BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: does not look for all SNIs before chosing a certificate
In bug #810, the SNI are not matched correctly, indeed when trying to
match a certificate type in ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk() all SNIs were not
looked up correctly.
In the case you have in a crt-list:
wildcard.subdomain.domain.tld.pem.rsa *.subdomain.domain.tld record.subdomain.domain.tld
record.subdomain.domain.tld.pem.ecdsa record.subdomain.domain.tld another-record.subdomain.domain.tld
If the client only supports RSA and requests
"another-record.subdomain.domain.tld", HAProxy will find the single
ECDSA certificate and won't try to look up for a wildcard RSA
certificate.
This patch fixes the code so we look for all single and
wildcard before chosing the certificate type.
This bug was introduced by commit 3777e3a ("BUG/MINOR: ssl: certificate
choice can be unexpected with openssl >= 1.1.1").
It must be backported as far as 1.8 once it is heavily tested.
(cherry picked from commit 94bd319b264a64f73202a82bdd2d0bcf23722246)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit fa434af0ac47304e6c060d864ba08202b4030ca9)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 822e4c88e17d3ce4546e5ce4115c9db41624281d)
[ad: context updated]
Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle <adenoyelle@haproxy.com>
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index e85e328..49b7da5 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -2363,6 +2363,8 @@
trash.area[i] = 0;
+ /* Look for an ECDSA, RSA and DSA certificate, first in the single
+ * name and if not found in the wildcard */
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (i == 0) /* lookup in full qualified names */
node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_ctx, trash.area);
@@ -2389,25 +2391,27 @@
}
}
}
- /* select by key_signature priority order */
- node = (has_ecdsa_sig && node_ecdsa) ? node_ecdsa
- : ((has_rsa_sig && node_rsa) ? node_rsa
- : (node_anonymous ? node_anonymous
- : (node_ecdsa ? node_ecdsa /* no ecdsa signature case (< TLSv1.2) */
- : node_rsa /* no rsa signature case (far far away) */
- )));
- if (node) {
- /* switch ctx */
- struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->conf;
- ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx);
- if (conf) {
- methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.min].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MIN);
- methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.max].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MAX);
- if (conf->early_data)
- allow_early = 1;
- }
- goto allow_early;
+ }
+ /* Once the certificates are found, select them depending on what is
+ * supported in the client and by key_signature priority order: EDSA >
+ * RSA > DSA */
+ node = (has_ecdsa_sig && node_ecdsa) ? node_ecdsa
+ : ((has_rsa_sig && node_rsa) ? node_rsa
+ : (node_anonymous ? node_anonymous
+ : (node_ecdsa ? node_ecdsa /* no ecdsa signature case (< TLSv1.2) */
+ : node_rsa /* no rsa signature case (far far away) */
+ )));
+ if (node) {
+ /* switch ctx */
+ struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->conf;
+ ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx);
+ if (conf) {
+ methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.min].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MIN);
+ methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.max].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MAX);
+ if (conf->early_data)
+ allow_early = 1;
}
+ goto allow_early;
}
#if (!defined SSL_NO_GENERATE_CERTIFICATES)
if (s->generate_certs && ssl_sock_generate_certificate(trash.area, s, ssl)) {