BUG/MAJOR: h2: enforce stricter syntax checks on the :method pseudo-header

Before HTX was introduced, all the HTTP request elements passed in
pseudo-headers fields were used to build an HTTP/1 request whose syntax
was then scrutinized by the HTTP/1 parser, leaving no room to inject
invalid characters.

While NUL, CR and LF are properly blocked, it is possible to inject
spaces in the method so that once translated to HTTP/1, fields are
shifted by one spcae, and a lenient HTTP/1 server could possibly be
fooled into using a part of the method as the URI. For example, the
following request:

   H2 request
     :method: "GET /admin? HTTP/1.1"
     :path:   "/static/images"

would become:

   GET /admin? HTTP/1.1 /static/images HTTP/1.1

It's important to note that the resulting request is *not* valid, and
that in order for this to be a problem, it requires that this request
is delivered to an already vulnerable HTTP/1 server.

A workaround here is to reject malformed methods by placing this rule
in the frontend or backend, at least before leaving haproxy in H1:

   http-request reject if { method -m reg [^A-Z0-9] }

Alternately H2 may be globally disabled by commenting out the "alpn"
directive on "bind" lines, and by rejecting H2 streams creation by
adding the following statement to the global section:

   tune.h2.max-concurrent-streams 0

This patch adds a check for each character of the method to make sure
they belong to the ones permitted in a token, as mentioned in RFC7231#4.1.

This should be backported to versions 2.0 and above. For older versions
not having HTX_FL_PARSING_ERROR, a "goto fail" works as well as it
results in a protocol error at the stream level. Non-HTX versions are
safe because the resulting invalid request will be rejected by the
internal HTTP/1 parser.

Thanks to Tim Düsterhus for reporting that one.

(cherry picked from commit 89265224d314a056d77d974284802c1b8a0dc97f)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
1 file changed