diff --git a/src/payload.c b/src/payload.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21d72a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/payload.c
@@ -0,0 +1,698 @@
+/*
+ * General protocol-agnostic payload-based sample fetches and ACLs
+ *
+ * Copyright 2000-2013 Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <proto/acl.h>
+#include <proto/arg.h>
+#include <proto/channel.h>
+#include <proto/payload.h>
+#include <proto/sample.h>
+
+
+/************************************************************************/
+/*       All supported sample fetch functions must be declared here     */
+/************************************************************************/
+
+/* wait for more data as long as possible, then return TRUE. This should be
+ * used with content inspection.
+ */
+static int
+smp_fetch_wait_end(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
+                   const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp)
+{
+	if (!(opt & SMP_OPT_FINAL)) {
+		smp->flags |= SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	smp->type = SMP_T_BOOL;
+	smp->data.uint = 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* return the number of bytes in the request buffer */
+static int
+smp_fetch_req_len(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
+                  const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp)
+{
+	if (!s || !s->req)
+		return 0;
+
+	smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
+	smp->data.uint = s->req->buf->i;
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE | SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* returns the type of SSL hello message (mainly used to detect an SSL hello) */
+static int
+smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
+                         const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp)
+{
+	int hs_len;
+	int hs_type, bleft;
+	struct channel *chn;
+	const unsigned char *data;
+
+	if (!s)
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	chn = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? s->rep : s->req;
+
+	bleft = chn->buf->i;
+	data = (const unsigned char *)chn->buf->p;
+
+	if (!bleft)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	if ((*data >= 0x14 && *data <= 0x17) || (*data == 0xFF)) {
+		/* SSLv3 header format */
+		if (bleft < 9)
+			goto too_short;
+
+		/* ssl version 3 */
+		if ((data[1] << 16) + data[2] < 0x00030000)
+			goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+		/* ssl message len must present handshake type and len */
+		if ((data[3] << 8) + data[4] < 4)
+			goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+		/* format introduced with SSLv3 */
+
+		hs_type = (int)data[5];
+		hs_len = ( data[6] << 16 ) + ( data[7] << 8 ) + data[8];
+
+		/* not a full handshake */
+		if (bleft < (9 + hs_len))
+			goto too_short;
+
+	}
+	else {
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+	}
+
+	smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
+	smp->data.uint = hs_type;
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE;
+
+	return 1;
+
+ too_short:
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
+
+ not_ssl_hello:
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return the version of the SSL protocol in the request. It supports both
+ * SSLv3 (TLSv1) header format for any message, and SSLv2 header format for
+ * the hello message. The SSLv3 format is described in RFC 2246 p49, and the
+ * SSLv2 format is described here, and completed p67 of RFC 2246 :
+ *    http://wp.netscape.com/eng/security/SSL_2.html
+ *
+ * Note: this decoder only works with non-wrapping data.
+ */
+static int
+smp_fetch_req_ssl_ver(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
+                      const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp)
+{
+	int version, bleft, msg_len;
+	const unsigned char *data;
+
+	if (!s || !s->req)
+		return 0;
+
+	msg_len = 0;
+	bleft = s->req->buf->i;
+	if (!bleft)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	data = (const unsigned char *)s->req->buf->p;
+	if ((*data >= 0x14 && *data <= 0x17) || (*data == 0xFF)) {
+		/* SSLv3 header format */
+		if (bleft < 5)
+			goto too_short;
+
+		version = (data[1] << 16) + data[2]; /* version: major, minor */
+		msg_len = (data[3] <<  8) + data[4]; /* record length */
+
+		/* format introduced with SSLv3 */
+		if (version < 0x00030000)
+			goto not_ssl;
+
+		/* message length between 1 and 2^14 + 2048 */
+		if (msg_len < 1 || msg_len > ((1<<14) + 2048))
+			goto not_ssl;
+
+		bleft -= 5; data += 5;
+	} else {
+		/* SSLv2 header format, only supported for hello (msg type 1) */
+		int rlen, plen, cilen, silen, chlen;
+
+		if (*data & 0x80) {
+			if (bleft < 3)
+				goto too_short;
+			/* short header format : 15 bits for length */
+			rlen = ((data[0] & 0x7F) << 8) | data[1];
+			plen = 0;
+			bleft -= 2; data += 2;
+		} else {
+			if (bleft < 4)
+				goto too_short;
+			/* long header format : 14 bits for length + pad length */
+			rlen = ((data[0] & 0x3F) << 8) | data[1];
+			plen = data[2];
+			bleft -= 3; data += 2;
+		}
+
+		if (*data != 0x01)
+			goto not_ssl;
+		bleft--; data++;
+
+		if (bleft < 8)
+			goto too_short;
+		version = (data[0] << 16) + data[1]; /* version: major, minor */
+		cilen   = (data[2] <<  8) + data[3]; /* cipher len, multiple of 3 */
+		silen   = (data[4] <<  8) + data[5]; /* session_id_len: 0 or 16 */
+		chlen   = (data[6] <<  8) + data[7]; /* 16<=challenge length<=32 */
+
+		bleft -= 8; data += 8;
+		if (cilen % 3 != 0)
+			goto not_ssl;
+		if (silen && silen != 16)
+			goto not_ssl;
+		if (chlen < 16 || chlen > 32)
+			goto not_ssl;
+		if (rlen != 9 + cilen + silen + chlen)
+			goto not_ssl;
+
+		/* focus on the remaining data length */
+		msg_len = cilen + silen + chlen + plen;
+	}
+	/* We could recursively check that the buffer ends exactly on an SSL
+	 * fragment boundary and that a possible next segment is still SSL,
+	 * but that's a bit pointless. However, we could still check that
+	 * all the part of the request which fits in a buffer is already
+	 * there.
+	 */
+	if (msg_len > buffer_max_len(s->req) + s->req->buf->data - s->req->buf->p)
+		msg_len = buffer_max_len(s->req) + s->req->buf->data - s->req->buf->p;
+
+	if (bleft < msg_len)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	/* OK that's enough. We have at least the whole message, and we have
+	 * the protocol version.
+	 */
+	smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
+	smp->data.uint = version;
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE;
+	return 1;
+
+ too_short:
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
+ not_ssl:
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Try to extract the Server Name Indication that may be presented in a TLS
+ * client hello handshake message. The format of the message is the following
+ * (cf RFC5246 + RFC6066) :
+ * TLS frame :
+ *   - uint8  type                            = 0x16   (Handshake)
+ *   - uint16 version                        >= 0x0301 (TLSv1)
+ *   - uint16 length                                   (frame length)
+ *   - TLS handshake :
+ *     - uint8  msg_type                      = 0x01   (ClientHello)
+ *     - uint24 length                                 (handshake message length)
+ *     - ClientHello :
+ *       - uint16 client_version             >= 0x0301 (TLSv1)
+ *       - uint8 Random[32]                  (4 first ones are timestamp)
+ *       - SessionID :
+ *         - uint8 session_id_len (0..32)              (SessionID len in bytes)
+ *         - uint8 session_id[session_id_len]
+ *       - CipherSuite :
+ *         - uint16 cipher_len               >= 2      (Cipher length in bytes)
+ *         - uint16 ciphers[cipher_len/2]
+ *       - CompressionMethod :
+ *         - uint8 compression_len           >= 1      (# of supported methods)
+ *         - uint8 compression_methods[compression_len]
+ *       - optional client_extension_len               (in bytes)
+ *       - optional sequence of ClientHelloExtensions  (as many bytes as above):
+ *         - uint16 extension_type            = 0 for server_name
+ *         - uint16 extension_len
+ *         - opaque extension_data[extension_len]
+ *           - uint16 server_name_list_len             (# of bytes here)
+ *           - opaque server_names[server_name_list_len bytes]
+ *             - uint8 name_type              = 0 for host_name
+ *             - uint16 name_len
+ *             - opaque hostname[name_len bytes]
+ */
+static int
+smp_fetch_ssl_hello_sni(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
+                        const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp)
+{
+	int hs_len, ext_len, bleft;
+	struct channel *chn;
+	unsigned char *data;
+
+	if (!s)
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	chn = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? s->rep : s->req;
+
+	bleft = chn->buf->i;
+	data = (unsigned char *)chn->buf->p;
+
+	/* Check for SSL/TLS Handshake */
+	if (!bleft)
+		goto too_short;
+	if (*data != 0x16)
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	/* Check for TLSv1 or later (SSL version >= 3.1) */
+	if (bleft < 3)
+		goto too_short;
+	if (data[1] < 0x03 || data[2] < 0x01)
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	if (bleft < 5)
+		goto too_short;
+	hs_len = (data[3] << 8) + data[4];
+	if (hs_len < 1 + 3 + 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2)
+		goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */
+
+	data += 5; /* enter TLS handshake */
+	bleft -= 5;
+
+	/* Check for a complete client hello starting at <data> */
+	if (bleft < 1)
+		goto too_short;
+	if (data[0] != 0x01) /* msg_type = Client Hello */
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	/* Check the Hello's length */
+	if (bleft < 4)
+		goto too_short;
+	hs_len = (data[1] << 16) + (data[2] << 8) + data[3];
+	if (hs_len < 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2)
+		goto not_ssl_hello; /* too short to have an extension */
+
+	/* We want the full handshake here */
+	if (bleft < hs_len)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	data += 4;
+	/* Start of the ClientHello message */
+	if (data[0] < 0x03 || data[1] < 0x01) /* TLSv1 minimum */
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	ext_len = data[34]; /* session_id_len */
+	if (ext_len > 32 || ext_len > (hs_len - 35)) /* check for correct session_id len */
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	/* Jump to cipher suite */
+	hs_len -= 35 + ext_len;
+	data   += 35 + ext_len;
+
+	if (hs_len < 4 ||                               /* minimum one cipher */
+	    (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) < 2 || /* minimum 2 bytes for a cipher */
+	    ext_len > hs_len)
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	/* Jump to the compression methods */
+	hs_len -= 2 + ext_len;
+	data   += 2 + ext_len;
+
+	if (hs_len < 2 ||                       /* minimum one compression method */
+	    data[0] < 1 || data[0] > hs_len)    /* minimum 1 bytes for a method */
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	/* Jump to the extensions */
+	hs_len -= 1 + data[0];
+	data   += 1 + data[0];
+
+	if (hs_len < 2 ||                       /* minimum one extension list length */
+	    (ext_len = (data[0] << 8) + data[1]) > hs_len - 2) /* list too long */
+		goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+	hs_len = ext_len; /* limit ourselves to the extension length */
+	data += 2;
+
+	while (hs_len >= 4) {
+		int ext_type, name_type, srv_len, name_len;
+
+		ext_type = (data[0] << 8) + data[1];
+		ext_len  = (data[2] << 8) + data[3];
+
+		if (ext_len > hs_len - 4) /* Extension too long */
+			goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+		if (ext_type == 0) { /* Server name */
+			if (ext_len < 2) /* need one list length */
+				goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+			srv_len = (data[4] << 8) + data[5];
+			if (srv_len < 4 || srv_len > hs_len - 6)
+				goto not_ssl_hello; /* at least 4 bytes per server name */
+
+			name_type = data[6];
+			name_len = (data[7] << 8) + data[8];
+
+			if (name_type == 0) { /* hostname */
+				smp->type = SMP_T_CSTR;
+				smp->data.str.str = (char *)data + 9;
+				smp->data.str.len = name_len;
+				smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE;
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		hs_len -= 4 + ext_len;
+		data   += 4 + ext_len;
+	}
+	/* server name not found */
+	goto not_ssl_hello;
+
+ too_short:
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
+
+ not_ssl_hello:
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Fetch the request RDP cookie identified in the args, or any cookie if no arg
+ * is passed. It is usable both for ACL and for samples. Note: this decoder
+ * only works with non-wrapping data. Accepts either 0 or 1 argument. Argument
+ * is a string (cookie name), other types will lead to undefined behaviour.
+ */
+int
+smp_fetch_rdp_cookie(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
+                     const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp)
+{
+	int bleft;
+	const unsigned char *data;
+
+	if (!s || !s->req)
+		return 0;
+
+	smp->flags = 0;
+	smp->type = SMP_T_CSTR;
+
+	bleft = s->req->buf->i;
+	if (bleft <= 11)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	data = (const unsigned char *)s->req->buf->p + 11;
+	bleft -= 11;
+
+	if (bleft <= 7)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	if (strncasecmp((const char *)data, "Cookie:", 7) != 0)
+		goto not_cookie;
+
+	data += 7;
+	bleft -= 7;
+
+	while (bleft > 0 && *data == ' ') {
+		data++;
+		bleft--;
+	}
+
+	if (args) {
+
+		if (bleft <= args->data.str.len)
+			goto too_short;
+
+		if ((data[args->data.str.len] != '=') ||
+		    strncasecmp(args->data.str.str, (const char *)data, args->data.str.len) != 0)
+			goto not_cookie;
+
+		data += args->data.str.len + 1;
+		bleft -= args->data.str.len + 1;
+	} else {
+		while (bleft > 0 && *data != '=') {
+			if (*data == '\r' || *data == '\n')
+				goto not_cookie;
+			data++;
+			bleft--;
+		}
+
+		if (bleft < 1)
+			goto too_short;
+
+		if (*data != '=')
+			goto not_cookie;
+
+		data++;
+		bleft--;
+	}
+
+	/* data points to cookie value */
+	smp->data.str.str = (char *)data;
+	smp->data.str.len = 0;
+
+	while (bleft > 0 && *data != '\r') {
+		data++;
+		bleft--;
+	}
+
+	if (bleft < 2)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	if (data[0] != '\r' || data[1] != '\n')
+		goto not_cookie;
+
+	smp->data.str.len = (char *)data - smp->data.str.str;
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE;
+	return 1;
+
+ too_short:
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
+ not_cookie:
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* returns either 1 or 0 depending on whether an RDP cookie is found or not */
+static int
+smp_fetch_rdp_cookie_cnt(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
+                         const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = smp_fetch_rdp_cookie(px, s, l7, opt, args, smp);
+
+	if (smp->flags & SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE)
+		return 0;
+
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE;
+	smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
+	smp->data.uint = ret;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* extracts part of a payload with offset and length at a given position */
+static int
+smp_fetch_payload_lv(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
+                     const struct arg *arg_p, struct sample *smp)
+{
+	unsigned int len_offset = arg_p[0].data.uint;
+	unsigned int len_size = arg_p[1].data.uint;
+	unsigned int buf_offset;
+	unsigned int buf_size = 0;
+	struct channel *chn;
+	int i;
+
+	/* Format is (len offset, len size, buf offset) or (len offset, len size) */
+	/* by default buf offset == len offset + len size */
+	/* buf offset could be absolute or relative to len offset + len size if prefixed by + or - */
+
+	if (!s)
+		return 0;
+
+	chn = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? s->rep : s->req;
+
+	if (!chn)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (len_offset + len_size > chn->buf->i)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len_size; i++) {
+		buf_size = (buf_size << 8) + ((unsigned char *)chn->buf->p)[i + len_offset];
+	}
+
+	/* buf offset may be implicit, absolute or relative */
+	buf_offset = len_offset + len_size;
+	if (arg_p[2].type == ARGT_UINT)
+		buf_offset = arg_p[2].data.uint;
+	else if (arg_p[2].type == ARGT_SINT)
+		buf_offset += arg_p[2].data.sint;
+
+	if (!buf_size || buf_size > chn->buf->size || buf_offset + buf_size > chn->buf->size) {
+		/* will never match */
+		smp->flags = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (buf_offset + buf_size > chn->buf->i)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	/* init chunk as read only */
+	smp->type = SMP_T_CBIN;
+	chunk_initlen(&smp->data.str, chn->buf->p + buf_offset, 0, buf_size);
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE;
+	return 1;
+
+ too_short:
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* extracts some payload at a fixed position and length */
+static int
+smp_fetch_payload(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
+                  const struct arg *arg_p, struct sample *smp)
+{
+	unsigned int buf_offset = arg_p[0].data.uint;
+	unsigned int buf_size = arg_p[1].data.uint;
+	struct channel *chn;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return 0;
+
+	chn = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? s->rep : s->req;
+
+	if (!chn)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!buf_size || buf_size > chn->buf->size || buf_offset + buf_size > chn->buf->size) {
+		/* will never match */
+		smp->flags = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (buf_offset + buf_size > chn->buf->i)
+		goto too_short;
+
+	/* init chunk as read only */
+	smp->type = SMP_T_CBIN;
+	chunk_initlen(&smp->data.str, chn->buf->p + buf_offset, 0, buf_size);
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_VOLATILE;
+	return 1;
+
+ too_short:
+	smp->flags = SMP_F_MAY_CHANGE;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function is used to validate the arguments passed to a "payload" fetch
+ * keyword. This keyword expects two positive integers, with the second one
+ * being strictly positive. It is assumed that the types are already the correct
+ * ones. Returns 0 on error, non-zero if OK. If <err_msg> is not NULL, it will be
+ * filled with a pointer to an error message in case of error, that the caller
+ * is responsible for freeing. The initial location must either be freeable or
+ * NULL.
+ */
+static int val_payload(struct arg *arg, char **err_msg)
+{
+	if (!arg[1].data.uint) {
+		memprintf(err_msg, "payload length must be > 0");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* This function is used to validate the arguments passed to a "payload_lv" fetch
+ * keyword. This keyword allows two positive integers and an optional signed one,
+ * with the second one being strictly positive and the third one being greater than
+ * the opposite of the two others if negative. It is assumed that the types are
+ * already the correct ones. Returns 0 on error, non-zero if OK. If <err_msg> is
+ * not NULL, it will be filled with a pointer to an error message in case of
+ * error, that the caller is responsible for freeing. The initial location must
+ * either be freeable or NULL.
+ */
+static int val_payload_lv(struct arg *arg, char **err_msg)
+{
+	if (!arg[1].data.uint) {
+		memprintf(err_msg, "payload length must be > 0");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (arg[2].type == ARGT_SINT &&
+	    (int)(arg[0].data.uint + arg[1].data.uint + arg[2].data.sint) < 0) {
+		memprintf(err_msg, "payload offset too negative");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************/
+/*      All supported sample and ACL keywords must be declared here.    */
+/************************************************************************/
+
+/* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten.
+ * Note: fetches that may return multiple types must be declared as the lowest
+ * common denominator, the type that can be casted into all other ones. For
+ * instance IPv4/IPv6 must be declared IPv4.
+ */
+static struct sample_fetch_kw_list smp_kws = {{ },{
+	{ "payload",             smp_fetch_payload,        ARG2(2,UINT,UINT),      val_payload,    SMP_T_CBIN, SMP_USE_L6REQ|SMP_USE_L6RES },
+	{ "payload_lv",          smp_fetch_payload_lv,     ARG3(2,UINT,UINT,SINT), val_payload_lv, SMP_T_CBIN, SMP_USE_L6REQ|SMP_USE_L6RES },
+	{ "rdp_cookie",          smp_fetch_rdp_cookie,     ARG1(0,STR),            NULL,           SMP_T_CSTR, SMP_USE_L6REQ },
+	{ "rdp_cookie_cnt",      smp_fetch_rdp_cookie_cnt, ARG1(0,STR),            NULL,           SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ },
+	{ "rep_ssl_hello_type",  smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type, 0,                      NULL,           SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L6RES },
+	{ "req_len",             smp_fetch_req_len,        0,                      NULL,           SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ },
+	{ "req_ssl_hello_type",  smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type, 0,                      NULL,           SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ },
+	{ "req_ssl_sni",         smp_fetch_ssl_hello_sni,  0,                      NULL,           SMP_T_CSTR, SMP_USE_L6REQ },
+	{ "req_ssl_ver",         smp_fetch_req_ssl_ver,    0,                      NULL,           SMP_T_UINT, SMP_USE_L6REQ },
+	{ "wait_end",            smp_fetch_wait_end,       0,                      NULL,           SMP_T_BOOL, SMP_USE_INTRN },
+	{ /* END */ },
+}};
+
+
+/* Note: must not be declared <const> as its list will be overwritten.
+ * Please take care of keeping this list alphabetically sorted.
+ */
+static struct acl_kw_list acl_kws = {{ },{
+	{ "payload",            acl_parse_str,        smp_fetch_payload,        acl_match_str,     ACL_USE_L6REQ_VOLATILE, ARG2(2,UINT,UINT),      val_payload },
+	{ "payload_lv",         acl_parse_str,        smp_fetch_payload_lv,     acl_match_str,     ACL_USE_L6REQ_VOLATILE, ARG3(2,UINT,UINT,SINT), val_payload_lv },
+	{ "rep_ssl_hello_type", acl_parse_int,        smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type, acl_match_int,     ACL_USE_L6RTR_VOLATILE, 0 },
+	{ "req_len",            acl_parse_int,        smp_fetch_req_len,        acl_match_int,     ACL_USE_L6REQ_VOLATILE, 0 },
+	{ "req_rdp_cookie",     acl_parse_str,        smp_fetch_rdp_cookie,     acl_match_str,     ACL_USE_L6REQ_VOLATILE, ARG1(0,STR) },
+	{ "req_rdp_cookie_cnt", acl_parse_int,        smp_fetch_rdp_cookie_cnt, acl_match_int,     ACL_USE_L6REQ_VOLATILE, ARG1(0,STR) },
+	{ "req_ssl_hello_type", acl_parse_int,        smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type, acl_match_int,     ACL_USE_L6REQ_VOLATILE, 0 },
+	{ "req_ssl_sni",        acl_parse_str,        smp_fetch_ssl_hello_sni,  acl_match_str,     ACL_USE_L6REQ_VOLATILE, 0 },
+	{ "req_ssl_ver",        acl_parse_dotted_ver, smp_fetch_req_ssl_ver,    acl_match_int,     ACL_USE_L6REQ_VOLATILE, 0 },
+	{ "wait_end",           acl_parse_nothing,    smp_fetch_wait_end,       acl_match_nothing, ACL_USE_NOTHING, 0 },
+	{ /* END */ },
+}};
+
+
+__attribute__((constructor))
+static void __payload_init(void)
+{
+	sample_register_fetches(&smp_kws);
+	acl_register_keywords(&acl_kws);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ *  c-indent-level: 8
+ *  c-basic-offset: 8
+ * End:
+ */