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/*
* Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* Neither the name of ARM nor the names of its contributors may be used
* to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
* prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*******************************************************************************
* This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a
* plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The
* SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that
* executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting
* the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either
* handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also
* responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP.
******************************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <arch_helpers.h>
#include <console.h>
#include <platform.h>
#include <context_mgmt.h>
#include <runtime_svc.h>
#include <bl31.h>
#include <tsp.h>
#include <psci.h>
#include <tspd_private.h>
#include <debug.h>
/*******************************************************************************
* Single structure to hold information about the various entry points into the
* Secure Payload. It is initialised once on the primary core after a cold boot.
******************************************************************************/
entry_info *tsp_entry_info;
/*******************************************************************************
* Array to keep track of per-cpu Secure Payload state
******************************************************************************/
tsp_context tspd_sp_context[TSPD_CORE_COUNT];
int32_t tspd_init(meminfo *bl32_meminfo);
/*******************************************************************************
* Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type
* (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry
* into the SP for its initialisation.
******************************************************************************/
int32_t tspd_setup(void)
{
el_change_info *image_info;
int32_t rc;
uint64_t mpidr = read_mpidr();
uint32_t linear_id;
linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr);
/*
* Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its
* absence is a critical failure. TODO: Add support to
* conditionally include the SPD service
*/
image_info = bl31_get_next_image_info(SECURE);
assert(image_info);
/*
* If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value
* signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without
* registering any handlers
*/
if (!image_info->entrypoint)
return 1;
/*
* We could inspect the SP image and determine it's execution
* state i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64. Assuming it's AArch64
* for the time being.
*/
rc = tspd_init_secure_context(image_info->entrypoint,
TSP_AARCH64,
mpidr,
&tspd_sp_context[linear_id]);
assert(rc == 0);
/*
* All TSPD initialization done. Now register our init function with
* BL31 for deferred invocation
*/
bl31_register_bl32_init(&tspd_init);
return rc;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first
* time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure
* context has already been created by tspd_setup() which can be directly used.
* It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI
* so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function
* performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control
* back to this routine through a SMC. It also passes the extents of memory made
* available to BL32 by BL31.
******************************************************************************/
int32_t tspd_init(meminfo *bl32_meminfo)
{
uint64_t mpidr = read_mpidr();
uint32_t linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr);
uint64_t rc;
tsp_context *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
/*
* Arrange for passing a pointer to the meminfo structure
* describing the memory extents available to the secure
* payload.
* TODO: We are passing a pointer to BL31 internal memory
* whereas this structure should be copied to a communication
* buffer between the SP and SPD.
*/
write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx),
CTX_GPREG_X0,
(uint64_t) bl32_meminfo);
/*
* Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. We expect an array
* of vectors in return
*/
rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx);
assert(rc != 0);
if (rc) {
tsp_ctx->state = TSP_STATE_ON;
/*
* TSP has been successfully initialized. Register power
* managemnt hooks with PSCI
*/
psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tspd_pm);
}
return rc;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
* range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention
* Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload
* to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it
* will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the
* work assigned to it.
******************************************************************************/
uint64_t tspd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
uint64_t x1,
uint64_t x2,
uint64_t x3,
uint64_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
uint64_t flags)
{
cpu_context *ns_cpu_context;
gp_regs *ns_gp_regs;
unsigned long mpidr = read_mpidr();
uint32_t linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr), ns;
tsp_context *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
switch (smc_fid) {
/*
* This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished initialising itself after a cold boot
*/
case TSP_ENTRY_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* Stash the SP entry points information. This is done
* only once on the primary cpu
*/
assert(tsp_entry_info == NULL);
tsp_entry_info = (entry_info *) x1;
/*
* SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated
* the original request through a synchronous entry
* into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime
* context.
*/
tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
/* Should never reach here */
assert(0);
/*
* These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished:
* 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci
* cpu_on request
* 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
*/
case TSP_ON_DONE:
case TSP_RESUME_DONE:
/*
* These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished:
* 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
* 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci
* cpu_off request.
*/
case TSP_OFF_DONE:
case TSP_SUSPEND_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated the
* original request through a synchronous entry into the SP.
* Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as
* return value to the caller
*/
tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
/* Should never reach here */
assert(0);
/*
* Request from non-secure client to perform an
* arithmetic operation or response from secure
* payload to an earlier request.
*/
case TSP_FID_ADD:
case TSP_FID_SUB:
case TSP_FID_MUL:
case TSP_FID_DIV:
if (ns) {
/*
* This is a fresh request from the non-secure client.
* The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which
* registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure
* state and send the request to the secure payload.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE));
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/* Save x1 and x2 for use by TSP_GET_ARGS call below */
SMC_SET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X1, x1);
SMC_SET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X2, x2);
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* secure payload to do the work now.
*/
/*
* Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the
* operation type and parameters to the secure context
* and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure
* payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit
* from this function.
*/
assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
set_aapcs_args7(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0);
cm_set_el3_elr(SECURE, (uint64_t) tsp_entry_info->fast_smc_entry);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
return smc_fid;
} else {
/*
* This is the result from the secure client of an
* earlier request. The results are in x1-x2. Copy it
* into the non-secure context, save the secure state
* and return to the non-secure state.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
ns_gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(ns_cpu_context);
/* Restore non-secure state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET2(ns_gp_regs, x1, x2);
}
break;
/*
* This is a request from the secure payload for more arguments
* for an ongoing arithmetic operation requested by the
* non-secure world. Simply return the arguments from the non-
* secure client in the original call.
*/
case TSP_GET_ARGS:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
ns_gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(ns_cpu_context);
SMC_RET2(handle, read_ctx_reg(ns_gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X1),
read_ctx_reg(ns_gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X2));
default:
break;
}
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor */
DECLARE_RT_SVC(
spd,
OEN_TOS_START,
OEN_TOS_END,
SMC_TYPE_FAST,
tspd_setup,
tspd_smc_handler
);