nxp: supports two mode of trusted board boot
NXP SoC supports two TBB mode:
- MBED_TLS based
-- ROTK key hash is placed as part of the BL2 binary at section:
--- .rodata.nxp_rotpk_hash
-- Supporting non-volatile counter via SFP.
-- platform function used by TFA common authentication code.
- NXP CSF based
-- ROTK key deployment vary from MBEDTLS
Signed-off-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Change-Id: Ib0f0bf024fd93de906c5d4f609383ae9e02b2fbc
diff --git a/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/csf_tbbr.c b/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/csf_tbbr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f38f3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/csf_tbbr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2021 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <csf_hdr.h>
+#include <dcfg.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
+#include <snvs.h>
+
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include "plat_common.h"
+
+extern bool rotpk_not_dpld;
+extern uint8_t rotpk_hash_table[MAX_KEY_ENTRIES][SHA256_BYTES];
+extern uint32_t num_rotpk_hash_entries;
+
+/*
+ * In case of secure boot, return ptr of rotpk_hash table in key_ptr and
+ * number of hashes in key_len
+ */
+int plat_get_rotpk_info(void *cookie, void **key_ptr, unsigned int *key_len,
+ unsigned int *flags)
+{
+ uint32_t mode = 0U;
+ *flags = ROTPK_NOT_DEPLOYED;
+
+ /* ROTPK hash table must be available for secure boot */
+ if (rotpk_not_dpld == true) {
+ if (check_boot_mode_secure(&mode) == true) {
+ /* Production mode, don;t continue further */
+ if (mode == 1U) {
+ return -EAUTH;
+ }
+
+ /* For development mode, rotpk flag false
+ * indicates that SRK hash comparison might
+ * have failed. This is not fatal error.
+ * Continue in this case but transition SNVS
+ * to non-secure state
+ */
+ transition_snvs_non_secure();
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We return the complete hash table and number of entries in
+ * table for NXP platform specific implementation.
+ * Here hash is always assume as SHA-256
+ */
+ *key_ptr = rotpk_hash_table;
+ *key_len = num_rotpk_hash_entries;
+ *flags = ROTPK_IS_HASH;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int plat_get_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int *nv_ctr)
+{
+ /*
+ * No support for non-volatile counter. Update the ROT key to protect
+ * the system against rollback.
+ */
+ *nv_ctr = 0U;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int plat_set_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int nv_ctr)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/nxp_rotpk.S b/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/nxp_rotpk.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e084d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/nxp_rotpk.S
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2020 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CSF_HDR_H_
+
+ .global nxp_rotpk_hash
+ .global nxp_rotpk_hash_end
+ .section .rodata.nxp_rotpk_hash, "a"
+nxp_rotpk_hash:
+ /* DER header */
+ .byte 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48
+ .byte 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
+ /* SHA256 */
+ .incbin ROTPK_HASH
+nxp_rotpk_hash_end:
+#endif
diff --git a/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/tbbr.mk b/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/tbbr.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25852ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/tbbr.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+#
+# Copyright 2020 NXP
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+# For TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT platforms need to include this makefile
+# Following definations are to be provided by platform.mk file or
+# by user - BL33_INPUT_FILE, BL32_INPUT_FILE, BL31_INPUT_FILE
+
+ifeq ($(CHASSIS), 2)
+include $(PLAT_DRIVERS_PATH)/csu/csu.mk
+CSF_FILE := input_blx_ch${CHASSIS}
+BL2_CSF_FILE := input_bl2_ch${CHASSIS}
+else
+ifeq ($(CHASSIS), 3_2)
+CSF_FILE := input_blx_ch3
+BL2_CSF_FILE := input_bl2_ch${CHASSIS}
+PBI_CSF_FILE := input_pbi_ch${CHASSIS}
+$(eval $(call add_define, CSF_HDR_CH3))
+else
+ $(error -> CHASSIS not set!)
+endif
+endif
+
+PLAT_AUTH_PATH := $(PLAT_DRIVERS_PATH)/auth
+
+
+ifeq (${BL2_INPUT_FILE},)
+ BL2_INPUT_FILE := $(PLAT_AUTH_PATH)/csf_hdr_parser/${BL2_CSF_FILE}
+endif
+
+ifeq (${PBI_INPUT_FILE},)
+ PBI_INPUT_FILE := $(PLAT_AUTH_PATH)/csf_hdr_parser/${PBI_CSF_FILE}
+endif
+
+# If MBEDTLS_DIR is not specified, use CSF Header option
+ifeq (${MBEDTLS_DIR},)
+ # Generic image processing filters to prepend CSF header
+ ifeq (${BL33_INPUT_FILE},)
+ BL33_INPUT_FILE := $(PLAT_AUTH_PATH)/csf_hdr_parser/${CSF_FILE}
+ endif
+
+ ifeq (${BL31_INPUT_FILE},)
+ BL31_INPUT_FILE := $(PLAT_AUTH_PATH)/csf_hdr_parser/${CSF_FILE}
+ endif
+
+ ifeq (${BL32_INPUT_FILE},)
+ BL32_INPUT_FILE := $(PLAT_AUTH_PATH)/csf_hdr_parser/${CSF_FILE}
+ endif
+
+ ifeq (${FUSE_INPUT_FILE},)
+ FUSE_INPUT_FILE := $(PLAT_AUTH_PATH)/csf_hdr_parser/${CSF_FILE}
+ endif
+
+ PLAT_INCLUDES += -I$(PLAT_DRIVERS_PATH)/sfp
+ PLAT_TBBR_SOURCES += $(PLAT_AUTH_PATH)/csf_hdr_parser/cot.c \
+ $(PLAT_COMMON_PATH)/tbbr/csf_tbbr.c
+ # IMG PARSER here is CSF header parser
+ include $(PLAT_DRIVERS_PATH)/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr.mk
+ PLAT_TBBR_SOURCES += $(CSF_HDR_SOURCES)
+
+ SCP_BL2_PRE_TOOL_FILTER := CST_SCP_BL2
+ BL31_PRE_TOOL_FILTER := CST_BL31
+ BL32_PRE_TOOL_FILTER := CST_BL32
+ BL33_PRE_TOOL_FILTER := CST_BL33
+else
+
+ ifeq (${DISABLE_FUSE_WRITE}, 1)
+ $(eval $(call add_define,DISABLE_FUSE_WRITE))
+ endif
+
+ # For Mbedtls currently crypto is not supported via CAAM
+ # enable it when that support is there
+ CAAM_INTEG := 0
+ KEY_ALG := rsa
+ KEY_SIZE := 2048
+
+ $(eval $(call add_define,MBEDTLS_X509))
+ ifeq (${PLAT_DDR_PHY},PHY_GEN2)
+ $(eval $(call add_define,PLAT_DEF_OID))
+ endif
+ include drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_x509.mk
+
+
+ PLAT_TBBR_SOURCES += $(PLAT_AUTH_PATH)/tbbr/tbbr_cot.c \
+ $(PLAT_COMMON_PATH)/tbbr/nxp_rotpk.S \
+ $(PLAT_COMMON_PATH)/tbbr/x509_tbbr.c
+
+ #ROTPK key is embedded in BL2 image
+ ifeq (${ROT_KEY},)
+ ROT_KEY = $(BUILD_PLAT)/rot_key.pem
+ endif
+
+ ifeq (${SAVE_KEYS},1)
+
+ ifeq (${TRUSTED_WORLD_KEY},)
+ TRUSTED_WORLD_KEY = ${BUILD_PLAT}/trusted.pem
+ endif
+
+ ifeq (${NON_TRUSTED_WORLD_KEY},)
+ NON_TRUSTED_WORLD_KEY = ${BUILD_PLAT}/non-trusted.pem
+ endif
+
+ ifeq (${BL31_KEY},)
+ BL31_KEY = ${BUILD_PLAT}/soc.pem
+ endif
+
+ ifeq (${BL32_KEY},)
+ BL32_KEY = ${BUILD_PLAT}/trusted_os.pem
+ endif
+
+ ifeq (${BL33_KEY},)
+ BL33_KEY = ${BUILD_PLAT}/non-trusted_os.pem
+ endif
+
+ endif
+
+ ROTPK_HASH = $(BUILD_PLAT)/rotpk_sha256.bin
+
+ $(eval $(call add_define_val,ROTPK_HASH,'"$(ROTPK_HASH)"'))
+
+ $(BUILD_PLAT)/bl2/nxp_rotpk.o: $(ROTPK_HASH)
+
+ certificates: $(ROT_KEY)
+ $(ROT_KEY): | $(BUILD_PLAT)
+ @echo " OPENSSL $@"
+ @if [ ! -f $(ROT_KEY) ]; then \
+ openssl genrsa 2048 > $@ 2>/dev/null; \
+ fi
+
+ $(ROTPK_HASH): $(ROT_KEY)
+ @echo " OPENSSL $@"
+ $(Q)openssl rsa -in $< -pubout -outform DER 2>/dev/null |\
+ openssl dgst -sha256 -binary > $@ 2>/dev/null
+
+endif #MBEDTLS_DIR
+
+PLAT_INCLUDES += -Iinclude/common/tbbr
+
+# Generic files for authentication framework
+TBBR_SOURCES += drivers/auth/auth_mod.c \
+ drivers/auth/crypto_mod.c \
+ drivers/auth/img_parser_mod.c \
+ plat/common/tbbr/plat_tbbr.c \
+ ${PLAT_TBBR_SOURCES}
+
+# If CAAM_INTEG is not defined (would be scenario with MBED TLS)
+# include mbedtls_crypto
+ifeq (${CAAM_INTEG},0)
+ include drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_crypto.mk
+else
+ include $(PLAT_DRIVERS_PATH)/crypto/caam/src/auth/auth.mk
+ TBBR_SOURCES += ${AUTH_SOURCES}
+endif
diff --git a/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/x509_tbbr.c b/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/x509_tbbr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec87674
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/nxp/common/tbbr/x509_tbbr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018-2021 NXP
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <lib/cassert.h>
+#include <sfp.h>
+#include <tools_share/tbbr_oid.h>
+
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include "plat_common.h"
+
+extern char nxp_rotpk_hash[], nxp_rotpk_hash_end[];
+
+int plat_get_rotpk_info(void *cookie, void **key_ptr, unsigned int *key_len,
+ unsigned int *flags)
+{
+ *key_ptr = nxp_rotpk_hash;
+ *key_len = nxp_rotpk_hash_end - nxp_rotpk_hash;
+ *flags = ROTPK_IS_HASH;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int plat_get_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int *nv_ctr)
+{
+ const char *oid;
+ uint32_t uid_num;
+ uint32_t val = 0U;
+
+ assert(cookie != NULL);
+ assert(nv_ctr != NULL);
+
+ oid = (const char *)cookie;
+ if (strcmp(oid, TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
+ uid_num = 3U;
+ } else if (strcmp(oid, NON_TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
+ uid_num = 4U;
+ } else {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ val = sfp_read_oem_uid(uid_num);
+
+ INFO("SFP Value read is %x from UID %d\n", val, uid_num);
+ if (val == 0U) {
+ *nv_ctr = 0U;
+ } else {
+ *nv_ctr = (32U - __builtin_clz(val));
+ }
+
+ INFO("NV Counter value for UID %d is %d\n", uid_num, *nv_ctr);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+int plat_set_nv_ctr(void *cookie, unsigned int nv_ctr)
+{
+ const char *oid;
+ uint32_t uid_num, sfp_val;
+
+ assert(cookie != NULL);
+
+ /* Counter values upto 32 are supported */
+ if (nv_ctr > 32U) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ oid = (const char *)cookie;
+ if (strcmp(oid, TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
+ uid_num = 3U;
+ } else if (strcmp(oid, NON_TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID) == 0) {
+ uid_num = 4U;
+ } else {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ sfp_val = (1U << (nv_ctr - 1));
+
+ if (sfp_write_oem_uid(uid_num, sfp_val) == 1) {
+ /* Enable POVDD on board */
+ if (board_enable_povdd()) {
+ sfp_program_fuses();
+ }
+
+ /* Disable POVDD on board */
+ board_disable_povdd();
+ } else {
+ ERROR("Invalid OEM UID sent.\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int plat_get_mbedtls_heap(void **heap_addr, size_t *heap_size)
+{
+ return get_mbedtls_heap_helper(heap_addr, heap_size);
+}