diff --git a/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst b/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst
index 072babc..d7cbaf6 100644
--- a/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst
+++ b/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 Generic Threat Model
 ********************
 
-************************
+************
 Introduction
-************************
+************
+
 This document provides a generic threat model for TF-A firmware.
 
 .. note::
@@ -11,9 +12,10 @@
  This threat model doesn't consider Root and Realm worlds introduced by
  :ref:`Realm Management Extension (RME)`.
 
-************************
+********************
 Target of Evaluation
-************************
+********************
+
 In this threat model, the target of evaluation is the Trusted
 Firmware for A-class Processors (TF-A). This includes the boot ROM (BL1),
 the trusted boot firmware (BL2) and the runtime EL3 firmware (BL31) as
@@ -35,7 +37,8 @@
   Secure-EL2 software.
 
 Data Flow Diagram
-======================
+=================
+
 Figure 1 shows a high-level data flow diagram for TF-A. The diagram
 shows a model of the different components of a TF-A-based system and
 their interactions with TF-A. A description of each diagram element
@@ -51,26 +54,26 @@
   +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
   | Diagram Element | Description                                            |
   +=================+========================================================+
-  |       ``DF1``   | | At boot time, images are loaded from non-volatile    |
+  |       DF1       | | At boot time, images are loaded from non-volatile    |
   |                 |   memory and verified by TF-A boot firmware. These     |
   |                 |   images include TF-A BL2 and BL31 images, as well as  |
   |                 |   other secure and non-secure images.                  |
   +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
-  |       ``DF2``   | | TF-A log system framework outputs debug messages     |
+  |       DF2       | | TF-A log system framework outputs debug messages     |
   |                 |   over a UART interface.                               |
   +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
-  |       ``DF3``   | | Debug and trace IP on a platform can allow access    |
+  |       DF3       | | Debug and trace IP on a platform can allow access    |
   |                 |   to registers and memory of TF-A.                     |
   +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
-  |       ``DF4``   | | Secure world software (e.g. trusted OS) interact     |
+  |       DF4       | | Secure world software (e.g. trusted OS) interact     |
   |                 |   with TF-A through SMC call interface and/or shared   |
   |                 |   memory.                                              |
   +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
-  |       ``DF5``   | | Non-secure world software (e.g. rich OS) interact    |
+  |       DF5       | | Non-secure world software (e.g. rich OS) interact    |
   |                 |   with TF-A through SMC call interface and/or shared   |
   |                 |   memory.                                              |
   +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
-  |       ``DF6``   | | This path represents the interaction between TF-A and|
+  |       DF6       | | This path represents the interaction between TF-A and|
   |                 |   various hardware IPs such as TrustZone controller    |
   |                 |   and GIC. At boot time TF-A configures/initializes the|
   |                 |   IPs and interacts with them at runtime through       |
@@ -78,9 +81,10 @@
   +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
 
 
-*********************
+***************
 Threat Analysis
-*********************
+***************
+
 In this section we identify and provide assessment of potential threats to TF-A
 firmware. The threats are identified for each diagram element on the
 data flow diagram above.
@@ -91,7 +95,8 @@
 potential mitigations.
 
 Assets
-==================
+======
+
 We have identified the following assets for TF-A:
 
 .. table:: Table 2: TF-A Assets
@@ -99,21 +104,22 @@
   +--------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
   | Asset              | Description                                       |
   +====================+===================================================+
-  | ``Sensitive Data`` | | These include sensitive data that an attacker   |
+  | Sensitive Data     | | These include sensitive data that an attacker   |
   |                    |   must not be able to tamper with (e.g. the Root  |
   |                    |   of Trust Public Key) or see (e.g. secure logs,  |
   |                    |   debugging information such as crash reports).   |
   +--------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
-  | ``Code Execution`` | | This represents the requirement that the        |
+  | Code Execution     | | This represents the requirement that the        |
   |                    |   platform should run only TF-A code approved by  |
   |                    |   the platform provider.                          |
   +--------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
-  | ``Availability``   | | This represents the requirement that TF-A       |
+  | Availability       | | This represents the requirement that TF-A       |
   |                    |   services should always be available for use.    |
   +--------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
 
 Threat Agents
-=====================
+=============
+
 To understand the attack surface, it is important to identify potential
 attackers, i.e. attack entry points. The following threat agents are
 in scope of this threat model.
@@ -123,16 +129,16 @@
   +-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
   | Threat Agent      | Description                                           |
   +===================+=======================================================+
-  |   ``NSCode``      | | Malicious or faulty code running in the Non-secure  |
+  |   NSCode          | | Malicious or faulty code running in the Non-secure  |
   |                   |   world, including NS-EL0 NS-EL1 and NS-EL2 levels    |
   +-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-  |   ``SecCode``     | | Malicious or faulty code running in the secure      |
+  |   SecCode         | | Malicious or faulty code running in the secure      |
   |                   |   world, including S-EL0 and S-EL1 levels             |
   +-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-  |   ``AppDebug``    | | Physical attacker using  debug signals to access    |
+  |   AppDebug        | | Physical attacker using  debug signals to access    |
   |                   |   TF-A resources                                      |
   +-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-  | ``PhysicalAccess``| | Physical attacker having access to external device  |
+  |  PhysicalAccess   | | Physical attacker having access to external device  |
   |                   |   communication bus and to external flash             |
   |                   |   communication bus using common hardware             |
   +-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
@@ -145,7 +151,8 @@
   considered out-of-scope.
 
 Threat Types
-========================
+============
+
 In this threat model we categorize threats using the `STRIDE threat
 analysis technique`_. In this technique a threat is categorized as one
 or more of these types: ``Spoofing``, ``Tampering``, ``Repudiation``,
@@ -153,7 +160,8 @@
 ``Elevation of privilege``.
 
 Threat Risk Ratings
-========================
+===================
+
 For each threat identified, a risk rating that ranges
 from *informational* to *critical* is given based on the likelihood of the
 threat occuring if a mitigation is not in place, and the impact of the
@@ -165,7 +173,7 @@
   +-----------------------+-------------------------+---------------------------+
   | **Rating (Score)**    | **Impact**              | **Likelihood**            |
   +=======================+=========================+===========================+
-  | ``Critical (5)``      | | Extreme impact to     | | Threat is almost        |
+  | Critical (5)          | | Extreme impact to     | | Threat is almost        |
   |                       |   entire organization   |   certain to be exploited.|
   |                       |   if exploited.         |                           |
   |                       |                         | | Knowledge of the threat |
@@ -173,17 +181,17 @@
   |                       |                         |   are in the public       |
   |                       |                         |   domain.                 |
   +-----------------------+-------------------------+---------------------------+
-  | ``High (4)``          | | Major impact to entire| | Threat is relatively    |
+  | High (4)              | | Major impact to entire| | Threat is relatively    |
   |                       |   organization or single|   easy to detect and      |
   |                       |   line of business if   |   exploit by an attacker  |
   |                       |   exploited             |   with little skill.      |
   +-----------------------+-------------------------+---------------------------+
-  | ``Medium (3)``        | | Noticeable impact to  | | A knowledgeable insider |
+  | Medium (3)            | | Noticeable impact to  | | A knowledgeable insider |
   |                       |   line of business if   |   or expert attacker could|
   |                       |   exploited.            |   exploit the threat      |
   |                       |                         |   without much difficulty.|
   +-----------------------+-------------------------+---------------------------+
-  | ``Low (2)``           | | Minor damage if       | | Exploiting the threat   |
+  | Low (2)               | | Minor damage if       | | Exploiting the threat   |
   |                       |   exploited or could    |   would require           |
   |                       |   be used in conjunction|   considerable expertise  |
   |                       |   with other            |   and resources           |
@@ -191,7 +199,7 @@
   |                       |   perform a more serious|                           |
   |                       |   attack                |                           |
   +-----------------------+-------------------------+---------------------------+
-  | ``Informational (1)`` | | Poor programming      | | Threat is not likely    |
+  | Informational (1)     | | Poor programming      | | Threat is not likely    |
   |                       |   practice or poor      |   to be exploited on its  |
   |                       |   design decision that  |   own, but may be used to |
   |                       |   may not represent an  |   gain information for    |
@@ -235,14 +243,15 @@
 ``Internet of Things(IoT)``, ``Mobile`` and ``Server``.
 
 Threat Assessment
-============================
+=================
+
 The following threats were identified by applying STRIDE analysis on
 each diagram element of the data flow diagram.
 
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 01                                                 |
 +========================+====================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **An attacker can mangle firmware images to      |
+| Threat                 | | **An attacker can mangle firmware images to      |
 |                        |   execute arbitrary code**                         |
 |                        |                                                    |
 |                        | | Some TF-A images are loaded from external        |
@@ -252,26 +261,26 @@
 |                        |   updating mechanism to modify the non-volatile    |
 |                        |   images to execute arbitrary code.                |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1, DF4, DF5                                      |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF1, DF4, DF5                                      |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL2, BL31                                          |
-| Components``           |                                                    |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL2, BL31                                          |
+| Components             |                                                    |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Code Execution                                     |
+| Assets                 | Code Execution                                     |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | PhysicalAccess, NSCode, SecCode                    |
+| Threat Agent           | PhysicalAccess, NSCode, SecCode                    |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Tampering, Elevation of Privilege                  |
+| Threat Type            | Tampering, Elevation of Privilege                  |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``       | ``IoT``         | ``Mobile``    |
+| Application            | Server           | IoT             | Mobile        |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Impact``             | Critical (5)     | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
+| Impact                 | Critical (5)     | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | Critical (5)     | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
+| Likelihood             | Critical (5)     | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Critical (25)    | Critical (25)   | Critical (25) |
+| Total Risk Rating      | Critical (25)    | Critical (25)   | Critical (25) |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | TF-A implements the `Trusted Board Boot (TBB)`_  |
+| Mitigations            | | TF-A implements the `Trusted Board Boot (TBB)`_  |
 |                        |   feature which prevents malicious firmware from   |
 |                        |   running on the platform by authenticating all    |
 |                        |   firmware images. In addition to this, the TF-A   |
@@ -283,33 +292,33 @@
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 02                                                 |
 +========================+====================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **An attacker may attempt to boot outdated,      |
+| Threat                 | | **An attacker may attempt to boot outdated,      |
 |                        |   potentially vulnerable firmware image**          |
 |                        |                                                    |
 |                        | | When updating firmware, an attacker may attempt  |
 |                        |   to rollback to an older version that has unfixed |
 |                        |   vulnerabilities.                                 |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1, DF4, DF5                                      |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF1, DF4, DF5                                      |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL2, BL31                                          |
-| Components``           |                                                    |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL2, BL31                                          |
+| Components             |                                                    |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Code Execution                                     |
+| Assets                 | Code Execution                                     |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | PhysicalAccess, NSCode, SecCode                    |
+| Threat Agent           | PhysicalAccess, NSCode, SecCode                    |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Tampering                                          |
+| Threat Type            | Tampering                                          |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``       | ``IoT``         | ``Mobile``    |
+| Application            | Server           | IoT             | Mobile        |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Impact``             | Critical (5)     | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
+| Impact                 | Critical (5)     | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | Critical (5)     | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
+| Likelihood             | Critical (5)     | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Critical (25)    | Critical (25)   | Critical (25) |
+| Total Risk Rating      | Critical (25)    | Critical (25)   | Critical (25) |
 +------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | TF-A supports anti-rollback protection using     |
+| Mitigations            | | TF-A supports anti-rollback protection using     |
 |                        |   non-volatile counters (NV counters) as required  |
 |                        |   by `TBBR-Client specification`_. After a firmware|
 |                        |   image is validated, the image revision number    |
@@ -324,7 +333,7 @@
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 03                                                    |
 +========================+=======================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | |  **An attacker can use Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use    |
+| Threat                 | |  **An attacker can use Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use    |
 |                        |   (TOCTOU) attack to bypass image authentication      |
 |                        |   during the boot process**                           |
 |                        |                                                       |
@@ -336,33 +345,33 @@
 |                        |   after the integrity and authentication check has    |
 |                        |   been performed.                                     |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1                                                   |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF1                                                   |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL1, BL2                                              |
-| Components``           |                                                       |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL1, BL2                                              |
+| Components             |                                                       |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Code Execution, Sensitive Data                        |
+| Assets                 | Code Execution, Sensitive Data                        |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | PhysicalAccess                                        |
+| Threat Agent           | PhysicalAccess                                        |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Elevation of Privilege                                |
+| Threat Type            | Elevation of Privilege                                |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``          | ``IoT``         | ``Mobile``    |
+| Application            | Server              | IoT             | Mobile        |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Impact``             | N/A                 | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
+| Impact                 | N/A                 | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | N/A                 | Medium (3)      | Medium (3)    |
+| Likelihood             | N/A                 | Medium (3)      | Medium (3)    |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | N/A                 | High (15)       | High (15)     |
+| Total Risk Rating      | N/A                 | High (15)       | High (15)     |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | TF-A boot firmware copies image to on-chip          |
+| Mitigations            | | TF-A boot firmware copies image to on-chip          |
 |                        |   memory before authenticating an image.              |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
 
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 04                                                    |
 +========================+=======================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **An attacker with physical access can execute      |
+| Threat                 | | **An attacker with physical access can execute      |
 |                        |   arbitrary image by bypassing the signature          |
 |                        |   verification stage using glitching techniques**     |
 |                        |                                                       |
@@ -381,26 +390,26 @@
 |                        |   points where the image is validated against the     |
 |                        |   signature.                                          |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1                                                   |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF1                                                   |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL1, BL2                                              |
-| Components``           |                                                       |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL1, BL2                                              |
+| Components             |                                                       |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Code Execution                                        |
+| Assets                 | Code Execution                                        |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | PhysicalAccess                                        |
+| Threat Agent           | PhysicalAccess                                        |
 +------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Tampering, Elevation of Privilege                     |
+| Threat Type            | Tampering, Elevation of Privilege                     |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``          | ``IoT``         | ``Mobile``    |
+| Application            | Server              | IoT             | Mobile        |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Impact``             | N/A                 | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
+| Impact                 | N/A                 | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)  |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | N/A                 | Medium (3)      | Medium (3)    |
+| Likelihood             | N/A                 | Medium (3)      | Medium (3)    |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | N/A                 | High (15)       | High (15)     |
+| Total Risk Rating      | N/A                 | High (15)       | High (15)     |
 +------------------------+---------------------+-----------------+---------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | The most effective mitigation is adding glitching   |
+| Mitigations            | | The most effective mitigation is adding glitching   |
 |                        |   detection and mitigation circuit at the hardware    |
 |                        |   level. However, software techniques,                |
 |                        |   such as adding redundant checks when performing     |
@@ -413,7 +422,7 @@
 +------------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 05                                                |
 +========================+===================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **Information leak via UART logs such as        |
+| Threat                 | | **Information leak via UART logs such as        |
 |                        |   crashes**                                       |
 |                        |                                                   |
 |                        | | During the development stages of software it is |
@@ -426,26 +435,26 @@
 |                        |   attacker to develop a working exploit if left   |
 |                        |   in the production version.                      |
 +------------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF2                                               |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF2                                               |
 +------------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL1, BL2, BL31                                    |
-| Components``           |                                                   |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL1, BL2, BL31                                    |
+| Components             |                                                   |
 +------------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Sensitive Data                                    |
+| Assets                 | Sensitive Data                                    |
 +------------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | AppDebug                                          |
+| Threat Agent           | AppDebug                                          |
 +------------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Information Disclosure                            |
+| Threat Type            | Information Disclosure                            |
 +------------------------+------------------+----------------+---------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``       | ``IoT``        | ``Mobile``    |
+| Application            | Server           | IoT            | Mobile        |
 +------------------------+------------------+----------------+---------------+
-| ``Impact``             | N/A              | Low (2)        | Low (2)       |
+| Impact                 | N/A              | Low (2)        | Low (2)       |
 +------------------------+------------------+----------------+---------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | N/A              | High (4)       | High (4)      |
+| Likelihood             | N/A              | High (4)       | High (4)      |
 +------------------------+------------------+----------------+---------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | N/A              | Medium (8)     | Medium (8)    |
+| Total Risk Rating      | N/A              | Medium (8)     | Medium (8)    |
 +------------------------+------------------+----------------+---------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | In TF-A, crash reporting is only enabled for    |
+| Mitigations            | | In TF-A, crash reporting is only enabled for    |
 |                        |   debug builds by default. Alternatively, the log |
 |                        |   level can be tuned at build time (from verbose  |
 |                        |   to no output at all), independently of the      |
@@ -455,7 +464,7 @@
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 06                                                 |
 +========================+====================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **An attacker can read sensitive data and        |
+| Threat                 | | **An attacker can read sensitive data and        |
 |                        |   execute arbitrary code through the external      |
 |                        |   debug and trace interface**                      |
 |                        |                                                    |
@@ -468,27 +477,27 @@
 |                        |   attacker to read sensitive data and execute      |
 |                        |   arbitrary code.                                  |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF3                                                |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF3                                                |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL1, BL2, BL31                                     |
-| Components``           |                                                    |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL1, BL2, BL31                                     |
+| Components             |                                                    |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Code Execution, Sensitive Data                     |
+| Assets                 | Code Execution, Sensitive Data                     |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | AppDebug                                           |
+| Threat Agent           | AppDebug                                           |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Tampering, Information Disclosure,                 |
+| Threat Type            | Tampering, Information Disclosure,                 |
 |                        | Elevation of privilege                             |
 +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``       | ``IoT``       | ``Mobile``      |
+| Application            | Server           | IoT           | Mobile          |
 +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
-| ``Impact``             | N/A              | High (4)      | High (4)        |
+| Impact                 | N/A              | High (4)      | High (4)        |
 +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | N/A              | Critical (5)  | Critical (5)    |
+| Likelihood             | N/A              | Critical (5)  | Critical (5)    |
 +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | N/A              | Critical (20) | Critical (20)   |
+| Total Risk Rating      | N/A              | Critical (20) | Critical (20)   |
 +------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | Configuration of debug and trace capabilities is |
+| Mitigations            | | Configuration of debug and trace capabilities is |
 |                        |   platform specific. Therefore, platforms must     |
 |                        |   disable the debug and trace capability for       |
 |                        |   production releases or enable proper debug       |
@@ -498,7 +507,7 @@
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 07                                                   |
 +========================+======================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **An attacker can perform a denial-of-service      |
+| Threat                 | | **An attacker can perform a denial-of-service      |
 |                        |   attack by using a broken SMC call that causes the  |
 |                        |   system to reboot or enter into unknown state.**    |
 |                        |                                                      |
@@ -508,26 +517,26 @@
 |                        |   by calling unimplemented SMC call or by passing    |
 |                        |   invalid arguments.                                 |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF4, DF5                                             |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF4, DF5                                             |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL31                                                 |
-| Components``           |                                                      |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL31                                                 |
+| Components             |                                                      |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Availability                                         |
+| Assets                 | Availability                                         |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | NSCode, SecCode                                      |
+| Threat Agent           | NSCode, SecCode                                      |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Denial of Service                                    |
+| Threat Type            | Denial of Service                                    |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``        | ``IoT``        | ``Mobile``      |
+| Application            | Server            | IoT            | Mobile          |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Impact``             | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)      |
+| Impact                 | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)      |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | High (4)          | High (4)       | High (4)        |
+| Likelihood             | High (4)          | High (4)       | High (4)        |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | High (12)         | High (12)      | High (12)       |
+| Total Risk Rating      | High (12)         | High (12)      | High (12)       |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | The generic TF-A code validates SMC function ids   |
+| Mitigations            | | The generic TF-A code validates SMC function ids   |
 |                        |   and arguments before using them.                   |
 |                        |   Platforms that implement SiP services must also    |
 |                        |   validate SMC call arguments.                       |
@@ -536,7 +545,7 @@
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 08                                                   |
 +========================+======================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **Memory corruption due to memory overflows and    |
+| Threat                 | | **Memory corruption due to memory overflows and    |
 |                        |   lack of boundary checking when accessing resources |
 |                        |   could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, |
 |                        |   modify some state variable to change the normal    |
@@ -558,27 +567,27 @@
 |                        |   validations might also result in these kinds of    |
 |                        |   errors in release builds.                          |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF4, DF5                                             |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF4, DF5                                             |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL1, BL2, BL31                                       |
-| Components``           |                                                      |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL1, BL2, BL31                                       |
+| Components             |                                                      |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Code Execution, Sensitive Data                       |
+| Assets                 | Code Execution, Sensitive Data                       |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | NSCode, SecCode                                      |
+| Threat Agent           | NSCode, SecCode                                      |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Tampering, Information Disclosure,                   |
+| Threat Type            | Tampering, Information Disclosure,                   |
 |                        | Elevation of Privilege                               |
 +------------------------+-------------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``        | ``IoT``         | ``Mobile``     |
+| Application            | Server            | IoT             | Mobile         |
 +------------------------+-------------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Impact``             | Critical (5)      | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)   |
+| Impact                 | Critical (5)      | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)   |
 +------------------------+-------------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | Medium (3         | Medium (3)      | Medium (3)     |
+| Likelihood             | Medium (3         | Medium (3)      | Medium (3)     |
 +------------------------+-------------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | High (15)         | High (15)       | High (15)      |
+| Total Risk Rating      | High (15)         | High (15)       | High (15)      |
 +------------------------+-------------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | TF-A uses a combination of manual code reviews and |
+| Mitigations            | | TF-A uses a combination of manual code reviews and |
 |                        |   automated program analysis and testing to detect   |
 |                        |   and fix memory corruption bugs. All TF-A code      |
 |                        |   including platform code go through manual code     |
@@ -607,7 +616,7 @@
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 09                                                   |
 +========================+======================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **Improperly handled SMC calls can leak register   |
+| Threat                 | | **Improperly handled SMC calls can leak register   |
 |                        |   contents**                                         |
 |                        |                                                      |
 |                        | | When switching between secure and non-secure       |
@@ -615,26 +624,26 @@
 |                        |   register contents of other normal world clients    |
 |                        |   can be leaked.                                     |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF5                                                  |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF5                                                  |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL31                                                 |
-| Components``           |                                                      |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL31                                                 |
+| Components             |                                                      |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Sensitive Data                                       |
+| Assets                 | Sensitive Data                                       |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | NSCode                                               |
+| Threat Agent           | NSCode                                               |
 +------------------------+------------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Information Disclosure                               |
+| Threat Type            | Information Disclosure                               |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``        | ``IoT``        | ``Mobile``      |
+| Application            | Server            | IoT            | Mobile          |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Impact``             | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)      |
+| Impact                 | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)      |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | High (4)          | High (4)       | High (4)        |
+| Likelihood             | High (4)          | High (4)       | High (4)        |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | High (12)         | High (12)      | High (12)       |
+| Total Risk Rating      | High (12)         | High (12)      | High (12)       |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | TF-A saves and restores registers                  |
+| Mitigations            | | TF-A saves and restores registers                  |
 |                        |   by default when switching contexts. Build options  |
 |                        |   are also provided to save/restore additional       |
 |                        |   registers such as floating-point registers.        |
@@ -643,7 +652,7 @@
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 10                                                  |
 +========================+=====================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **SMC calls can leak sensitive information from   |
+| Threat                 | | **SMC calls can leak sensitive information from   |
 |                        |   TF-A memory via microarchitectural side channels**|
 |                        |                                                     |
 |                        | | Microarchitectural side-channel attacks such as   |
@@ -652,26 +661,26 @@
 |                        |   use this kind of attack to leak sensitive         |
 |                        |   data from TF-A memory.                            |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF4, DF5                                            |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF4, DF5                                            |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL31                                                |
-| Components``           |                                                     |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL31                                                |
+| Components             |                                                     |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Sensitive Data                                      |
+| Assets                 | Sensitive Data                                      |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | SecCode, NSCode                                     |
+| Threat Agent           | SecCode, NSCode                                     |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Information Disclosure                              |
+| Threat Type            | Information Disclosure                              |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+----------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``        | ``IoT``        | ``Mobile``     |
+| Application            | Server            | IoT            | Mobile         |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+----------------+
-| ``Impact``             | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)     |
+| Impact                 | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)     |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+----------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)     |
+| Likelihood             | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)     |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+----------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Medium (9)        | Medium (9)     | Medium (9)     |
+| Total Risk Rating      | Medium (9)        | Medium (9)     | Medium (9)     |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+----------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | TF-A implements software mitigations for Spectre  |
+| Mitigations            | | TF-A implements software mitigations for Spectre  |
 |                        |   type attacks as recommended by `Cache Speculation |
 |                        |   Side-channels`_ for the generic code. SiPs should |
 |                        |   implement similar mitigations for code that is    |
@@ -681,7 +690,7 @@
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 11                                                 |
 +========================+====================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **Misconfiguration of the Memory Management Unit |
+| Threat                 | | **Misconfiguration of the Memory Management Unit |
 |                        |   (MMU) may allow a normal world software to       |
 |                        |   access sensitive data or execute arbitrary       |
 |                        |   code**                                           |
@@ -692,26 +701,26 @@
 |                        |   execute code if the proper security mechanisms   |
 |                        |   are not in place.                                |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF5, DF6                                           |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF5, DF6                                           |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL1, BL2, BL31                                     |
-| Components``           |                                                    |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL1, BL2, BL31                                     |
+| Components             |                                                    |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Sensitive Data, Code execution                     |
+| Assets                 | Sensitive Data, Code execution                     |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | NSCode                                             |
+| Threat Agent           | NSCode                                             |
 +------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Information Disclosure, Elevation of Privilege     |
+| Threat Type            | Information Disclosure, Elevation of Privilege     |
 +------------------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Application``        | ``Server``      | ``IoT``         | ``Mobile``     |
+| Application            | Server          | IoT             | Mobile         |
 +------------------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Impact``             | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)   |
+| Impact                 | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)    | Critical (5)   |
 +------------------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | High (4)        | High (4)        | High (4)       |
+| Likelihood             | High (4)        | High (4)        | High (4)       |
 +------------------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Critical (20)   | Critical (20)   | Critical (20)  |
+| Total Risk Rating      | Critical (20)   | Critical (20)   | Critical (20)  |
 +------------------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | In TF-A, configuration of the MMU is done        |
+| Mitigations            | | In TF-A, configuration of the MMU is done        |
 |                        |   through a translation tables library. The        |
 |                        |   library provides APIs to define memory regions   |
 |                        |   and assign attributes including memory types and |
@@ -729,7 +738,7 @@
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
 | ID                     | 12                                                  |
 +========================+=====================================================+
-| ``Threat``             | | **Incorrect configuration of Performance Monitor  |
+| Threat                 | | **Incorrect configuration of Performance Monitor  |
 |                        |   Unit (PMU) counters can allow an attacker to      |
 |                        |   mount side-channel attacks using information      |
 |                        |   exposed by the counters**                         |
@@ -741,24 +750,24 @@
 |                        |   software) to potentially  carry out               |
 |                        |   side-channel timing attacks against TF-A.         |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF5, DF6                                            |
+| Diagram Elements       | DF5, DF6                                            |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Affected TF-A        | BL31                                                |
-| Components``           |                                                     |
+| Affected TF-A          | BL31                                                |
+| Components             |                                                     |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Assets``             | Sensitive Data                                      |
+| Assets                 | Sensitive Data                                      |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Agent``       | NSCode                                              |
+| Threat Agent           | NSCode                                              |
 +------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
-| ``Threat Type``        | Information Disclosure                              |
+| Threat Type            | Information Disclosure                              |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+----------------+
-| ``Impact``             | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)     |
+| Impact                 | Medium (3)        | Medium (3)     | Medium (3)     |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+----------------+
-| ``Likelihood``         | Low (2)           | Low (2)        | Low (2)        |
+| Likelihood             | Low (2)           | Low (2)        | Low (2)        |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+----------------+
-| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Medium (6)        | Medium (6)     | Medium (6)     |
+| Total Risk Rating      | Medium (6)        | Medium (6)     | Medium (6)     |
 +------------------------+-------------------+----------------+----------------+
-| ``Mitigations``        | | TF-A follows mitigation strategies as described   |
+| Mitigations            | | TF-A follows mitigation strategies as described   |
 |                        |   in `Secure Development Guidelines`_. General      |
 |                        |   events and cycle counting in the Secure world is  |
 |                        |   prohibited by default when applicable. However,   |
@@ -774,7 +783,7 @@
 
 --------------
 
-*Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2021-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
 
 
 .. _STRIDE threat analysis technique: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool-threats#stride-model