diff --git a/include/proto/proto_http.h b/include/proto/proto_http.h
index 6b5a5e8..ff3b59e 100644
--- a/include/proto/proto_http.h
+++ b/include/proto/proto_http.h
@@ -52,6 +52,18 @@
 void http_txn_reset_req(struct http_txn *txn);
 void http_txn_reset_res(struct http_txn *txn);
 
+/* Export HTX analyzers */
+int htx_wait_for_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit);
+int htx_process_req_common(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit, struct proxy *px);
+int htx_process_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit);
+int htx_process_tarpit(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit);
+int htx_wait_for_request_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit);
+int htx_send_name_header(struct http_txn *txn, struct proxy* be, const char* svr_name);
+int htx_wait_for_response(struct stream *s, struct channel *rep, int an_bit);
+int htx_process_res_common(struct stream *s, struct channel *rep, int an_bit, struct proxy *px);
+int htx_request_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit);
+int htx_response_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *res, int an_bit);
+
 void debug_hdr(const char *dir, struct stream *s, const char *start, const char *end);
 int apply_filter_to_req_headers(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, struct hdr_exp *exp);
 int apply_filter_to_req_line(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, struct hdr_exp *exp);
diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
index 9678d51..face0bf 100644
--- a/src/proto_http.c
+++ b/src/proto_http.c
@@ -864,6 +864,9 @@
 	struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
 	struct hdr_ctx ctx;
 
+	if (IS_HTX_STRM(s))
+		return htx_wait_for_request(s, req, an_bit);
+
 	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
 		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
 		s,
@@ -2844,6 +2847,9 @@
 	int deny_status = HTTP_ERR_403;
 	struct connection *conn = objt_conn(sess->origin);
 
+	if (IS_HTX_STRM(s))
+		return htx_process_req_common(s, req, an_bit, px);
+
 	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
 		/* we need more data */
 		goto return_prx_yield;
@@ -3115,6 +3121,9 @@
 	struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
 	struct connection *cli_conn = objt_conn(strm_sess(s)->origin);
 
+	if (IS_HTX_STRM(s))
+		return htx_process_request(s, req, an_bit);
+
 	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
 		/* we need more data */
 		channel_dont_connect(req);
@@ -3448,6 +3457,9 @@
 {
 	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
 
+	if (IS_HTX_STRM(s))
+		return htx_process_tarpit(s, req, an_bit);
+
 	/* This connection is being tarpitted. The CLIENT side has
 	 * already set the connect expiration date to the right
 	 * timeout. We just have to check that the client is still
@@ -3494,6 +3506,9 @@
 	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
 	struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->req;
 
+	if (IS_HTX_STRM(s))
+		return htx_wait_for_request_body(s, req, an_bit);
+
 	/* We have to parse the HTTP request body to find any required data.
 	 * "balance url_param check_post" should have been the only way to get
 	 * into this. We were brought here after HTTP header analysis, so all
@@ -4272,6 +4287,9 @@
 	struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->req;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (IS_HTX_STRM(s))
+		return htx_request_forward_body(s, req, an_bit);
+
 	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
 		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
 		s,
@@ -4511,6 +4529,9 @@
 
 	srv_conn = cs_conn(objt_cs(s->si[1].end));
 
+	if (IS_HTX_STRM(s))
+		return htx_wait_for_response(s, rep, an_bit);
+
 	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
 		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
 		s,
@@ -5154,6 +5175,9 @@
 	struct cond_wordlist *wl;
 	enum rule_result ret = HTTP_RULE_RES_CONT;
 
+	if (IS_HTX_STRM(s))
+		return htx_process_res_common(s, rep, an_bit, px);
+
 	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
 		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
 		s,
@@ -5501,6 +5525,9 @@
 	struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->rsp;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (IS_HTX_STRM(s))
+		return htx_response_forward_body(s, res, an_bit);
+
 	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
 		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
 		s,
diff --git a/src/proto_htx.c b/src/proto_htx.c
index ec29cbc..dbe0890 100644
--- a/src/proto_htx.c
+++ b/src/proto_htx.c
@@ -10,6 +10,2874 @@
  *
  */
 
+#include <common/base64.h>
+#include <common/config.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <common/uri_auth.h>
+
+#include <types/cache.h>
+
+#include <proto/acl.h>
+#include <proto/channel.h>
+#include <proto/checks.h>
+#include <proto/connection.h>
+#include <proto/filters.h>
+#include <proto/hdr_idx.h>
+#include <proto/log.h>
+#include <proto/proto_http.h>
+#include <proto/proxy.h>
+#include <proto/stream.h>
+#include <proto/stream_interface.h>
+#include <proto/stats.h>
+
+/* This stream analyser waits for a complete HTTP request. It returns 1 if the
+ * processing can continue on next analysers, or zero if it either needs more
+ * data or wants to immediately abort the request (eg: timeout, error, ...). It
+ * is tied to AN_REQ_WAIT_HTTP and may may remove itself from s->req.analysers
+ * when it has nothing left to do, and may remove any analyser when it wants to
+ * abort.
+ */
+int htx_wait_for_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We will parse the partial (or complete) lines.
+	 * We will check the request syntax, and also join multi-line
+	 * headers. An index of all the lines will be elaborated while
+	 * parsing.
+	 *
+	 * For the parsing, we use a 28 states FSM.
+	 *
+	 * Here is the information we currently have :
+	 *   ci_head(req)             = beginning of request
+	 *   ci_head(req) + msg->eoh  = end of processed headers / start of current one
+	 *   ci_tail(req)             = end of input data
+	 *   msg->eol                 = end of current header or line (LF or CRLF)
+	 *   msg->next                = first non-visited byte
+	 *
+	 * At end of parsing, we may perform a capture of the error (if any), and
+	 * we will set a few fields (txn->meth, sn->flags/SF_REDIRECTABLE).
+	 * We also check for monitor-uri, logging, HTTP/0.9 to 1.0 conversion, and
+	 * finally headers capture.
+	 */
+
+	int cur_idx;
+	struct session *sess = s->sess;
+	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+	struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
+	struct hdr_ctx ctx;
+
+	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+		s,
+		req,
+		req->rex, req->wex,
+		req->flags,
+		ci_data(req),
+		req->analysers);
+
+	/* we're speaking HTTP here, so let's speak HTTP to the client */
+	s->srv_error = http_return_srv_error;
+
+	/* If there is data available for analysis, log the end of the idle time. */
+	if (c_data(req) && s->logs.t_idle == -1)
+		s->logs.t_idle = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now) - s->logs.t_handshake;
+
+	/* There's a protected area at the end of the buffer for rewriting
+	 * purposes. We don't want to start to parse the request if the
+	 * protected area is affected, because we may have to move processed
+	 * data later, which is much more complicated.
+	 */
+	if (c_data(req) && msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR) {
+		if (txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST) {
+			if (unlikely(!channel_is_rewritable(req))) {
+				if (req->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT))
+					goto failed_keep_alive;
+				/* some data has still not left the buffer, wake us once that's done */
+				channel_dont_connect(req);
+				req->flags |= CF_READ_DONTWAIT; /* try to get back here ASAP */
+				req->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (unlikely(ci_tail(req) < c_ptr(req, msg->next) ||
+			             ci_tail(req) > b_wrap(&req->buf) - global.tune.maxrewrite))
+				channel_slow_realign(req, trash.area);
+		}
+
+		if (likely(msg->next < ci_data(req))) /* some unparsed data are available */
+			http_msg_analyzer(msg, &txn->hdr_idx);
+	}
+
+	/* 1: we might have to print this header in debug mode */
+	if (unlikely((global.mode & MODE_DEBUG) &&
+		     (!(global.mode & MODE_QUIET) || (global.mode & MODE_VERBOSE)) &&
+		     msg->msg_state >= HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+		char *eol, *sol;
+
+		sol = ci_head(req);
+		/* this is a bit complex : in case of error on the request line,
+		 * we know that rq.l is still zero, so we display only the part
+		 * up to the end of the line (truncated by debug_hdr).
+		 */
+		eol = sol + (msg->sl.rq.l ? msg->sl.rq.l : ci_data(req));
+		debug_hdr("clireq", s, sol, eol);
+
+		sol += hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
+		cur_idx = hdr_idx_first_idx(&txn->hdr_idx);
+
+		while (cur_idx) {
+			eol = sol + txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].len;
+			debug_hdr("clihdr", s, sol, eol);
+			sol = eol + txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].cr + 1;
+			cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].next;
+		}
+	}
+
+
+	/*
+	 * Now we quickly check if we have found a full valid request.
+	 * If not so, we check the FD and buffer states before leaving.
+	 * A full request is indicated by the fact that we have seen
+	 * the double LF/CRLF, so the state is >= HTTP_MSG_BODY. Invalid
+	 * requests are checked first. When waiting for a second request
+	 * on a keep-alive stream, if we encounter and error, close, t/o,
+	 * we note the error in the stream flags but don't set any state.
+	 * Since the error will be noted there, it will not be counted by
+	 * process_stream() as a frontend error.
+	 * Last, we may increase some tracked counters' http request errors on
+	 * the cases that are deliberately the client's fault. For instance,
+	 * a timeout or connection reset is not counted as an error. However
+	 * a bad request is.
+	 */
+
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+		/*
+		 * First, let's catch bad requests.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
+			stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+			stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+			proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+
+		/* 1: Since we are in header mode, if there's no space
+		 *    left for headers, we won't be able to free more
+		 *    later, so the stream will never terminate. We
+		 *    must terminate it now.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(channel_full(req, global.tune.maxrewrite))) {
+			/* FIXME: check if URI is set and return Status
+			 * 414 Request URI too long instead.
+			 */
+			stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+			stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+			proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+			if (msg->err_pos < 0)
+				msg->err_pos = ci_data(req);
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+
+		/* 2: have we encountered a read error ? */
+		else if (req->flags & CF_READ_ERROR) {
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+
+			if (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ)
+				goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+			if (sess->fe->options & PR_O_IGNORE_PRB)
+				goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+			/* we cannot return any message on error */
+			if (msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+				http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+				stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+			}
+
+			txn->status = 400;
+			msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+			msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+			req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+			stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+			proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+			if (sess->listener->counters)
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* 3: has the read timeout expired ? */
+		else if (req->flags & CF_READ_TIMEOUT || tick_is_expired(req->analyse_exp, now_ms)) {
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLITO;
+
+			if (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ)
+				goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+			if (sess->fe->options & PR_O_IGNORE_PRB)
+				goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+			/* read timeout : give up with an error message. */
+			if (msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+				http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+				stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+			}
+			txn->status = 408;
+			msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+			msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+			req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+
+			stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+			proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+			if (sess->listener->counters)
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* 4: have we encountered a close ? */
+		else if (req->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+
+			if (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ)
+				goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+			if (sess->fe->options & PR_O_IGNORE_PRB)
+				goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+			if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+				http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+			txn->status = 400;
+			msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+			msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+			req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+			stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+			stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+			proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+			if (sess->listener->counters)
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		channel_dont_connect(req);
+		req->flags |= CF_READ_DONTWAIT; /* try to get back here ASAP */
+		s->res.flags &= ~CF_EXPECT_MORE; /* speed up sending a previous response */
+#ifdef TCP_QUICKACK
+		if (sess->listener->options & LI_O_NOQUICKACK && ci_data(req) &&
+		    objt_conn(sess->origin) && conn_ctrl_ready(__objt_conn(sess->origin))) {
+			/* We need more data, we have to re-enable quick-ack in case we
+			 * previously disabled it, otherwise we might cause the client
+			 * to delay next data.
+			 */
+			setsockopt(__objt_conn(sess->origin)->handle.fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_QUICKACK, &one, sizeof(one));
+		}
+#endif
+
+		if ((msg->msg_state != HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE) && (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ)) {
+			/* If the client starts to talk, let's fall back to
+			 * request timeout processing.
+			 */
+			txn->flags &= ~TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ;
+			req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+		}
+
+		/* just set the request timeout once at the beginning of the request */
+		if (!tick_isset(req->analyse_exp)) {
+			if ((msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE) &&
+			    (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ) &&
+			    tick_isset(s->be->timeout.httpka))
+				req->analyse_exp = tick_add(now_ms, s->be->timeout.httpka);
+			else
+				req->analyse_exp = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, s->be->timeout.httpreq);
+		}
+
+		/* we're not ready yet */
+		return 0;
+
+	failed_keep_alive:
+		/* Here we process low-level errors for keep-alive requests. In
+		 * short, if the request is not the first one and it experiences
+		 * a timeout, read error or shutdown, we just silently close so
+		 * that the client can try again.
+		 */
+		txn->status = 0;
+		msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE;
+		req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+		s->logs.logwait = 0;
+		s->logs.level = 0;
+		s->res.flags &= ~CF_EXPECT_MORE; /* speed up sending a previous response */
+		http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* OK now we have a complete HTTP request with indexed headers. Let's
+	 * complete the request parsing by setting a few fields we will need
+	 * later. At this point, we have the last CRLF at req->buf.data + msg->eoh.
+	 * If the request is in HTTP/0.9 form, the rule is still true, and eoh
+	 * points to the CRLF of the request line. msg->next points to the first
+	 * byte after the last LF. msg->sov points to the first byte of data.
+	 * msg->eol cannot be trusted because it may have been left uninitialized
+	 * (for instance in the absence of headers).
+	 */
+
+	stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+	proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe); /* one more valid request for this FE */
+
+	if (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ) {
+		/* kill the pending keep-alive timeout */
+		txn->flags &= ~TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ;
+		req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+	}
+
+
+	/* Maybe we found in invalid header name while we were configured not
+	 * to block on that, so we have to capture it now.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(msg->err_pos >= 0))
+		http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+
+	/*
+	 * 1: identify the method
+	 */
+	txn->meth = find_http_meth(ci_head(req), msg->sl.rq.m_l);
+
+	/* we can make use of server redirect on GET and HEAD */
+	if (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_GET || txn->meth == HTTP_METH_HEAD)
+		s->flags |= SF_REDIRECTABLE;
+	else if (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_OTHER &&
+		 msg->sl.rq.m_l == 3 && memcmp(ci_head(req), "PRI", 3) == 0) {
+		/* PRI is reserved for the HTTP/2 preface */
+		msg->err_pos = 0;
+		goto return_bad_req;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 2: check if the URI matches the monitor_uri.
+	 * We have to do this for every request which gets in, because
+	 * the monitor-uri is defined by the frontend.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely((sess->fe->monitor_uri_len != 0) &&
+		     (sess->fe->monitor_uri_len == msg->sl.rq.u_l) &&
+		     !memcmp(ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u,
+			     sess->fe->monitor_uri,
+			     sess->fe->monitor_uri_len))) {
+		/*
+		 * We have found the monitor URI
+		 */
+		struct acl_cond *cond;
+
+		s->flags |= SF_MONITOR;
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.intercepted_req, 1);
+
+		/* Check if we want to fail this monitor request or not */
+		list_for_each_entry(cond, &sess->fe->mon_fail_cond, list) {
+			int ret = acl_exec_cond(cond, sess->fe, sess, s, SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ|SMP_OPT_FINAL);
+
+			ret = acl_pass(ret);
+			if (cond->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
+				ret = !ret;
+
+			if (ret) {
+				/* we fail this request, let's return 503 service unavail */
+				txn->status = 503;
+				http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+				if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+					s->flags |= SF_ERR_LOCAL; /* we don't want a real error here */
+				goto return_prx_cond;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* nothing to fail, let's reply normaly */
+		txn->status = 200;
+		http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+		if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+			s->flags |= SF_ERR_LOCAL; /* we don't want a real error here */
+		goto return_prx_cond;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 3: Maybe we have to copy the original REQURI for the logs ?
+	 * Note: we cannot log anymore if the request has been
+	 * classified as invalid.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(s->logs.logwait & LW_REQ)) {
+		/* we have a complete HTTP request that we must log */
+		if ((txn->uri = pool_alloc(pool_head_requri)) != NULL) {
+			int urilen = msg->sl.rq.l;
+
+			if (urilen >= global.tune.requri_len )
+				urilen = global.tune.requri_len - 1;
+			memcpy(txn->uri, ci_head(req), urilen);
+			txn->uri[urilen] = 0;
+
+			if (!(s->logs.logwait &= ~(LW_REQ|LW_INIT)))
+				s->do_log(s);
+		} else {
+			ha_alert("HTTP logging : out of memory.\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* RFC7230#2.6 has enforced the format of the HTTP version string to be
+	 * exactly one digit "." one digit. This check may be disabled using
+	 * option accept-invalid-http-request.
+	 */
+	if (!(sess->fe->options2 & PR_O2_REQBUG_OK)) {
+		if (msg->sl.rq.v_l != 8) {
+			msg->err_pos = msg->sl.rq.v;
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+
+		if (ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 4] != '/' ||
+		    !isdigit((unsigned char)ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 5]) ||
+		    ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 6] != '.' ||
+		    !isdigit((unsigned char)ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 7])) {
+			msg->err_pos = msg->sl.rq.v + 4;
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+	}
+	else {
+		/* 4. We may have to convert HTTP/0.9 requests to HTTP/1.0 */
+		if (unlikely(msg->sl.rq.v_l == 0) && !http_upgrade_v09_to_v10(txn))
+			goto return_bad_req;
+	}
+
+	/* ... and check if the request is HTTP/1.1 or above */
+	if ((msg->sl.rq.v_l == 8) &&
+	    ((ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 5] > '1') ||
+	     ((ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 5] == '1') &&
+	      (ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 7] >= '1'))))
+		msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_VER_11;
+
+	/* "connection" has not been parsed yet */
+	txn->flags &= ~(TX_HDR_CONN_PRS | TX_HDR_CONN_CLO | TX_HDR_CONN_KAL | TX_HDR_CONN_UPG);
+
+	/* if the frontend has "option http-use-proxy-header", we'll check if
+	 * we have what looks like a proxied connection instead of a connection,
+	 * and in this case set the TX_USE_PX_CONN flag to use Proxy-connection.
+	 * Note that this is *not* RFC-compliant, however browsers and proxies
+	 * happen to do that despite being non-standard :-(
+	 * We consider that a request not beginning with either '/' or '*' is
+	 * a proxied connection, which covers both "scheme://location" and
+	 * CONNECT ip:port.
+	 */
+	if ((sess->fe->options2 & PR_O2_USE_PXHDR) &&
+	    ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.u] != '/' && ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.u] != '*')
+		txn->flags |= TX_USE_PX_CONN;
+
+	/* transfer length unknown*/
+	msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+
+	/* 5: we may need to capture headers */
+	if (unlikely((s->logs.logwait & LW_REQHDR) && s->req_cap))
+		http_capture_headers(ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx,
+				     s->req_cap, sess->fe->req_cap);
+
+	/* 6: determine the transfer-length according to RFC2616 #4.4, updated
+	 * by RFC7230#3.3.3 :
+	 *
+	 * The length of a message body is determined by one of the following
+	 *   (in order of precedence):
+	 *
+	 *   1.  Any response to a HEAD request and any response with a 1xx
+	 *       (Informational), 204 (No Content), or 304 (Not Modified) status
+	 *       code is always terminated by the first empty line after the
+	 *       header fields, regardless of the header fields present in the
+	 *       message, and thus cannot contain a message body.
+	 *
+	 *   2.  Any 2xx (Successful) response to a CONNECT request implies that
+	 *       the connection will become a tunnel immediately after the empty
+	 *       line that concludes the header fields.  A client MUST ignore any
+	 *       Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header fields received in
+	 *       such a message.
+	 *
+	 *   3.  If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present and the chunked
+	 *       transfer coding (Section 4.1) is the final encoding, the message
+	 *       body length is determined by reading and decoding the chunked
+	 *       data until the transfer coding indicates the data is complete.
+	 *
+	 *       If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a response and
+	 *       the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the
+	 *       message body length is determined by reading the connection until
+	 *       it is closed by the server.  If a Transfer-Encoding header field
+	 *       is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not
+	 *       the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined
+	 *       reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request)
+	 *       status code and then close the connection.
+	 *
+	 *       If a message is received with both a Transfer-Encoding and a
+	 *       Content-Length header field, the Transfer-Encoding overrides the
+	 *       Content-Length.  Such a message might indicate an attempt to
+	 *       perform request smuggling (Section 9.5) or response splitting
+	 *       (Section 9.4) and ought to be handled as an error.  A sender MUST
+	 *       remove the received Content-Length field prior to forwarding such
+	 *       a message downstream.
+	 *
+	 *   4.  If a message is received without Transfer-Encoding and with
+	 *       either multiple Content-Length header fields having differing
+	 *       field-values or a single Content-Length header field having an
+	 *       invalid value, then the message framing is invalid and the
+	 *       recipient MUST treat it as an unrecoverable error.  If this is a
+	 *       request message, the server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request)
+	 *       status code and then close the connection.  If this is a response
+	 *       message received by a proxy, the proxy MUST close the connection
+	 *       to the server, discard the received response, and send a 502 (Bad
+	 *       Gateway) response to the client.  If this is a response message
+	 *       received by a user agent, the user agent MUST close the
+	 *       connection to the server and discard the received response.
+	 *
+	 *   5.  If a valid Content-Length header field is present without
+	 *       Transfer-Encoding, its decimal value defines the expected message
+	 *       body length in octets.  If the sender closes the connection or
+	 *       the recipient times out before the indicated number of octets are
+	 *       received, the recipient MUST consider the message to be
+	 *       incomplete and close the connection.
+	 *
+	 *   6.  If this is a request message and none of the above are true, then
+	 *       the message body length is zero (no message body is present).
+	 *
+	 *   7.  Otherwise, this is a response message without a declared message
+	 *       body length, so the message body length is determined by the
+	 *       number of octets received prior to the server closing the
+	 *       connection.
+	 */
+
+	ctx.idx = 0;
+	/* set TE_CHNK and XFER_LEN only if "chunked" is seen last */
+	while (http_find_header2("Transfer-Encoding", 17, ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+		if (ctx.vlen == 7 && strncasecmp(ctx.line + ctx.val, "chunked", 7) == 0)
+			msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK;
+		else if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) {
+			/* chunked not last, return badreq */
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Chunked requests must have their content-length removed */
+	ctx.idx = 0;
+	if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) {
+		while (http_find_header2("Content-Length", 14, ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx))
+			http_remove_header2(msg, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
+	}
+	else while (http_find_header2("Content-Length", 14, ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+		signed long long cl;
+
+		if (!ctx.vlen) {
+			msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(req);
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+
+		if (strl2llrc(ctx.line + ctx.val, ctx.vlen, &cl)) {
+			msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(req);
+			goto return_bad_req; /* parse failure */
+		}
+
+		if (cl < 0) {
+			msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(req);
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+
+		if ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN) && (msg->chunk_len != cl)) {
+			msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(req);
+			goto return_bad_req; /* already specified, was different */
+		}
+
+		msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN;
+		msg->body_len = msg->chunk_len = cl;
+	}
+
+	/* even bodyless requests have a known length */
+	msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+
+	/* Until set to anything else, the connection mode is set as Keep-Alive. It will
+	 * only change if both the request and the config reference something else.
+	 * Option httpclose by itself sets tunnel mode where headers are mangled.
+	 * However, if another mode is set, it will affect it (eg: server-close/
+	 * keep-alive + httpclose = close). Note that we avoid to redo the same work
+	 * if FE and BE have the same settings (common). The method consists in
+	 * checking if options changed between the two calls (implying that either
+	 * one is non-null, or one of them is non-null and we are there for the first
+	 * time.
+	 */
+	if (!(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_PRS) ||
+	    ((sess->fe->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) != (s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE)))
+		http_adjust_conn_mode(s, txn, msg);
+
+	/* we may have to wait for the request's body */
+	if ((s->be->options & PR_O_WREQ_BODY) &&
+	    (msg->body_len || (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)))
+		req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY;
+
+	/*
+	 * RFC7234#4:
+	 *   A cache MUST write through requests with methods
+	 *   that are unsafe (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC7231]) to
+	 *   the origin server; i.e., a cache is not allowed
+	 *   to generate a reply to such a request before
+	 *   having forwarded the request and having received
+	 *   a corresponding response.
+	 *
+	 * RFC7231#4.2.1:
+	 *   Of the request methods defined by this
+	 *   specification, the GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, and TRACE
+	 *   methods are defined to be safe.
+	 */
+	if (likely(txn->meth == HTTP_METH_GET ||
+		   txn->meth == HTTP_METH_HEAD ||
+		   txn->meth == HTTP_METH_OPTIONS ||
+		   txn->meth == HTTP_METH_TRACE))
+		txn->flags |= TX_CACHEABLE | TX_CACHE_COOK;
+
+	/* end of job, return OK */
+	req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+	req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+	return 1;
+
+ return_bad_req:
+	/* We centralize bad requests processing here */
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+		/* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this request
+		 * in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
+		 */
+		http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+	}
+
+	txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+	txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+	txn->status = 400;
+	http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+	if (sess->listener->counters)
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ return_prx_cond:
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+	req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+	req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* This stream analyser runs all HTTP request processing which is common to
+ * frontends and backends, which means blocking ACLs, filters, connection-close,
+ * reqadd, stats and redirects. This is performed for the designated proxy.
+ * It returns 1 if the processing can continue on next analysers, or zero if it
+ * either needs more data or wants to immediately abort the request (eg: deny,
+ * error, ...).
+ */
+int htx_process_req_common(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit, struct proxy *px)
+{
+	struct session *sess = s->sess;
+	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+	struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
+	struct redirect_rule *rule;
+	struct cond_wordlist *wl;
+	enum rule_result verdict;
+	int deny_status = HTTP_ERR_403;
+	struct connection *conn = objt_conn(sess->origin);
+
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+		/* we need more data */
+		goto return_prx_yield;
+	}
+
+	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+		s,
+		req,
+		req->rex, req->wex,
+		req->flags,
+		ci_data(req),
+		req->analysers);
+
+	/* just in case we have some per-backend tracking */
+	stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr(s);
+
+	/* evaluate http-request rules */
+	if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&px->http_req_rules)) {
+		verdict = http_req_get_intercept_rule(px, &px->http_req_rules, s, &deny_status);
+
+		switch (verdict) {
+		case HTTP_RULE_RES_YIELD: /* some data miss, call the function later. */
+			goto return_prx_yield;
+
+		case HTTP_RULE_RES_CONT:
+		case HTTP_RULE_RES_STOP: /* nothing to do */
+			break;
+
+		case HTTP_RULE_RES_DENY: /* deny or tarpit */
+			if (txn->flags & TX_CLTARPIT)
+				goto tarpit;
+			goto deny;
+
+		case HTTP_RULE_RES_ABRT: /* abort request, response already sent. Eg: auth */
+			goto return_prx_cond;
+
+		case HTTP_RULE_RES_DONE: /* OK, but terminate request processing (eg: redirect) */
+			goto done;
+
+		case HTTP_RULE_RES_BADREQ: /* failed with a bad request */
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (conn && (conn->flags & CO_FL_EARLY_DATA) &&
+	    (conn->flags & (CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_HANDSHAKE))) {
+		struct hdr_ctx ctx;
+
+		ctx.idx = 0;
+		if (!http_find_header2("Early-Data", strlen("Early-Data"),
+		    ci_head(&s->req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+			if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req,
+			    &txn->hdr_idx, "Early-Data: 1",
+			    strlen("Early-Data: 1")) < 0)) {
+				goto return_bad_req;
+			 }
+		}
+
+	}
+
+	/* OK at this stage, we know that the request was accepted according to
+	 * the http-request rules, we can check for the stats. Note that the
+	 * URI is detected *before* the req* rules in order not to be affected
+	 * by a possible reqrep, while they are processed *after* so that a
+	 * reqdeny can still block them. This clearly needs to change in 1.6!
+	 */
+	if (stats_check_uri(&s->si[1], txn, px)) {
+		s->target = &http_stats_applet.obj_type;
+		if (unlikely(!stream_int_register_handler(&s->si[1], objt_applet(s->target)))) {
+			txn->status = 500;
+			s->logs.tv_request = now;
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_RESOURCE;
+			goto return_prx_cond;
+		}
+
+		/* parse the whole stats request and extract the relevant information */
+		http_handle_stats(s, req);
+		verdict = http_req_get_intercept_rule(px, &px->uri_auth->http_req_rules, s, &deny_status);
+		/* not all actions implemented: deny, allow, auth */
+
+		if (verdict == HTTP_RULE_RES_DENY) /* stats http-request deny */
+			goto deny;
+
+		if (verdict == HTTP_RULE_RES_ABRT) /* stats auth / stats http-request auth */
+			goto return_prx_cond;
+	}
+
+	/* evaluate the req* rules except reqadd */
+	if (px->req_exp != NULL) {
+		if (apply_filters_to_request(s, req, px) < 0)
+			goto return_bad_req;
+
+		if (txn->flags & TX_CLDENY)
+			goto deny;
+
+		if (txn->flags & TX_CLTARPIT) {
+			deny_status = HTTP_ERR_500;
+			goto tarpit;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* add request headers from the rule sets in the same order */
+	list_for_each_entry(wl, &px->req_add, list) {
+		if (wl->cond) {
+			int ret = acl_exec_cond(wl->cond, px, sess, s, SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ|SMP_OPT_FINAL);
+			ret = acl_pass(ret);
+			if (((struct acl_cond *)wl->cond)->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
+				ret = !ret;
+			if (!ret)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, wl->s, strlen(wl->s)) < 0))
+			goto return_bad_req;
+	}
+
+
+	/* Proceed with the stats now. */
+	if (unlikely(objt_applet(s->target) == &http_stats_applet) ||
+	    unlikely(objt_applet(s->target) == &http_cache_applet)) {
+		/* process the stats request now */
+		if (sess->fe == s->be) /* report it if the request was intercepted by the frontend */
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.intercepted_req, 1);
+
+		if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))      // this is not really an error but it is
+			s->flags |= SF_ERR_LOCAL;   // to mark that it comes from the proxy
+		if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+			s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+		/* enable the minimally required analyzers to handle keep-alive and compression on the HTTP response */
+		req->analysers &= (AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY | AN_REQ_FLT_HTTP_HDRS | AN_REQ_FLT_END);
+		req->analysers &= ~AN_REQ_FLT_XFER_DATA;
+		req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_XFER_BODY;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* check whether we have some ACLs set to redirect this request */
+	list_for_each_entry(rule, &px->redirect_rules, list) {
+		if (rule->cond) {
+			int ret;
+
+			ret = acl_exec_cond(rule->cond, px, sess, s, SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ|SMP_OPT_FINAL);
+			ret = acl_pass(ret);
+			if (rule->cond->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
+				ret = !ret;
+			if (!ret)
+				continue;
+		}
+		if (!http_apply_redirect_rule(rule, s, txn))
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* POST requests may be accompanied with an "Expect: 100-Continue" header.
+	 * If this happens, then the data will not come immediately, so we must
+	 * send all what we have without waiting. Note that due to the small gain
+	 * in waiting for the body of the request, it's easier to simply put the
+	 * CF_SEND_DONTWAIT flag any time. It's a one-shot flag so it will remove
+	 * itself once used.
+	 */
+	req->flags |= CF_SEND_DONTWAIT;
+
+ done:	/* done with this analyser, continue with next ones that the calling
+	 * points will have set, if any.
+	 */
+	req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ done_without_exp: /* done with this analyser, but dont reset the analyse_exp. */
+	req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+	return 1;
+
+ tarpit:
+	/* Allow cookie logging
+	 */
+	if (s->be->cookie_name || sess->fe->capture_name)
+		manage_client_side_cookies(s, req);
+
+	/* When a connection is tarpitted, we use the tarpit timeout,
+	 * which may be the same as the connect timeout if unspecified.
+	 * If unset, then set it to zero because we really want it to
+	 * eventually expire. We build the tarpit as an analyser.
+	 */
+	channel_erase(&s->req);
+
+	/* wipe the request out so that we can drop the connection early
+	 * if the client closes first.
+	 */
+	channel_dont_connect(req);
+
+	txn->status = http_err_codes[deny_status];
+
+	req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END; /* remove switching rules etc... */
+	req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_TARPIT;
+	req->analyse_exp = tick_add_ifset(now_ms,  s->be->timeout.tarpit);
+	if (!req->analyse_exp)
+		req->analyse_exp = tick_add(now_ms, 0);
+	stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_req, 1);
+	if (sess->fe != s->be)
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_req, 1);
+	if (sess->listener->counters)
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_req, 1);
+	goto done_without_exp;
+
+ deny:	/* this request was blocked (denied) */
+
+	/* Allow cookie logging
+	 */
+	if (s->be->cookie_name || sess->fe->capture_name)
+		manage_client_side_cookies(s, req);
+
+	txn->flags |= TX_CLDENY;
+	txn->status = http_err_codes[deny_status];
+	s->logs.tv_request = now;
+	http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+	stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_req, 1);
+	if (sess->fe != s->be)
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_req, 1);
+	if (sess->listener->counters)
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_req, 1);
+	goto return_prx_cond;
+
+ return_bad_req:
+	/* We centralize bad requests processing here */
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+		/* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this request
+		 * in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
+		 */
+		http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+	}
+
+	txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+	txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+	txn->status = 400;
+	http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+	if (sess->listener->counters)
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ return_prx_cond:
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+	req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+	req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+	return 0;
+
+ return_prx_yield:
+	channel_dont_connect(req);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function performs all the processing enabled for the current request.
+ * It returns 1 if the processing can continue on next analysers, or zero if it
+ * needs more data, encounters an error, or wants to immediately abort the
+ * request. It relies on buffers flags, and updates s->req.analysers.
+ */
+int htx_process_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+	struct session *sess = s->sess;
+	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+	struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
+	struct connection *cli_conn = objt_conn(strm_sess(s)->origin);
+
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+		/* we need more data */
+		channel_dont_connect(req);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+		s,
+		req,
+		req->rex, req->wex,
+		req->flags,
+		ci_data(req),
+		req->analysers);
+
+	/*
+	 * Right now, we know that we have processed the entire headers
+	 * and that unwanted requests have been filtered out. We can do
+	 * whatever we want with the remaining request. Also, now we
+	 * may have separate values for ->fe, ->be.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * If HTTP PROXY is set we simply get remote server address parsing
+	 * incoming request. Note that this requires that a connection is
+	 * allocated on the server side.
+	 */
+	if ((s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_PROXY) && !(s->flags & SF_ADDR_SET)) {
+		struct connection *conn;
+		char *path;
+
+		/* Note that for now we don't reuse existing proxy connections */
+		if (unlikely((conn = cs_conn(si_alloc_cs(&s->si[1], NULL))) == NULL)) {
+			txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+			txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+			txn->status = 500;
+			req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_RESOURCE;
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		path = http_txn_get_path(txn);
+		if (url2sa(ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u,
+			   path ? path - (ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u) : msg->sl.rq.u_l,
+			   &conn->addr.to, NULL) == -1)
+			goto return_bad_req;
+
+		/* if the path was found, we have to remove everything between
+		 * ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u and path (excluded). If it was not
+		 * found, we need to replace from ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u for
+		 * u_l characters by a single "/".
+		 */
+		if (path) {
+			char *cur_ptr = ci_head(req);
+			char *cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
+			int delta;
+
+			delta = b_rep_blk(&req->buf, cur_ptr + msg->sl.rq.u, path, NULL, 0);
+			http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
+			cur_end += delta;
+			if (http_parse_reqline(&txn->req, HTTP_MSG_RQMETH,  cur_ptr, cur_end + 1, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+				goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+		else {
+			char *cur_ptr = ci_head(req);
+			char *cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
+			int delta;
+
+			delta = b_rep_blk(&req->buf, cur_ptr + msg->sl.rq.u,
+						cur_ptr + msg->sl.rq.u + msg->sl.rq.u_l, "/", 1);
+			http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
+			cur_end += delta;
+			if (http_parse_reqline(&txn->req, HTTP_MSG_RQMETH,  cur_ptr, cur_end + 1, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+				goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 7: Now we can work with the cookies.
+	 * Note that doing so might move headers in the request, but
+	 * the fields will stay coherent and the URI will not move.
+	 * This should only be performed in the backend.
+	 */
+	if (s->be->cookie_name || sess->fe->capture_name)
+		manage_client_side_cookies(s, req);
+
+	/* add unique-id if "header-unique-id" is specified */
+
+	if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&sess->fe->format_unique_id) && !s->unique_id) {
+		if ((s->unique_id = pool_alloc(pool_head_uniqueid)) == NULL)
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		s->unique_id[0] = '\0';
+		build_logline(s, s->unique_id, UNIQUEID_LEN, &sess->fe->format_unique_id);
+	}
+
+	if (sess->fe->header_unique_id && s->unique_id) {
+		if (chunk_printf(&trash, "%s: %s", sess->fe->header_unique_id, s->unique_id) < 0)
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, trash.data) < 0))
+		   goto return_bad_req;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 9: add X-Forwarded-For if either the frontend or the backend
+	 * asks for it.
+	 */
+	if ((sess->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_FWDFOR) {
+		struct hdr_ctx ctx = { .idx = 0 };
+		if (!((sess->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_FF_ALWAYS) &&
+			http_find_header2(s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len ? s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name : sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name,
+			                  s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len ? s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len : sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len,
+			                  ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+			/* The header is set to be added only if none is present
+			 * and we found it, so don't do anything.
+			 */
+		}
+		else if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+			/* Add an X-Forwarded-For header unless the source IP is
+			 * in the 'except' network range.
+			 */
+			if ((!sess->fe->except_mask.s_addr ||
+			     (((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr.s_addr & sess->fe->except_mask.s_addr)
+			     != sess->fe->except_net.s_addr) &&
+			    (!s->be->except_mask.s_addr ||
+			     (((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->be->except_mask.s_addr)
+			     != s->be->except_net.s_addr)) {
+				int len;
+				unsigned char *pn;
+				pn = (unsigned char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr;
+
+				/* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
+				 * x-forwarded-for, because the header is really meant for the backends.
+				 * However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
+				 * on the frontend's header name.
+				 */
+				if (s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len) {
+					len = s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len;
+					memcpy(trash.area,
+					       s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
+				} else {
+					len = sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len;
+					memcpy(trash.area,
+					       sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
+				}
+				len += snprintf(trash.area + len,
+						trash.size - len,
+						": %d.%d.%d.%d", pn[0], pn[1],
+						pn[2], pn[3]);
+
+				if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, len) < 0))
+					goto return_bad_req;
+			}
+		}
+		else if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+			/* FIXME: for the sake of completeness, we should also support
+			 * 'except' here, although it is mostly useless in this case.
+			 */
+			int len;
+			char pn[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+			inet_ntop(AF_INET6,
+				  (const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&cli_conn->addr.from))->sin6_addr,
+				  pn, sizeof(pn));
+
+			/* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
+			 * x-forwarded-for, because the header is really meant for the backends.
+			 * However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
+			 * on the frontend's header name.
+			 */
+			if (s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len) {
+				len = s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len;
+				memcpy(trash.area, s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name,
+				       len);
+			} else {
+				len = sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len;
+				memcpy(trash.area, sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name,
+				       len);
+			}
+			len += snprintf(trash.area + len, trash.size - len,
+					": %s", pn);
+
+			if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, len) < 0))
+				goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 10: add X-Original-To if either the frontend or the backend
+	 * asks for it.
+	 */
+	if ((sess->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_ORGTO) {
+
+		/* FIXME: don't know if IPv6 can handle that case too. */
+		if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+			/* Add an X-Original-To header unless the destination IP is
+			 * in the 'except' network range.
+			 */
+			conn_get_to_addr(cli_conn);
+
+			if (cli_conn->addr.to.ss_family == AF_INET &&
+			    ((!sess->fe->except_mask_to.s_addr ||
+			      (((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr.s_addr & sess->fe->except_mask_to.s_addr)
+			      != sess->fe->except_to.s_addr) &&
+			     (!s->be->except_mask_to.s_addr ||
+			      (((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->be->except_mask_to.s_addr)
+			      != s->be->except_to.s_addr))) {
+				int len;
+				unsigned char *pn;
+				pn = (unsigned char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr;
+
+				/* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
+				 * x-original-to, because the header is really meant for the backends.
+				 * However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
+				 * on the frontend's header name.
+				 */
+				if (s->be->orgto_hdr_len) {
+					len = s->be->orgto_hdr_len;
+					memcpy(trash.area,
+					       s->be->orgto_hdr_name, len);
+				} else {
+					len = sess->fe->orgto_hdr_len;
+					memcpy(trash.area,
+					       sess->fe->orgto_hdr_name, len);
+				}
+				len += snprintf(trash.area + len,
+						trash.size - len,
+						": %d.%d.%d.%d", pn[0], pn[1],
+						pn[2], pn[3]);
+
+				if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, len) < 0))
+					goto return_bad_req;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* 11: add "Connection: close" or "Connection: keep-alive" if needed and not yet set.
+	 * If an "Upgrade" token is found, the header is left untouched in order not to have
+	 * to deal with some servers bugs : some of them fail an Upgrade if anything but
+	 * "Upgrade" is present in the Connection header.
+	 */
+	if (!(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_UPG) && (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN) {
+		unsigned int want_flags = 0;
+
+		if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11) {
+			if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) >= TX_CON_WANT_SCL &&
+			    !((sess->fe->options2|s->be->options2) & PR_O2_FAKE_KA))
+				want_flags |= TX_CON_CLO_SET;
+		} else {
+			if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
+			    ((sess->fe->options2|s->be->options2) & PR_O2_FAKE_KA))
+				want_flags |= TX_CON_KAL_SET;
+		}
+
+		if (want_flags != (txn->flags & (TX_CON_CLO_SET|TX_CON_KAL_SET)))
+			http_change_connection_header(txn, msg, want_flags);
+	}
+
+
+	/* If we have no server assigned yet and we're balancing on url_param
+	 * with a POST request, we may be interested in checking the body for
+	 * that parameter. This will be done in another analyser.
+	 */
+	if (!(s->flags & (SF_ASSIGNED|SF_DIRECT)) &&
+	    s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST && s->be->url_param_name != NULL &&
+	    (msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN|HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK))) {
+		channel_dont_connect(req);
+		req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY;
+	}
+
+	req->analysers &= ~AN_REQ_FLT_XFER_DATA;
+	req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_XFER_BODY;
+#ifdef TCP_QUICKACK
+	/* We expect some data from the client. Unless we know for sure
+	 * we already have a full request, we have to re-enable quick-ack
+	 * in case we previously disabled it, otherwise we might cause
+	 * the client to delay further data.
+	 */
+	if ((sess->listener->options & LI_O_NOQUICKACK) &&
+	    cli_conn && conn_ctrl_ready(cli_conn) &&
+	    ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) ||
+	     (msg->body_len > ci_data(req) - txn->req.eoh - 2)))
+		setsockopt(cli_conn->handle.fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_QUICKACK, &one, sizeof(one));
+#endif
+
+	/*************************************************************
+	 * OK, that's finished for the headers. We have done what we *
+	 * could. Let's switch to the DATA state.                    *
+	 ************************************************************/
+	req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+	req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+
+	s->logs.tv_request = now;
+	/* OK let's go on with the BODY now */
+	return 1;
+
+ return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+		/* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this request
+		 * in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
+		 */
+		http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+	}
+
+	txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+	txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+	txn->status = 400;
+	req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+	http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+	if (sess->listener->counters)
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function is an analyser which processes the HTTP tarpit. It always
+ * returns zero, at the beginning because it prevents any other processing
+ * from occurring, and at the end because it terminates the request.
+ */
+int htx_process_tarpit(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+
+	/* This connection is being tarpitted. The CLIENT side has
+	 * already set the connect expiration date to the right
+	 * timeout. We just have to check that the client is still
+	 * there and that the timeout has not expired.
+	 */
+	channel_dont_connect(req);
+	if ((req->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_READ_ERROR)) == 0 &&
+	    !tick_is_expired(req->analyse_exp, now_ms))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* We will set the queue timer to the time spent, just for
+	 * logging purposes. We fake a 500 server error, so that the
+	 * attacker will not suspect his connection has been tarpitted.
+	 * It will not cause trouble to the logs because we can exclude
+	 * the tarpitted connections by filtering on the 'PT' status flags.
+	 */
+	s->logs.t_queue = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now);
+
+	if (!(req->flags & CF_READ_ERROR))
+		http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+	req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+	req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_FINST_T;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function is an analyser which waits for the HTTP request body. It waits
+ * for either the buffer to be full, or the full advertised contents to have
+ * reached the buffer. It must only be called after the standard HTTP request
+ * processing has occurred, because it expects the request to be parsed and will
+ * look for the Expect header. It may send a 100-Continue interim response. It
+ * takes in input any state starting from HTTP_MSG_BODY and leaves with one of
+ * HTTP_MSG_CHK_SIZE, HTTP_MSG_DATA or HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS. It returns zero if it
+ * needs to read more data, or 1 once it has completed its analysis.
+ */
+int htx_wait_for_request_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+	struct session *sess = s->sess;
+	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+	struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->req;
+
+	/* We have to parse the HTTP request body to find any required data.
+	 * "balance url_param check_post" should have been the only way to get
+	 * into this. We were brought here after HTTP header analysis, so all
+	 * related structures are ready.
+	 */
+
+	if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
+		/* This is the first call */
+		if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)
+			goto missing_data;
+
+		if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_100_SENT) {
+			/* If we have HTTP/1.1 and Expect: 100-continue, then we must
+			 * send an HTTP/1.1 100 Continue intermediate response.
+			 */
+			if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11) {
+				struct hdr_ctx ctx;
+				ctx.idx = 0;
+				/* Expect is allowed in 1.1, look for it */
+				if (http_find_header2("Expect", 6, ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx) &&
+				    unlikely(ctx.vlen == 12 && strncasecmp(ctx.line+ctx.val, "100-continue", 12) == 0)) {
+					co_inject(&s->res, HTTP_100.ptr, HTTP_100.len);
+					http_remove_header2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
+				}
+			}
+			msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_100_SENT;
+		}
+
+		/* we have msg->sov which points to the first byte of message body.
+		 * ci_head(req) still points to the beginning of the message. We
+		 * must save the body in msg->next because it survives buffer
+		 * re-alignments.
+		 */
+		msg->next = msg->sov;
+
+		if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+			msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE;
+		else
+			msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DATA;
+	}
+
+	if (!(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)) {
+		/* We're in content-length mode, we just have to wait for enough data. */
+		if (http_body_bytes(msg) < msg->body_len)
+			goto missing_data;
+
+		/* OK we have everything we need now */
+		goto http_end;
+	}
+
+	/* OK here we're parsing a chunked-encoded message */
+
+	if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
+		/* read the chunk size and assign it to ->chunk_len, then
+		 * set ->sov and ->next to point to the body and switch to DATA or
+		 * TRAILERS state.
+		 */
+		unsigned int chunk;
+		int ret = h1_parse_chunk_size(&req->buf, co_data(req) + msg->next, c_data(req), &chunk);
+
+		if (!ret)
+			goto missing_data;
+		else if (ret < 0) {
+			msg->err_pos = ci_data(req) + ret;
+			if (msg->err_pos < 0)
+				msg->err_pos += req->buf.size;
+			stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+
+		msg->chunk_len = chunk;
+		msg->body_len += chunk;
+
+		msg->sol = ret;
+		msg->next += ret;
+		msg->msg_state = msg->chunk_len ? HTTP_MSG_DATA : HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS;
+	}
+
+	/* Now we're in HTTP_MSG_DATA or HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS state.
+	 * We have the first data byte is in msg->sov + msg->sol. We're waiting
+	 * for at least a whole chunk or the whole content length bytes after
+	 * msg->sov + msg->sol.
+	 */
+	if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS)
+		goto http_end;
+
+	if (http_body_bytes(msg) >= msg->body_len)   /* we have enough bytes now */
+		goto http_end;
+
+ missing_data:
+	/* we get here if we need to wait for more data. If the buffer is full,
+	 * we have the maximum we can expect.
+	 */
+	if (channel_full(req, global.tune.maxrewrite))
+		goto http_end;
+
+	if ((req->flags & CF_READ_TIMEOUT) || tick_is_expired(req->analyse_exp, now_ms)) {
+		txn->status = 408;
+		http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+		if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+			s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLITO;
+		if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+			s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+		goto return_err_msg;
+	}
+
+	/* we get here if we need to wait for more data */
+	if (!(req->flags & (CF_SHUTR | CF_READ_ERROR))) {
+		/* Not enough data. We'll re-use the http-request
+		 * timeout here. Ideally, we should set the timeout
+		 * relative to the accept() date. We just set the
+		 * request timeout once at the beginning of the
+		 * request.
+		 */
+		channel_dont_connect(req);
+		if (!tick_isset(req->analyse_exp))
+			req->analyse_exp = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, s->be->timeout.httpreq);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+ http_end:
+	/* The situation will not evolve, so let's give up on the analysis. */
+	s->logs.tv_request = now;  /* update the request timer to reflect full request */
+	req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+	req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+	return 1;
+
+ return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
+	txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+	txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+	txn->status = 400;
+	http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+ return_err_msg:
+	req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+	if (sess->listener->counters)
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function is an analyser which forwards request body (including chunk
+ * sizes if any). It is called as soon as we must forward, even if we forward
+ * zero byte. The only situation where it must not be called is when we're in
+ * tunnel mode and we want to forward till the close. It's used both to forward
+ * remaining data and to resync after end of body. It expects the msg_state to
+ * be between MSG_BODY and MSG_DONE (inclusive). It returns zero if it needs to
+ * read more data, or 1 once we can go on with next request or end the stream.
+ * When in MSG_DATA or MSG_TRAILERS, it will automatically forward chunk_len
+ * bytes of pending data + the headers if not already done.
+ */
+int htx_request_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+	struct session *sess = s->sess;
+	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+	struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->req;
+	int ret;
+
+	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+		s,
+		req,
+		req->rex, req->wex,
+		req->flags,
+		ci_data(req),
+		req->analysers);
+
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((req->flags & (CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_TIMEOUT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT)) ||
+	    ((req->flags & CF_SHUTW) && (req->to_forward || co_data(req)))) {
+		/* Output closed while we were sending data. We must abort and
+		 * wake the other side up.
+		 */
+		msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+		msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+		http_resync_states(s);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Note that we don't have to send 100-continue back because we don't
+	 * need the data to complete our job, and it's up to the server to
+	 * decide whether to return 100, 417 or anything else in return of
+	 * an "Expect: 100-continue" header.
+	 */
+	if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_BODY) {
+		msg->msg_state = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+				  ? HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE
+				  : HTTP_MSG_DATA);
+
+		/* TODO/filters: when http-buffer-request option is set or if a
+		 * rule on url_param exists, the first chunk size could be
+		 * already parsed. In that case, msg->next is after the chunk
+		 * size (including the CRLF after the size). So this case should
+		 * be handled to */
+	}
+
+	/* Some post-connect processing might want us to refrain from starting to
+	 * forward data. Currently, the only reason for this is "balance url_param"
+	 * whichs need to parse/process the request after we've enabled forwarding.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN)) {
+		if (!(s->res.flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)) {
+			channel_auto_connect(req);
+			req->flags |= CF_WAKE_CONNECT;
+			channel_dont_close(req); /* don't fail on early shutr */
+			goto waiting;
+		}
+		msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN;
+	}
+
+	/* in most states, we should abort in case of early close */
+	channel_auto_close(req);
+
+	if (req->to_forward) {
+		/* We can't process the buffer's contents yet */
+		req->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
+		goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+	}
+
+	if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_DONE) {
+		ret = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+		       ? http_msg_forward_chunked_body(s, msg)
+		       : http_msg_forward_body(s, msg));
+		if (!ret)
+			goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto return_bad_req;
+	}
+
+	/* other states, DONE...TUNNEL */
+	/* we don't want to forward closes on DONE except in tunnel mode. */
+	if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN)
+		channel_dont_close(req);
+
+	http_resync_states(s);
+	if (!(req->analysers & an_bit)) {
+		if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
+			if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
+				/* request errors are most likely due to the
+				 * server aborting the transfer. */
+				goto aborted_xfer;
+			}
+			if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+				http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, s->be);
+			goto return_bad_req;
+		}
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* If "option abortonclose" is set on the backend, we want to monitor
+	 * the client's connection and forward any shutdown notification to the
+	 * server, which will decide whether to close or to go on processing the
+	 * request. We only do that in tunnel mode, and not in other modes since
+	 * it can be abused to exhaust source ports. */
+	if ((s->be->options & PR_O_ABRT_CLOSE) && !(s->si[0].flags & SI_FL_CLEAN_ABRT)) {
+		channel_auto_read(req);
+		if ((req->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_READ_NULL)) &&
+		    ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN))
+			s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+		channel_auto_close(req);
+	}
+	else if (s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST) {
+		/* POST requests may require to read extra CRLF sent by broken
+		 * browsers and which could cause an RST to be sent upon close
+		 * on some systems (eg: Linux). */
+		channel_auto_read(req);
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+ missing_data_or_waiting:
+	/* stop waiting for data if the input is closed before the end */
+	if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ENDING && req->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
+		if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+			s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+		if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK)) {
+			if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+			else
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+		}
+
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+		if (objt_server(s->target))
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+
+		goto return_bad_req_stats_ok;
+	}
+
+ waiting:
+	/* waiting for the last bits to leave the buffer */
+	if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW)
+		goto aborted_xfer;
+
+	/* When TE: chunked is used, we need to get there again to parse remaining
+	 * chunks even if the client has closed, so we don't want to set CF_DONTCLOSE.
+	 * And when content-length is used, we never want to let the possible
+	 * shutdown be forwarded to the other side, as the state machine will
+	 * take care of it once the client responds. It's also important to
+	 * prevent TIME_WAITs from accumulating on the backend side, and for
+	 * HTTP/2 where the last frame comes with a shutdown.
+	 */
+	if (msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK|HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN))
+		channel_dont_close(req);
+
+	/* We know that more data are expected, but we couldn't send more that
+	 * what we did. So we always set the CF_EXPECT_MORE flag so that the
+	 * system knows it must not set a PUSH on this first part. Interactive
+	 * modes are already handled by the stream sock layer. We must not do
+	 * this in content-length mode because it could present the MSG_MORE
+	 * flag with the last block of forwarded data, which would cause an
+	 * additional delay to be observed by the receiver.
+	 */
+	if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+		req->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE;
+
+	return 0;
+
+ return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+	if (sess->listener->counters)
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ return_bad_req_stats_ok:
+	txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+	txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+	if (txn->status) {
+		/* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
+		http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+	} else {
+		txn->status = 400;
+		http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+	}
+	req->analysers   &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+	s->res.analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
+
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK)) {
+		if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
+			s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+		else
+			s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+ aborted_xfer:
+	txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+	txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+	if (txn->status) {
+		/* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
+		http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+	} else {
+		txn->status = 502;
+		http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+	}
+	req->analysers   &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+	s->res.analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
+
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+	if (objt_server(s->target))
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL;
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK)) {
+		if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
+			s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+		else
+			s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This stream analyser waits for a complete HTTP response. It returns 1 if the
+ * processing can continue on next analysers, or zero if it either needs more
+ * data or wants to immediately abort the response (eg: timeout, error, ...). It
+ * is tied to AN_RES_WAIT_HTTP and may may remove itself from s->res.analysers
+ * when it has nothing left to do, and may remove any analyser when it wants to
+ * abort.
+ */
+int htx_wait_for_response(struct stream *s, struct channel *rep, int an_bit)
+{
+	struct session *sess = s->sess;
+	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+	struct http_msg *msg = &txn->rsp;
+	struct hdr_ctx ctx;
+	int use_close_only;
+	int cur_idx;
+	int n;
+
+	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+		s,
+		rep,
+		rep->rex, rep->wex,
+		rep->flags,
+		ci_data(rep),
+		rep->analysers);
+
+	/*
+	 * Now parse the partial (or complete) lines.
+	 * We will check the response syntax, and also join multi-line
+	 * headers. An index of all the lines will be elaborated while
+	 * parsing.
+	 *
+	 * For the parsing, we use a 28 states FSM.
+	 *
+	 * Here is the information we currently have :
+	 *   ci_head(rep)             = beginning of response
+	 *   ci_head(rep) + msg->eoh  = end of processed headers / start of current one
+	 *   ci_tail(rep)             = end of input data
+	 *   msg->eol                 = end of current header or line (LF or CRLF)
+	 *   msg->next                = first non-visited byte
+	 */
+
+ next_one:
+	/* There's a protected area at the end of the buffer for rewriting
+	 * purposes. We don't want to start to parse the request if the
+	 * protected area is affected, because we may have to move processed
+	 * data later, which is much more complicated.
+	 */
+	if (c_data(rep) && msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR) {
+		if (unlikely(!channel_is_rewritable(rep))) {
+			/* some data has still not left the buffer, wake us once that's done */
+			if (rep->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT))
+				goto abort_response;
+			channel_dont_close(rep);
+			rep->flags |= CF_READ_DONTWAIT; /* try to get back here ASAP */
+			rep->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		if (unlikely(ci_tail(rep) < c_ptr(rep, msg->next) ||
+		             ci_tail(rep) > b_wrap(&rep->buf) - global.tune.maxrewrite))
+			channel_slow_realign(rep, trash.area);
+
+		if (likely(msg->next < ci_data(rep)))
+			http_msg_analyzer(msg, &txn->hdr_idx);
+	}
+
+	/* 1: we might have to print this header in debug mode */
+	if (unlikely((global.mode & MODE_DEBUG) &&
+		     (!(global.mode & MODE_QUIET) || (global.mode & MODE_VERBOSE)) &&
+		     msg->msg_state >= HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+		char *eol, *sol;
+
+		sol = ci_head(rep);
+		eol = sol + (msg->sl.st.l ? msg->sl.st.l : ci_data(rep));
+		debug_hdr("srvrep", s, sol, eol);
+
+		sol += hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
+		cur_idx = hdr_idx_first_idx(&txn->hdr_idx);
+
+		while (cur_idx) {
+			eol = sol + txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].len;
+			debug_hdr("srvhdr", s, sol, eol);
+			sol = eol + txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].cr + 1;
+			cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].next;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now we quickly check if we have found a full valid response.
+	 * If not so, we check the FD and buffer states before leaving.
+	 * A full response is indicated by the fact that we have seen
+	 * the double LF/CRLF, so the state is >= HTTP_MSG_BODY. Invalid
+	 * responses are checked first.
+	 *
+	 * Depending on whether the client is still there or not, we
+	 * may send an error response back or not. Note that normally
+	 * we should only check for HTTP status there, and check I/O
+	 * errors somewhere else.
+	 */
+
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+		/* Invalid response */
+		if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
+			/* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this response
+			 * in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
+			 */
+		hdr_response_bad:
+			if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR || msg->err_pos >= 0)
+				http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+			if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+				health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_HDRRSP);
+			}
+		abort_response:
+			channel_auto_close(rep);
+			rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+			txn->status = 502;
+			s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+			channel_truncate(rep);
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* too large response does not fit in buffer. */
+		else if (channel_full(rep, global.tune.maxrewrite)) {
+			if (msg->err_pos < 0)
+				msg->err_pos = ci_data(rep);
+			goto hdr_response_bad;
+		}
+
+		/* read error */
+		else if (rep->flags & CF_READ_ERROR) {
+			if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+				http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+			else if (txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST)
+				goto abort_keep_alive;
+
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+			if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+				health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_READ_ERROR);
+			}
+
+			channel_auto_close(rep);
+			rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+			txn->status = 502;
+
+			/* Check to see if the server refused the early data.
+			 * If so, just send a 425
+			 */
+			if (objt_cs(s->si[1].end)) {
+				struct connection *conn = objt_cs(s->si[1].end)->conn;
+
+				if (conn->err_code == CO_ER_SSL_EARLY_FAILED)
+					txn->status = 425;
+			}
+
+			s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+			channel_truncate(rep);
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL;
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* read timeout : return a 504 to the client. */
+		else if (rep->flags & CF_READ_TIMEOUT) {
+			if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+				http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+			if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+				health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_READ_TIMEOUT);
+			}
+
+			channel_auto_close(rep);
+			rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+			txn->status = 504;
+			s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+			channel_truncate(rep);
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVTO;
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* client abort with an abortonclose */
+		else if ((rep->flags & CF_SHUTR) && ((s->req.flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTW)) == (CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTW))) {
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+			if (objt_server(s->target))
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+
+			rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+			channel_auto_close(rep);
+
+			txn->status = 400;
+			channel_truncate(rep);
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+
+			/* process_stream() will take care of the error */
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* close from server, capture the response if the server has started to respond */
+		else if (rep->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
+			if (msg->msg_state >= HTTP_MSG_RPVER || msg->err_pos >= 0)
+				http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+			else if (txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST)
+				goto abort_keep_alive;
+
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+			if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+				health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_BROKEN_PIPE);
+			}
+
+			channel_auto_close(rep);
+			rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+			txn->status = 502;
+			s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+			channel_truncate(rep);
+			http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL;
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* write error to client (we don't send any message then) */
+		else if (rep->flags & CF_WRITE_ERROR) {
+			if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+				http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+			else if (txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST)
+				goto abort_keep_alive;
+
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+			rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+			channel_auto_close(rep);
+
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+
+			/* process_stream() will take care of the error */
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		channel_dont_close(rep);
+		rep->flags |= CF_READ_DONTWAIT; /* try to get back here ASAP */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* More interesting part now : we know that we have a complete
+	 * response which at least looks like HTTP. We have an indicator
+	 * of each header's length, so we can parse them quickly.
+	 */
+
+	if (unlikely(msg->err_pos >= 0))
+		http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+
+	/*
+	 * 1: get the status code
+	 */
+	n = ci_head(rep)[msg->sl.st.c] - '0';
+	if (n < 1 || n > 5)
+		n = 0;
+	/* when the client triggers a 4xx from the server, it's most often due
+	 * to a missing object or permission. These events should be tracked
+	 * because if they happen often, it may indicate a brute force or a
+	 * vulnerability scan.
+	 */
+	if (n == 4)
+		stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+
+	if (objt_server(s->target))
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.p.http.rsp[n], 1);
+
+	/* RFC7230#2.6 has enforced the format of the HTTP version string to be
+	 * exactly one digit "." one digit. This check may be disabled using
+	 * option accept-invalid-http-response.
+	 */
+	if (!(s->be->options2 & PR_O2_RSPBUG_OK)) {
+		if (msg->sl.st.v_l != 8) {
+			msg->err_pos = 0;
+			goto hdr_response_bad;
+		}
+
+		if (ci_head(rep)[4] != '/' ||
+		    !isdigit((unsigned char)ci_head(rep)[5]) ||
+		    ci_head(rep)[6] != '.' ||
+		    !isdigit((unsigned char)ci_head(rep)[7])) {
+			msg->err_pos = 4;
+			goto hdr_response_bad;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* check if the response is HTTP/1.1 or above */
+	if ((msg->sl.st.v_l == 8) &&
+	    ((ci_head(rep)[5] > '1') ||
+	     ((ci_head(rep)[5] == '1') && (ci_head(rep)[7] >= '1'))))
+		msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_VER_11;
+
+	/* "connection" has not been parsed yet */
+	txn->flags &= ~(TX_HDR_CONN_PRS|TX_HDR_CONN_CLO|TX_HDR_CONN_KAL|TX_HDR_CONN_UPG|TX_CON_CLO_SET|TX_CON_KAL_SET);
+
+	/* transfer length unknown*/
+	msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+
+	txn->status = strl2ui(ci_head(rep) + msg->sl.st.c, msg->sl.st.c_l);
+
+	/* Adjust server's health based on status code. Note: status codes 501
+	 * and 505 are triggered on demand by client request, so we must not
+	 * count them as server failures.
+	 */
+	if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+		if (txn->status >= 100 && (txn->status < 500 || txn->status == 501 || txn->status == 505))
+			health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_OK);
+		else
+			health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_STS);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We may be facing a 100-continue response, or any other informational
+	 * 1xx response which is non-final, in which case this is not the right
+	 * response, and we're waiting for the next one. Let's allow this response
+	 * to go to the client and wait for the next one. There's an exception for
+	 * 101 which is used later in the code to switch protocols.
+	 */
+	if (txn->status < 200 &&
+	    (txn->status == 100 || txn->status >= 102)) {
+		hdr_idx_init(&txn->hdr_idx);
+		msg->next -= channel_forward(rep, msg->next);
+		msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE;
+		txn->status = 0;
+		s->logs.t_data = -1; /* was not a response yet */
+		FLT_STRM_CB(s, flt_http_reset(s, msg));
+		goto next_one;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 2: check for cacheability.
+	 */
+
+	switch (txn->status) {
+	case 200:
+	case 203:
+	case 204:
+	case 206:
+	case 300:
+	case 301:
+	case 404:
+	case 405:
+	case 410:
+	case 414:
+	case 501:
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* RFC7231#6.1:
+		 *   Responses with status codes that are defined as
+		 *   cacheable by default (e.g., 200, 203, 204, 206,
+		 *   300, 301, 404, 405, 410, 414, and 501 in this
+		 *   specification) can be reused by a cache with
+		 *   heuristic expiration unless otherwise indicated
+		 *   by the method definition or explicit cache
+		 *   controls [RFC7234]; all other status codes are
+		 *   not cacheable by default.
+		 */
+		txn->flags &= ~(TX_CACHEABLE | TX_CACHE_COOK);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 3: we may need to capture headers
+	 */
+	s->logs.logwait &= ~LW_RESP;
+	if (unlikely((s->logs.logwait & LW_RSPHDR) && s->res_cap))
+		http_capture_headers(ci_head(rep), &txn->hdr_idx,
+				     s->res_cap, sess->fe->rsp_cap);
+
+	/* 4: determine the transfer-length according to RFC2616 #4.4, updated
+	 * by RFC7230#3.3.3 :
+	 *
+	 * The length of a message body is determined by one of the following
+	 *   (in order of precedence):
+	 *
+	 *   1.  Any 2xx (Successful) response to a CONNECT request implies that
+	 *       the connection will become a tunnel immediately after the empty
+	 *       line that concludes the header fields.  A client MUST ignore
+	 *       any Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header fields received
+	 *       in such a message. Any 101 response (Switching Protocols) is
+	 *       managed in the same manner.
+	 *
+	 *   2.  Any response to a HEAD request and any response with a 1xx
+	 *       (Informational), 204 (No Content), or 304 (Not Modified) status
+	 *       code is always terminated by the first empty line after the
+	 *       header fields, regardless of the header fields present in the
+	 *       message, and thus cannot contain a message body.
+	 *
+	 *   3.  If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present and the chunked
+	 *       transfer coding (Section 4.1) is the final encoding, the message
+	 *       body length is determined by reading and decoding the chunked
+	 *       data until the transfer coding indicates the data is complete.
+	 *
+	 *       If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a response and
+	 *       the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the
+	 *       message body length is determined by reading the connection until
+	 *       it is closed by the server.  If a Transfer-Encoding header field
+	 *       is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not
+	 *       the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined
+	 *       reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request)
+	 *       status code and then close the connection.
+	 *
+	 *       If a message is received with both a Transfer-Encoding and a
+	 *       Content-Length header field, the Transfer-Encoding overrides the
+	 *       Content-Length.  Such a message might indicate an attempt to
+	 *       perform request smuggling (Section 9.5) or response splitting
+	 *       (Section 9.4) and ought to be handled as an error.  A sender MUST
+	 *       remove the received Content-Length field prior to forwarding such
+	 *       a message downstream.
+	 *
+	 *   4.  If a message is received without Transfer-Encoding and with
+	 *       either multiple Content-Length header fields having differing
+	 *       field-values or a single Content-Length header field having an
+	 *       invalid value, then the message framing is invalid and the
+	 *       recipient MUST treat it as an unrecoverable error.  If this is a
+	 *       request message, the server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request)
+	 *       status code and then close the connection.  If this is a response
+	 *       message received by a proxy, the proxy MUST close the connection
+	 *       to the server, discard the received response, and send a 502 (Bad
+	 *       Gateway) response to the client.  If this is a response message
+	 *       received by a user agent, the user agent MUST close the
+	 *       connection to the server and discard the received response.
+	 *
+	 *   5.  If a valid Content-Length header field is present without
+	 *       Transfer-Encoding, its decimal value defines the expected message
+	 *       body length in octets.  If the sender closes the connection or
+	 *       the recipient times out before the indicated number of octets are
+	 *       received, the recipient MUST consider the message to be
+	 *       incomplete and close the connection.
+	 *
+	 *   6.  If this is a request message and none of the above are true, then
+	 *       the message body length is zero (no message body is present).
+	 *
+	 *   7.  Otherwise, this is a response message without a declared message
+	 *       body length, so the message body length is determined by the
+	 *       number of octets received prior to the server closing the
+	 *       connection.
+	 */
+
+	/* Skip parsing if no content length is possible. The response flags
+	 * remain 0 as well as the chunk_len, which may or may not mirror
+	 * the real header value, and we note that we know the response's length.
+	 * FIXME: should we parse anyway and return an error on chunked encoding ?
+	 */
+	if (unlikely((txn->meth == HTTP_METH_CONNECT && txn->status == 200) ||
+		     txn->status == 101)) {
+		/* Either we've established an explicit tunnel, or we're
+		 * switching the protocol. In both cases, we're very unlikely
+		 * to understand the next protocols. We have to switch to tunnel
+		 * mode, so that we transfer the request and responses then let
+		 * this protocol pass unmodified. When we later implement specific
+		 * parsers for such protocols, we'll want to check the Upgrade
+		 * header which contains information about that protocol for
+		 * responses with status 101 (eg: see RFC2817 about TLS).
+		 */
+		txn->flags = (txn->flags & ~TX_CON_WANT_MSK) | TX_CON_WANT_TUN;
+		msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+		goto end;
+	}
+
+	if (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_HEAD ||
+	    (txn->status >= 100 && txn->status < 200) ||
+	    txn->status == 204 || txn->status == 304) {
+		msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+		goto skip_content_length;
+	}
+
+	use_close_only = 0;
+	ctx.idx = 0;
+	while (http_find_header2("Transfer-Encoding", 17, ci_head(rep), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+		if (ctx.vlen == 7 && strncasecmp(ctx.line + ctx.val, "chunked", 7) == 0)
+			msg->flags |= (HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK | HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN);
+		else if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) {
+			/* bad transfer-encoding (chunked followed by something else) */
+			use_close_only = 1;
+			msg->flags &= ~(HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK | HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Chunked responses must have their content-length removed */
+	ctx.idx = 0;
+	if (use_close_only || (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)) {
+		while (http_find_header2("Content-Length", 14, ci_head(rep), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx))
+			http_remove_header2(msg, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
+	}
+	else while (http_find_header2("Content-Length", 14, ci_head(rep), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+		signed long long cl;
+
+		if (!ctx.vlen) {
+			msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(rep);
+			goto hdr_response_bad;
+		}
+
+		if (strl2llrc(ctx.line + ctx.val, ctx.vlen, &cl)) {
+			msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(rep);
+			goto hdr_response_bad; /* parse failure */
+		}
+
+		if (cl < 0) {
+			msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(rep);
+			goto hdr_response_bad;
+		}
+
+		if ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN) && (msg->chunk_len != cl)) {
+			msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(rep);
+			goto hdr_response_bad; /* already specified, was different */
+		}
+
+		msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN | HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+		msg->body_len = msg->chunk_len = cl;
+	}
+
+ skip_content_length:
+	/* Now we have to check if we need to modify the Connection header.
+	 * This is more difficult on the response than it is on the request,
+	 * because we can have two different HTTP versions and we don't know
+	 * how the client will interprete a response. For instance, let's say
+	 * that the client sends a keep-alive request in HTTP/1.0 and gets an
+	 * HTTP/1.1 response without any header. Maybe it will bound itself to
+	 * HTTP/1.0 because it only knows about it, and will consider the lack
+	 * of header as a close, or maybe it knows HTTP/1.1 and can consider
+	 * the lack of header as a keep-alive. Thus we will use two flags
+	 * indicating how a request MAY be understood by the client. In case
+	 * of multiple possibilities, we'll fix the header to be explicit. If
+	 * ambiguous cases such as both close and keepalive are seen, then we
+	 * will fall back to explicit close. Note that we won't take risks with
+	 * HTTP/1.0 clients which may not necessarily understand keep-alive.
+	 * See doc/internals/connection-header.txt for the complete matrix.
+	 */
+	if ((txn->status >= 200) && !(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_PRS) &&
+	    (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN) {
+		int to_del = 0;
+
+		/* on unknown transfer length, we must close */
+		if (!(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN))
+			txn->flags = (txn->flags & ~TX_CON_WANT_MSK) | TX_CON_WANT_CLO;
+
+		/* now adjust header transformations depending on current state */
+		if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_CLO) {
+			to_del |= 2; /* remove "keep-alive" on any response */
+			if (!(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11))
+				to_del |= 1; /* remove "close" for HTTP/1.0 responses */
+		}
+		else { /* SCL / KAL */
+			to_del |= 1; /* remove "close" on any response */
+			if (txn->req.flags & msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11)
+				to_del |= 2; /* remove "keep-alive" on pure 1.1 responses */
+		}
+
+		/* Parse and remove some headers from the connection header */
+		http_parse_connection_header(txn, msg, to_del);
+
+		/* Some keep-alive responses are converted to Server-close if
+		 * the server wants to close.
+		 */
+		if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL) {
+			if ((txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_CLO) ||
+			    (!(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_KAL) && !(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11)))
+				txn->flags = (txn->flags & ~TX_CON_WANT_MSK) | TX_CON_WANT_SCL;
+		}
+	}
+
+ end:
+	/* we want to have the response time before we start processing it */
+	s->logs.t_data = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now);
+
+	/* end of job, return OK */
+	rep->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+	rep->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+	channel_auto_close(rep);
+	return 1;
+
+ abort_keep_alive:
+	/* A keep-alive request to the server failed on a network error.
+	 * The client is required to retry. We need to close without returning
+	 * any other information so that the client retries.
+	 */
+	txn->status = 0;
+	rep->analysers   &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+	s->req.analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+	channel_auto_close(rep);
+	s->logs.logwait = 0;
+	s->logs.level = 0;
+	s->res.flags &= ~CF_EXPECT_MORE; /* speed up sending a previous response */
+	channel_truncate(rep);
+	http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function performs all the processing enabled for the current response.
+ * It normally returns 1 unless it wants to break. It relies on buffers flags,
+ * and updates s->res.analysers. It might make sense to explode it into several
+ * other functions. It works like process_request (see indications above).
+ */
+int htx_process_res_common(struct stream *s, struct channel *rep, int an_bit, struct proxy *px)
+{
+	struct session *sess = s->sess;
+	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+	struct http_msg *msg = &txn->rsp;
+	struct proxy *cur_proxy;
+	struct cond_wordlist *wl;
+	enum rule_result ret = HTTP_RULE_RES_CONT;
+
+	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+		s,
+		rep,
+		rep->rex, rep->wex,
+		rep->flags,
+		ci_data(rep),
+		rep->analysers);
+
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))	/* we need more data */
+		return 0;
+
+	/* The stats applet needs to adjust the Connection header but we don't
+	 * apply any filter there.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(objt_applet(s->target) == &http_stats_applet)) {
+		rep->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+		rep->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+		goto skip_filters;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We will have to evaluate the filters.
+	 * As opposed to version 1.2, now they will be evaluated in the
+	 * filters order and not in the header order. This means that
+	 * each filter has to be validated among all headers.
+	 *
+	 * Filters are tried with ->be first, then with ->fe if it is
+	 * different from ->be.
+	 *
+	 * Maybe we are in resume condiion. In this case I choose the
+	 * "struct proxy" which contains the rule list matching the resume
+	 * pointer. If none of theses "struct proxy" match, I initialise
+	 * the process with the first one.
+	 *
+	 * In fact, I check only correspondance betwwen the current list
+	 * pointer and the ->fe rule list. If it doesn't match, I initialize
+	 * the loop with the ->be.
+	 */
+	if (s->current_rule_list == &sess->fe->http_res_rules)
+		cur_proxy = sess->fe;
+	else
+		cur_proxy = s->be;
+	while (1) {
+		struct proxy *rule_set = cur_proxy;
+
+		/* evaluate http-response rules */
+		if (ret == HTTP_RULE_RES_CONT) {
+			ret = http_res_get_intercept_rule(cur_proxy, &cur_proxy->http_res_rules, s);
+
+			if (ret == HTTP_RULE_RES_BADREQ)
+				goto return_srv_prx_502;
+
+			if (ret == HTTP_RULE_RES_DONE) {
+				rep->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+				rep->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* we need to be called again. */
+		if (ret == HTTP_RULE_RES_YIELD) {
+			channel_dont_close(rep);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* try headers filters */
+		if (rule_set->rsp_exp != NULL) {
+			if (apply_filters_to_response(s, rep, rule_set) < 0) {
+			return_bad_resp:
+				if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+					HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+					health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_RSP);
+				}
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+			return_srv_prx_502:
+				rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+				txn->status = 502;
+				s->logs.t_data = -1; /* was not a valid response */
+				s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+				channel_truncate(rep);
+				http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+				if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+					s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+				if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+					s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* has the response been denied ? */
+		if (txn->flags & TX_SVDENY) {
+			if (objt_server(s->target))
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_secu, 1);
+
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_resp, 1);
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_resp, 1);
+			if (sess->listener->counters)
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_resp, 1);
+
+			goto return_srv_prx_502;
+		}
+
+		/* add response headers from the rule sets in the same order */
+		list_for_each_entry(wl, &rule_set->rsp_add, list) {
+			if (txn->status < 200 && txn->status != 101)
+				break;
+			if (wl->cond) {
+				int ret = acl_exec_cond(wl->cond, px, sess, s, SMP_OPT_DIR_RES|SMP_OPT_FINAL);
+				ret = acl_pass(ret);
+				if (((struct acl_cond *)wl->cond)->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
+					ret = !ret;
+				if (!ret)
+					continue;
+			}
+			if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->rsp, &txn->hdr_idx, wl->s, strlen(wl->s)) < 0))
+				goto return_bad_resp;
+		}
+
+		/* check whether we're already working on the frontend */
+		if (cur_proxy == sess->fe)
+			break;
+		cur_proxy = sess->fe;
+	}
+
+	/* After this point, this anayzer can't return yield, so we can
+	 * remove the bit corresponding to this analyzer from the list.
+	 *
+	 * Note that the intermediate returns and goto found previously
+	 * reset the analyzers.
+	 */
+	rep->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+	rep->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+
+	/* OK that's all we can do for 1xx responses */
+	if (unlikely(txn->status < 200 && txn->status != 101))
+		goto skip_header_mangling;
+
+	/*
+	 * Now check for a server cookie.
+	 */
+	if (s->be->cookie_name || sess->fe->capture_name || (s->be->options & PR_O_CHK_CACHE))
+		manage_server_side_cookies(s, rep);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for cache-control or pragma headers if required.
+	 */
+	if ((s->be->options & PR_O_CHK_CACHE) || (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_NOC))
+		check_response_for_cacheability(s, rep);
+
+	/*
+	 * Add server cookie in the response if needed
+	 */
+	if (objt_server(s->target) && (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_INS) &&
+	    !((txn->flags & TX_SCK_FOUND) && (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_PSV)) &&
+	    (!(s->flags & SF_DIRECT) ||
+	     ((s->be->cookie_maxidle || txn->cookie_last_date) &&
+	      (!txn->cookie_last_date || (txn->cookie_last_date - date.tv_sec) < 0)) ||
+	     (s->be->cookie_maxlife && !txn->cookie_first_date) ||  // set the first_date
+	     (!s->be->cookie_maxlife && txn->cookie_first_date)) && // remove the first_date
+	    (!(s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_POST) || (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST)) &&
+	    !(s->flags & SF_IGNORE_PRST)) {
+		/* the server is known, it's not the one the client requested, or the
+		 * cookie's last seen date needs to be refreshed. We have to
+		 * insert a set-cookie here, except if we want to insert only on POST
+		 * requests and this one isn't. Note that servers which don't have cookies
+		 * (eg: some backup servers) will return a full cookie removal request.
+		 */
+		if (!objt_server(s->target)->cookie) {
+			chunk_printf(&trash,
+				     "Set-Cookie: %s=; Expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT; path=/",
+				     s->be->cookie_name);
+		}
+		else {
+			chunk_printf(&trash, "Set-Cookie: %s=%s", s->be->cookie_name, objt_server(s->target)->cookie);
+
+			if (s->be->cookie_maxidle || s->be->cookie_maxlife) {
+				/* emit last_date, which is mandatory */
+				trash.area[trash.data++] = COOKIE_DELIM_DATE;
+				s30tob64((date.tv_sec+3) >> 2,
+					 trash.area + trash.data);
+				trash.data += 5;
+
+				if (s->be->cookie_maxlife) {
+					/* emit first_date, which is either the original one or
+					 * the current date.
+					 */
+					trash.area[trash.data++] = COOKIE_DELIM_DATE;
+					s30tob64(txn->cookie_first_date ?
+						 txn->cookie_first_date >> 2 :
+						 (date.tv_sec+3) >> 2,
+						 trash.area + trash.data);
+					trash.data += 5;
+				}
+			}
+			chunk_appendf(&trash, "; path=/");
+		}
+
+		if (s->be->cookie_domain)
+			chunk_appendf(&trash, "; domain=%s", s->be->cookie_domain);
+
+		if (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_HTTPONLY)
+			chunk_appendf(&trash, "; HttpOnly");
+
+		if (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_SECURE)
+			chunk_appendf(&trash, "; Secure");
+
+		if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->rsp, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, trash.data) < 0))
+			goto return_bad_resp;
+
+		txn->flags &= ~TX_SCK_MASK;
+		if (__objt_server(s->target)->cookie && (s->flags & SF_DIRECT))
+			/* the server did not change, only the date was updated */
+			txn->flags |= TX_SCK_UPDATED;
+		else
+			txn->flags |= TX_SCK_INSERTED;
+
+		/* Here, we will tell an eventual cache on the client side that we don't
+		 * want it to cache this reply because HTTP/1.0 caches also cache cookies !
+		 * Some caches understand the correct form: 'no-cache="set-cookie"', but
+		 * others don't (eg: apache <= 1.3.26). So we use 'private' instead.
+		 */
+		if ((s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_NOC) && (txn->flags & TX_CACHEABLE)) {
+
+			txn->flags &= ~TX_CACHEABLE & ~TX_CACHE_COOK;
+
+			if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->rsp, &txn->hdr_idx,
+			                                   "Cache-control: private", 22) < 0))
+				goto return_bad_resp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if result will be cacheable with a cookie.
+	 * We'll block the response if security checks have caught
+	 * nasty things such as a cacheable cookie.
+	 */
+	if (((txn->flags & (TX_CACHEABLE | TX_CACHE_COOK | TX_SCK_PRESENT)) ==
+	     (TX_CACHEABLE | TX_CACHE_COOK | TX_SCK_PRESENT)) &&
+	    (s->be->options & PR_O_CHK_CACHE)) {
+		/* we're in presence of a cacheable response containing
+		 * a set-cookie header. We'll block it as requested by
+		 * the 'checkcache' option, and send an alert.
+		 */
+		if (objt_server(s->target))
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_secu, 1);
+
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_resp, 1);
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_resp, 1);
+		if (sess->listener->counters)
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_resp, 1);
+
+		ha_alert("Blocking cacheable cookie in response from instance %s, server %s.\n",
+			 s->be->id, objt_server(s->target) ? objt_server(s->target)->id : "<dispatch>");
+		send_log(s->be, LOG_ALERT,
+			 "Blocking cacheable cookie in response from instance %s, server %s.\n",
+			 s->be->id, objt_server(s->target) ? objt_server(s->target)->id : "<dispatch>");
+		goto return_srv_prx_502;
+	}
+
+ skip_filters:
+	/*
+	 * Adjust "Connection: close" or "Connection: keep-alive" if needed.
+	 * If an "Upgrade" token is found, the header is left untouched in order
+	 * not to have to deal with some client bugs : some of them fail an upgrade
+	 * if anything but "Upgrade" is present in the Connection header. We don't
+	 * want to touch any 101 response either since it's switching to another
+	 * protocol.
+	 */
+	if ((txn->status != 101) && !(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_UPG) &&
+	    (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN) {
+		unsigned int want_flags = 0;
+
+		if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
+		    (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL) {
+			/* we want a keep-alive response here. Keep-alive header
+			 * required if either side is not 1.1.
+			 */
+			if (!(txn->req.flags & msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11))
+				want_flags |= TX_CON_KAL_SET;
+		}
+		else { /* CLO */
+			/* we want a close response here. Close header required if
+			 * the server is 1.1, regardless of the client.
+			 */
+			if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11)
+				want_flags |= TX_CON_CLO_SET;
+		}
+
+		if (want_flags != (txn->flags & (TX_CON_CLO_SET|TX_CON_KAL_SET)))
+			http_change_connection_header(txn, msg, want_flags);
+	}
+
+ skip_header_mangling:
+	/* Always enter in the body analyzer */
+	rep->analysers &= ~AN_RES_FLT_XFER_DATA;
+	rep->analysers |= AN_RES_HTTP_XFER_BODY;
+
+	/* if the user wants to log as soon as possible, without counting
+	 * bytes from the server, then this is the right moment. We have
+	 * to temporarily assign bytes_out to log what we currently have.
+	 */
+	if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&sess->fe->logformat) && !(s->logs.logwait & LW_BYTES)) {
+		s->logs.t_close = s->logs.t_data; /* to get a valid end date */
+		s->logs.bytes_out = txn->rsp.eoh;
+		s->do_log(s);
+		s->logs.bytes_out = 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* This function is an analyser which forwards response body (including chunk
+ * sizes if any). It is called as soon as we must forward, even if we forward
+ * zero byte. The only situation where it must not be called is when we're in
+ * tunnel mode and we want to forward till the close. It's used both to forward
+ * remaining data and to resync after end of body. It expects the msg_state to
+ * be between MSG_BODY and MSG_DONE (inclusive). It returns zero if it needs to
+ * read more data, or 1 once we can go on with next request or end the stream.
+ *
+ * It is capable of compressing response data both in content-length mode and
+ * in chunked mode. The state machines follows different flows depending on
+ * whether content-length and chunked modes are used, since there are no
+ * trailers in content-length :
+ *
+ *       chk-mode        cl-mode
+ *          ,----- BODY -----.
+ *         /                  \
+ *        V     size > 0       V    chk-mode
+ *  .--> SIZE -------------> DATA -------------> CRLF
+ *  |     | size == 0          | last byte         |
+ *  |     v      final crlf    v inspected         |
+ *  |  TRAILERS -----------> DONE                  |
+ *  |                                              |
+ *  `----------------------------------------------'
+ *
+ * Compression only happens in the DATA state, and must be flushed in final
+ * states (TRAILERS/DONE) or when leaving on missing data. Normal forwarding
+ * is performed at once on final states for all bytes parsed, or when leaving
+ * on missing data.
+ */
+int htx_response_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *res, int an_bit)
+{
+	struct session *sess = s->sess;
+	struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+	struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->rsp;
+	int ret;
+
+	DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+		now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+		s,
+		res,
+		res->rex, res->wex,
+		res->flags,
+		ci_data(res),
+		res->analysers);
+
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((res->flags & (CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_TIMEOUT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT)) ||
+	    ((res->flags & CF_SHUTW) && (res->to_forward || co_data(res))) ||
+	     !s->req.analysers) {
+		/* Output closed while we were sending data. We must abort and
+		 * wake the other side up.
+		 */
+		msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+		msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+		http_resync_states(s);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* in most states, we should abort in case of early close */
+	channel_auto_close(res);
+
+	if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_BODY) {
+		msg->msg_state = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+				  ? HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE
+				  : HTTP_MSG_DATA);
+	}
+
+	if (res->to_forward) {
+                /* We can't process the buffer's contents yet */
+		res->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
+		goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+	}
+
+	if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_DONE) {
+		ret = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+		       ? http_msg_forward_chunked_body(s, msg)
+		       : http_msg_forward_body(s, msg));
+		if (!ret)
+			goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto return_bad_res;
+	}
+
+	/* other states, DONE...TUNNEL */
+	/* for keep-alive we don't want to forward closes on DONE */
+	if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
+	    (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL)
+		channel_dont_close(res);
+
+	http_resync_states(s);
+	if (!(res->analysers & an_bit)) {
+		if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
+			if (res->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
+				/* response errors are most likely due to the
+				 * client aborting the transfer. */
+				goto aborted_xfer;
+			}
+			if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+				http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, strm_fe(s));
+			goto return_bad_res;
+		}
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+  missing_data_or_waiting:
+	if (res->flags & CF_SHUTW)
+		goto aborted_xfer;
+
+	/* stop waiting for data if the input is closed before the end. If the
+	 * client side was already closed, it means that the client has aborted,
+	 * so we don't want to count this as a server abort. Otherwise it's a
+	 * server abort.
+	 */
+	if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ENDING && res->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
+		if ((s->req.flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTW)) == (CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTW))
+			goto aborted_xfer;
+		/* If we have some pending data, we continue the processing */
+		if (!ci_data(res)) {
+			if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+				s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL;
+			HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+			if (objt_server(s->target))
+				HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+			goto return_bad_res_stats_ok;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* we need to obey the req analyser, so if it leaves, we must too */
+	if (!s->req.analysers)
+		goto return_bad_res;
+
+	/* When TE: chunked is used, we need to get there again to parse
+	 * remaining chunks even if the server has closed, so we don't want to
+	 * set CF_DONTCLOSE. Similarly, if keep-alive is set on the client side
+	 * or if there are filters registered on the stream, we don't want to
+	 * forward a close
+	 */
+	if ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) ||
+	    HAS_DATA_FILTERS(s, res) ||
+	    (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
+	    (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL)
+		channel_dont_close(res);
+
+	/* We know that more data are expected, but we couldn't send more that
+	 * what we did. So we always set the CF_EXPECT_MORE flag so that the
+	 * system knows it must not set a PUSH on this first part. Interactive
+	 * modes are already handled by the stream sock layer. We must not do
+	 * this in content-length mode because it could present the MSG_MORE
+	 * flag with the last block of forwarded data, which would cause an
+	 * additional delay to be observed by the receiver.
+	 */
+	if ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) || (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_COMPRESSING))
+		res->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE;
+
+	/* the stream handler will take care of timeouts and errors */
+	return 0;
+
+ return_bad_res: /* let's centralize all bad responses */
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+	if (objt_server(s->target))
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+
+ return_bad_res_stats_ok:
+	txn->rsp.err_state = txn->rsp.msg_state;
+	txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+	/* don't send any error message as we're in the body */
+	http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+	res->analysers   &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+	s->req.analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
+	if (objt_server(s->target))
+		health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_HDRRSP);
+
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+	return 0;
+
+ aborted_xfer:
+	txn->rsp.err_state = txn->rsp.msg_state;
+	txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+	/* don't send any error message as we're in the body */
+	http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+	res->analysers   &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+	s->req.analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
+
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+	HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+	if (objt_server(s->target))
+		HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+	if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+		s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 __attribute__((constructor))
 static void __htx_protocol_init(void)
 {