| Advisory TFV-9 (CVE-2022-23960) |
| ============================================================ |
| |
| +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | Title | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to speculative processor | |
| | | vulnerabilities with branch prediction target reuse | |
| +================+=============================================================+ |
| | CVE ID | `CVE-2022-23960`_ | |
| +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | Date | 08 Mar 2022 | |
| +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | Versions | All, up to and including v2.6 | |
| | Affected | | |
| +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | Configurations | All | |
| | Affected | | |
| +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | Impact | Potential leakage of secure world data to normal world | |
| | | if an attacker is able to find a TF-A exfiltration primitive| |
| | | that can be predicted as a valid branch target, and somehow | |
| | | induce misprediction onto that primitive. There are | |
| | | currently no known exploits. | |
| +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | Fix Version | `Gerrit topic #spectre_bhb`_ | |
| +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | Credit | Systems and Network Security Group at Vrije Universiteit | |
| | | Amsterdam for CVE-2022-23960, Arm for patches | |
| +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| This security advisory describes the current understanding of the Trusted |
| Firmware-A exposure to the new speculative processor vulnerability. |
| To understand the background and wider impact of these vulnerabilities on Arm |
| systems, please refer to the `Arm Processor Security Update`_. The whitepaper |
| referred to below describes the Spectre attack and mitigation in more detail |
| including implementation specific mitigation details for all impacted Arm CPUs. |
| |
| |
| `CVE-2022-23960`_ |
| ----------------- |
| |
| Where possible on vulnerable CPUs that implement FEAT_CSV2, Arm recommends |
| inserting a loop workaround with implementation specific number of iterations |
| that will discard the branch history on exception entry to a higher exception |
| level for the given CPU. This is done as early as possible on entry into EL3, |
| before any branch instruction is executed. This is sufficient to mitigate |
| Spectre-BHB on behalf of all secure world code, assuming that no secure world |
| code is under attacker control. |
| |
| The below table lists the CPUs that mitigate against this vulnerability in |
| TF-A using the loop workaround(all cores that implement FEAT_CSV2 except the |
| revisions of Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75 that implements FEAT_CSV2). |
| |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Core | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-A72(from r1p0)| |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-A76 | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-A76AE | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-A77 | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-A78 | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-A78AE | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-A78C | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-X1 | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-X2 | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-A710 | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-Makalu | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-Makalu-ELP | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Cortex-Hunter | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Neoverse-N1 | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Neoverse-N2 | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Neoverse-V1 | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Neoverse-Demeter | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | Neoverse-Poseidon | |
| +----------------------+ |
| |
| For all other cores impacted by Spectre-BHB, some of which that do not implement |
| FEAT_CSV2 and some that do e.g. Cortex-A73, the recommended mitigation is to |
| flush all branch predictions via an implementation specific route. |
| |
| In case local workaround is not feasible, the Rich OS can invoke the SMC |
| (``SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3``) to apply the workaround. Refer to `SMCCC Calling |
| Convention specification`_ for more details. |
| |
| `Gerrit topic #spectre_bhb`_ This patchset implements the Spectre-BHB loop |
| workaround for CPUs mentioned in the above table. It also mitigates against |
| this vulnerability for Cortex-A72 CPU versions that support the CSV2 feature |
| (from r1p0). The patch stack also includes an implementation for a specified |
| `CVE-2022-23960`_ workaround SMC(``SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3``) for use by normal |
| world privileged software. Details of ``SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3`` can be found |
| in the `SMCCC Calling Convention specification`_. The specification and |
| implementation also enables the normal world to discover the presence of this |
| firmware service. This patch also implements ``SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3`` for |
| Cortex-A57, Coxtex-A72, Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75 using the existing workaround. |
| for CVE-2017-5715. Cortex-A15 patch extends Spectre V2 mitigation to Spectre-BHB. |
| |
| The above workaround is enabled by default (on vulnerable CPUs only). Platforms |
| can choose to disable them at compile time if they do not require them. |
| |
| For more information about non-Arm CPUs, please contact the CPU vendor. |
| |
| .. _Arm Processor Security Update: http://www.arm.com/security-update |
| .. _CVE-2022-23960: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-23960 |
| .. _Gerrit topic #spectre_bhb: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:"spectre_bhb"+(status:open%20OR%20status:merged) |
| .. _CVE-2022-23960 mitigation specification: https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability |
| .. _SMCCC Calling Convention specification: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0028/latest |