blob: 14c3172c9771af9c767c1d5b9a00fbbfd824e159 [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* Copyright (c) 2015-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <platform_def.h>
#include <common/debug.h>
#include <common/tbbr/cot_def.h>
#include <drivers/auth/auth_common.h>
#include <drivers/auth/auth_mod.h>
#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
#include <drivers/auth/img_parser_mod.h>
#include <drivers/fwu/fwu.h>
#include <lib/fconf/fconf_tbbr_getter.h>
#include <plat/common/platform.h>
#include <tools_share/zero_oid.h>
/* ASN.1 tags */
#define ASN1_INTEGER 0x02
#define return_if_error(rc) \
do { \
if (rc != 0) { \
return rc; \
} \
} while (0)
#pragma weak plat_set_nv_ctr2
static int cmp_auth_param_type_desc(const auth_param_type_desc_t *a,
const auth_param_type_desc_t *b)
{
if ((a->type == b->type) && (a->cookie == b->cookie)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* This function obtains the requested authentication parameter data from the
* information extracted from the parent image after its authentication.
*/
static int auth_get_param(const auth_param_type_desc_t *param_type_desc,
const auth_img_desc_t *img_desc,
void **param, unsigned int *len)
{
int i;
if (img_desc->authenticated_data == NULL)
return 1;
for (i = 0 ; i < COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS ; i++) {
if (0 == cmp_auth_param_type_desc(param_type_desc,
img_desc->authenticated_data[i].type_desc)) {
*param = img_desc->authenticated_data[i].data.ptr;
*len = img_desc->authenticated_data[i].data.len;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Authenticate an image by matching the data hash
*
* This function implements 'AUTH_METHOD_HASH'. To authenticate an image using
* this method, the image must contain:
*
* - The data to calculate the hash from
*
* The parent image must contain:
*
* - The hash to be matched with (including hash algorithm)
*
* For a successful authentication, both hashes must match. The function calls
* the crypto-module to check this matching.
*
* Parameters:
* param: parameters to perform the hash authentication
* img_desc: pointer to image descriptor so we can know the image type
* and parent image
* img: pointer to image in memory
* img_len: length of image (in bytes)
*
* Return:
* 0 = success, Otherwise = error
*/
static int auth_hash(const auth_method_param_hash_t *param,
const auth_img_desc_t *img_desc,
void *img, unsigned int img_len)
{
void *data_ptr, *hash_der_ptr;
unsigned int data_len, hash_der_len;
int rc = 0;
/* Get the hash from the parent image. This hash will be DER encoded
* and contain the hash algorithm */
rc = auth_get_param(param->hash, img_desc->parent,
&hash_der_ptr, &hash_der_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/* Get the data to be hashed from the current image */
rc = img_parser_get_auth_param(img_desc->img_type, param->data,
img, img_len, &data_ptr, &data_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/* Ask the crypto module to verify this hash */
rc = crypto_mod_verify_hash(data_ptr, data_len,
hash_der_ptr, hash_der_len);
return rc;
}
/*
* Authenticate by digital signature
*
* This function implements 'AUTH_METHOD_SIG'. To authenticate an image using
* this method, the image must contain:
*
* - Data to be signed
* - Signature
* - Signature algorithm
*
* We rely on the image parser module to extract this data from the image.
* The parent image must contain:
*
* - Public key (or a hash of it)
*
* If the parent image contains only a hash of the key, we will try to obtain
* the public key from the image itself (i.e. self-signed certificates). In that
* case, the signature verification is considered just an integrity check and
* the authentication is established by calculating the hash of the key and
* comparing it with the hash obtained from the parent.
*
* If the image has no parent (NULL), it means it has to be authenticated using
* the ROTPK stored in the platform. Again, this ROTPK could be the key itself
* or a hash of it.
*
* Return: 0 = success, Otherwise = error
*/
static int auth_signature(const auth_method_param_sig_t *param,
const auth_img_desc_t *img_desc,
void *img, unsigned int img_len)
{
void *data_ptr, *pk_ptr, *cnv_pk_ptr, *pk_plat_ptr, *sig_ptr, *sig_alg_ptr, *pk_oid;
unsigned int data_len, pk_len, cnv_pk_len, pk_plat_len, sig_len, sig_alg_len;
unsigned int flags = 0;
int rc = 0;
/* Get the data to be signed from current image */
rc = img_parser_get_auth_param(img_desc->img_type, param->data,
img, img_len, &data_ptr, &data_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/* Get the signature from current image */
rc = img_parser_get_auth_param(img_desc->img_type, param->sig,
img, img_len, &sig_ptr, &sig_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/* Get the signature algorithm from current image */
rc = img_parser_get_auth_param(img_desc->img_type, param->alg,
img, img_len, &sig_alg_ptr, &sig_alg_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/* Get the public key from the parent. If there is no parent (NULL),
* the certificate has been signed with the ROTPK, so we have to get
* the PK from the platform */
if (img_desc->parent != NULL) {
rc = auth_get_param(param->pk, img_desc->parent,
&pk_ptr, &pk_len);
return_if_error(rc);
} else {
/*
* Root certificates are signed with the ROTPK, so we have to
* get it from the platform.
*/
rc = plat_get_rotpk_info(param->pk->cookie, &pk_plat_ptr,
&pk_plat_len, &flags);
return_if_error(rc);
assert(is_rotpk_flags_valid(flags));
/* Also retrieve the key from the image. */
rc = img_parser_get_auth_param(img_desc->img_type,
param->pk, img, img_len,
&pk_ptr, &pk_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/*
* Validate the certificate's key against the platform ROTPK.
*
* Platform may store key in one of the following way -
* 1. Hash of ROTPK
* 2. Hash if prefixed, suffixed or modified ROTPK
* 3. Full ROTPK
*/
if ((flags & ROTPK_NOT_DEPLOYED) != 0U) {
NOTICE("ROTPK is not deployed on platform. "
"Skipping ROTPK verification.\n");
} else if ((flags & ROTPK_IS_HASH) != 0U) {
/*
* platform may store the hash of a prefixed,
* suffixed or modified pk
*/
rc = crypto_mod_convert_pk(pk_ptr, pk_len, &cnv_pk_ptr, &cnv_pk_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/*
* The hash of the certificate's public key must match
* the hash of the ROTPK.
*/
rc = crypto_mod_verify_hash(cnv_pk_ptr, cnv_pk_len,
pk_plat_ptr, pk_plat_len);
return_if_error(rc);
} else {
/* Platform supports full ROTPK */
if ((pk_len != pk_plat_len) ||
(memcmp(pk_plat_ptr, pk_ptr, pk_len) != 0)) {
ERROR("plat and cert ROTPK len mismatch\n");
return -1;
}
}
/*
* Set Zero-OID for ROTPK(subject key) as a the certificate
* does not hold Key-OID information for ROTPK.
*/
if (param->pk->cookie != NULL) {
pk_oid = param->pk->cookie;
} else {
pk_oid = ZERO_OID;
}
/*
* Public key is verified at this stage, notify platform
* to measure and publish it.
*/
rc = plat_mboot_measure_key(pk_oid, pk_ptr, pk_len);
if (rc != 0) {
WARN("Public Key measurement failure = %d\n", rc);
}
}
/* Ask the crypto module to verify the signature */
rc = crypto_mod_verify_signature(data_ptr, data_len,
sig_ptr, sig_len,
sig_alg_ptr, sig_alg_len,
pk_ptr, pk_len);
return rc;
}
/*
* Authenticate by Non-Volatile counter
*
* To protect the system against rollback, the platform includes a non-volatile
* counter whose value can only be increased. All certificates include a counter
* value that should not be lower than the value stored in the platform. If the
* value is larger, the counter in the platform must be updated to the new value
* (provided it has been authenticated).
*
* Return: 0 = success, Otherwise = error
* Returns additionally,
* cert_nv_ctr -> NV counter value present in the certificate
* need_nv_ctr_upgrade = 0 -> platform NV counter upgrade is not needed
* need_nv_ctr_upgrade = 1 -> platform NV counter upgrade is needed
*/
static int auth_nvctr(const auth_method_param_nv_ctr_t *param,
const auth_img_desc_t *img_desc,
void *img, unsigned int img_len,
unsigned int *cert_nv_ctr,
bool *need_nv_ctr_upgrade)
{
unsigned char *p;
void *data_ptr = NULL;
unsigned int data_len, len, i;
unsigned int plat_nv_ctr;
int rc = 0;
bool is_trial_run = false;
/* Get the counter value from current image. The AM expects the IPM
* to return the counter value as a DER encoded integer */
rc = img_parser_get_auth_param(img_desc->img_type, param->cert_nv_ctr,
img, img_len, &data_ptr, &data_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/* Parse the DER encoded integer */
assert(data_ptr);
p = (unsigned char *)data_ptr;
/*
* Integers must be at least 3 bytes: 1 for tag, 1 for length, and 1
* for value. The first byte (tag) must be ASN1_INTEGER.
*/
if ((data_len < 3) || (*p != ASN1_INTEGER)) {
/* Invalid ASN.1 integer */
return 1;
}
p++;
/*
* NV-counters are unsigned integers up to 31 bits. Trailing
* padding is not allowed.
*/
len = (unsigned int)*p;
if ((len > 4) || (data_len - 2 != len)) {
return 1;
}
p++;
/* Check the number is not negative */
if (*p & 0x80) {
return 1;
}
/* Convert to unsigned int. This code is for a little-endian CPU */
*cert_nv_ctr = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
*cert_nv_ctr = (*cert_nv_ctr << 8) | *p++;
}
/* Get the counter from the platform */
rc = plat_get_nv_ctr(param->plat_nv_ctr->cookie, &plat_nv_ctr);
return_if_error(rc);
if (*cert_nv_ctr < plat_nv_ctr) {
/* Invalid NV-counter */
return 1;
} else if (*cert_nv_ctr > plat_nv_ctr) {
#if PSA_FWU_SUPPORT && IMAGE_BL2
is_trial_run = fwu_is_trial_run_state();
#endif /* PSA_FWU_SUPPORT && IMAGE_BL2 */
*need_nv_ctr_upgrade = !is_trial_run;
}
return 0;
}
int plat_set_nv_ctr2(void *cookie, const auth_img_desc_t *img_desc __unused,
unsigned int nv_ctr)
{
return plat_set_nv_ctr(cookie, nv_ctr);
}
/*
* Return the parent id in the output parameter '*parent_id'
*
* Return value:
* 0 = Image has parent, 1 = Image has no parent or parent is authenticated
*/
int auth_mod_get_parent_id(unsigned int img_id, unsigned int *parent_id)
{
const auth_img_desc_t *img_desc = NULL;
assert(parent_id != NULL);
/* Get the image descriptor */
img_desc = FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(tbbr, cot, img_id);
/* Check if the image has no parent (ROT) */
if (img_desc->parent == NULL) {
*parent_id = 0;
return 1;
}
/* Check if the parent has already been authenticated */
if (auth_img_flags[img_desc->parent->img_id] & IMG_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED) {
*parent_id = 0;
return 1;
}
*parent_id = img_desc->parent->img_id;
return 0;
}
/*
* Initialize the different modules in the authentication framework
*/
void auth_mod_init(void)
{
/* Check we have a valid CoT registered */
assert(cot_desc_ptr != NULL);
/* Image parser module */
img_parser_init();
}
/*
* Authenticate a certificate/image
*
* Return: 0 = success, Otherwise = error
*/
int auth_mod_verify_img(unsigned int img_id,
void *img_ptr,
unsigned int img_len)
{
const auth_img_desc_t *img_desc = NULL;
const auth_param_type_desc_t *type_desc = NULL;
const auth_method_desc_t *auth_method = NULL;
void *param_ptr;
unsigned int param_len;
int rc, i;
unsigned int cert_nv_ctr = 0;
bool need_nv_ctr_upgrade = false;
bool sig_auth_done = false;
const auth_method_param_nv_ctr_t *nv_ctr_param = NULL;
/* Get the image descriptor from the chain of trust */
img_desc = FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(tbbr, cot, img_id);
/* Ask the parser to check the image integrity */
rc = img_parser_check_integrity(img_desc->img_type, img_ptr, img_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/* Authenticate the image using the methods indicated in the image
* descriptor. */
if (img_desc->img_auth_methods == NULL)
return 1;
for (i = 0 ; i < AUTH_METHOD_NUM ; i++) {
auth_method = &img_desc->img_auth_methods[i];
switch (auth_method->type) {
case AUTH_METHOD_NONE:
rc = 0;
break;
case AUTH_METHOD_HASH:
rc = auth_hash(&auth_method->param.hash,
img_desc, img_ptr, img_len);
break;
case AUTH_METHOD_SIG:
rc = auth_signature(&auth_method->param.sig,
img_desc, img_ptr, img_len);
sig_auth_done = true;
break;
case AUTH_METHOD_NV_CTR:
nv_ctr_param = &auth_method->param.nv_ctr;
rc = auth_nvctr(nv_ctr_param,
img_desc, img_ptr, img_len,
&cert_nv_ctr, &need_nv_ctr_upgrade);
break;
default:
/* Unknown authentication method */
rc = 1;
break;
}
return_if_error(rc);
}
/*
* Do platform NV counter upgrade only if the certificate gets
* authenticated, and platform NV-counter upgrade is needed.
*/
if (need_nv_ctr_upgrade && sig_auth_done) {
rc = plat_set_nv_ctr2(nv_ctr_param->plat_nv_ctr->cookie,
img_desc, cert_nv_ctr);
return_if_error(rc);
}
/* Extract the parameters indicated in the image descriptor to
* authenticate the children images. */
if (img_desc->authenticated_data != NULL) {
for (i = 0 ; i < COT_MAX_VERIFIED_PARAMS ; i++) {
if (img_desc->authenticated_data[i].type_desc == NULL) {
continue;
}
/* Get the parameter from the image parser module */
rc = img_parser_get_auth_param(img_desc->img_type,
img_desc->authenticated_data[i].type_desc,
img_ptr, img_len, &param_ptr, &param_len);
return_if_error(rc);
/* Check parameter size */
if (param_len > img_desc->authenticated_data[i].data.len) {
return 1;
}
/* Copy the parameter for later use */
memcpy((void *)img_desc->authenticated_data[i].data.ptr,
(void *)param_ptr, param_len);
/*
* If this is a public key then measure and publicise
* it.
*/
type_desc = img_desc->authenticated_data[i].type_desc;
if (type_desc->type == AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY) {
rc = plat_mboot_measure_key(type_desc->cookie,
param_ptr,
param_len);
if (rc != 0) {
WARN("Public Key measurement "
"failure = %d\n", rc);
}
}
}
}
/* Mark image as authenticated */
auth_img_flags[img_desc->img_id] |= IMG_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED;
return 0;
}