Merge tag 'efi-next' of https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi into next
Pull request for UEFI sub-system for next
* UEFI capsule authentication
* UEFI capsule update on QEMU ARM
* fsuuid command for FAT file system
* bug fixes
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-qemu/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mach-qemu/Kconfig
index 588d2d3..186c358 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-qemu/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-qemu/Kconfig
@@ -16,12 +16,14 @@
config TARGET_QEMU_ARM_32BIT
bool "ARMv7-A, 32bit"
select ARCH_SUPPORT_PSCI
+ select BOARD_LATE_INIT
select CPU_V7A
select SYS_ARCH_TIMER
config TARGET_QEMU_ARM_64BIT
bool "ARMv8, 64bit"
select ARM64
+ select BOARD_LATE_INIT
endchoice
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h
index 29e5114..3cd3e4f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h
@@ -7,11 +7,12 @@
#ifndef __FSP_SUPPORT_H__
#define __FSP_SUPPORT_H__
+#include <signatures.h>
+
#include <asm/fsp/fsp_bootmode.h>
#include <asm/fsp/fsp_fv.h>
#include <asm/fsp/fsp_hob.h>
#include <asm/fsp/fsp_infoheader.h>
-#include <asm/fsp/fsp_types.h>
#include <asm/fsp_arch.h>
#include <asm/fsp/fsp_azalia.h>
diff --git a/board/emulation/common/Kconfig b/board/emulation/common/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c15c8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/emulation/common/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+config MTDPARTS_NOR0
+ string "mtd boot partition for nor0"
+ default "64m(u-boot)" if TARGET_QEMU_ARM_64BIT && !TFABOOT
+ depends on SYS_MTDPARTS_RUNTIME
+ help
+ This define the partition of nor0 used to build mtparts dynamically
+ for boot from nor0.
+
+config MTDPARTS_NOR1
+ string "mtd u-boot env partition for nor1"
+ default "64m(u-boot-env)" if TARGET_QEMU_ARM_64BIT && !TFABOOT
+ depends on SYS_MTDPARTS_RUNTIME
+ help
+ This define the partition of nor1 used to build mtparts dynamically
+ for the u-boot env stored on nor1.
diff --git a/board/emulation/common/Makefile b/board/emulation/common/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ed447a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/emulation/common/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYS_MTDPARTS_RUNTIME) += qemu_mtdparts.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SET_DFU_ALT_INFO) += qemu_dfu.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT) += qemu_capsule.o
diff --git a/board/emulation/common/qemu_capsule.c b/board/emulation/common/qemu_capsule.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1d4035
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/emulation/common/qemu_capsule.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Linaro Limited
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <efi_api.h>
+#include <efi_loader.h>
+#include <env.h>
+#include <fdtdec.h>
+
+DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
+
+int efi_get_public_key_data(void **pkey, efi_uintn_t *pkey_len)
+{
+ const void *fdt_blob = gd->fdt_blob;
+ const void *blob;
+ const char *cnode_name = "capsule-key";
+ const char *snode_name = "signature";
+ int sig_node;
+ int len;
+
+ sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(fdt_blob, 0, snode_name);
+ if (sig_node < 0) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Unable to get signature node offset\n");
+ return -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND;
+ }
+
+ blob = fdt_getprop(fdt_blob, sig_node, cnode_name, &len);
+
+ if (!blob || len < 0) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Unable to get capsule-key value\n");
+ *pkey = NULL;
+ *pkey_len = 0;
+ return -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND;
+ }
+
+ *pkey = (void *)blob;
+ *pkey_len = len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void)
+{
+ return env_get("capsule_authentication_enabled") != NULL ?
+ true : false;
+}
diff --git a/board/emulation/common/qemu_dfu.c b/board/emulation/common/qemu_dfu.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62234a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/emulation/common/qemu_dfu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Linaro Limited
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <dfu.h>
+#include <env.h>
+#include <memalign.h>
+#include <mtd.h>
+
+#define DFU_ALT_BUF_LEN SZ_1K
+
+static void board_get_alt_info(struct mtd_info *mtd, char *buf)
+{
+ struct mtd_info *part;
+ bool first = true;
+ const char *name;
+ int len, partnum = 0;
+
+ name = mtd->name;
+ len = strlen(buf);
+
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ len += snprintf(buf + len, DFU_ALT_BUF_LEN - len, "&");
+ len += snprintf(buf + len, DFU_ALT_BUF_LEN - len,
+ "mtd %s=", name);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(part, &mtd->partitions, node) {
+ partnum++;
+ if (!first)
+ len += snprintf(buf + len, DFU_ALT_BUF_LEN - len, ";");
+ first = false;
+
+ len += snprintf(buf + len, DFU_ALT_BUF_LEN - len,
+ "%s part %d",
+ part->name, partnum);
+ }
+}
+
+void set_dfu_alt_info(char *interface, char *devstr)
+{
+ struct mtd_info *mtd;
+
+ ALLOC_CACHE_ALIGN_BUFFER(char, buf, DFU_ALT_BUF_LEN);
+
+ if (env_get("dfu_alt_info"))
+ return;
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ /*
+ * Currently dfu_alt_info is needed on Qemu ARM64 for
+ * capsule updates
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT) &&
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TARGET_QEMU_ARM_64BIT)) {
+ /* probe all MTD devices */
+ mtd_probe_devices();
+
+ mtd = get_mtd_device_nm("nor0");
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mtd))
+ board_get_alt_info(mtd, buf);
+ }
+
+ env_set("dfu_alt_info", buf);
+ printf("dfu_alt_info set\n");
+}
diff --git a/board/emulation/common/qemu_mtdparts.c b/board/emulation/common/qemu_mtdparts.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60212e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/emulation/common/qemu_mtdparts.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Linaro Limited
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <dm.h>
+#include <mtd.h>
+
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#define MTDPARTS_LEN 256
+#define MTDIDS_LEN 128
+
+static void board_get_mtdparts(const char *dev, const char *partition,
+ char *mtdids, char *mtdparts)
+{
+ /* mtdids: "<dev>=<dev>, ...." */
+ if (mtdids[0] != '\0')
+ strcat(mtdids, ",");
+ strcat(mtdids, dev);
+ strcat(mtdids, "=");
+ strcat(mtdids, dev);
+
+ /* mtdparts: "mtdparts=<dev>:<mtdparts_<dev>>;..." */
+ if (mtdparts[0] != '\0')
+ strncat(mtdparts, ";", MTDPARTS_LEN);
+ else
+ strcat(mtdparts, "mtdparts=");
+
+ strncat(mtdparts, dev, MTDPARTS_LEN);
+ strncat(mtdparts, ":", MTDPARTS_LEN);
+ strncat(mtdparts, partition, MTDPARTS_LEN);
+}
+
+void board_mtdparts_default(const char **mtdids, const char **mtdparts)
+{
+ struct mtd_info *mtd;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ const char *mtd_partition;
+ static char parts[3 * MTDPARTS_LEN + 1];
+ static char ids[MTDIDS_LEN + 1];
+ static bool mtd_initialized;
+
+ if (mtd_initialized) {
+ *mtdids = ids;
+ *mtdparts = parts;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ memset(parts, 0, sizeof(parts));
+ memset(ids, 0, sizeof(ids));
+
+ /* Currently mtdparts is needed on Qemu ARM64 for capsule updates */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT) &&
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TARGET_QEMU_ARM_64BIT)) {
+ /* probe all MTD devices */
+ for (uclass_first_device(UCLASS_MTD, &dev); dev;
+ uclass_next_device(&dev)) {
+ debug("mtd device = %s\n", dev->name);
+ }
+
+ mtd = get_mtd_device_nm("nor0");
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mtd)) {
+ mtd_partition = CONFIG_MTDPARTS_NOR0;
+ board_get_mtdparts("nor0", mtd_partition, ids, parts);
+ put_mtd_device(mtd);
+ }
+
+ mtd = get_mtd_device_nm("nor1");
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mtd)) {
+ mtd_partition = CONFIG_MTDPARTS_NOR1;
+ board_get_mtdparts("nor1", mtd_partition, ids, parts);
+ put_mtd_device(mtd);
+ }
+ }
+
+ mtd_initialized = true;
+ *mtdids = ids;
+ *mtdparts = parts;
+ debug("%s:mtdids=%s & mtdparts=%s\n", __func__, ids, parts);
+}
diff --git a/board/emulation/qemu-arm/Kconfig b/board/emulation/qemu-arm/Kconfig
index 02ae4d9..fb8d38f 100644
--- a/board/emulation/qemu-arm/Kconfig
+++ b/board/emulation/qemu-arm/Kconfig
@@ -11,3 +11,11 @@
imply VIRTIO_BLK
endif
+
+if TARGET_QEMU_ARM_64BIT && !TFABOOT
+config BOARD_SPECIFIC_OPTIONS
+ imply SYS_MTDPARTS_RUNTIME
+ imply SET_DFU_ALT_INFO
+
+source "board/emulation/common/Kconfig"
+endif
diff --git a/board/emulation/qemu-arm/qemu-arm.c b/board/emulation/qemu-arm/qemu-arm.c
index f18f2ed..aa68bef 100644
--- a/board/emulation/qemu-arm/qemu-arm.c
+++ b/board/emulation/qemu-arm/qemu-arm.c
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@
int board_init(void)
{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int board_late_init(void)
+{
/*
* Make sure virtio bus is enumerated so that peripherals
* on the virtio bus can be discovered by their drivers
diff --git a/cmd/efidebug.c b/cmd/efidebug.c
index fa9d7fe..5fb7b1e 100644
--- a/cmd/efidebug.c
+++ b/cmd/efidebug.c
@@ -79,6 +79,16 @@
return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
}
+static int do_efi_capsule_on_disk_update(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag,
+ int argc, char * const argv[])
+{
+ efi_status_t ret;
+
+ ret = efi_launch_capsules();
+
+ return ret == EFI_SUCCESS ? CMD_RET_SUCCESS : CMD_RET_FAILURE;
+}
+
/**
* do_efi_capsule_show() - show capsule information
*
@@ -207,6 +217,8 @@
"", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(show, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_efi_capsule_show,
"", ""),
+ U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(disk-update, 0, 0, do_efi_capsule_on_disk_update,
+ "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(result, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_efi_capsule_res,
"", ""),
};
@@ -1544,6 +1556,8 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT
"efidebug capsule update [-v] <capsule address>\n"
" - process a capsule\n"
+ "efidebug capsule disk-update\n"
+ " - update a capsule from disk\n"
"efidebug capsule show <capsule address>\n"
" - show capsule information\n"
"efidebug capsule result [<capsule result var>]\n"
diff --git a/doc/board/emulation/index.rst b/doc/board/emulation/index.rst
index 1adefee..a09ead1 100644
--- a/doc/board/emulation/index.rst
+++ b/doc/board/emulation/index.rst
@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@
qemu-mips
qemu-riscv
qemu-x86
+ qemu_capsule_update
diff --git a/doc/board/emulation/qemu_capsule_update.rst b/doc/board/emulation/qemu_capsule_update.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fec75f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/board/emulation/qemu_capsule_update.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+.. Copyright (C) 2020, Linaro Limited
+
+Enabling UEFI Capsule Update feature
+------------------------------------
+
+Support has been added for the UEFI capsule update feature which
+enables updating the U-Boot image using the UEFI firmware management
+protocol (fmp). The capsules are not passed to the firmware through
+the UpdateCapsule runtime service. Instead, capsule-on-disk
+functionality is used for fetching the capsule from the EFI System
+Partition (ESP) by placing the capsule file under the
+\EFI\UpdateCapsule directory.
+
+Currently, support has been added on the QEMU ARM64 virt platform for
+updating the U-Boot binary as a raw image when the platform is booted
+in non-secure mode, i.e. with CONFIG_TFABOOT disabled. For this
+configuration, the QEMU platform needs to be booted with
+'secure=off'. The U-Boot binary placed on the first bank of the NOR
+flash at offset 0x0. The U-Boot environment is placed on the second
+NOR flash bank at offset 0x4000000.
+
+The capsule update feature is enabled with the following configuration
+settings::
+
+ CONFIG_MTD=y
+ CONFIG_FLASH_CFI_MTD=y
+ CONFIG_CMD_MTDPARTS=y
+ CONFIG_CMD_DFU=y
+ CONFIG_DFU_MTD=y
+ CONFIG_PCI_INIT_R=y
+ CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK=y
+ CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT=y
+ CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE=y
+ CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_RAW=y
+ CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FMP_HEADER=y
+
+In addition, the following config needs to be disabled(QEMU ARM specific)::
+
+ CONFIG_TFABOOT
+
+The capsule file can be generated by using the GenerateCapsule.py
+script in EDKII::
+
+ $ ./BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/GenerateCapsule -e -o \
+ <capsule_file_name> --fw-version <val> --lsv <val> --guid \
+ e2bb9c06-70e9-4b14-97a3-5a7913176e3f --verbose --update-image-index \
+ <val> --verbose <u-boot.bin>
+
+The above is a wrapper script(GenerateCapsule) which eventually calls
+the actual GenerateCapsule.py script.
+
+As per the UEFI specification, the capsule file needs to be placed on
+the EFI System Partition, under the \EFI\UpdateCapsule directory. The
+EFI System Partition can be a virtio-blk-device.
+
+Before initiating the firmware update, the efi variables BootNext,
+BootXXXX and OsIndications need to be set. The BootXXXX variable needs
+to be pointing to the EFI System Partition which contains the capsule
+file. The BootNext, BootXXXX and OsIndications variables can be set
+using the following commands::
+
+ => efidebug boot add 0 Boot0000 virtio 0:1 <capsule_file_name>
+ => efidebug boot next 0
+ => setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -v OsIndications =0x04
+ => saveenv
+
+Finally, the capsule update can be initiated with the following
+command::
+
+ => efidebug capsule disk-update
+
+The updated U-Boot image will be booted on subsequent boot.
+
+Enabling Capsule Authentication
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+The UEFI specification defines a way of authenticating the capsule to
+be updated by verifying the capsule signature. The capsule signature
+is computed and prepended to the capsule payload at the time of
+capsule generation. This signature is then verified by using the
+public key stored as part of the X509 certificate. This certificate is
+in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded as
+part of the platform's device tree blob using the mkeficapsule
+utility.
+
+On the QEMU virt platforms, the device-tree is generated on the fly
+based on the devices configured. This device tree is then passed on to
+the various software components booting on the platform, including
+U-Boot. Therefore, on the QEMU virt platform, the signatute is
+embedded on an overlay. This overlay is then applied at runtime to the
+base platform device-tree. Steps needed for embedding the esl file in
+the overlay are highlighted below.
+
+The capsule authentication feature can be enabled through the
+following config, in addition to the configs listed above for capsule
+update::
+
+ CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y
+
+The public and private keys used for the signing process are generated
+and used by the steps highlighted below::
+
+ 1. Install utility commands on your host
+ * OPENSSL
+ * efitools
+
+ 2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host
+
+ $ openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=CRT/ \
+ -keyout CRT.key -out CRT.crt -nodes -days 365
+ $ cert-to-efi-sig-list CRT.crt CRT.esl
+
+ $ openssl x509 -in CRT.crt -out CRT.cer -outform DER
+ $ openssl x509 -inform DER -in CRT.cer -outform PEM -out CRT.pub.pem
+
+ $ openssl pkcs12 -export -out CRT.pfx -inkey CRT.key -in CRT.crt
+ $ openssl pkcs12 -in CRT.pfx -nodes -out CRT.pem
+
+The capsule file can be generated by using the GenerateCapsule.py
+script in EDKII::
+
+ $ ./BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/GenerateCapsule -e -o \
+ <capsule_file_name> --monotonic-count <val> --fw-version \
+ <val> --lsv <val> --guid \
+ e2bb9c06-70e9-4b14-97a3-5a7913176e3f --verbose \
+ --update-image-index <val> --signer-private-cert \
+ /path/to/CRT.pem --trusted-public-cert \
+ /path/to/CRT.pub.pem --other-public-cert /path/to/CRT.pub.pem \
+ <u-boot.bin>
+
+Place the capsule generated in the above step on the EFI System
+Partition under the EFI/UpdateCapsule directory
+
+For embedding the public key certificate, the following steps need to
+be followed::
+
+ 1. Generate a skeleton overlay dts file, with a single fragment
+ node and an empty __overlay__ node
+
+ A typical skeleton overlay file will look like this
+
+ /dts-v1/;
+ /plugin/;
+
+ / {
+ fragment@0 {
+ target-path = "/";
+ __overlay__ {
+ };
+ };
+ };
+
+
+ 2. Convert the dts to a corresponding dtb with the following
+ command
+ ./scripts/dtc/dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o <ov_dtb_file_name> \
+ <dts_file>
+
+ 3. Run the dtb file generated above through the mkeficapsule tool
+ in U-Boot
+ ./tools/mkeficapsule -O <pub_key.esl> -D <ov_dtb>
+
+Running the above command results in the creation of a 'signature'
+node in the dtb, under which the public key is stored as a
+'capsule-key' property. The '-O' option is to be used since the
+public key certificate(esl) file is being embedded in an overlay.
+
+The dtb file embedded with the certificate is now to be placed on an
+EFI System Partition. This would then be loaded and "merged" with the
+base platform flattened device-tree(dtb) at runtime.
+
+Build U-Boot with the following steps(QEMU ARM64)::
+
+ $ make qemu_arm64_defconfig
+ $ make menuconfig
+ Disable CONFIG_TFABOOT
+ Enable CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
+ Enable all configs needed for capsule update(listed above)
+ $ make all
+
+Boot the platform and perform the following steps on the U-Boot
+command line::
+
+ 1. Enable capsule authentication by setting the following env
+ variable
+
+ => setenv capsule_authentication_enabled 1
+ => saveenv
+
+ 2. Load the overlay dtb to memory and merge it with the base fdt
+
+ => fatload virtio 0:1 <$fdtovaddr> EFI/<ov_dtb_file>
+ => fdt addr $fdtcontroladdr
+ => fdt resize <size_of_ov_dtb_file>
+ => fdt apply <$fdtovaddr>
+
+ 3. Set the following environment and UEFI boot variables
+
+ => setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -v OsIndications =0x04
+ => efidebug boot add 0 Boot0000 virtio 0:1 <capsule_file_name>
+ => efidebug boot next 0
+ => saveenv
+
+ 4. Finally, the capsule update can be initiated with the following
+ command
+
+ => efidebug capsule disk-update
+
+On subsequent reboot, the platform should boot the updated U-Boot binary.
diff --git a/drivers/dfu/dfu_mtd.c b/drivers/dfu/dfu_mtd.c
index 36cd4e9..b34975d 100644
--- a/drivers/dfu/dfu_mtd.c
+++ b/drivers/dfu/dfu_mtd.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
static int mtd_block_op(enum dfu_op op, struct dfu_entity *dfu,
u64 offset, void *buf, long *len)
{
- u64 off, lim, remaining;
+ u64 off, lim, remaining, lock_ofs, lock_len;
struct mtd_info *mtd = dfu->data.mtd.info;
struct mtd_oob_ops io_op = {};
int ret = 0;
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
return 0;
}
- off = dfu->data.mtd.start + offset + dfu->bad_skip;
+ off = lock_ofs = dfu->data.mtd.start + offset + dfu->bad_skip;
lim = dfu->data.mtd.start + dfu->data.mtd.size;
if (off >= lim) {
@@ -56,12 +56,19 @@
if (op == DFU_OP_WRITE) {
struct erase_info erase_op = {};
- remaining = round_up(*len, mtd->erasesize);
+ remaining = lock_len = round_up(*len, mtd->erasesize);
erase_op.mtd = mtd;
erase_op.addr = off;
erase_op.len = mtd->erasesize;
erase_op.scrub = 0;
+ debug("Unlocking the mtd device\n");
+ ret = mtd_unlock(mtd, lock_ofs, lock_len);
+ if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ printf("MTD device unlock failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
while (remaining) {
if (erase_op.addr + remaining > lim) {
printf("Limit reached 0x%llx while erasing at offset 0x%llx\n",
@@ -139,6 +146,13 @@
io_op.len = mtd->writesize;
}
+ if (op == DFU_OP_WRITE) {
+ /* Write done, lock again */
+ debug("Locking the mtd device\n");
+ ret = mtd_lock(mtd, lock_ofs, lock_len);
+ if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ printf("MTD device lock failed\n");
+ }
return ret;
}
diff --git a/fs/fat/fat.c b/fs/fat/fat.c
index 47344bb..157dad6 100644
--- a/fs/fat/fat.c
+++ b/fs/fat/fat.c
@@ -810,7 +810,6 @@
*/
void *fat_next_cluster(fat_itr *itr, unsigned int *nbytes)
{
- fsdata *mydata = itr->fsdata; /* for silly macros */
int ret;
u32 sect;
u32 read_size;
@@ -838,8 +837,8 @@
read_size = itr->fsdata->clust_size;
}
- debug("FAT read(sect=%d), clust_size=%d, read_size=%u, DIRENTSPERBLOCK=%zd\n",
- sect, itr->fsdata->clust_size, read_size, DIRENTSPERBLOCK);
+ log_debug("FAT read(sect=%d), clust_size=%d, read_size=%u\n",
+ sect, itr->fsdata->clust_size, read_size);
/*
* NOTE: do_fat_read_at() had complicated logic to deal w/
@@ -1378,3 +1377,21 @@
void fat_close(void)
{
}
+
+int fat_uuid(char *uuid_str)
+{
+ boot_sector bs;
+ volume_info volinfo;
+ int fatsize;
+ int ret;
+ u8 *id;
+
+ ret = read_bootsectandvi(&bs, &volinfo, &fatsize);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ id = volinfo.volume_id;
+ sprintf(uuid_str, "%02X%02X-%02X%02X", id[3], id[2], id[1], id[0]);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/fs/fs.c b/fs/fs.c
index 7a40206..5e80648 100644
--- a/fs/fs.c
+++ b/fs/fs.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@
.unlink = fs_unlink_unsupported,
.mkdir = fs_mkdir_unsupported,
#endif
- .uuid = fs_uuid_unsupported,
+ .uuid = fat_uuid,
.opendir = fat_opendir,
.readdir = fat_readdir,
.closedir = fat_closedir,
diff --git a/include/efi_api.h b/include/efi_api.h
index e82d4ca..ecb43a0 100644
--- a/include/efi_api.h
+++ b/include/efi_api.h
@@ -1813,6 +1813,24 @@
} __attribute__((__packed__));
/**
+ * efi_firmware_image_authentication - Capsule authentication method
+ * descriptor
+ *
+ * This structure describes an authentication information for
+ * a capsule with IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED set
+ * and should be included as part of the capsule.
+ * Only EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID is accepted.
+ *
+ * @monotonic_count: Count to prevent replay
+ * @auth_info: Authentication info
+ */
+struct efi_firmware_image_authentication {
+ uint64_t monotonic_count;
+ struct win_certificate_uefi_guid auth_info;
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+
+/**
* efi_signature_data - A format of signature
*
* This structure describes a single signature in signature database.
diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h
index 365f3d0..4719fa9 100644
--- a/include/efi_loader.h
+++ b/include/efi_loader.h
@@ -304,15 +304,17 @@
* @exit_status: exit status passed to Exit()
* @exit_data_size: exit data size passed to Exit()
* @exit_data: exit data passed to Exit()
- * @exit_jmp: long jump buffer for returning form started image
+ * @exit_jmp: long jump buffer for returning from started image
* @entry: entry address of the relocated image
+ * @image_type: indicates if the image is an applicition or a driver
+ * @auth_status: indicates if the image is authenticated
*/
struct efi_loaded_image_obj {
struct efi_object header;
- efi_status_t exit_status;
+ efi_status_t *exit_status;
efi_uintn_t *exit_data_size;
u16 **exit_data;
- struct jmp_buf_data exit_jmp;
+ struct jmp_buf_data *exit_jmp;
EFIAPI efi_status_t (*entry)(efi_handle_t image_handle,
struct efi_system_table *st);
u16 image_type;
@@ -811,18 +813,27 @@
int nocheck);
void efi_sigstore_free(struct efi_signature_store *sigstore);
+struct efi_signature_store *efi_build_signature_store(void *sig_list,
+ efi_uintn_t size);
struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name);
bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void);
+bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void);
+
bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp,
WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len);
+struct pkcs7_message *efi_parse_pkcs7_header(const void *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ u8 **tmpbuf);
+
/* runtime implementation of memcpy() */
void efi_memcpy_runtime(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
/* commonly used helper function */
-u16 *efi_create_indexed_name(u16 *buffer, const char *name, unsigned int index);
+u16 *efi_create_indexed_name(u16 *buffer, size_t buffer_size, const char *name,
+ unsigned int index);
extern const struct efi_firmware_management_protocol efi_fmp_fit;
extern const struct efi_firmware_management_protocol efi_fmp_raw;
@@ -838,6 +849,10 @@
u64 *maximum_capsule_size,
u32 *reset_type);
+efi_status_t efi_capsule_authenticate(const void *capsule,
+ efi_uintn_t capsule_size,
+ void **image, efi_uintn_t *image_size);
+
#define EFI_CAPSULE_DIR L"\\EFI\\UpdateCapsule\\"
/* Hook at initialization */
diff --git a/include/efi_variable.h b/include/efi_variable.h
index 4704a3c..bf50762 100644
--- a/include/efi_variable.h
+++ b/include/efi_variable.h
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
#define EFI_VAR_FILE_NAME "ubootefi.var"
-#define EFI_VAR_BUF_SIZE 0x4000
+#define EFI_VAR_BUF_SIZE CONFIG_EFI_VAR_BUF_SIZE
/*
* This constant identifies the file format for storing UEFI variables in
diff --git a/include/fat.h b/include/fat.h
index 3c29a44..b9f273f 100644
--- a/include/fat.h
+++ b/include/fat.h
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
#define MAX_CLUSTSIZE CONFIG_FS_FAT_MAX_CLUSTSIZE
-#define DIRENTSPERBLOCK (mydata->sect_size / sizeof(dir_entry))
#define DIRENTSPERCLUST ((mydata->clust_size * mydata->sect_size) / \
sizeof(dir_entry))
@@ -213,4 +212,16 @@
int fat_mkdir(const char *dirname);
void fat_close(void);
void *fat_next_cluster(fat_itr *itr, unsigned int *nbytes);
+
+/**
+ * fat_uuid() - get FAT volume ID
+ *
+ * The FAT volume ID returned in @uuid_str as hexadecimal number in XXXX-XXXX
+ * format.
+ *
+ * @uuid_str: caller allocated buffer of at least 10 bytes for the volume ID
+ * Return: 0 on success
+ */
+int fat_uuid(char *uuid_str);
+
#endif /* _FAT_H_ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_types.h b/include/signatures.h
similarity index 94%
rename from arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_types.h
rename to include/signatures.h
index 3d5b17e..4042db1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_types.h
+++ b/include/signatures.h
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
* Copyright (C) 2014, Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
*/
-#ifndef __FSP_TYPES_H__
-#define __FSP_TYPES_H__
+#ifndef __SIGNATURES_H__
+#define __SIGNATURES_H__
/**
* Returns a 16-bit signature built from 2 ASCII characters.
@@ -59,4 +59,4 @@
#define SIGNATURE_64(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) \
(SIGNATURE_32(A, B, C, D) | ((u64)(SIGNATURE_32(E, F, G, H)) << 32))
-#endif
+#endif /* __SIGNATURES_H__ */
diff --git a/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c b/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c
index 320ba49..58683ef 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -50,8 +50,15 @@
struct image_region regions[2];
int ret = 0;
- /* The digest was calculated already. */
- if (sig->digest)
+ /*
+ * [RFC2315 9.3]
+ * If the authenticated attributes are present,
+ * the message-digest is calculated on the
+ * attributes present in the
+ * authenticatedAttributes field and not just
+ * the contents field
+ */
+ if (!sinfo->authattrs && sig->digest)
return 0;
if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
@@ -63,17 +70,25 @@
else
return -ENOPKG;
- sig->digest = calloc(1, sig->digest_size);
- if (!sig->digest) {
- pr_warn("Sig %u: Out of memory\n", sinfo->index);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ /*
+ * Calculate the hash only if the data is present.
+ * In case of authenticated variable and capsule,
+ * the hash has already been calculated on the
+ * efi_image_regions and populated
+ */
+ if (pkcs7->data) {
+ sig->digest = calloc(1, sig->digest_size);
+ if (!sig->digest) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: Out of memory\n", sinfo->index);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
- regions[0].data = pkcs7->data;
- regions[0].size = pkcs7->data_len;
+ regions[0].data = pkcs7->data;
+ regions[0].size = pkcs7->data_len;
- /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
- hash_calculate(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, regions, 1, sig->digest);
+ /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
+ hash_calculate(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, regions, 1, sig->digest);
+ }
/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
index 073d90c..fdf245d 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
@@ -77,6 +77,20 @@
endif
+config EFI_VAR_BUF_SIZE
+ int "Memory size of the UEFI variable store"
+ default 16384
+ range 4096 2147483647
+ help
+ This defines the size in bytes of the memory area reserved for keeping
+ UEFI variables.
+
+ When using StandAloneMM (CONFIG_EFI_MM_COMM_TEE=y) this value should
+ match the value of PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize used to compile the
+ StandAloneMM module.
+
+ Minimum 4096, default 16384.
+
config EFI_GET_TIME
bool "GetTime() runtime service"
depends on DM_RTC
@@ -139,6 +153,23 @@
Select this option if you want to enable capsule-based
firmware update using Firmware Management Protocol.
+config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
+ bool "Update Capsule authentication"
+ depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE
+ depends on EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK
+ depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT
+ select SHA256
+ select RSA
+ select RSA_VERIFY
+ select RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ select PKCS7_VERIFY
+ default n
+ help
+ Select this option if you want to enable capsule
+ authentication
+
config EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_FIT
bool "FMP driver for FIT image"
depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c
index 61dc72a..d3be2f9 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@
memcpy(*load_options, lo.optional_data, size);
ret = efi_set_load_options(*handle, size, *load_options);
} else {
- load_options = NULL;
+ *load_options = NULL;
}
error:
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c
index 03053e8..b2cb016 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c
@@ -247,8 +247,8 @@
}
if (event)
list_add_tail(&event->queue_link, &efi_event_queue);
+ efi_process_event_queue();
}
- efi_process_event_queue();
}
/**
@@ -274,8 +274,8 @@
* efi_signal_event() - signal an EFI event
* @event: event to signal
*
- * This function signals an event. If the event belongs to an event group all
- * events of the group are signaled. If they are of type EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
+ * This function signals an event. If the event belongs to an event group, all
+ * events of the group are signaled. If they are of type EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL,
* their notification function is queued.
*
* For the SignalEvent service see efi_signal_event_ext.
@@ -2161,7 +2161,7 @@
}
if (!efi_st_keep_devices) {
- if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_DEVICE)
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_DEVICE))
udc_disconnect();
board_quiesce_devices();
dm_remove_devices_flags(DM_REMOVE_ACTIVE_ALL);
@@ -2978,6 +2978,8 @@
efi_status_t ret;
void *info;
efi_handle_t parent_image = current_image;
+ efi_status_t exit_status;
+ struct jmp_buf_data exit_jmp;
EFI_ENTRY("%p, %p, %p", image_handle, exit_data_size, exit_data);
@@ -2999,9 +3001,11 @@
image_obj->exit_data_size = exit_data_size;
image_obj->exit_data = exit_data;
+ image_obj->exit_status = &exit_status;
+ image_obj->exit_jmp = &exit_jmp;
/* call the image! */
- if (setjmp(&image_obj->exit_jmp)) {
+ if (setjmp(&exit_jmp)) {
/*
* We called the entry point of the child image with EFI_CALL
* in the lines below. The child image called the Exit() boot
@@ -3023,10 +3027,10 @@
*/
assert(__efi_entry_check());
EFI_PRINT("%lu returned by started image\n",
- (unsigned long)((uintptr_t)image_obj->exit_status &
+ (unsigned long)((uintptr_t)exit_status &
~EFI_ERROR_MASK));
current_image = parent_image;
- return EFI_EXIT(image_obj->exit_status);
+ return EFI_EXIT(exit_status);
}
current_image = image_handle;
@@ -3209,6 +3213,7 @@
struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_protocol;
struct efi_loaded_image_obj *image_obj =
(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *)image_handle;
+ struct jmp_buf_data *exit_jmp;
EFI_ENTRY("%p, %ld, %zu, %p", image_handle, exit_status,
exit_data_size, exit_data);
@@ -3250,6 +3255,9 @@
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
EFI_PRINT("%s: out of memory\n", __func__);
}
+ /* efi_delete_image() frees image_obj. Copy before the call. */
+ exit_jmp = image_obj->exit_jmp;
+ *image_obj->exit_status = exit_status;
if (image_obj->image_type == IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION ||
exit_status != EFI_SUCCESS)
efi_delete_image(image_obj, loaded_image_protocol);
@@ -3263,8 +3271,7 @@
*/
efi_restore_gd();
- image_obj->exit_status = exit_status;
- longjmp(&image_obj->exit_jmp, 1);
+ longjmp(exit_jmp, 1);
panic("EFI application exited");
out:
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
index ea22ee7..dad1b0f 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
#include <mapmem.h>
#include <sort.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_capsule_report = EFI_CAPSULE_REPORT_GUID;
static const efi_guid_t efi_guid_firmware_management_capsule_id =
EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID;
@@ -73,8 +77,8 @@
struct efi_time time;
efi_status_t ret;
- efi_create_indexed_name(variable_name16, "Capsule", index);
-
+ efi_create_indexed_name(variable_name16, sizeof(variable_name16),
+ "Capsule", index);
result.variable_total_size = sizeof(result);
result.capsule_guid = capsule->capsule_guid;
ret = EFI_CALL((*efi_runtime_services.get_time)(&time, NULL));
@@ -191,6 +195,124 @@
return NULL;
}
+#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
+
+const efi_guid_t efi_guid_capsule_root_cert_guid =
+ EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID;
+
+__weak int efi_get_public_key_data(void **pkey, efi_uintn_t *pkey_len)
+{
+ /* The platform is supposed to provide
+ * a method for getting the public key
+ * stored in the form of efi signature
+ * list
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+efi_status_t efi_capsule_authenticate(const void *capsule, efi_uintn_t capsule_size,
+ void **image, efi_uintn_t *image_size)
+{
+ u8 *buf;
+ int ret;
+ void *fdt_pkey, *pkey;
+ efi_uintn_t pkey_len;
+ uint64_t monotonic_count;
+ struct efi_signature_store *truststore;
+ struct pkcs7_message *capsule_sig;
+ struct efi_image_regions *regs;
+ struct efi_firmware_image_authentication *auth_hdr;
+ efi_status_t status;
+
+ status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ capsule_sig = NULL;
+ truststore = NULL;
+ regs = NULL;
+
+ /* Sanity checks */
+ if (capsule == NULL || capsule_size == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ auth_hdr = (struct efi_firmware_image_authentication *)capsule;
+ if (capsule_size < sizeof(*auth_hdr))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (auth_hdr->auth_info.hdr.dwLength <=
+ offsetof(struct win_certificate_uefi_guid, cert_data))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (guidcmp(&auth_hdr->auth_info.cert_type, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7))
+ goto out;
+
+ *image = (uint8_t *)capsule + sizeof(auth_hdr->monotonic_count) +
+ auth_hdr->auth_info.hdr.dwLength;
+ *image_size = capsule_size - auth_hdr->auth_info.hdr.dwLength -
+ sizeof(auth_hdr->monotonic_count);
+ memcpy(&monotonic_count, &auth_hdr->monotonic_count,
+ sizeof(monotonic_count));
+
+ /* data to be digested */
+ regs = calloc(sizeof(*regs) + sizeof(struct image_region) * 2, 1);
+ if (!regs)
+ goto out;
+
+ regs->max = 2;
+ efi_image_region_add(regs, (uint8_t *)*image,
+ (uint8_t *)*image + *image_size, 1);
+
+ efi_image_region_add(regs, (uint8_t *)&monotonic_count,
+ (uint8_t *)&monotonic_count + sizeof(monotonic_count),
+ 1);
+
+ capsule_sig = efi_parse_pkcs7_header(auth_hdr->auth_info.cert_data,
+ auth_hdr->auth_info.hdr.dwLength
+ - sizeof(auth_hdr->auth_info),
+ &buf);
+ if (IS_ERR(capsule_sig)) {
+ debug("Parsing variable's pkcs7 header failed\n");
+ capsule_sig = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = efi_get_public_key_data(&fdt_pkey, &pkey_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ pkey = malloc(pkey_len);
+ if (!pkey)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(pkey, fdt_pkey, pkey_len);
+ truststore = efi_build_signature_store(pkey, pkey_len);
+ if (!truststore)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* verify signature */
+ if (efi_signature_verify(regs, capsule_sig, truststore, NULL)) {
+ debug("Verified\n");
+ } else {
+ debug("Verifying variable's signature failed\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+out:
+ efi_sigstore_free(truststore);
+ pkcs7_free_message(capsule_sig);
+ free(regs);
+
+ return status;
+}
+#else
+efi_status_t efi_capsule_authenticate(const void *capsule, efi_uintn_t capsule_size,
+ void **image, efi_uintn_t *image_size)
+{
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */
+
+
/**
* efi_capsule_update_firmware - update firmware from capsule
* @capsule_data: Capsule
@@ -896,7 +1018,8 @@
free(files);
/* CapsuleLast */
- efi_create_indexed_name(variable_name16, "Capsule", index - 1);
+ efi_create_indexed_name(variable_name16, sizeof(variable_name16),
+ "Capsule", index - 1);
efi_set_variable_int(L"CapsuleLast", &efi_guid_capsule_report,
EFI_VARIABLE_READ_ONLY |
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_console.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_console.c
index 011acca..7051095 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_console.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_console.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <env.h>
#include <stdio_dev.h>
#include <video_console.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
#define EFI_COUT_MODE_2 2
#define EFI_MAX_COUT_MODE 3
@@ -689,6 +690,17 @@
switch (ch) {
case 0x1b:
/*
+ * If a second key is received within 10 ms, assume that we are
+ * dealing with an escape sequence. Otherwise consider this the
+ * escape key being hit. 10 ms is long enough to work fine at
+ * 1200 baud and above.
+ */
+ udelay(10000);
+ if (!tstc()) {
+ pressed_key.scan_code = 23;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
* Xterm Control Sequences
* https://www.xfree86.org/4.8.0/ctlseqs.html
*/
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c
index 72c560d..5e401bb 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c
@@ -11,8 +11,30 @@
#include <dfu.h>
#include <efi_loader.h>
#include <image.h>
+#include <signatures.h>
+
#include <linux/list.h>
+#define FMP_PAYLOAD_HDR_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32('M', 'S', 'S', '1')
+
+/**
+ * struct fmp_payload_header - EDK2 header for the FMP payload
+ *
+ * This structure describes the header which is preprended to the
+ * FMP payload by the edk2 capsule generation scripts.
+ *
+ * @signature: Header signature used to identify the header
+ * @header_size: Size of the structure
+ * @fw_version: Firmware versions used
+ * @lowest_supported_version: Lowest supported version
+ */
+struct fmp_payload_header {
+ u32 signature;
+ u32 header_size;
+ u32 fw_version;
+ u32 lowest_supported_version;
+};
+
/* Place holder; not supported */
static
efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_firmware_get_image_unsupported(
@@ -162,9 +184,16 @@
image_info[i].version_name = NULL; /* not supported */
image_info[i].size = 0;
image_info[i].attributes_supported =
- IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_IMAGE_UPDATABLE;
+ IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_IMAGE_UPDATABLE |
+ IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED;
image_info[i].attributes_setting =
IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_IMAGE_UPDATABLE;
+
+ /* Check if the capsule authentication is enabled */
+ if (env_get("capsule_authentication_enabled"))
+ image_info[0].attributes_setting |=
+ IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED;
+
image_info[i].lowest_supported_image_version = 0;
image_info[i].last_attempt_version = 0;
image_info[i].last_attempt_status = LAST_ATTEMPT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
@@ -379,12 +408,58 @@
efi_status_t (*progress)(efi_uintn_t completion),
u16 **abort_reason)
{
+ u32 fmp_hdr_signature;
+ struct fmp_payload_header *header;
+ void *capsule_payload;
+ efi_status_t status;
+ efi_uintn_t capsule_payload_size;
+
EFI_ENTRY("%p %d %p %ld %p %p %p\n", this, image_index, image,
image_size, vendor_code, progress, abort_reason);
if (!image)
return EFI_EXIT(EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ /* Authenticate the capsule if authentication enabled */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) &&
+ env_get("capsule_authentication_enabled")) {
+ capsule_payload = NULL;
+ capsule_payload_size = 0;
+ status = efi_capsule_authenticate(image, image_size,
+ &capsule_payload,
+ &capsule_payload_size);
+
+ if (status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+ printf("Capsule authentication check failed. Aborting update\n");
+ return EFI_EXIT(status);
+ } else if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ return EFI_EXIT(status);
+ }
+
+ debug("Capsule authentication successfull\n");
+ image = capsule_payload;
+ image_size = capsule_payload_size;
+ } else {
+ debug("Capsule authentication disabled. ");
+ debug("Updating capsule without authenticating.\n");
+ }
+
+ fmp_hdr_signature = FMP_PAYLOAD_HDR_SIGNATURE;
+ header = (void *)image;
+
+ if (!memcmp(&header->signature, &fmp_hdr_signature,
+ sizeof(fmp_hdr_signature))) {
+ /*
+ * When building the capsule with the scripts in
+ * edk2, a FMP header is inserted above the capsule
+ * payload. Compensate for this header to get the
+ * actual payload that is to be updated.
+ */
+ image += header->header_size;
+ image_size -= header->header_size;
+
+ }
+
if (dfu_write_by_alt(image_index - 1, (void *)image, image_size,
NULL, NULL))
return EFI_EXIT(EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_load_initrd.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_load_initrd.c
index 4bf3b5e..b9ee883 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_load_initrd.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_load_initrd.c
@@ -4,13 +4,11 @@
*/
#include <common.h>
-#include <env.h>
-#include <malloc.h>
-#include <mapmem.h>
-#include <dm.h>
-#include <fs.h>
#include <efi_loader.h>
#include <efi_load_initrd.h>
+#include <fs.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <mapmem.h>
static efi_status_t EFIAPI
efi_load_file2_initrd(struct efi_load_file_protocol *this,
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c
index ce6292f..5800cbf 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c
@@ -257,11 +257,6 @@
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out;
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD
- ret = efi_initrd_register();
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out;
-#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NET
ret = efi_net_register();
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
index 79dee27..c7ec275 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
@@ -26,9 +26,94 @@
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
-#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
+static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
+ /* SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7,
+ /* OID: pkcs7-signedData */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02,
+ /* Context Structured? */
+ 0xa0, 0x82, 0x05, 0xb8,
+};
/**
+ * efi_parse_pkcs7_header - parse a signature in payload
+ * @buf: Pointer to payload's value
+ * @buflen: Length of @buf
+ * @tmpbuf: Pointer to temporary buffer
+ *
+ * Parse a signature embedded in payload's value and instantiate
+ * a pkcs7_message structure. Since pkcs7_parse_message() accepts only
+ * pkcs7's signedData, some header needed be prepended for correctly
+ * parsing authentication data
+ * A temporary buffer will be allocated if needed, and it should be
+ * kept valid during the authentication because some data in the buffer
+ * will be referenced by efi_signature_verify().
+ *
+ * Return: Pointer to pkcs7_message structure on success, NULL on error
+ */
+struct pkcs7_message *efi_parse_pkcs7_header(const void *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ u8 **tmpbuf)
+{
+ u8 *ebuf;
+ size_t ebuflen, len;
+ struct pkcs7_message *msg;
+
+ /*
+ * This is the best assumption to check if the binary is
+ * already in a form of pkcs7's signedData.
+ */
+ if (buflen > sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) &&
+ !memcmp(&((u8 *)buf)[4], &pkcs7_hdr[4], 11)) {
+ msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf, buflen);
+ if (IS_ERR(msg))
+ return NULL;
+ return msg;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, we should add a dummy prefix sequence for pkcs7
+ * message parser to be able to process.
+ * NOTE: EDK2 also uses similar hack in WrapPkcs7Data()
+ * in CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7VerifyCommon.c
+ * TODO:
+ * The header should be composed in a more refined manner.
+ */
+ EFI_PRINT("Makeshift prefix added to authentication data\n");
+ ebuflen = sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) + buflen;
+ if (ebuflen <= 0x7f) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Data is too short\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ebuf = malloc(ebuflen);
+ if (!ebuf) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Out of memory\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ebuf, pkcs7_hdr, sizeof(pkcs7_hdr));
+ memcpy(ebuf + sizeof(pkcs7_hdr), buf, buflen);
+ len = ebuflen - 4;
+ ebuf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
+ ebuf[3] = len & 0xff;
+ len = ebuflen - 0x13;
+ ebuf[0x11] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
+ ebuf[0x12] = len & 0xff;
+
+ msg = pkcs7_parse_message(ebuf, ebuflen);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(msg)) {
+ free(ebuf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ *tmpbuf = ebuf;
+ return msg;
+}
+
+/**
* efi_hash_regions - calculate a hash value
* @regs: Array of regions
* @count: Number of regions
@@ -652,6 +737,63 @@
}
/**
+ * efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb - parse the signature list and populate
+ * the signature store
+ *
+ * @sig_list: Pointer to the signature list
+ * @size: Size of the signature list
+ *
+ * Parse the efi signature list and instantiate a signature store
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * Return: Pointer to signature store on success, NULL on error
+ */
+struct efi_signature_store *efi_build_signature_store(void *sig_list,
+ efi_uintn_t size)
+{
+ struct efi_signature_list *esl;
+ struct efi_signature_store *sigstore = NULL, *siglist;
+
+ esl = sig_list;
+ while (size > 0) {
+ /* List must exist if there is remaining data. */
+ if (size < sizeof(*esl)) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Signature list in wrong format\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (size < esl->signature_list_size) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Signature list in wrong format\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse a single siglist. */
+ siglist = efi_sigstore_parse_siglist(esl);
+ if (!siglist) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Parsing of signature list of failed\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Append siglist */
+ siglist->next = sigstore;
+ sigstore = siglist;
+
+ /* Next */
+ size -= esl->signature_list_size;
+ esl = (void *)esl + esl->signature_list_size;
+ }
+ free(sig_list);
+
+ return sigstore;
+
+err:
+ efi_sigstore_free(sigstore);
+ free(sig_list);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
* efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb - parse a signature database variable
* @name: Variable's name
*
@@ -662,8 +804,7 @@
*/
struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name)
{
- struct efi_signature_store *sigstore = NULL, *siglist;
- struct efi_signature_list *esl;
+ struct efi_signature_store *sigstore = NULL;
const efi_guid_t *vendor;
void *db;
efi_uintn_t db_size;
@@ -699,47 +840,10 @@
ret = EFI_CALL(efi_get_variable(name, vendor, NULL, &db_size, db));
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
EFI_PRINT("Getting variable, %ls, failed\n", name);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Parse siglist list */
- esl = db;
- while (db_size > 0) {
- /* List must exist if there is remaining data. */
- if (db_size < sizeof(*esl)) {
- EFI_PRINT("variable, %ls, in wrong format\n", name);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (db_size < esl->signature_list_size) {
- EFI_PRINT("variable, %ls, in wrong format\n", name);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Parse a single siglist. */
- siglist = efi_sigstore_parse_siglist(esl);
- if (!siglist) {
- EFI_PRINT("Parsing signature list of %ls failed\n",
- name);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Append siglist */
- siglist->next = sigstore;
- sigstore = siglist;
-
- /* Next */
- db_size -= esl->signature_list_size;
- esl = (void *)esl + esl->signature_list_size;
+ free(db);
+ return NULL;
}
- free(db);
- return sigstore;
-
-err:
- efi_sigstore_free(sigstore);
- free(db);
-
- return NULL;
+ return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size);
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
+#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_string.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_string.c
index 3de721f..9627242 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_string.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_string.c
@@ -23,13 +23,19 @@
* Return: A pointer to the next position after the created string
* in @buffer, or NULL otherwise
*/
-u16 *efi_create_indexed_name(u16 *buffer, const char *name, unsigned int index)
+u16 *efi_create_indexed_name(u16 *buffer, size_t buffer_size, const char *name,
+ unsigned int index)
{
u16 *p = buffer;
char index_buf[5];
+ size_t size;
+ size = (utf8_utf16_strlen(name) * sizeof(u16) +
+ sizeof(index_buf) * sizeof(u16));
+ if (buffer_size < size)
+ return NULL;
utf8_utf16_strcpy(&p, name);
- sprintf(index_buf, "%04X", index);
+ snprintf(index_buf, sizeof(index_buf), "%04X", index);
utf8_utf16_strcpy(&p, index_buf);
return p;
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
index 0c689cf..ba0874e 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
@@ -24,93 +24,8 @@
#include <asm/sections.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
-static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
- /* SEQUENCE */
- 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7,
- /* OID: pkcs7-signedData */
- 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02,
- /* Context Structured? */
- 0xa0, 0x82, 0x05, 0xb8,
-};
/**
- * efi_variable_parse_signature - parse a signature in variable
- * @buf: Pointer to variable's value
- * @buflen: Length of @buf
- * @tmpbuf: Pointer to temporary buffer
- *
- * Parse a signature embedded in variable's value and instantiate
- * a pkcs7_message structure. Since pkcs7_parse_message() accepts only
- * pkcs7's signedData, some header needed be prepended for correctly
- * parsing authentication data, particularly for variable's.
- * A temporary buffer will be allocated if needed, and it should be
- * kept valid during the authentication because some data in the buffer
- * will be referenced by efi_signature_verify().
- *
- * Return: Pointer to pkcs7_message structure on success, NULL on error
- */
-static struct pkcs7_message *efi_variable_parse_signature(const void *buf,
- size_t buflen,
- u8 **tmpbuf)
-{
- u8 *ebuf;
- size_t ebuflen, len;
- struct pkcs7_message *msg;
-
- /*
- * This is the best assumption to check if the binary is
- * already in a form of pkcs7's signedData.
- */
- if (buflen > sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) &&
- !memcmp(&((u8 *)buf)[4], &pkcs7_hdr[4], 11)) {
- msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf, buflen);
- if (IS_ERR(msg))
- return NULL;
- return msg;
- }
-
- /*
- * Otherwise, we should add a dummy prefix sequence for pkcs7
- * message parser to be able to process.
- * NOTE: EDK2 also uses similar hack in WrapPkcs7Data()
- * in CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7VerifyCommon.c
- * TODO:
- * The header should be composed in a more refined manner.
- */
- EFI_PRINT("Makeshift prefix added to authentication data\n");
- ebuflen = sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) + buflen;
- if (ebuflen <= 0x7f) {
- EFI_PRINT("Data is too short\n");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ebuf = malloc(ebuflen);
- if (!ebuf) {
- EFI_PRINT("Out of memory\n");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- memcpy(ebuf, pkcs7_hdr, sizeof(pkcs7_hdr));
- memcpy(ebuf + sizeof(pkcs7_hdr), buf, buflen);
- len = ebuflen - 4;
- ebuf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
- ebuf[3] = len & 0xff;
- len = ebuflen - 0x13;
- ebuf[0x11] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
- ebuf[0x12] = len & 0xff;
-
- msg = pkcs7_parse_message(ebuf, ebuflen);
-
- if (IS_ERR(msg)) {
- free(ebuf);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- *tmpbuf = ebuf;
- return msg;
-}
-
-/**
* efi_variable_authenticate - authenticate a variable
* @variable: Variable name in u16
* @vendor: Guid of variable
@@ -215,10 +130,10 @@
goto err;
/* ebuf should be kept valid during the authentication */
- var_sig = efi_variable_parse_signature(auth->auth_info.cert_data,
- auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength
- - sizeof(auth->auth_info),
- &ebuf);
+ var_sig = efi_parse_pkcs7_header(auth->auth_info.cert_data,
+ auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength
+ - sizeof(auth->auth_info),
+ &ebuf);
if (!var_sig) {
EFI_PRINT("Parsing variable's signature failed\n");
goto err;
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c
index be6f3df..b8808fd 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c
@@ -36,20 +36,29 @@
static const struct tee_optee_ta_uuid uuid = PTA_STMM_UUID;
struct udevice *tee = NULL;
struct tee_open_session_arg arg;
- int rc;
+ int rc = -ENODEV;
tee = tee_find_device(tee, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!tee)
- return -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg));
tee_optee_ta_uuid_to_octets(arg.uuid, &uuid);
rc = tee_open_session(tee, &arg, 0, NULL);
- if (!rc) {
- conn->tee = tee;
- conn->session = arg.session;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check the internal OP-TEE result */
+ if (arg.ret != TEE_SUCCESS) {
+ rc = -EIO;
+ goto out;
}
+ conn->tee = tee;
+ conn->session = arg.session;
+
+ return 0;
+out:
return rc;
}
@@ -88,6 +97,7 @@
if (tee_shm_register(conn.tee, comm_buf, buf_size, 0, &shm)) {
log_err("Unable to register shared memory\n");
+ tee_close_session(conn.tee, conn.session);
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
diff --git a/test/unicode_ut.c b/test/unicode_ut.c
index 33fc8b0..6130ef0 100644
--- a/test/unicode_ut.c
+++ b/test/unicode_ut.c
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@
u16 *pos;
memset(buf, 0xeb, sizeof(buf));
- pos = efi_create_indexed_name(buf, "Capsule", 0x0af9);
+ pos = efi_create_indexed_name(buf, sizeof(buf), "Capsule", 0x0af9);
ut_asserteq_mem(expected, buf, sizeof(expected));
ut_asserteq(pos - buf, u16_strnlen(buf, SIZE_MAX));
diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
index 66d9376..6d7b48f 100644
--- a/tools/Makefile
+++ b/tools/Makefile
@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler
HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include
+mkeficapsule-objs := mkeficapsule.o $(LIBFDT_OBJS)
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT) += mkeficapsule
# We build some files with extra pedantic flags to try to minimize things
diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
index 3f8bc70..270943f 100644
--- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c
+++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
@@ -4,16 +4,22 @@
* Author: AKASHI Takahiro
*/
+#include <errno.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "fdt_host.h"
+
typedef __u8 u8;
typedef __u16 u16;
typedef __u32 u32;
@@ -23,6 +29,9 @@
#define aligned_u64 __aligned_u64
+#define SIGNATURE_NODENAME "signature"
+#define OVERLAY_NODENAME "__overlay__"
+
#ifndef __packed
#define __packed __attribute__((packed))
#endif
@@ -43,6 +52,9 @@
{"raw", required_argument, NULL, 'r'},
{"index", required_argument, NULL, 'i'},
{"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'},
+ {"dtb", required_argument, NULL, 'D'},
+ {"public key", required_argument, NULL, 'K'},
+ {"overlay", no_argument, NULL, 'O'},
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
{NULL, 0, NULL, 0},
};
@@ -51,14 +63,183 @@
{
printf("Usage: %s [options] <output file>\n"
"Options:\n"
- "\t--fit <fit image> new FIT image file\n"
- "\t--raw <raw image> new raw image file\n"
- "\t--index <index> update image index\n"
- "\t--instance <instance> update hardware instance\n"
- "\t--help print a help message\n",
+
+ "\t--fit <fit image> new FIT image file\n"
+ "\t--raw <raw image> new raw image file\n"
+ "\t--index <index> update image index\n"
+ "\t--instance <instance> update hardware instance\n"
+ "\t--public-key <key file> public key esl file\n"
+ "\t--dtb <dtb file> dtb file\n"
+ "\t--overlay the dtb file is an overlay\n"
+ "\t--help print a help message\n",
tool_name);
}
+static int fdt_add_pub_key_data(void *sptr, void *dptr, size_t key_size,
+ bool overlay)
+{
+ int parent;
+ int ov_node;
+ int frag_node;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (overlay) {
+ /*
+ * The signature would be stored in the
+ * first fragment node of the overlay
+ */
+ frag_node = fdt_first_subnode(dptr, 0);
+ if (frag_node == -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Couldn't find the fragment node: %s\n",
+ fdt_strerror(frag_node));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ov_node = fdt_subnode_offset(dptr, frag_node, OVERLAY_NODENAME);
+ if (ov_node == -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Couldn't find the __overlay__ node: %s\n",
+ fdt_strerror(ov_node));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ov_node = 0;
+ }
+
+ parent = fdt_subnode_offset(dptr, ov_node, SIGNATURE_NODENAME);
+ if (parent == -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
+ parent = fdt_add_subnode(dptr, ov_node, SIGNATURE_NODENAME);
+ if (parent < 0) {
+ ret = parent;
+ if (ret != -FDT_ERR_NOSPACE) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Couldn't create signature node: %s\n",
+ fdt_strerror(parent));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (ret)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Write the key to the FDT node */
+ ret = fdt_setprop(dptr, parent, "capsule-key",
+ sptr, key_size);
+
+done:
+ if (ret)
+ ret = ret == -FDT_ERR_NOSPACE ? -ENOSPC : -EIO;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int add_public_key(const char *pkey_file, const char *dtb_file,
+ bool overlay)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int srcfd = 0;
+ int destfd = 0;
+ void *sptr = NULL;
+ void *dptr = NULL;
+ off_t src_size;
+ struct stat pub_key;
+ struct stat dtb;
+
+ /* Find out the size of the public key */
+ srcfd = open(pkey_file, O_RDONLY);
+ if (srcfd == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't open %s: %s\n",
+ __func__, pkey_file, strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = fstat(srcfd, &pub_key);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't stat %s: %s\n",
+ __func__, pkey_file, strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ src_size = pub_key.st_size;
+
+ /* mmap the public key esl file */
+ sptr = mmap(0, src_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, srcfd, 0);
+ if ((sptr == MAP_FAILED) || (errno != 0)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Failed to mmap %s:%s\n",
+ __func__, pkey_file, strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Open the dest FDT */
+ destfd = open(dtb_file, O_RDWR);
+ if (destfd == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't open %s: %s\n",
+ __func__, dtb_file, strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = fstat(destfd, &dtb);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't stat %s: %s\n",
+ __func__, dtb_file, strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ dtb.st_size += src_size + 0x30;
+ if (ftruncate(destfd, dtb.st_size)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't expand %s: %s\n",
+ __func__, dtb_file, strerror(errno));
+ goto err;;
+ }
+
+ errno = 0;
+ /* mmap the dtb file */
+ dptr = mmap(0, dtb.st_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED,
+ destfd, 0);
+ if ((dptr == MAP_FAILED) || (errno != 0)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Failed to mmap %s:%s\n",
+ __func__, dtb_file, strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (fdt_check_header(dptr)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Invalid FDT header\n", __func__);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = fdt_open_into(dptr, dptr, dtb.st_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Cannot expand FDT: %s\n",
+ __func__, fdt_strerror(ret));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the esl file to the expanded FDT */
+ ret = fdt_add_pub_key_data(sptr, dptr, src_size, overlay);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to add public key to the FDT\n",
+ __func__);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ if (sptr)
+ munmap(sptr, src_size);
+
+ if (dptr)
+ munmap(dptr, dtb.st_size);
+
+ if (srcfd >= 0)
+ close(srcfd);
+
+ if (destfd >= 0)
+ close(destfd);
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
unsigned long index, unsigned long instance)
{
@@ -173,16 +354,22 @@
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *file;
+ char *pkey_file;
+ char *dtb_file;
efi_guid_t *guid;
unsigned long index, instance;
int c, idx;
+ int ret;
+ bool overlay = false;
file = NULL;
+ pkey_file = NULL;
+ dtb_file = NULL;
guid = NULL;
index = 0;
instance = 0;
for (;;) {
- c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "f:r:i:I:v:h", options, &idx);
+ c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "f:r:i:I:v:D:K:Oh", options, &idx);
if (c == -1)
break;
@@ -209,22 +396,44 @@
case 'I':
instance = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0);
break;
+ case 'K':
+ if (pkey_file) {
+ printf("Public Key already specified\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ pkey_file = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ if (dtb_file) {
+ printf("DTB file already specified\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dtb_file = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'O':
+ overlay = true;
+ break;
case 'h':
print_usage();
return 0;
}
}
- /* need a output file */
- if (argc != optind + 1) {
+ /* need a fit image file or raw image file */
+ if (!file && !pkey_file && !dtb_file) {
+ printf("%s: %d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
print_usage();
return -1;
}
- /* need a fit image file or raw image file */
- if (!file) {
- print_usage();
- return -1;
+ if (pkey_file && dtb_file) {
+ ret = add_public_key(pkey_file, dtb_file, overlay);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ printf("Adding public key to the dtb failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
}
if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance)