docs/design/trusted-board-boot.rst - filogic/atf - Gitiles

 Trusted Board Boot
 ==================

 The Trusted Board Boot (TBB) feature prevents malicious firmware from running on
 the platform by authenticating all firmware images up to and including the
 normal world bootloader. It does this by establishing a Chain of Trust using
 Public-Key-Cryptography Standards (PKCS).

 This document describes the design of Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) TBB, which is an
 implementation of the `Trusted Board Boot Requirements (TBBR)`_ specification,
 Arm DEN0006D. It should be used in conjunction with the
 :ref:`Firmware Update (FWU)` design document, which implements a specific aspect
 of the TBBR.

 Chain of Trust
 --------------

 A Chain of Trust (CoT) starts with a set of implicitly trusted components. On
 the Arm development platforms, these components are:

 -  A SHA-256 hash of the Root of Trust Public Key (ROTPK). It is stored in the
    trusted root-key storage registers. Alternatively, a development ROTPK might
    be used and its hash embedded into the BL1 and BL2 images (only for
    development purposes).

 -  The BL1 image, on the assumption that it resides in ROM so cannot be
    tampered with.

 The remaining components in the CoT are either certificates or boot loader
 images. The certificates follow the `X.509 v3`_ standard. This standard
 enables adding custom extensions to the certificates, which are used to store
 essential information to establish the CoT.

 In the TBB CoT all certificates are self-signed. There is no need for a
 Certificate Authority (CA) because the CoT is not established by verifying the
 validity of a certificate's issuer but by the content of the certificate
 extensions. To sign the certificates, different signature schemes are available,
 please refer to the :ref:`Build Options` for more details.

 The certificates are categorised as "Key" and "Content" certificates. Key
 certificates are used to verify public keys which have been used to sign content
 certificates. Content certificates are used to store the hash of a boot loader
 image. An image can be authenticated by calculating its hash and matching it
 with the hash extracted from the content certificate. Various hash algorithms
 are supported to calculate all hashes, please refer to the :ref:`Build Options`
 for more details.. The public keys and hashes are included as non-standard
 extension fields in the `X.509 v3`_ certificates.

 The keys used to establish the CoT are:

 -  **Root of trust key**

    The private part of this key is used to sign the BL2 content certificate and
    the trusted key certificate. The public part is the ROTPK.

 -  **Trusted world key**

    The private part is used to sign the key certificates corresponding to the
    secure world images (SCP_BL2, BL31 and BL32). The public part is stored in
    one of the extension fields in the trusted world certificate.

 -  **Non-trusted world key**

    The private part is used to sign the key certificate corresponding to the
    non secure world image (BL33). The public part is stored in one of the
    extension fields in the trusted world certificate.

 -  **BL3X keys**

    For each of SCP_BL2, BL31, BL32 and BL33, the private part is used to
    sign the content certificate for the BL3X image. The public part is stored
    in one of the extension fields in the corresponding key certificate.

 The following images are included in the CoT:

 -  BL1
 -  BL2
 -  SCP_BL2 (optional)
 -  BL31
 -  BL33
 -  BL32 (optional)

 The following certificates are used to authenticate the images.

 -  **BL2 content certificate**

    It is self-signed with the private part of the ROT key. It contains a hash
    of the BL2 image.

 -  **Trusted key certificate**

    It is self-signed with the private part of the ROT key. It contains the
    public part of the trusted world key and the public part of the non-trusted
    world key.

 -  **SCP_BL2 key certificate**

    It is self-signed with the trusted world key. It contains the public part of
    the SCP_BL2 key.

 -  **SCP_BL2 content certificate**

    It is self-signed with the SCP_BL2 key. It contains a hash of the SCP_BL2
    image.

 -  **BL31 key certificate**

    It is self-signed with the trusted world key. It contains the public part of
    the BL31 key.

 -  **BL31 content certificate**

    It is self-signed with the BL31 key. It contains a hash of the BL31 image.

 -  **BL32 key certificate**

    It is self-signed with the trusted world key. It contains the public part of
    the BL32 key.

 -  **BL32 content certificate**

    It is self-signed with the BL32 key. It contains a hash of the BL32 image.

 -  **BL33 key certificate**

    It is self-signed with the non-trusted world key. It contains the public
    part of the BL33 key.

 -  **BL33 content certificate**

    It is self-signed with the BL33 key. It contains a hash of the BL33 image.

 The SCP_BL2 and BL32 certificates are optional, but they must be present if the
 corresponding SCP_BL2 or BL32 images are present.

 Trusted Board Boot Sequence
 ---------------------------

 The CoT is verified through the following sequence of steps. The system panics
 if any of the steps fail.

 -  BL1 loads and verifies the BL2 content certificate. The issuer public key is
    read from the verified certificate. A hash of that key is calculated and
    compared with the hash of the ROTPK read from the trusted root-key storage
    registers. If they match, the BL2 hash is read from the certificate.

    .. note::
       The matching operation is platform specific and is currently
       unimplemented on the Arm development platforms.

 -  BL1 loads the BL2 image. Its hash is calculated and compared with the hash
    read from the certificate. Control is transferred to the BL2 image if all
    the comparisons succeed.

 -  BL2 loads and verifies the trusted key certificate. The issuer public key is
    read from the verified certificate. A hash of that key is calculated and
    compared with the hash of the ROTPK read from the trusted root-key storage
    registers. If the comparison succeeds, BL2 reads and saves the trusted and
    non-trusted world public keys from the verified certificate.

 The next two steps are executed for each of the SCP_BL2, BL31 & BL32 images.
 The steps for the optional SCP_BL2 and BL32 images are skipped if these images
 are not present.

 -  BL2 loads and verifies the BL3x key certificate. The certificate signature
    is verified using the trusted world public key. If the signature
    verification succeeds, BL2 reads and saves the BL3x public key from the
    certificate.

 -  BL2 loads and verifies the BL3x content certificate. The signature is
    verified using the BL3x public key. If the signature verification succeeds,
    BL2 reads and saves the BL3x image hash from the certificate.

 The next two steps are executed only for the BL33 image.

 -  BL2 loads and verifies the BL33 key certificate. If the signature
    verification succeeds, BL2 reads and saves the BL33 public key from the
    certificate.

 -  BL2 loads and verifies the BL33 content certificate. If the signature
    verification succeeds, BL2 reads and saves the BL33 image hash from the
    certificate.

 The next step is executed for all the boot loader images.

 -  BL2 calculates the hash of each image. It compares it with the hash obtained
    from the corresponding content certificate. The image authentication succeeds
    if the hashes match.

 The Trusted Board Boot implementation spans both generic and platform-specific
 BL1 and BL2 code, and in tool code on the host build machine. The feature is
 enabled through use of specific build flags as described in
 :ref:`Build Options`.

 On the host machine, a tool generates the certificates, which are included in
 the FIP along with the boot loader images. These certificates are loaded in
 Trusted SRAM using the IO storage framework. They are then verified by an
 Authentication module included in TF-A.

 The mechanism used for generating the FIP and the Authentication module are
 described in the following sections.

 Authentication Framework
 ------------------------

 The authentication framework included in TF-A provides support to implement
 the desired trusted boot sequence. Arm platforms use this framework to
 implement the boot requirements specified in the
 `Trusted Board Boot Requirements (TBBR)`_ document.

 More information about the authentication framework can be found in the
 :ref:`Authentication Framework & Chain of Trust` document.

 Certificate Generation Tool
 ---------------------------

 The ``cert_create`` tool is built and runs on the host machine as part of the
 TF-A build process when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It takes the boot loader images
 and keys as inputs (keys must be in PEM format) and generates the
 certificates (in DER format) required to establish the CoT. New keys can be
 generated by the tool in case they are not provided. The certificates are then
 passed as inputs to the ``fiptool`` utility for creating the FIP.

 The certificates are also stored individually in the output build directory.

 The tool resides in the ``tools/cert_create`` directory. It uses the OpenSSL SSL
 library version to generate the X.509 certificates. The specific version of the
 library that is required is given in the :ref:`Prerequisites` document.

 Instructions for building and using the tool can be found at
 :ref:`tools_build_cert_create`.

 Authenticated Encryption Framework
 ----------------------------------

 The authenticated encryption framework included in TF-A provides support to
 implement the optional firmware encryption feature. This feature can be
 optionally enabled on platforms to implement the optional requirement:
 R060_TBBR_FUNCTION as specified in the `Trusted Board Boot Requirements (TBBR)`_
 document.

 Note that due to security considerations and complexity of this feature, it is
 marked as experimental.

 Firmware Encryption Tool
 ------------------------

 The ``encrypt_fw`` tool is built and runs on the host machine as part of the
 TF-A build process when ``DECRYPTION_SUPPORT != none``. It takes the plain
 firmware image as input and generates the encrypted firmware image which can
 then be passed as input to the ``fiptool`` utility for creating the FIP.

 The encrypted firmwares are also stored individually in the output build
 directory.

 The tool resides in the ``tools/encrypt_fw`` directory. It uses OpenSSL SSL
 library version 1.0.1 or later to do authenticated encryption operation.
 Instructions for building and using the tool can be found in the
 :ref:`tools_build_enctool`.

 --------------

 *Copyright (c) 2015-2020, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*

 .. _X.509 v3: https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt
 .. _Trusted Board Boot Requirements (TBBR): https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0006/latest/trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-tbbr-client-armv8-a
	Trusted Board Boot
	==================

	The Trusted Board Boot (TBB) feature prevents malicious firmware from running on
	the platform by authenticating all firmware images up to and including the
	normal world bootloader. It does this by establishing a Chain of Trust using
	Public-Key-Cryptography Standards (PKCS).

	This document describes the design of Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) TBB, which is an
	implementation of the `Trusted Board Boot Requirements (TBBR)`_ specification,
	Arm DEN0006D. It should be used in conjunction with the
	:ref:`Firmware Update (FWU)` design document, which implements a specific aspect
	of the TBBR.

	Chain of Trust
	--------------

	A Chain of Trust (CoT) starts with a set of implicitly trusted components. On
	the Arm development platforms, these components are:

	- A SHA-256 hash of the Root of Trust Public Key (ROTPK). It is stored in the
	trusted root-key storage registers. Alternatively, a development ROTPK might
	be used and its hash embedded into the BL1 and BL2 images (only for
	development purposes).

	- The BL1 image, on the assumption that it resides in ROM so cannot be
	tampered with.

	The remaining components in the CoT are either certificates or boot loader
	images. The certificates follow the `X.509 v3`_ standard. This standard
	enables adding custom extensions to the certificates, which are used to store
	essential information to establish the CoT.

	In the TBB CoT all certificates are self-signed. There is no need for a
	Certificate Authority (CA) because the CoT is not established by verifying the
	validity of a certificate's issuer but by the content of the certificate
	extensions. To sign the certificates, different signature schemes are available,
	please refer to the :ref:`Build Options` for more details.

	The certificates are categorised as "Key" and "Content" certificates. Key
	certificates are used to verify public keys which have been used to sign content
	certificates. Content certificates are used to store the hash of a boot loader
	image. An image can be authenticated by calculating its hash and matching it
	with the hash extracted from the content certificate. Various hash algorithms
	are supported to calculate all hashes, please refer to the :ref:`Build Options`
	for more details.. The public keys and hashes are included as non-standard
	extension fields in the `X.509 v3`_ certificates.

	The keys used to establish the CoT are:

	- Root of trust key

	The private part of this key is used to sign the BL2 content certificate and
	the trusted key certificate. The public part is the ROTPK.

	- Trusted world key

	The private part is used to sign the key certificates corresponding to the
	secure world images (SCP_BL2, BL31 and BL32). The public part is stored in
	one of the extension fields in the trusted world certificate.

	- Non-trusted world key

	The private part is used to sign the key certificate corresponding to the
	non secure world image (BL33). The public part is stored in one of the
	extension fields in the trusted world certificate.

	- BL3X keys

	For each of SCP_BL2, BL31, BL32 and BL33, the private part is used to
	sign the content certificate for the BL3X image. The public part is stored
	in one of the extension fields in the corresponding key certificate.

	The following images are included in the CoT:

	- BL1
	- BL2
	- SCP_BL2 (optional)
	- BL31
	- BL33
	- BL32 (optional)

	The following certificates are used to authenticate the images.

	- BL2 content certificate

	It is self-signed with the private part of the ROT key. It contains a hash
	of the BL2 image.

	- Trusted key certificate

	It is self-signed with the private part of the ROT key. It contains the
	public part of the trusted world key and the public part of the non-trusted
	world key.

	- SCP_BL2 key certificate

	It is self-signed with the trusted world key. It contains the public part of
	the SCP_BL2 key.

	- SCP_BL2 content certificate

	It is self-signed with the SCP_BL2 key. It contains a hash of the SCP_BL2
	image.

	- BL31 key certificate

	It is self-signed with the trusted world key. It contains the public part of
	the BL31 key.

	- BL31 content certificate

	It is self-signed with the BL31 key. It contains a hash of the BL31 image.

	- BL32 key certificate

	It is self-signed with the trusted world key. It contains the public part of
	the BL32 key.

	- BL32 content certificate

	It is self-signed with the BL32 key. It contains a hash of the BL32 image.

	- BL33 key certificate

	It is self-signed with the non-trusted world key. It contains the public
	part of the BL33 key.

	- BL33 content certificate

	It is self-signed with the BL33 key. It contains a hash of the BL33 image.

	The SCP_BL2 and BL32 certificates are optional, but they must be present if the
	corresponding SCP_BL2 or BL32 images are present.

	Trusted Board Boot Sequence
	---------------------------

	The CoT is verified through the following sequence of steps. The system panics
	if any of the steps fail.

	- BL1 loads and verifies the BL2 content certificate. The issuer public key is
	read from the verified certificate. A hash of that key is calculated and
	compared with the hash of the ROTPK read from the trusted root-key storage
	registers. If they match, the BL2 hash is read from the certificate.

	.. note::
	The matching operation is platform specific and is currently
	unimplemented on the Arm development platforms.

	- BL1 loads the BL2 image. Its hash is calculated and compared with the hash
	read from the certificate. Control is transferred to the BL2 image if all
	the comparisons succeed.

	- BL2 loads and verifies the trusted key certificate. The issuer public key is
	read from the verified certificate. A hash of that key is calculated and
	compared with the hash of the ROTPK read from the trusted root-key storage
	registers. If the comparison succeeds, BL2 reads and saves the trusted and
	non-trusted world public keys from the verified certificate.

	The next two steps are executed for each of the SCP_BL2, BL31 & BL32 images.
	The steps for the optional SCP_BL2 and BL32 images are skipped if these images
	are not present.

	- BL2 loads and verifies the BL3x key certificate. The certificate signature
	is verified using the trusted world public key. If the signature
	verification succeeds, BL2 reads and saves the BL3x public key from the
	certificate.

	- BL2 loads and verifies the BL3x content certificate. The signature is
	verified using the BL3x public key. If the signature verification succeeds,
	BL2 reads and saves the BL3x image hash from the certificate.

	The next two steps are executed only for the BL33 image.

	- BL2 loads and verifies the BL33 key certificate. If the signature
	verification succeeds, BL2 reads and saves the BL33 public key from the
	certificate.

	- BL2 loads and verifies the BL33 content certificate. If the signature
	verification succeeds, BL2 reads and saves the BL33 image hash from the
	certificate.

	The next step is executed for all the boot loader images.

	- BL2 calculates the hash of each image. It compares it with the hash obtained
	from the corresponding content certificate. The image authentication succeeds
	if the hashes match.

	The Trusted Board Boot implementation spans both generic and platform-specific
	BL1 and BL2 code, and in tool code on the host build machine. The feature is
	enabled through use of specific build flags as described in
	:ref:`Build Options`.

	On the host machine, a tool generates the certificates, which are included in
	the FIP along with the boot loader images. These certificates are loaded in
	Trusted SRAM using the IO storage framework. They are then verified by an
	Authentication module included in TF-A.

	The mechanism used for generating the FIP and the Authentication module are
	described in the following sections.

	Authentication Framework
	------------------------

	The authentication framework included in TF-A provides support to implement
	the desired trusted boot sequence. Arm platforms use this framework to
	implement the boot requirements specified in the
	`Trusted Board Boot Requirements (TBBR)`_ document.

	More information about the authentication framework can be found in the
	:ref:`Authentication Framework & Chain of Trust` document.

	Certificate Generation Tool
	---------------------------

	The ``cert_create`` tool is built and runs on the host machine as part of the
	TF-A build process when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It takes the boot loader images
	and keys as inputs (keys must be in PEM format) and generates the
	certificates (in DER format) required to establish the CoT. New keys can be
	generated by the tool in case they are not provided. The certificates are then
	passed as inputs to the ``fiptool`` utility for creating the FIP.

	The certificates are also stored individually in the output build directory.

	The tool resides in the ``tools/cert_create`` directory. It uses the OpenSSL SSL
	library version to generate the X.509 certificates. The specific version of the
	library that is required is given in the :ref:`Prerequisites` document.

	Instructions for building and using the tool can be found at
	:ref:`tools_build_cert_create`.

	Authenticated Encryption Framework
	----------------------------------

	The authenticated encryption framework included in TF-A provides support to
	implement the optional firmware encryption feature. This feature can be
	optionally enabled on platforms to implement the optional requirement:
	R060_TBBR_FUNCTION as specified in the `Trusted Board Boot Requirements (TBBR)`_
	document.

	Note that due to security considerations and complexity of this feature, it is
	marked as experimental.

	Firmware Encryption Tool
	------------------------

	The ``encrypt_fw`` tool is built and runs on the host machine as part of the
	TF-A build process when ``DECRYPTION_SUPPORT != none``. It takes the plain
	firmware image as input and generates the encrypted firmware image which can
	then be passed as input to the ``fiptool`` utility for creating the FIP.

	The encrypted firmwares are also stored individually in the output build
	directory.

	The tool resides in the ``tools/encrypt_fw`` directory. It uses OpenSSL SSL
	library version 1.0.1 or later to do authenticated encryption operation.
	Instructions for building and using the tool can be found in the
	:ref:`tools_build_enctool`.

	--------------

	Copyright (c) 2015-2020, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.

	.. _X.509 v3: https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt
	.. _Trusted Board Boot Requirements (TBBR): https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0006/latest/trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-tbbr-client-armv8-a