMM_BOOT_SUCCESS) {
ERROR("RMM init failed on CPU%d: %ld\n", linear_id, rc);
/* Mark the boot as failed for any other booting CPU */
rmm_boot_failed = true;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Subscribe to PSCI CPU on to initialize RMM on secondary */
SUBSCRIBE_TO_EVENT(psci_cpu_on_finish, rmmd_cpu_on_finish_handler);
/* Convert GPT lib error to RMMD GTS error */
static int gpt_to_gts_error(int error, uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t address)
{
int ret;
if (error == 0) {
return E_RMM_OK;
}
if (error == -EINVAL) {
ret = E_RMM_BAD_ADDR;
} else {
/* This is the only other error code we expect */
assert(error == -EPERM);
ret = E_RMM_BAD_PAS;
}
ERROR("RMMD: PAS Transition failed. GPT ret = %d, PA: 0x%"PRIx64 ", FID = 0x%x\n",
error, address, smc_fid);
return ret;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function handles RMM-EL3 interface SMCs
******************************************************************************/
uint64_t rmmd_rmm_el3_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2,
uint64_t x3, uint64_t x4, void *cookie,
void *handle, uint64_t flags)
{
uint32_t src_sec_state;
int ret;
/* If RMM failed to boot, treat any RMM-EL3 interface SMC as unknown */
if (rmm_boot_failed) {
WARN("RMMD: Failed to boot up RMM. Ignoring RMM-EL3 call\n");
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
src_sec_state = caller_sec_state(flags);
if (src_sec_state != SMC_FROM_REALM) {
WARN("RMMD: RMM-EL3 call originated from secure or normal world\n");
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
switch (smc_fid) {
case RMM_GTSI_DELEGATE:
ret = gpt_delegate_pas(x1, PAGE_SIZE_4KB, SMC_FROM_REALM);
SMC_RET1(handle, gpt_to_gts_error(ret, smc_fid, x1));
case RMM_GTSI_UNDELEGATE:
ret = gpt_undelegate_pas(x1, PAGE_SIZE_4KB, SMC_FROM_REALM);
SMC_RET1(handle, gpt_to_gts_error(ret, smc_fid, x1));
case RMM_ATTEST_GET_PLAT_TOKEN:
ret = rmmd_attest_get_platform_token(x1, &x2, x3);
SMC_RET2(handle, ret, x2);
case RMM_ATTEST_GET_REALM_KEY:
ret = rmmd_attest_get_signing_key(x1, &x2, x3);
SMC_RET2(handle, ret, x2);
case RMM_BOOT_COMPLETE:
VERBOSE("RMMD: running rmmd_rmm_sync_exit\n");
rmmd_rmm_sync_exit(x1);
default:
WARN("RMMD: Unsupported RMM-EL3 call 0x%08x\n", smc_fid);
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
}