BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: memory leak of ocsp data at SSL_CTX_free()
This bug affects all version of HAProxy since the OCSP data is not free
in the deinit(), but leaking on exit() is not really an issue. However,
when doing dynamic update of certificates over the CLI, those data are
not free'd upon the free of the SSL_CTX.
3 leaks are happening, the first leak is the one of the ocsp_arg
structure which serves the purpose of containing the pointers in the
case of a multi-certificate bundle. The second leak is the one ocsp
struct. And the third leak is the one of the struct buffer in the
ocsp_struct.
The problem lies with SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg() which does not
provide a way to free the argument upon an SSL_CTX_free().
This fix uses ex index functions instead of registering a
tlsext_status_arg(). This is really convenient because it allows to
register a free callback which will free the ex index content upon a
SSL_CTX_free().
A refcount was also added to the ocsp_response structure since it is
stored in a tree and can be reused in another SSL_CTX.
Should fix part of the issue #746.
This must be backported in 2.2 and 2.1.
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index 9c094a5..48f2da9 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -852,6 +852,7 @@
struct ebmb_node key;
unsigned char key_data[OCSP_MAX_CERTID_ASN1_LENGTH];
struct buffer response;
+ int refcount;
long expire;
};
@@ -1203,6 +1204,8 @@
#endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+int ocsp_ex_index = -1;
+
int ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(int evp_keytype)
{
switch (evp_keytype) {
@@ -1225,11 +1228,18 @@
struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp;
struct ocsp_cbk_arg *ocsp_arg;
char *ssl_buf;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
EVP_PKEY *ssl_pkey;
int key_type;
int index;
+ ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+
- ocsp_arg = arg;
+ ocsp_arg = SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ocsp_ex_index);
+ if (!ocsp_arg)
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
ssl_pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
if (!ssl_pkey)
@@ -1271,6 +1281,26 @@
#endif
#if ((defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) || defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+
+
+/*
+ * Decrease the refcount of the struct ocsp_response and frees it if it's not
+ * used anymore. Also removes it from the tree if free'd.
+ */
+static void ssl_sock_free_ocsp(struct certificate_ocsp *ocsp)
+{
+ if (!ocsp)
+ return;
+
+ ocsp->refcount--;
+ if (ocsp->refcount <= 0) {
+ ebmb_delete(&ocsp->key);
+ chunk_destroy(&ocsp->response);
+ free(ocsp);
+ }
+}
+
+
/*
* This function enables the handling of OCSP status extension on 'ctx' if a
* ocsp_response buffer was found in the cert_key_and_chain. To enable OCSP
@@ -1351,13 +1381,15 @@
cb_arg->is_single = 1;
cb_arg->s_ocsp = iocsp;
+ iocsp->refcount++;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
cb_arg->single_kt = EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_ocsp_stapling_cbk);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, cb_arg);
+ SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, ocsp_ex_index, cb_arg); /* we use the ex_data instead of the cb_arg function here, so we can use the cleanup callback to free */
+
} else {
/*
* If the ctx has a status CB, then we have previously set an OCSP staple for this ctx
@@ -1369,11 +1401,7 @@
int key_type;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-#ifdef SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_arg
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG, 0, &cb_arg);
-#else
- cb_arg = ctx->tlsext_status_arg;
-#endif
+ cb_arg = SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ocsp_ex_index);
/*
* The following few lines will convert cb_arg from a single ocsp to multi ocsp
@@ -1391,9 +1419,10 @@
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
index = ssl_sock_get_ocsp_arg_kt_index(key_type);
- if (index >= 0 && !cb_arg->m_ocsp[index])
+ if (index >= 0 && !cb_arg->m_ocsp[index]) {
cb_arg->m_ocsp[index] = iocsp;
-
+ iocsp->refcount++;
+ }
}
ret = 0;
@@ -6721,6 +6750,31 @@
}
#endif
+
+#if ((defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+static void ssl_sock_ocsp_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+ struct ocsp_cbk_arg *ocsp_arg;
+
+ if (ptr) {
+ ocsp_arg = ptr;
+
+ if (ocsp_arg->is_single) {
+ ssl_sock_free_ocsp(ocsp_arg->s_ocsp);
+ ocsp_arg->s_ocsp = NULL;
+ } else {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_SOCK_NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
+ ssl_sock_free_ocsp(ocsp_arg->m_ocsp[i]);
+ ocsp_arg->m_ocsp[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ free(ocsp_arg);
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
static void ssl_sock_capture_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
{
pool_free(pool_head_ssl_capture, ptr);
@@ -6786,6 +6840,11 @@
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
sctl_ex_index = SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_sctl_free_func);
#endif
+
+#if ((defined SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB && !defined OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+ ocsp_ex_index = SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_ocsp_free_func);
+#endif
+
ssl_app_data_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
ssl_capture_ptr_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, ssl_sock_capture_free_func);
#if (HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)