MINOR: SSL: add client/server random sample fetches
This adds 4 sample fetches:
- ssl_fc_client_random
- ssl_fc_server_random
- ssl_bc_client_random
- ssl_bc_server_random
These fetches retrieve the client or server random value sent during the
handshake.
Their use is to be able to decrypt traffic sent using ephemeral ciphers. Tools
like wireshark expect a TLS log file with lines in a few known formats
(https://code.wireshark.org/review/gitweb?p=wireshark.git;a=blob;f=epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c;h=28a51fb1fb029eae5cea52d37ff5b67d9b11950f;hb=HEAD#l5209).
Previously the only format supported using data retrievable from HAProxy state
was the one utilizing the Session-ID. However an SSL/TLS session ID is
optional, and thus cannot be relied upon for this purpose.
This change introduces the ability to extract the client random instead which
can be used for one of the other formats. The change also adds the ability to
extract the server random, just in case it might have some other use, as the
code change to support this was trivial.
diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
index d2cdf27..03df57c 100644
--- a/doc/configuration.txt
+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
@@ -15430,6 +15430,11 @@
Returns the name of the used cipher when the outgoing connection was made
over an SSL/TLS transport layer.
+ssl_bc_client_random : binary
+ Returns the client random of the back connection when the incoming connection
+ was made over an SSL/TLS transport layer. It is useful to to decrypt traffic
+ sent using ephemeral ciphers. This requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.0, or BoringSSL.
+
ssl_bc_is_resumed : boolean
Returns true when the back connection was made over an SSL/TLS transport
layer and the newly created SSL session was resumed using a cached
@@ -15454,6 +15459,11 @@
returns the TLS unique ID as defined in RFC5929 section 3. The unique id
can be encoded to base64 using the converter: "ssl_bc_unique_id,base64".
+ssl_bc_server_random : binary
+ Returns the server random of the back connection when the incoming connection
+ was made over an SSL/TLS transport layer. It is useful to to decrypt traffic
+ sent using ephemeral ciphers. This requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.0, or BoringSSL.
+
ssl_bc_session_id : binary
Returns the SSL ID of the back connection when the outgoing connection was
made over an SSL/TLS transport layer. It is useful to log if we want to know
@@ -15675,6 +15685,11 @@
"tune.ssl.capture-cipherlist-size" is set greater than 0, however the hash
take in account all the data of the cipher list.
+ssl_fc_client_random : binary
+ Returns the client random of the front connection when the incoming connection
+ was made over an SSL/TLS transport layer. It is useful to to decrypt traffic
+ sent using ephemeral ciphers. This requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.0, or BoringSSL.
+
ssl_fc_has_crt : boolean
Returns true if a client certificate is present in an incoming connection over
SSL/TLS transport layer. Useful if 'verify' statement is set to 'optional'.
@@ -15719,6 +15734,11 @@
returns the TLS unique ID as defined in RFC5929 section 3. The unique id
can be encoded to base64 using the converter: "ssl_bc_unique_id,base64".
+ssl_fc_server_random : binary
+ Returns the server random of the front connection when the incoming connection
+ was made over an SSL/TLS transport layer. It is useful to to decrypt traffic
+ sent using ephemeral ciphers. This requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.0, or BoringSSL.
+
ssl_fc_session_id : binary
Returns the SSL ID of the front connection when the incoming connection was
made over an SSL/TLS transport layer. It is useful to stick a given client to
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index 2676fcd..a007e9a 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -7196,6 +7196,37 @@
#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
static int
+smp_fetch_ssl_fc_random(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
+{
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
+ struct buffer *data;
+ struct ssl_sock_ctx *ctx;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
+ return 0;
+ ctx = conn->xprt_ctx;
+
+ data = get_trash_chunk();
+ if (kw[7] == 'c')
+ data->data = SSL_get_client_random(ctx->ssl,
+ (unsigned char *) data->area,
+ data->size);
+ else
+ data->data = SSL_get_server_random(ctx->ssl,
+ (unsigned char *) data->area,
+ data->size);
+ if (!data->data)
+ return 0;
+
+ smp->flags = 0;
+ smp->data.type = SMP_T_BIN;
+ smp->data.u.str = *data;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_key(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
@@ -9395,6 +9426,8 @@
{ "ssl_bc_session_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
#endif
#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ { "ssl_bc_client_random", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_random, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
+ { "ssl_bc_server_random", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_random, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
{ "ssl_bc_session_key", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_key, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5SRV },
#endif
{ "ssl_c_ca_err", smp_fetch_ssl_c_ca_err, 0, NULL, SMP_T_SINT, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
@@ -9444,6 +9477,8 @@
{ "ssl_fc_session_id", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
#endif
#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ { "ssl_fc_client_random", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_random, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
+ { "ssl_fc_server_random", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_random, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
{ "ssl_fc_session_key", smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_key, 0, NULL, SMP_T_BIN, SMP_USE_L5CLI },
#endif
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME