diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/common/aarch64/spm_helpers.S b/services/std_svc/spm/common/aarch64/spm_helpers.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..95e69fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/common/aarch64/spm_helpers.S
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include "spm_common.h"
+
+	.global spm_secure_partition_enter
+	.global spm_secure_partition_exit
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. Here we stash our EL3
+	 * callee-saved registers on to the stack as a part of saving the C
+	 * runtime and enter the secure payload.
+	 * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where the address of the C
+	 *  runtime context is to be saved.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func spm_secure_partition_enter
+	/* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */
+	mov	x3, sp
+	str	x3, [x0, #0]
+	sub	sp, sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE
+
+	/* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */
+	stp	x19, x20, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X19]
+	stp	x21, x22, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X21]
+	stp	x23, x24, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X23]
+	stp	x25, x26, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X25]
+	stp	x27, x28, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X27]
+	stp	x29, x30, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X29]
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will use the secure context to
+	 * restore to the general purpose and EL3 system registers to ERET
+	 * into the secure payload.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	b	el3_exit
+endfunc spm_secure_partition_enter
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This function is called with 'x0' pointing to a C runtime context
+	 * saved in spm_secure_partition_enter().
+	 * It restores the saved registers and jumps to that runtime with 'x0'
+	 * as the new SP register. This destroys the C runtime context that had
+	 * been built on the stack below the saved context by the caller. Later
+	 * the second parameter 'x1' is passed as a return value to the caller.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func spm_secure_partition_exit
+	/* Restore the previous stack */
+	mov	sp, x0
+
+	/* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */
+	ldp	x19, x20, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X19 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x21, x22, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X21 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x23, x24, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X23 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x25, x26, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X25 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x27, x28, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X27 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x29, x30, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X29 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This should take us back to the instruction after the call to the
+	 * last spm_secure_partition_enter().* Place the second parameter to x0
+	 * so that the caller will see it as a return value from the original
+	 * entry call.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	x0, x1
+	ret
+endfunc spm_secure_partition_exit
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/common/include/spm_common.h b/services/std_svc/spm/common/include/spm_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68805fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/common/include/spm_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef SPM_COMMON_H
+#define SPM_COMMON_H
+
+#include <context.h>
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the
+ * C runtime context while performing a security state switch.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X19		0x0
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X20		0x8
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X21		0x10
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X22		0x18
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X23		0x20
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X24		0x28
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X25		0x30
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X26		0x38
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X27		0x40
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X28		0x48
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X29		0x50
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X30		0x58
+
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE	0x60
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES	(SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT)
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/* Assembly helpers */
+uint64_t spm_secure_partition_enter(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx);
+void __dead2 spm_secure_partition_exit(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret);
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
+
+#endif /* SPM_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/common/spm.mk b/services/std_svc/spm/common/spm.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9aa96be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/common/spm.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64)
+        $(error "Error: SPM is only supported on aarch64.")
+endif
+
+INCLUDES	+=	-Iservices/std_svc/spm/common/include
+
+SPM_SOURCES	:=	$(addprefix services/std_svc/spm/common/,\
+			${ARCH}/spm_helpers.S)
+
+# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include a BL32 image
+NEED_BL32		:=	yes
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/aarch64/spm_mm_shim_exceptions.S b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/aarch64/spm_mm_shim_exceptions.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..836f75c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/aarch64/spm_mm_shim_exceptions.S
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <context.h>
+
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Very simple stackless exception handlers used by the spm shim layer.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+	.globl	spm_shim_exceptions_ptr
+
+vector_base spm_shim_exceptions_ptr, .spm_shim_exceptions
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Current EL with SP0 : 0x0 - 0x200
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSP0
+
+vector_entry IrqSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry IrqSP0
+
+vector_entry FiqSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry FiqSP0
+
+vector_entry SErrorSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry SErrorSP0
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Current EL with SPx: 0x200 - 0x400
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSPx
+
+vector_entry IrqSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry IrqSPx
+
+vector_entry FiqSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry FiqSPx
+
+vector_entry SErrorSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry SErrorSPx
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600. No exceptions
+	 * are handled since secure_partition does not implement
+	 * a lower EL
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA64, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	msr	tpidr_el1, x30
+	mrs	x30, esr_el1
+	ubfx	x30, x30, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH
+
+	cmp	x30, #EC_AARCH64_SVC
+	b.eq 	do_smc
+
+	cmp	x30, #EC_AARCH32_SVC
+	b.eq	do_smc
+
+	cmp	x30, #EC_AARCH64_SYS
+	b.eq	handle_sys_trap
+
+	/* Fail in all the other cases */
+	b	panic
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Tell SPM that we are done initialising
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+do_smc:
+	mrs	x30, tpidr_el1
+	smc	#0
+	exception_return
+
+	/* AArch64 system instructions trap are handled as a panic for now */
+handle_sys_trap:
+panic:
+	b	panic
+end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA64
+
+vector_entry IrqA64, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry IrqA64
+
+vector_entry FiqA64, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry FiqA64
+
+vector_entry SErrorA64, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry SErrorA64
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA32, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA32
+
+vector_entry IrqA32, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry IrqA32
+
+vector_entry FiqA32, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry FiqA32
+
+vector_entry SErrorA32, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+end_vector_entry SErrorA32
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm.mk b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78ef0c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+ifneq (${SPD},none)
+        $(error "Error: SPD and SPM_MM are incompatible build options.")
+endif
+ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64)
+        $(error "Error: SPM_MM is only supported on aarch64.")
+endif
+ifeq (${ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS},1)
+        $(error "Error: SPM_MM is not compatible with ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS")
+endif
+ifeq (${ENABLE_SME_FOR_NS},1)
+        $(error "Error: SPM_MM is not compatible with ENABLE_SME_FOR_NS")
+endif
+
+SPM_MM_SOURCES	:=	$(addprefix services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/,	\
+			${ARCH}/spm_mm_shim_exceptions.S		\
+			spm_mm_main.c					\
+			spm_mm_setup.c					\
+			spm_mm_xlat.c)
+
+
+# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include a BL32 image
+NEED_BL32		:=	yes
+
+# required so that SPM code executing at S-EL0 can access the timer registers
+NS_TIMER_SWITCH		:=	1
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_main.c b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e71e65b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <bl31/bl31.h>
+#include <bl31/ehf.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <lib/smccc.h>
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <services/spm_mm_partition.h>
+#include <services/spm_mm_svc.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+
+#include "spm_common.h"
+#include "spm_mm_private.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Secure Partition context information.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static sp_context_t sp_ctx;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Set state of a Secure Partition context.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void sp_state_set(sp_context_t *sp_ptr, sp_state_t state)
+{
+	spin_lock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock));
+	sp_ptr->state = state;
+	spin_unlock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Wait until the state of a Secure Partition is the specified one and change it
+ * to the desired state.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void sp_state_wait_switch(sp_context_t *sp_ptr, sp_state_t from, sp_state_t to)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+
+	while (success == 0) {
+		spin_lock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock));
+
+		if (sp_ptr->state == from) {
+			sp_ptr->state = to;
+
+			success = 1;
+		}
+
+		spin_unlock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock));
+	}
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Check if the state of a Secure Partition is the specified one and, if so,
+ * change it to the desired state. Returns 0 on success, -1 on error.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int sp_state_try_switch(sp_context_t *sp_ptr, sp_state_t from, sp_state_t to)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	spin_lock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock));
+
+	if (sp_ptr->state == from) {
+		sp_ptr->state = to;
+
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(&(sp_ptr->state_lock));
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function takes an SP context pointer and performs a synchronous entry
+ * into it.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t spm_sp_synchronous_entry(sp_context_t *ctx)
+{
+	uint64_t rc;
+
+	assert(ctx != NULL);
+
+	/* Assign the context of the SP to this CPU */
+	cm_set_context(&(ctx->cpu_ctx), SECURE);
+
+	/* Restore the context assigned above */
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+	cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+
+	/* Invalidate TLBs at EL1. */
+	tlbivmalle1();
+	dsbish();
+
+	/* Enter Secure Partition */
+	rc = spm_secure_partition_enter(&ctx->c_rt_ctx);
+
+	/* Save secure state */
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function returns to the place where spm_sp_synchronous_entry() was
+ * called originally.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+__dead2 static void spm_sp_synchronous_exit(uint64_t rc)
+{
+	sp_context_t *ctx = &sp_ctx;
+
+	/*
+	 * The SPM must have initiated the original request through a
+	 * synchronous entry into the secure partition. Jump back to the
+	 * original C runtime context with the value of rc in x0;
+	 */
+	spm_secure_partition_exit(ctx->c_rt_ctx, rc);
+
+	panic();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Jump to each Secure Partition for the first time.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int32_t spm_init(void)
+{
+	uint64_t rc;
+	sp_context_t *ctx;
+
+	INFO("Secure Partition init...\n");
+
+	ctx = &sp_ctx;
+
+	ctx->state = SP_STATE_RESET;
+
+	rc = spm_sp_synchronous_entry(ctx);
+	assert(rc == 0);
+
+	ctx->state = SP_STATE_IDLE;
+
+	INFO("Secure Partition initialized.\n");
+
+	return !rc;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Initialize contexts of all Secure Partitions.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int32_t spm_mm_setup(void)
+{
+	sp_context_t *ctx;
+
+	/* Disable MMU at EL1 (initialized by BL2) */
+	disable_mmu_icache_el1();
+
+	/* Initialize context of the SP */
+	INFO("Secure Partition context setup start...\n");
+
+	ctx = &sp_ctx;
+
+	/* Assign translation tables context. */
+	ctx->xlat_ctx_handle = spm_get_sp_xlat_context();
+
+	spm_sp_setup(ctx);
+
+	/* Register init function for deferred init.  */
+	bl31_register_bl32_init(&spm_init);
+
+	INFO("Secure Partition setup done.\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Function to perform a call to a Secure Partition.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t spm_mm_sp_call(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3)
+{
+	uint64_t rc;
+	sp_context_t *sp_ptr = &sp_ctx;
+
+	/* Wait until the Secure Partition is idle and set it to busy. */
+	sp_state_wait_switch(sp_ptr, SP_STATE_IDLE, SP_STATE_BUSY);
+
+	/* Set values for registers on SP entry */
+	cpu_context_t *cpu_ctx = &(sp_ptr->cpu_ctx);
+
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X0, smc_fid);
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X1, x1);
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X2, x2);
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(cpu_ctx), CTX_GPREG_X3, x3);
+
+	/* Jump to the Secure Partition. */
+	rc = spm_sp_synchronous_entry(sp_ptr);
+
+	/* Flag Secure Partition as idle. */
+	assert(sp_ptr->state == SP_STATE_BUSY);
+	sp_state_set(sp_ptr, SP_STATE_IDLE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * MM_COMMUNICATE handler
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t mm_communicate(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t mm_cookie,
+			       uint64_t comm_buffer_address,
+			       uint64_t comm_size_address, void *handle)
+{
+	uint64_t rc;
+
+	/* Cookie. Reserved for future use. It must be zero. */
+	if (mm_cookie != 0U) {
+		ERROR("MM_COMMUNICATE: cookie is not zero\n");
+		SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+	}
+
+	if (comm_buffer_address == 0U) {
+		ERROR("MM_COMMUNICATE: comm_buffer_address is zero\n");
+		SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+	}
+
+	if (comm_size_address != 0U) {
+		VERBOSE("MM_COMMUNICATE: comm_size_address is not 0 as recommended.\n");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The current secure partition design mandates
+	 * - at any point, only a single core can be
+	 *   executing in the secure partiton.
+	 * - a core cannot be preempted by an interrupt
+	 *   while executing in secure partition.
+	 * Raise the running priority of the core to the
+	 * interrupt level configured for secure partition
+	 * so as to block any interrupt from preempting this
+	 * core.
+	 */
+	ehf_activate_priority(PLAT_SP_PRI);
+
+	/* Save the Normal world context */
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+	rc = spm_mm_sp_call(smc_fid, comm_buffer_address, comm_size_address,
+			    plat_my_core_pos());
+
+	/* Restore non-secure state */
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+	cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Exited from secure partition. This core can take
+	 * interrupts now.
+	 */
+	ehf_deactivate_priority(PLAT_SP_PRI);
+
+	SMC_RET1(handle, rc);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Secure Partition Manager SMC handler.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t spm_mm_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+			 uint64_t x1,
+			 uint64_t x2,
+			 uint64_t x3,
+			 uint64_t x4,
+			 void *cookie,
+			 void *handle,
+			 uint64_t flags)
+{
+	unsigned int ns;
+
+	/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
+	ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
+
+	if (ns == SMC_FROM_SECURE) {
+
+		/* Handle SMCs from Secure world. */
+
+		assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
+
+		/* Make next ERET jump to S-EL0 instead of S-EL1. */
+		cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(SECURE, read_elr_el1(), read_spsr_el1());
+
+		switch (smc_fid) {
+
+		case SPM_MM_VERSION_AARCH32:
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_VERSION_COMPILED);
+
+		case MM_SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64:
+			spm_sp_synchronous_exit(x1);
+
+		case MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64:
+			INFO("Received MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64 SMC\n");
+
+			if (sp_ctx.state != SP_STATE_RESET) {
+				WARN("MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64 is available at boot time only\n");
+				SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+			SMC_RET1(handle,
+				 spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler(
+					 &sp_ctx, x1));
+
+		case MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64:
+			INFO("Received MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 SMC\n");
+
+			if (sp_ctx.state != SP_STATE_RESET) {
+				WARN("MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 is available at boot time only\n");
+				SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+			SMC_RET1(handle,
+				 spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler(
+					&sp_ctx, x1, x2, x3));
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	} else {
+
+		/* Handle SMCs from Non-secure world. */
+
+		assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
+
+		switch (smc_fid) {
+
+		case MM_VERSION_AARCH32:
+			SMC_RET1(handle, MM_VERSION_COMPILED);
+
+		case MM_COMMUNICATE_AARCH32:
+		case MM_COMMUNICATE_AARCH64:
+			return mm_communicate(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, handle);
+
+		case MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64:
+		case MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64:
+			/* SMC interfaces reserved for secure callers. */
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_MM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+}
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_private.h b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0eff1c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef SPM_MM_PRIVATE_H
+#define SPM_MM_PRIVATE_H
+
+#include <context.h>
+#include "spm_common.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the
+ * C runtime context while performing a security state switch.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X19		0x0
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X20		0x8
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X21		0x10
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X22		0x18
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X23		0x20
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X24		0x28
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X25		0x30
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X26		0x38
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X27		0x40
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X28		0x48
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X29		0x50
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X30		0x58
+
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE	0x60
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES	(SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT)
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h>
+
+typedef enum sp_state {
+	SP_STATE_RESET = 0,
+	SP_STATE_IDLE,
+	SP_STATE_BUSY
+} sp_state_t;
+
+typedef struct sp_context {
+	uint64_t c_rt_ctx;
+	cpu_context_t cpu_ctx;
+	xlat_ctx_t *xlat_ctx_handle;
+
+	sp_state_t state;
+	spinlock_t state_lock;
+} sp_context_t;
+
+
+void spm_sp_setup(sp_context_t *sp_ctx);
+
+xlat_ctx_t *spm_get_sp_xlat_context(void);
+
+int32_t spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler(sp_context_t *sp_ctx,
+					      uintptr_t base_va);
+int spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler(sp_context_t *sp_ctx,
+					  u_register_t page_address,
+					  u_register_t pages_count,
+					  u_register_t smc_attributes);
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
+
+#endif /* SPM_MM_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_setup.c b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_setup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04dc212
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_setup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+#include <plat/common/common_def.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <services/spm_mm_partition.h>
+
+#include "spm_common.h"
+#include "spm_mm_private.h"
+#include "spm_mm_shim_private.h"
+
+/* Setup context of the Secure Partition */
+void spm_sp_setup(sp_context_t *sp_ctx)
+{
+	cpu_context_t *ctx = &(sp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
+
+	/* Pointer to the MP information from the platform port. */
+	const spm_mm_boot_info_t *sp_boot_info =
+			plat_get_secure_partition_boot_info(NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize CPU context
+	 * ----------------------
+	 */
+
+	entry_point_info_t ep_info = {0};
+
+	SET_PARAM_HEAD(&ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE);
+
+	/* Setup entrypoint and SPSR */
+	ep_info.pc = sp_boot_info->sp_image_base;
+	ep_info.spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL0, MODE_SP_EL0, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
+
+	/*
+	 * X0: Virtual address of a buffer shared between EL3 and Secure EL0.
+	 *     The buffer will be mapped in the Secure EL1 translation regime
+	 *     with Normal IS WBWA attributes and RO data and Execute Never
+	 *     instruction access permissions.
+	 *
+	 * X1: Size of the buffer in bytes
+	 *
+	 * X2: cookie value (Implementation Defined)
+	 *
+	 * X3: cookie value (Implementation Defined)
+	 *
+	 * X4 to X7 = 0
+	 */
+	ep_info.args.arg0 = sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base;
+	ep_info.args.arg1 = sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_size;
+	ep_info.args.arg2 = PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_0;
+	ep_info.args.arg3 = PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_1;
+
+	cm_setup_context(ctx, &ep_info);
+
+	/*
+	 * SP_EL0: A non-zero value will indicate to the SP that the SPM has
+	 * initialized the stack pointer for the current CPU through
+	 * implementation defined means. The value will be 0 otherwise.
+	 */
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_SP_EL0,
+			sp_boot_info->sp_stack_base + sp_boot_info->sp_pcpu_stack_size);
+
+	/*
+	 * Setup translation tables
+	 * ------------------------
+	 */
+
+#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
+
+	/* Get max granularity supported by the platform. */
+	unsigned int max_granule = xlat_arch_get_max_supported_granule_size();
+
+	VERBOSE("Max translation granule size supported: %u KiB\n",
+		max_granule / 1024U);
+
+	unsigned int max_granule_mask = max_granule - 1U;
+
+	/* Base must be aligned to the max granularity */
+	assert((sp_boot_info->sp_ns_comm_buf_base & max_granule_mask) == 0);
+
+	/* Size must be a multiple of the max granularity */
+	assert((sp_boot_info->sp_ns_comm_buf_size & max_granule_mask) == 0);
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */
+
+	/* This region contains the exception vectors used at S-EL1. */
+	const mmap_region_t sel1_exception_vectors =
+		MAP_REGION_FLAT(SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START,
+				SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_SIZE,
+				MT_CODE | MT_SECURE | MT_PRIVILEGED);
+	mmap_add_region_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle,
+			    &sel1_exception_vectors);
+
+	mmap_add_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle,
+		     plat_get_secure_partition_mmap(NULL));
+
+	init_xlat_tables_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle);
+
+	/*
+	 * MMU-related registers
+	 * ---------------------
+	 */
+	xlat_ctx_t *xlat_ctx = sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle;
+
+	uint64_t mmu_cfg_params[MMU_CFG_PARAM_MAX];
+
+	setup_mmu_cfg((uint64_t *)&mmu_cfg_params, 0, xlat_ctx->base_table,
+		      xlat_ctx->pa_max_address, xlat_ctx->va_max_address,
+		      EL1_EL0_REGIME);
+
+	write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_MAIR_EL1,
+		      mmu_cfg_params[MMU_CFG_MAIR]);
+
+	write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TCR_EL1,
+		      mmu_cfg_params[MMU_CFG_TCR]);
+
+	write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TTBR0_EL1,
+		      mmu_cfg_params[MMU_CFG_TTBR0]);
+
+	/* Setup SCTLR_EL1 */
+	u_register_t sctlr_el1 = read_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1);
+
+	sctlr_el1 |=
+		/*SCTLR_EL1_RES1 |*/
+		/* Don't trap DC CVAU, DC CIVAC, DC CVAC, DC CVAP, or IC IVAU */
+		SCTLR_UCI_BIT							|
+		/* RW regions at xlat regime EL1&0 are forced to be XN. */
+		SCTLR_WXN_BIT							|
+		/* Don't trap to EL1 execution of WFI or WFE at EL0. */
+		SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT					|
+		/* Don't trap to EL1 accesses to CTR_EL0 from EL0. */
+		SCTLR_UCT_BIT							|
+		/* Don't trap to EL1 execution of DZ ZVA at EL0. */
+		SCTLR_DZE_BIT							|
+		/* Enable SP Alignment check for EL0 */
+		SCTLR_SA0_BIT							|
+		/* Don't change PSTATE.PAN on taking an exception to EL1 */
+		SCTLR_SPAN_BIT							|
+		/* Allow cacheable data and instr. accesses to normal memory. */
+		SCTLR_C_BIT | SCTLR_I_BIT					|
+		/* Enable MMU. */
+		SCTLR_M_BIT
+	;
+
+	sctlr_el1 &= ~(
+		/* Explicit data accesses at EL0 are little-endian. */
+		SCTLR_E0E_BIT							|
+		/*
+		 * Alignment fault checking disabled when at EL1 and EL0 as
+		 * the UEFI spec permits unaligned accesses.
+		 */
+		SCTLR_A_BIT							|
+		/* Accesses to DAIF from EL0 are trapped to EL1. */
+		SCTLR_UMA_BIT
+	);
+
+	write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr_el1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Setup other system registers
+	 * ----------------------------
+	 */
+
+	/* Shim Exception Vector Base Address */
+	write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_VBAR_EL1,
+			SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_PTR);
+
+	write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_CNTKCTL_EL1,
+		      EL0PTEN_BIT | EL0VTEN_BIT | EL0PCTEN_BIT | EL0VCTEN_BIT);
+
+	/*
+	 * FPEN: Allow the Secure Partition to access FP/SIMD registers.
+	 * Note that SPM will not do any saving/restoring of these registers on
+	 * behalf of the SP. This falls under the SP's responsibility.
+	 * TTA: Enable access to trace registers.
+	 * ZEN (v8.2): Trap SVE instructions and access to SVE registers.
+	 */
+	write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_CPACR_EL1,
+			CPACR_EL1_FPEN(CPACR_EL1_FP_TRAP_NONE));
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare information in buffer shared between EL3 and S-EL0
+	 * ----------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+
+	void *shared_buf_ptr = (void *) sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base;
+
+	/* Copy the boot information into the shared buffer with the SP. */
+	assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr + sizeof(spm_mm_boot_info_t)
+	       <= (sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base + sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_size));
+
+	assert(sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base <=
+				(UINTPTR_MAX - sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_size + 1));
+
+	assert(sp_boot_info != NULL);
+
+	memcpy((void *) shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_boot_info,
+	       sizeof(spm_mm_boot_info_t));
+
+	/* Pointer to the MP information from the platform port. */
+	spm_mm_mp_info_t *sp_mp_info =
+		((spm_mm_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info;
+
+	assert(sp_mp_info != NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Point the shared buffer MP information pointer to where the info will
+	 * be populated, just after the boot info.
+	 */
+	((spm_mm_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info =
+		(spm_mm_mp_info_t *) ((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr
+				+ sizeof(spm_mm_boot_info_t));
+
+	/*
+	 * Update the shared buffer pointer to where the MP information for the
+	 * payload will be populated
+	 */
+	shared_buf_ptr = ((spm_mm_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the cpu information into the shared buffer area after the boot
+	 * information.
+	 */
+	assert(sp_boot_info->num_cpus <= PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT);
+
+	assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr
+	       <= (sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_base + sp_boot_info->sp_shared_buf_size -
+		       (sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info))));
+
+	memcpy(shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_mp_info,
+		sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info));
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the linear indices of cores in boot information for the
+	 * secure partition and flag the primary CPU
+	 */
+	sp_mp_info = (spm_mm_mp_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr;
+
+	for (unsigned int index = 0; index < sp_boot_info->num_cpus; index++) {
+		u_register_t mpidr = sp_mp_info[index].mpidr;
+
+		sp_mp_info[index].linear_id = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr);
+		if (plat_my_core_pos() == sp_mp_info[index].linear_id)
+			sp_mp_info[index].flags |= MP_INFO_FLAG_PRIMARY_CPU;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_shim_private.h b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_shim_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f69c748
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_shim_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef SPM_MM_SHIM_PRIVATE_H
+#define SPM_MM_SHIM_PRIVATE_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <lib/utils_def.h>
+
+/* Assembly source */
+IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, spm_shim_exceptions_ptr,		SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_PTR);
+
+/* Linker symbols */
+IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START__,	SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START);
+IMPORT_SYM(uintptr_t, __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END__,	SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END);
+
+/* Definitions */
+
+#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_SIZE	\
+	(SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END - SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START)
+
+#endif /* SPM_MM_SHIM_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_xlat.c b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_xlat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6261016
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_mm/spm_mm_xlat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <services/spm_mm_partition.h>
+#include <services/spm_mm_svc.h>
+
+#include "spm_mm_private.h"
+#include "spm_mm_shim_private.h"
+
+/* Place translation tables by default along with the ones used by BL31. */
+#ifndef PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME
+#define PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME	"xlat_table"
+#endif
+#ifndef PLAT_SP_IMAGE_BASE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME
+#define PLAT_SP_IMAGE_BASE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME	".bss"
+#endif
+
+/* Allocate and initialise the translation context for the secure partitions. */
+REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT2(sp,
+		       PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MMAP_REGIONS,
+		       PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MAX_XLAT_TABLES,
+		       PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE,
+		       EL1_EL0_REGIME, PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME,
+		       PLAT_SP_IMAGE_BASE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME);
+
+/* Lock used for SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET and SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET */
+static spinlock_t mem_attr_smc_lock;
+
+/* Get handle of Secure Partition translation context */
+xlat_ctx_t *spm_get_sp_xlat_context(void)
+{
+	return &sp_xlat_ctx;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Attributes are encoded using a different format in the SMC interface than in
+ * the Trusted Firmware, where the mmap_attr_t enum type is used. This function
+ * converts an attributes value from the SMC format to the mmap_attr_t format by
+ * setting MT_RW/MT_RO, MT_USER/MT_PRIVILEGED and MT_EXECUTE/MT_EXECUTE_NEVER.
+ * The other fields are left as 0 because they are ignored by the function
+ * xlat_change_mem_attributes_ctx().
+ */
+static unsigned int smc_attr_to_mmap_attr(unsigned int attributes)
+{
+	unsigned int tf_attr = 0U;
+
+	unsigned int access = (attributes & MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_MASK)
+			      >> MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_SHIFT;
+
+	if (access == MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_RW) {
+		tf_attr |= MT_RW | MT_USER;
+	} else if (access ==  MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_RO) {
+		tf_attr |= MT_RO | MT_USER;
+	} else {
+		/* Other values are reserved. */
+		assert(access == MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_NOACCESS);
+		/* The only requirement is that there's no access from EL0 */
+		tf_attr |= MT_RO | MT_PRIVILEGED;
+	}
+
+	if ((attributes & MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_NON_EXEC) == 0) {
+		tf_attr |= MT_EXECUTE;
+	} else {
+		tf_attr |= MT_EXECUTE_NEVER;
+	}
+
+	return tf_attr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function converts attributes from the Trusted Firmware format into the
+ * SMC interface format.
+ */
+static unsigned int smc_mmap_to_smc_attr(unsigned int attr)
+{
+	unsigned int smc_attr = 0U;
+
+	unsigned int data_access;
+
+	if ((attr & MT_USER) == 0) {
+		/* No access from EL0. */
+		data_access = MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_NOACCESS;
+	} else {
+		if ((attr & MT_RW) != 0) {
+			assert(MT_TYPE(attr) != MT_DEVICE);
+			data_access = MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_RW;
+		} else {
+			data_access = MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_RO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	smc_attr |= (data_access & MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_MASK)
+		    << MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_ACCESS_SHIFT;
+
+	if ((attr & MT_EXECUTE_NEVER) != 0U) {
+		smc_attr |= MM_SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_NON_EXEC;
+	}
+
+	return smc_attr;
+}
+
+int32_t spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler(sp_context_t *sp_ctx,
+					      uintptr_t base_va)
+{
+	uint32_t attributes;
+
+	spin_lock(&mem_attr_smc_lock);
+
+	int rc = xlat_get_mem_attributes_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle,
+				     base_va, &attributes);
+
+	spin_unlock(&mem_attr_smc_lock);
+
+	/* Convert error codes of xlat_get_mem_attributes_ctx() into SPM. */
+	assert((rc == 0) || (rc == -EINVAL));
+
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		return (int32_t) smc_mmap_to_smc_attr(attributes);
+	} else {
+		return SPM_MM_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+}
+
+int spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler(sp_context_t *sp_ctx,
+					  u_register_t page_address,
+					  u_register_t pages_count,
+					  u_register_t smc_attributes)
+{
+	uintptr_t base_va = (uintptr_t) page_address;
+	size_t size = (size_t) (pages_count * PAGE_SIZE);
+	uint32_t attributes = (uint32_t) smc_attributes;
+
+	INFO("  Start address  : 0x%lx\n", base_va);
+	INFO("  Number of pages: %i (%zi bytes)\n", (int) pages_count, size);
+	INFO("  Attributes     : 0x%x\n", attributes);
+
+	spin_lock(&mem_attr_smc_lock);
+
+	int ret = xlat_change_mem_attributes_ctx(sp_ctx->xlat_ctx_handle,
+					base_va, size,
+					smc_attr_to_mmap_attr(attributes));
+
+	spin_unlock(&mem_attr_smc_lock);
+
+	/* Convert error codes of xlat_change_mem_attributes_ctx() into SPM. */
+	assert((ret == 0) || (ret == -EINVAL));
+
+	return (ret == 0) ? SPM_MM_SUCCESS : SPM_MM_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}