| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 2015-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * X509 parser based on mbed TLS |
| * |
| * This module implements functions to check the integrity of a X509v3 |
| * certificate ASN.1 structure and extract authentication parameters from the |
| * extensions field, such as an image hash or a public key. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <stddef.h> |
| #include <stdint.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| /* mbed TLS headers */ |
| #include <mbedtls/asn1.h> |
| #include <mbedtls/oid.h> |
| #include <mbedtls/platform.h> |
| |
| #include <arch_helpers.h> |
| #include <drivers/auth/img_parser_mod.h> |
| #include <drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.h> |
| #include <lib/utils.h> |
| |
| /* Maximum OID string length ("a.b.c.d.e.f ...") */ |
| #define MAX_OID_STR_LEN 64 |
| |
| #define LIB_NAME "mbed TLS X509v3" |
| |
| /* Temporary variables to speed up the authentication parameters search. These |
| * variables are assigned once during the integrity check and used any time an |
| * authentication parameter is requested, so we do not have to parse the image |
| * again */ |
| static mbedtls_asn1_buf tbs; |
| static mbedtls_asn1_buf v3_ext; |
| static mbedtls_asn1_buf pk; |
| static mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_alg; |
| static mbedtls_asn1_buf signature; |
| |
| /* |
| * Clear all static temporary variables. |
| */ |
| static void clear_temp_vars(void) |
| { |
| #define ZERO_AND_CLEAN(x) \ |
| do { \ |
| zeromem(&x, sizeof(x)); \ |
| clean_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&x, sizeof(x)); \ |
| } while (0); |
| |
| ZERO_AND_CLEAN(tbs) |
| ZERO_AND_CLEAN(v3_ext); |
| ZERO_AND_CLEAN(pk); |
| ZERO_AND_CLEAN(sig_alg); |
| ZERO_AND_CLEAN(signature); |
| |
| #undef ZERO_AND_CLEAN |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Get X509v3 extension |
| * |
| * Global variable 'v3_ext' must point to the extensions region |
| * in the certificate. OID may be NULL to request that get_ext() |
| * is only being called for integrity checking. |
| */ |
| static int get_ext(const char *oid, void **ext, unsigned int *ext_len) |
| { |
| int oid_len, ret, is_critical; |
| size_t len; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| const unsigned char *end; |
| char oid_str[MAX_OID_STR_LEN]; |
| mbedtls_asn1_buf extn_oid; |
| |
| p = v3_ext.p; |
| end = v3_ext.p + v3_ext.len; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check extensions integrity. At least one extension is |
| * required: the ASN.1 specifies a minimum size of 1, and at |
| * least one extension is needed to authenticate the next stage |
| * in the boot chain. |
| */ |
| do { |
| unsigned char *end_ext_data; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| end_ext_data = p + len; |
| |
| /* Get extension ID */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; |
| extn_oid.p = p; |
| p += extn_oid.len; |
| |
| /* Get optional critical */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(&p, end_ext_data, &is_critical); |
| if ((ret != 0) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Data should be octet string type and must use all bytes in |
| * the Extension. |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_ext_data, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); |
| if ((ret != 0) || ((p + len) != end_ext_data)) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| /* Detect requested extension */ |
| oid_len = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(oid_str, |
| MAX_OID_STR_LEN, |
| &extn_oid); |
| if ((oid_len == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) || (oid_len < 0)) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR; |
| } |
| |
| if ((oid != NULL) && |
| ((size_t)oid_len == strlen(oid_str)) && |
| (strcmp(oid, oid_str) == 0)) { |
| /* Extension must be ASN.1 DER */ |
| if (len < 2) { |
| /* too short */ |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| if ((p[0] & 0x1F) == 0x1F) { |
| /* multi-byte ASN.1 DER tag, not allowed */ |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| if ((p[0] & 0xDF) == 0) { |
| /* UNIVERSAL 0 tag, not allowed */ |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| *ext = (void *)p; |
| *ext_len = (unsigned int)len; |
| |
| /* Advance past the tag byte */ |
| p++; |
| |
| if (mbedtls_asn1_get_len(&p, end_ext_data, &len)) { |
| /* not valid DER */ |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| if (p + len != end_ext_data) { |
| /* junk after ASN.1 object */ |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| return IMG_PARSER_OK; |
| } |
| |
| /* Next */ |
| p = end_ext_data; |
| } while (p < end); |
| |
| return (oid == NULL) ? IMG_PARSER_OK : IMG_PARSER_ERR_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the integrity of the certificate ASN.1 structure. |
| * |
| * Extract the relevant data that will be used later during authentication. |
| * |
| * This function doesn't clear the static variables located on the top of this |
| * file in case of an error. It is only called from check_integrity(), which |
| * performs the cleanup if necessary. |
| */ |
| static int cert_parse(void *img, unsigned int img_len) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t len; |
| unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end, *pk_end; |
| mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_alg1; |
| /* |
| * The unique ASN.1 DER encoding of [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER { v3(2} }. |
| */ |
| static const char v3[] = { |
| /* The outer CONTEXT SPECIFIC 0 tag */ |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0, |
| /* The number bytes used to encode the inner INTEGER */ |
| 3, |
| /* The tag of the inner INTEGER */ |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER, |
| /* The number of bytes needed to represent 2 */ |
| 1, |
| /* The actual value 2 */ |
| 2, |
| }; |
| |
| p = (unsigned char *)img; |
| len = img_len; |
| crt_end = p + len; |
| end = crt_end; |
| |
| /* |
| * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, |
| * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| * signatureValue BIT STRING } |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if ((ret != 0) || ((p + len) != end)) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { |
| */ |
| tbs.p = p; |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| end = p + len; |
| tbs.len = end - tbs.p; |
| |
| /* |
| * Version ::= [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } |
| * -- only v3 accepted |
| */ |
| if (((end - p) <= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(v3)) || |
| (memcmp(p, v3, sizeof(v3)) != 0)) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| p += sizeof(v3); |
| |
| /* |
| * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| p += len; |
| |
| /* |
| * signature AlgorithmIdentifier |
| */ |
| sig_alg1.p = p; |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| sig_alg1.len = (p + len) - sig_alg1.p; |
| p += len; |
| |
| /* |
| * issuer Name |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| p += len; |
| |
| /* |
| * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * notBefore Time, |
| * notAfter Time } |
| * |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| p += len; |
| |
| /* |
| * subject Name |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| p += len; |
| |
| /* |
| * SubjectPublicKeyInfo |
| */ |
| pk.p = p; |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| pk_end = p + len; |
| pk.len = pk_end - pk.p; |
| |
| /* algorithm */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, pk_end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| p += len; |
| |
| /* Key is a BIT STRING and must use all bytes in SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, pk_end, &len); |
| if ((ret != 0) || (p + len != pk_end)) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| p = pk_end; |
| |
| /* |
| * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| * -- technically these contain BIT STRINGs but that is not worth |
| * -- validating |
| */ |
| for (int i = 1; i < 3; i++) { |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | i); |
| /* |
| * Unique IDs are obsolete, so MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG |
| * is the common case. |
| */ |
| if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| p += len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL |
| * } |
| * |
| * X.509 and RFC5280 allow omitting the extensions entirely. |
| * However, in TF-A, a certificate with no extensions would |
| * always fail later on, as the extensions contain the |
| * information needed to authenticate the next stage in the |
| * boot chain. Furthermore, get_ext() assumes that the |
| * extensions have been parsed into v3_ext, and allowing |
| * there to be no extensions would pointlessly complicate |
| * the code. Therefore, just reject certificates without |
| * extensions. This is also why version 1 and 2 certificates |
| * are rejected above. |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3); |
| if ((ret != 0) || (len != (size_t)(end - p))) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension |
| * -- must use all remaining bytes in TBSCertificate |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if ((ret != 0) || (len != (size_t)(end - p))) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| v3_ext.p = p; |
| v3_ext.len = len; |
| p += len; |
| |
| /* Check extensions integrity */ |
| ret = get_ext(NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| if (ret != IMG_PARSER_OK) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| end = crt_end; |
| |
| /* |
| * } |
| * -- end of TBSCertificate |
| * |
| * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier |
| * -- Does not need to be parsed. Ensuring it is bitwise |
| * -- identical (including the tag!) with the first signature |
| * -- algorithm is sufficient. |
| */ |
| if ((sig_alg1.len >= (size_t)(end - p)) || |
| (0 != memcmp(sig_alg1.p, p, sig_alg1.len))) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| p += sig_alg1.len; |
| memcpy(&sig_alg, &sig_alg1, sizeof(sig_alg)); |
| |
| /* |
| * signatureValue BIT STRING |
| * } -- must consume all bytes |
| */ |
| signature.p = p; |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, end, &len); |
| if ((ret != 0) || ((p + len) != end)) { |
| return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; |
| } |
| signature.len = end - signature.p; |
| |
| return IMG_PARSER_OK; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Exported functions */ |
| |
| static void init(void) |
| { |
| mbedtls_init(); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Wrapper for cert_parse() that clears the static variables used by it in case |
| * of an error. |
| */ |
| static int check_integrity(void *img, unsigned int img_len) |
| { |
| int rc = cert_parse(img, img_len); |
| |
| if (rc != IMG_PARSER_OK) |
| clear_temp_vars(); |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Extract an authentication parameter from an X509v3 certificate |
| * |
| * This function returns a pointer to the extracted data and its length. |
| * Depending on the type of parameter, a pointer to the data stored in the |
| * certificate may be returned (i.e. an octet string containing a hash). Other |
| * data may need to be copied and formatted (i.e. integers). In the later case, |
| * a buffer of the correct type needs to be statically allocated, filled and |
| * returned. |
| */ |
| static int get_auth_param(const auth_param_type_desc_t *type_desc, |
| void *img, unsigned int img_len, |
| void **param, unsigned int *param_len) |
| { |
| int rc = IMG_PARSER_OK; |
| |
| /* We do not use img because the check_integrity function has already |
| * extracted the relevant data (v3_ext, pk, sig_alg, etc) */ |
| |
| switch (type_desc->type) { |
| case AUTH_PARAM_RAW_DATA: |
| /* Data to be signed */ |
| *param = (void *)tbs.p; |
| *param_len = (unsigned int)tbs.len; |
| break; |
| case AUTH_PARAM_HASH: |
| case AUTH_PARAM_NV_CTR: |
| /* All these parameters are included as X509v3 extensions */ |
| rc = get_ext(type_desc->cookie, param, param_len); |
| break; |
| case AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY: |
| if (type_desc->cookie != NULL) { |
| /* Get public key from extension */ |
| rc = get_ext(type_desc->cookie, param, param_len); |
| } else { |
| /* Get the subject public key */ |
| *param = (void *)pk.p; |
| *param_len = (unsigned int)pk.len; |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUTH_PARAM_SIG_ALG: |
| /* Get the certificate signature algorithm */ |
| *param = (void *)sig_alg.p; |
| *param_len = (unsigned int)sig_alg.len; |
| break; |
| case AUTH_PARAM_SIG: |
| /* Get the certificate signature */ |
| *param = (void *)signature.p; |
| *param_len = (unsigned int)signature.len; |
| break; |
| default: |
| rc = IMG_PARSER_ERR_NOT_FOUND; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| REGISTER_IMG_PARSER_LIB(IMG_CERT, LIB_NAME, init, |
| check_integrity, get_auth_param); |