MINOR: ssl: add new sample ssl_c_r_dn
This patch addresses #1514, adds the ability to fetch DN of the root
ca that was in the chain when client certificate was verified during SSL
handshake.
diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
index aabbe8e..43e4bff 100644
--- a/doc/configuration.txt
+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
@@ -20768,6 +20768,20 @@
YYMMDDhhmmss[Z] when the incoming connection was made over an SSL/TLS
transport layer.
+ssl_c_r_dn([<entry>[,<occ>[,<format>]]]) : string
+ When the incoming connection was made over an SSL/TLS transport layer, and is
+ successfully validated with the configured ca-file, returns the full
+ distinguished name of the root CA of the certificate presented by the client
+ when no <entry> is specified, or the value of the first given entry found from
+ the beginning of the DN. If a positive/negative occurrence number is specified
+ as the optional second argument, it returns the value of the nth given entry
+ value from the beginning/end of the DN. For instance, "ssl_c_r_dn(OU,2)" the
+ second organization unit, and "ssl_c_r_dn(CN)" retrieves the common name. The
+ <format> parameter allows you to receive the DN suitable for consumption by
+ different protocols. Currently supported is rfc2253 for LDAP v3. If you'd like
+ to modify the format only you can specify an empty string and zero for the
+ first two parameters. Example: ssl_c_r_dn(,0,rfc2253)
+
ssl_c_s_dn([<entry>[,<occ>[,<format>]]]) : string
When the incoming connection was made over an SSL/TLS transport layer,
returns the full distinguished name of the subject of the certificate
diff --git a/include/haproxy/ssl_utils.h b/include/haproxy/ssl_utils.h
index d6db087..3391efd 100644
--- a/include/haproxy/ssl_utils.h
+++ b/include/haproxy/ssl_utils.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
int ssl_sock_get_dn_formatted(X509_NAME *a, const struct buffer *format, struct buffer *out);
int ssl_sock_get_dn_oneline(X509_NAME *a, struct buffer *out);
X509* ssl_sock_get_peer_certificate(SSL *ssl);
+X509* ssl_sock_get_verified_chain_root(SSL *ssl);
unsigned int openssl_version_parser(const char *version);
void exclude_tls_grease(char *input, int len, struct buffer *output);
int x509_v_err_str_to_int(const char *str);
diff --git a/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_client_samples.vtc b/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_client_samples.vtc
index 81a52ab..62956f1 100644
--- a/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_client_samples.vtc
+++ b/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_client_samples.vtc
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
http-response add-header x-ssl-sig_alg %[ssl_c_sig_alg]
http-response add-header x-ssl-i_dn %[ssl_c_i_dn]
http-response add-header x-ssl-s_dn %[ssl_c_s_dn]
+ http-response add-header x-ssl-r_dn %[ssl_c_r_dn]
http-response add-header x-ssl-s_serial %[ssl_c_serial,hex]
http-response add-header x-ssl-key_alg %[ssl_c_key_alg]
http-response add-header x-ssl-version %[ssl_c_version]
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@
expect resp.http.x-ssl-sig_alg == "RSA-SHA256"
expect resp.http.x-ssl-i_dn == "/C=FR/ST=Some-State/O=HAProxy Technologies/CN=HAProxy Technologies CA Test Client Auth"
expect resp.http.x-ssl-s_dn == "/C=FR/O=HAProxy Technologies Test/CN=client1"
+ expect resp.http.x-ssl-r_dn == "/C=FR/ST=Some-State/O=HAProxy Technologies/CN=HAProxy Technologies CA Test Client Auth"
expect resp.http.x-ssl-s_serial == "02"
expect resp.http.x-ssl-key_alg == "rsaEncryption"
expect resp.http.x-ssl-version == "1"
diff --git a/src/ssl_sample.c b/src/ssl_sample.c
index 5c6ad1c..582b713 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sample.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sample.c
@@ -538,6 +538,62 @@
return 1;
}
+/* string, returns a string of a formatted full dn \C=..\O=..\OU=.. \CN=.. of the
+ * client certificate's root CA.
+ */
+static int
+smp_fetch_ssl_r_dn(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
+{
+ X509 *crt = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct buffer *smp_trash;
+ struct connection *conn;
+ SSL *ssl;
+
+ conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin);
+ ssl = ssl_sock_get_ssl_object(conn);
+ if (!ssl)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_XPRT && !conn->err_code) {
+ smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ crt = ssl_sock_get_verified_chain_root(ssl);
+ if (!crt)
+ goto out;
+
+ name = X509_get_subject_name(crt);
+ if (!name)
+ goto out;
+
+ smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
+ if (args[0].type == ARGT_STR && args[0].data.str.data > 0) {
+ int pos = 1;
+
+ if (args[1].type == ARGT_SINT)
+ pos = args[1].data.sint;
+
+ if (ssl_sock_get_dn_entry(name, &args[0].data.str, pos, smp_trash) <= 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ else if (args[2].type == ARGT_STR && args[2].data.str.data > 0) {
+ if (ssl_sock_get_dn_formatted(name, &args[2].data.str, smp_trash) <= 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ else if (ssl_sock_get_dn_oneline(name, smp_trash) <= 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_SESS;
+ smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR;
+ smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash;
+ ret = 1;
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* binary, returns a certificate in a binary chunk (der/raw).
* The 5th keyword char is used to know if SSL_get_certificate or SSL_get_peer_certificate
* should be use.
@@ -2142,6 +2198,7 @@
{ "ssl_c_key_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_notafter", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_notbefore", smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
+ { "ssl_c_r_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_r_dn, ARG3(0,STR,SINT,STR),val_dnfmt, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_sig_alg", smp_fetch_ssl_x_sig_alg, 0, NULL, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_s_dn", smp_fetch_ssl_x_s_dn, ARG3(0,STR,SINT,STR),val_dnfmt, SMP_T_STR, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_c_serial", smp_fetch_ssl_x_serial, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
diff --git a/src/ssl_utils.c b/src/ssl_utils.c
index 836f054..03d4341 100644
--- a/src/ssl_utils.c
+++ b/src/ssl_utils.c
@@ -318,6 +318,33 @@
}
/*
+ * This function fetches the x509* for the root CA of client certificate
+ * from the verified chain. We use the SSL_get0_verified_chain and get the
+ * last certificate in the x509 stack.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL in case of failure.
+*/
+X509* ssl_sock_get_verified_chain_root(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ X509 *crt = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ chain = SSL_get0_verified_chain(ssl);
+ if (!chain)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ crt = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+
+ if (X509_check_issued(crt, crt) == X509_V_OK)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return crt;
+}
+
+/*
* Take an OpenSSL version in text format and return a numeric openssl version
* Return 0 if it failed to parse the version
*