diff --git a/services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99c4aa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/spd/pncd/pncd_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a
+ * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The
+ * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that
+ * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting
+ * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either
+ * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also
+ * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <bl31/bl31.h>
+#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h>
+#include <bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <common/ep_info.h>
+#include <drivers/arm/gic_common.h>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <lib/spinlock.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <pnc.h>
+#include "pncd_private.h"
+#include <runtime_svc.h>
+#include <tools_share/uuid.h>
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Structure to keep track of ProvenCore state
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static pnc_context_t pncd_sp_context;
+
+static bool ree_info;
+static uint64_t ree_base_addr;
+static uint64_t ree_length;
+static uint64_t ree_tag;
+
+static bool pnc_initialized;
+
+static spinlock_t smc_handler_lock;
+
+static int pncd_init(void);
+
+static void context_save(unsigned long security_state)
+{
+	assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state));
+
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_save((uint32_t) security_state);
+#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS
+	fpregs_context_save(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state)));
+#endif
+}
+
+static void *context_restore(unsigned long security_state)
+{
+	void *handle;
+
+	assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state));
+
+	/* Get a reference to the next context */
+	handle = cm_get_context((uint32_t) security_state);
+	assert(handle);
+
+	/* Restore state */
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore((uint32_t) security_state);
+#if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS
+	fpregs_context_restore(get_fpregs_ctx(cm_get_context(security_state)));
+#endif
+
+	cm_set_next_eret_context((uint32_t) security_state);
+
+	return handle;
+}
+
+static uint64_t pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id,
+		uint32_t flags, void *handle, void *cookie);
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Switch context to the specified security state and return the targeted
+ * handle. Note that the context may remain unchanged if the switch is not
+ * allowed.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void *pncd_context_switch_to(unsigned long security_state)
+{
+	unsigned long sec_state_from =
+	    security_state == SECURE ? NON_SECURE : SECURE;
+
+	assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state));
+
+	/* Check if this is the first world switch */
+	if (!pnc_initialized) {
+		int rc;
+		uint32_t flags;
+
+		assert(sec_state_from == SECURE);
+
+		INFO("PnC initialization done\n");
+
+		/*
+		 * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts
+		 * when generated during code executing in the
+		 * non-secure state.
+		 */
+		flags = 0U;
+		set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
+		rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
+				pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler,
+				flags);
+		if (rc != 0) {
+			ERROR("Failed to register S-EL1 interrupt handler (%d)\n",
+			      rc);
+			panic();
+		}
+
+		context_save(SECURE);
+
+		pnc_initialized = true;
+
+		/*
+		 * Release the lock before restoring the EL3 context to
+		 * bl31_main.
+		 */
+		spin_unlock(&smc_handler_lock);
+
+		/*
+		 * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated
+		 * the original request through a synchronous entry
+		 * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime
+		 * context.
+		 */
+		pncd_synchronous_sp_exit(&pncd_sp_context, (uint64_t) 0x0);
+
+		/* Unreachable */
+		ERROR("Returned from pncd_synchronous_sp_exit... Should not happen\n");
+		panic();
+	}
+
+	/* Check that the world switch is allowed */
+	if (read_mpidr() != pncd_sp_context.mpidr) {
+		if (sec_state_from == SECURE) {
+			/*
+			 * Secure -> Non-Secure world switch initiated on a CPU where there
+			 * should be no Trusted OS running
+			 */
+			WARN("Secure to Non-Secure switch requested on CPU where ProvenCore is not supposed to be running...\n");
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Secure or Non-Secure world wants to switch world but there is no Secure
+		 * software on this core
+		 */
+		return cm_get_context((uint32_t) sec_state_from);
+	}
+
+	context_save(sec_state_from);
+
+	return context_restore(security_state);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the PNCD. It
+ * validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the PNC at
+ * 'pnc_sel1_intr_entry()' for handling the interrupt.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id,
+		uint32_t flags,
+		void *handle,
+		void *cookie)
+{
+	/* Check the security state when the exception was generated */
+	assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE);
+
+	/* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */
+	assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
+
+	/* switch to PnC */
+	handle = pncd_context_switch_to(SECURE);
+
+	assert(handle != NULL);
+
+	SMC_RET0(handle);
+}
+
+#pragma weak plat_pncd_setup
+int plat_pncd_setup(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type
+ * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry
+ * into the SP for its initialisation.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int pncd_setup(void)
+{
+	entry_point_info_t *pnc_ep_info;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its
+	 * absence is a critical failure.
+	 *
+	 * TODO: Add support to conditionally include the SPD service
+	 */
+	pnc_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
+	if (!pnc_ep_info) {
+		WARN("No PNC provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device without PNC initialization. SMC`s destined for PNC will return SMC_UNK\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value
+	 * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without
+	 * registering any handlers
+	 */
+	if (!pnc_ep_info->pc) {
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	pncd_init_pnc_ep_state(pnc_ep_info,
+			pnc_ep_info->pc,
+			&pncd_sp_context);
+
+	/*
+	 * All PNCD initialization done. Now register our init function with
+	 * BL31 for deferred invocation
+	 */
+	bl31_register_bl32_init(&pncd_init);
+	bl31_set_next_image_type(NON_SECURE);
+
+	return plat_pncd_setup();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first
+ * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure
+ * context has already been created by pncd_setup() which can be directly used.
+ * It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI
+ * so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function
+ * performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control
+ * back to this routine through a SMC.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int32_t pncd_init(void)
+{
+	entry_point_info_t *pnc_entry_point;
+	uint64_t rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its
+	 * absence is a critical failure.
+	 */
+	pnc_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
+	assert(pnc_entry_point);
+
+	cm_init_my_context(pnc_entry_point);
+
+	/*
+	 * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. It will be
+	 * returned via PNC_ENTRY_DONE case
+	 */
+	rc = pncd_synchronous_sp_entry(&pncd_sp_context);
+
+	/*
+	 * If everything went well at this point, the return value should be 0.
+	 */
+	return rc == 0;
+}
+
+#pragma weak plat_pncd_smc_handler
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for handling the platform-specific SMCs in the
+ * Trusted OS/App range as defined in the SMC Calling Convention Document.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uintptr_t plat_pncd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+		u_register_t x1,
+		u_register_t x2,
+		u_register_t x3,
+		u_register_t x4,
+		void *cookie,
+		void *handle,
+		u_register_t flags)
+{
+	(void) smc_fid;
+	(void) x1;
+	(void) x2;
+	(void) x3;
+	(void) x4;
+	(void) cookie;
+	(void) flags;
+
+	SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
+ * range as defined in the SMC Calling Convention Document. It is also
+ * responsible for communicating with the Secure payload to delegate work and
+ * return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it will also return any
+ * information that the secure payload needs to do the work assigned to it.
+ *
+ * It should only be called with the smc_handler_lock held.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uintptr_t pncd_smc_handler_unsafe(uint32_t smc_fid,
+		u_register_t x1,
+		u_register_t x2,
+		u_register_t x3,
+		u_register_t x4,
+		void *cookie,
+		void *handle,
+		u_register_t flags)
+{
+	uint32_t ns;
+
+	/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
+	ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
+
+	assert(ns != 0 || read_mpidr() == pncd_sp_context.mpidr);
+
+	switch (smc_fid) {
+	case SMC_CONFIG_SHAREDMEM:
+		if (ree_info) {
+			/* Do not Yield */
+			SMC_RET0(handle);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Fetch the physical base address (x1) and size (x2) of the
+		 * shared memory allocated by the Non-Secure world. This memory
+		 * will be used by PNC to communicate with the Non-Secure world.
+		 * Verifying the validity of these values is up to the Trusted
+		 * OS.
+		 */
+		ree_base_addr = x1 | (x2 << 32);
+		ree_length = x3;
+		ree_tag = x4;
+
+		INFO("IN SMC_CONFIG_SHAREDMEM: addr=%lx, length=%lx, tag=%lx\n",
+		     (unsigned long) ree_base_addr,
+		     (unsigned long) ree_length,
+		     (unsigned long) ree_tag);
+
+		if ((ree_base_addr % 0x200000) != 0) {
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+		}
+
+		if ((ree_length % 0x200000) != 0) {
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+		}
+
+		ree_info = true;
+
+		/* Do not Yield */
+		SMC_RET4(handle, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+		break;
+
+	case SMC_GET_SHAREDMEM:
+		if (ree_info) {
+			x1 = (1U << 16) | ree_tag;
+			x2 = ree_base_addr & 0xFFFFFFFF;
+			x3 = (ree_base_addr >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
+			x4 = ree_length & 0xFFFFFFFF;
+			SMC_RET4(handle, x1, x2, x3, x4);
+		} else {
+			SMC_RET4(handle, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+		}
+
+		break;
+
+	case SMC_ACTION_FROM_NS:
+		if (ns == 0) {
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+		}
+
+		if (SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ < MIN_PPI_ID) {
+			plat_ic_raise_s_el1_sgi(SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ,
+						pncd_sp_context.mpidr);
+		} else {
+			plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ);
+		}
+
+		SMC_RET0(handle);
+
+		break;
+
+	case SMC_ACTION_FROM_S:
+		if (ns != 0) {
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+		}
+
+		if (SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ < MIN_PPI_ID) {
+			/*
+			 * NS SGI is sent to the same core as the one running
+			 * PNC
+			 */
+			plat_ic_raise_ns_sgi(SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ, read_mpidr());
+		} else {
+			plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ);
+		}
+
+		SMC_RET0(handle);
+
+		break;
+
+	case SMC_YIELD:
+		assert(handle == cm_get_context(ns != 0 ? NON_SECURE : SECURE));
+		handle = pncd_context_switch_to(ns != 0 ? SECURE : NON_SECURE);
+
+		assert(handle != NULL);
+
+		SMC_RET0(handle);
+
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		INFO("Unknown smc: %x\n", smc_fid);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return plat_pncd_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4,
+				     cookie, handle, flags);
+}
+
+static uintptr_t pncd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+		u_register_t x1,
+		u_register_t x2,
+		u_register_t x3,
+		u_register_t x4,
+		void *cookie,
+		void *handle,
+		u_register_t flags)
+{
+	uintptr_t ret;
+
+	/* SMC handling is serialized */
+	spin_lock(&smc_handler_lock);
+	ret = pncd_smc_handler_unsafe(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle,
+								  flags);
+	spin_unlock(&smc_handler_lock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */
+DECLARE_RT_SVC(
+	pncd_fast,
+	OEN_TOS_START,
+	OEN_TOS_END,
+	SMC_TYPE_FAST,
+	pncd_setup,
+	pncd_smc_handler
+);
+
+/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for standard SMC calls */
+DECLARE_RT_SVC(
+	pncd_std,
+	OEN_TOS_START,
+	OEN_TOS_END,
+	SMC_TYPE_YIELD,
+	NULL,
+	pncd_smc_handler
+);