feat(drivers/measured_boot): add RSS backend

Runtime Security Subsystem (RSS) provides for the host:
- Runtime service to store measurments, which were
  computed by the host during measured boot.

Signed-off-by: Tamas Ban <tamas.ban@arm.com>
Change-Id: Ia9e4e8a1fe8f01a28da1fd8c434b780f2a08f94e
diff --git a/drivers/measured_boot/rss/rss_measured_boot.c b/drivers/measured_boot/rss/rss_measured_boot.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe2baf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/measured_boot/rss/rss_measured_boot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
+#include <drivers/measured_boot/rss/rss_measured_boot.h>
+#include <lib/psa/measured_boot.h>
+#include <psa/crypto_types.h>
+#include <psa/crypto_values.h>
+#include <psa/error.h>
+
+#define MBOOT_ALG_SHA512 0
+#define MBOOT_ALG_SHA384 1
+#define MBOOT_ALG_SHA256 2
+
+#if MBOOT_ALG_ID == MBOOT_ALG_SHA512
+#define	CRYPTO_MD_ID		CRYPTO_MD_SHA512
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_MD_ID	PSA_ALG_SHA_512
+#elif MBOOT_ALG_ID == MBOOT_ALG_SHA384
+#define	CRYPTO_MD_ID		CRYPTO_MD_SHA384
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_MD_ID	PSA_ALG_SHA_384
+#elif MBOOT_ALG_ID == MBOOT_ALG_SHA256
+#define	CRYPTO_MD_ID		CRYPTO_MD_SHA256
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_MD_ID	PSA_ALG_SHA_256
+#else
+#  error Invalid Measured Boot algorithm.
+#endif /* MBOOT_ALG_ID */
+
+/* Pointer to struct rss_mboot_metadata */
+static struct rss_mboot_metadata *plat_metadata_ptr;
+
+/* Functions' declarations */
+void rss_measured_boot_init(void)
+{
+	/* At this point it is expected that communication channel over MHU
+	 * is already initialised by platform init.
+	 */
+
+	/* Get pointer to platform's struct rss_mboot_metadata structure */
+	plat_metadata_ptr = plat_rss_mboot_get_metadata();
+	assert(plat_metadata_ptr != NULL);
+}
+
+int rss_mboot_measure_and_record(uintptr_t data_base, uint32_t data_size,
+				 uint32_t data_id)
+{
+	unsigned char hash_data[CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+	int rc;
+	psa_status_t ret;
+	const struct rss_mboot_metadata *metadata_ptr = plat_metadata_ptr;
+
+	/* Get the metadata associated with this image. */
+	while ((metadata_ptr->id != RSS_MBOOT_INVALID_ID) &&
+		(metadata_ptr->id != data_id)) {
+		metadata_ptr++;
+	}
+
+	/* If image is not present in metadata array then skip */
+	if (metadata_ptr->id == RSS_MBOOT_INVALID_ID) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Calculate hash */
+	rc = crypto_mod_calc_hash(CRYPTO_MD_ID,
+				  (void *)data_base, data_size, hash_data);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	ret = rss_measured_boot_extend_measurement(
+						metadata_ptr->slot,
+						metadata_ptr->signer_id,
+						metadata_ptr->signer_id_size,
+						metadata_ptr->version,
+						metadata_ptr->version_size,
+						PSA_CRYPTO_MD_ID,
+						metadata_ptr->sw_type,
+						metadata_ptr->sw_type_size,
+						hash_data,
+						MBOOT_DIGEST_SIZE,
+						metadata_ptr->lock_measurement);
+	if (ret != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int rss_mboot_set_signer_id(unsigned int img_id,
+			    const void *pk_ptr,
+			    size_t pk_len)
+{
+	unsigned char hash_data[CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+	struct rss_mboot_metadata *metadata_ptr = plat_metadata_ptr;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Get the metadata associated with this image. */
+	while ((metadata_ptr->id != RSS_MBOOT_INVALID_ID) &&
+		(metadata_ptr->id != img_id)) {
+		metadata_ptr++;
+	}
+
+	/* If image is not present in metadata array then skip */
+	if (metadata_ptr->id == RSS_MBOOT_INVALID_ID) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Calculate public key hash */
+	rc = crypto_mod_calc_hash(CRYPTO_MD_ID, (void *)pk_ptr,
+				  pk_len, hash_data);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* Update metadata struct with the received signer_id */
+	(void)memcpy(metadata_ptr->signer_id, hash_data, MBOOT_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	metadata_ptr->signer_id_size = MBOOT_DIGEST_SIZE;
+
+	return 0;
+}