tree bbe39bc01ef743ecd4758c5e6f0319f3f45487f3
parent d30a04a4bb4522d6ead55f2de788d9195d16df89
author Frédéric Lécaille <flecaille@haproxy.com> 1677079209 +0100
committer Frédéric Lécaille <flecaille@haproxy.com> 1677867146 +0100

BUG/MINOR: quic: v2 Initial packets decryption failed

v2 interop runner test revealed this bug as follows:

     [01|quic|4|c_conn.c:4087] new packet : qc@0x7f62ec026e30 pkt@0x7f62ec056390 el=I pn=491940080 rel=H
     [01|quic|5|c_conn.c:1509] qc_pkt_decrypt(): entering : qc@0x7f62ec026e30
     [01|quic|0|c_conn.c:1553] quic_tls_decrypt() failed : qc@0x7f62ec026e30
     [01|quic|5|c_conn.c:1575] qc_pkt_decrypt(): leaving : qc@0x7f62ec026e30
     [01|quic|0|c_conn.c:4091] packet decryption failed -> dropped : qc@0x7f62ec026e30 pkt@0x7f62ec056390 el=I pn=491940080

Only v2 Initial packets decryption received by the clients were impacted. There
is no issue to encrypt v2 Initial packets. This is due to the fact that when
negotiated the client may send two versions of Initial packets (currently v1,
then v2). The selection was done for the TX path but not on the RX path.

Implement qc_select_tls_ctx() to select the correct TLS cipher context for all
types of packets and call this function before removing the header protection
and before deciphering the packet.

Must be backported to 2.7.