blob: 9b3f62226591afb397d16427433d49acdd88d5e2 [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <arch.h>
#include <arch_helpers.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <common_def.h>
#include <context.h>
#include <context_mgmt.h>
#include <debug.h>
#include <platform_def.h>
#include <platform.h>
#include <secure_partition.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <types.h>
#include <xlat_tables_v2.h>
#include "spm_private.h"
#include "spm_shim_private.h"
/* Place translation tables by default along with the ones used by BL31. */
#ifndef PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME
#define PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME "xlat_table"
#endif
/* Allocate and initialise the translation context for the secure partition. */
REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT2(secure_partition,
PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MMAP_REGIONS,
PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MAX_XLAT_TABLES,
PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE,
EL1_EL0_REGIME, PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME);
/* Export a handle on the secure partition translation context */
xlat_ctx_t *secure_partition_xlat_ctx_handle = &secure_partition_xlat_ctx;
/* Setup context of the Secure Partition */
void secure_partition_setup(void)
{
VERBOSE("S-EL1/S-EL0 context setup start...\n");
cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(SECURE);
/* Make sure that we got a Secure context. */
assert(ctx != NULL);
/* Assert we are in Secure state. */
assert((read_scr_el3() & SCR_NS_BIT) == 0);
/* Disable MMU at EL1. */
disable_mmu_icache_el1();
/* Invalidate TLBs at EL1. */
tlbivmalle1();
dsbish();
/*
* General-Purpose registers
* -------------------------
*/
/*
* X0: Virtual address of a buffer shared between EL3 and Secure EL0.
* The buffer will be mapped in the Secure EL1 translation regime
* with Normal IS WBWA attributes and RO data and Execute Never
* instruction access permissions.
*
* X1: Size of the buffer in bytes
*
* X2: cookie value (Implementation Defined)
*
* X3: cookie value (Implementation Defined)
*
* X4 to X30 = 0 (already done by cm_init_my_context())
*/
write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X0, PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE);
write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X1, PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE);
write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X2, PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_0);
write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X3, PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_1);
/*
* SP_EL0: A non-zero value will indicate to the SP that the SPM has
* initialized the stack pointer for the current CPU through
* implementation defined means. The value will be 0 otherwise.
*/
write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_SP_EL0,
PLAT_SP_IMAGE_STACK_BASE + PLAT_SP_IMAGE_STACK_PCPU_SIZE);
/*
* Setup translation tables
* ------------------------
*/
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/* Get max granularity supported by the platform. */
u_register_t id_aa64mmfr0_el1 = read_id_aa64mmfr0_el1();
int tgran64_supported =
((id_aa64mmfr0_el1 >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_SHIFT) &
ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_MASK) ==
ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_SUPPORTED;
int tgran16_supported =
((id_aa64mmfr0_el1 >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_SHIFT) &
ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_MASK) ==
ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_SUPPORTED;
int tgran4_supported =
((id_aa64mmfr0_el1 >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_SHIFT) &
ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_MASK) ==
ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_SUPPORTED;
uintptr_t max_granule_size;
if (tgran64_supported) {
max_granule_size = 64 * 1024;
} else if (tgran16_supported) {
max_granule_size = 16 * 1024;
} else {
assert(tgran4_supported);
max_granule_size = 4 * 1024;
}
VERBOSE("Max translation granule supported: %lu KiB\n",
max_granule_size / 1024);
uintptr_t max_granule_size_mask = max_granule_size - 1;
/* Base must be aligned to the max granularity */
assert((ARM_SP_IMAGE_NS_BUF_BASE & max_granule_size_mask) == 0);
/* Size must be a multiple of the max granularity */
assert((ARM_SP_IMAGE_NS_BUF_SIZE & max_granule_size_mask) == 0);
#endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */
/* This region contains the exception vectors used at S-EL1. */
const mmap_region_t sel1_exception_vectors =
MAP_REGION_FLAT(SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START,
SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_SIZE,
MT_CODE | MT_SECURE | MT_PRIVILEGED);
mmap_add_region_ctx(&secure_partition_xlat_ctx,
&sel1_exception_vectors);
mmap_add_ctx(&secure_partition_xlat_ctx,
plat_get_secure_partition_mmap(NULL));
init_xlat_tables_ctx(&secure_partition_xlat_ctx);
/*
* MMU-related registers
* ---------------------
*/
/* Set attributes in the right indices of the MAIR */
u_register_t mair_el1 =
MAIR_ATTR_SET(ATTR_DEVICE, ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) |
MAIR_ATTR_SET(ATTR_IWBWA_OWBWA_NTR, ATTR_IWBWA_OWBWA_NTR_INDEX) |
MAIR_ATTR_SET(ATTR_NON_CACHEABLE, ATTR_NON_CACHEABLE_INDEX);
write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_MAIR_EL1, mair_el1);
/* Setup TCR_EL1. */
u_register_t tcr_ps_bits = tcr_physical_addr_size_bits(PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE);
u_register_t tcr_el1 =
/* Size of region addressed by TTBR0_EL1 = 2^(64-T0SZ) bytes. */
(64 - __builtin_ctzl(PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)) |
/* Inner and outer WBWA, shareable. */
TCR_SH_INNER_SHAREABLE | TCR_RGN_OUTER_WBA | TCR_RGN_INNER_WBA |
/* Set the granularity to 4KB. */
TCR_TG0_4K |
/* Limit Intermediate Physical Address Size. */
tcr_ps_bits << TCR_EL1_IPS_SHIFT |
/* Disable translations using TBBR1_EL1. */
TCR_EPD1_BIT
/* The remaining fields related to TBBR1_EL1 are left as zero. */
;
tcr_el1 &= ~(
/* Enable translations using TBBR0_EL1 */
TCR_EPD0_BIT
);
write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TCR_EL1, tcr_el1);
/* Setup SCTLR_EL1 */
u_register_t sctlr_el1 = read_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1);
sctlr_el1 |=
/*SCTLR_EL1_RES1 |*/
/* Don't trap DC CVAU, DC CIVAC, DC CVAC, DC CVAP, or IC IVAU */
SCTLR_UCI_BIT |
/* RW regions at xlat regime EL1&0 are forced to be XN. */
SCTLR_WXN_BIT |
/* Don't trap to EL1 execution of WFI or WFE at EL0. */
SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT |
/* Don't trap to EL1 accesses to CTR_EL0 from EL0. */
SCTLR_UCT_BIT |
/* Don't trap to EL1 execution of DZ ZVA at EL0. */
SCTLR_DZE_BIT |
/* Enable SP Alignment check for EL0 */
SCTLR_SA0_BIT |
/* Allow cacheable data and instr. accesses to normal memory. */
SCTLR_C_BIT | SCTLR_I_BIT |
/* Alignment fault checking enabled when at EL1 and EL0. */
SCTLR_A_BIT |
/* Enable MMU. */
SCTLR_M_BIT
;
sctlr_el1 &= ~(
/* Explicit data accesses at EL0 are little-endian. */
SCTLR_E0E_BIT |
/* Accesses to DAIF from EL0 are trapped to EL1. */
SCTLR_UMA_BIT
);
write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr_el1);
/* Point TTBR0_EL1 at the tables of the context created for the SP. */
write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TTBR0_EL1,
(u_register_t)secure_partition_base_xlat_table);
/*
* Setup other system registers
* ----------------------------
*/
/* Shim Exception Vector Base Address */
write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_VBAR_EL1,
SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_PTR);
/*
* FPEN: Allow the Secure Partition to access FP/SIMD registers.
* Note that SPM will not do any saving/restoring of these registers on
* behalf of the SP. This falls under the SP's responsibility.
* TTA: Enable access to trace registers.
* ZEN (v8.2): Trap SVE instructions and access to SVE registers.
*/
write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_CPACR_EL1,
CPACR_EL1_FPEN(CPACR_EL1_FP_TRAP_NONE));
/*
* Prepare information in buffer shared between EL3 and S-EL0
* ----------------------------------------------------------
*/
void *shared_buf_ptr = (void *) PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE;
/* Copy the boot information into the shared buffer with the SP. */
assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr + sizeof(secure_partition_boot_info_t)
<= (PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE + PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE));
assert(PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE <= (UINTPTR_MAX - PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE + 1));
const secure_partition_boot_info_t *sp_boot_info =
plat_get_secure_partition_boot_info(NULL);
assert(sp_boot_info != NULL);
memcpy((void *) shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_boot_info,
sizeof(secure_partition_boot_info_t));
/* Pointer to the MP information from the platform port. */
secure_partition_mp_info_t *sp_mp_info =
((secure_partition_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info;
assert(sp_mp_info != NULL);
/*
* Point the shared buffer MP information pointer to where the info will
* be populated, just after the boot info.
*/
((secure_partition_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info =
(secure_partition_mp_info_t *) ((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr
+ sizeof(secure_partition_boot_info_t));
/*
* Update the shared buffer pointer to where the MP information for the
* payload will be populated
*/
shared_buf_ptr = ((secure_partition_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info;
/*
* Copy the cpu information into the shared buffer area after the boot
* information.
*/
assert(sp_boot_info->num_cpus <= PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT);
assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr
<= (PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE + PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE -
(sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info))));
memcpy(shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_mp_info,
sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info));
/*
* Calculate the linear indices of cores in boot information for the
* secure partition and flag the primary CPU
*/
sp_mp_info = (secure_partition_mp_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr;
for (unsigned int index = 0; index < sp_boot_info->num_cpus; index++) {
u_register_t mpidr = sp_mp_info[index].mpidr;
sp_mp_info[index].linear_id = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr);
if (plat_my_core_pos() == sp_mp_info[index].linear_id)
sp_mp_info[index].flags |= MP_INFO_FLAG_PRIMARY_CPU;
}
VERBOSE("S-EL1/S-EL0 context setup end.\n");
}