Merge pull request #290 from soby-mathew/sm/AEM_crash_report_fix
Fix recursive crash prints on FVP AEM model
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index aefcd2c..02bb317 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -42,8 +42,6 @@
V := 0
# Debug build
DEBUG := 0
-# Build architecture
-ARCH := aarch64
# Build platform
DEFAULT_PLAT := fvp
PLAT := ${DEFAULT_PLAT}
diff --git a/bl2/bl2_main.c b/bl2/bl2_main.c
index 29ca0a5..fb79f04 100644
--- a/bl2/bl2_main.c
+++ b/bl2/bl2_main.c
@@ -205,23 +205,28 @@
&bl30_image_info,
NULL);
- if (e == 0) {
+ if (e)
+ return e;
+
#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT
- e = auth_verify_obj(AUTH_BL30_IMG,
- bl30_image_info.image_base,
- bl30_image_info.image_size);
- if (e) {
- ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-0 image.\n");
- panic();
- }
+ e = auth_verify_obj(AUTH_BL30_IMG,
+ bl30_image_info.image_base,
+ bl30_image_info.image_size);
+ if (e) {
+ ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-0 image.\n");
+ return e;
+ }
- /* After working with data, invalidate the data cache */
- inv_dcache_range(bl30_image_info.image_base,
- (size_t)bl30_image_info.image_size);
+ /* After working with data, invalidate the data cache */
+ inv_dcache_range(bl30_image_info.image_base,
+ (size_t)bl30_image_info.image_size);
#endif /* TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT */
- /* The subsequent handling of BL3-0 is platform specific */
- bl2_plat_handle_bl30(&bl30_image_info);
+ /* The subsequent handling of BL3-0 is platform specific */
+ e = bl2_plat_handle_bl30(&bl30_image_info);
+ if (e) {
+ ERROR("Failure in platform-specific handling of BL3-0 image.\n");
+ return e;
}
#endif /* BL30_BASE */
@@ -256,25 +261,25 @@
BL31_BASE,
bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info,
bl31_ep_info);
+ if (e)
+ return e;
- if (e == 0) {
#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT
- e = auth_verify_obj(AUTH_BL31_IMG,
- bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info->image_base,
- bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info->image_size);
- if (e) {
- ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-1 image.\n");
- panic();
- }
+ e = auth_verify_obj(AUTH_BL31_IMG,
+ bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info->image_base,
+ bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info->image_size);
+ if (e) {
+ ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-1 image.\n");
+ return e;
+ }
- /* After working with data, invalidate the data cache */
- inv_dcache_range(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info->image_base,
+ /* After working with data, invalidate the data cache */
+ inv_dcache_range(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info->image_base,
(size_t)bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info->image_size);
#endif /* TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT */
- bl2_plat_set_bl31_ep_info(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info,
- bl31_ep_info);
- }
+ bl2_plat_set_bl31_ep_info(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl31_image_info,
+ bl31_ep_info);
return e;
}
@@ -309,30 +314,31 @@
bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info,
bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_ep_info);
- if (e == 0) {
+ if (e)
+ return e;
+
#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT
- /* Image is present. Check if there is a valid certificate */
- if (bl32_cert_error) {
- ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-2 certificates.\n");
- panic();
- }
+ /* Image is present. Check if there is a valid certificate */
+ if (bl32_cert_error) {
+ ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-2 certificates.\n");
+ return bl32_cert_error;
+ }
- e = auth_verify_obj(AUTH_BL32_IMG,
- bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info->image_base,
- bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info->image_size);
- if (e) {
- ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-2 image.\n");
- panic();
- }
- /* After working with data, invalidate the data cache */
- inv_dcache_range(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info->image_base,
+ e = auth_verify_obj(AUTH_BL32_IMG,
+ bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info->image_base,
+ bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info->image_size);
+ if (e) {
+ ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-2 image.\n");
+ return e;
+ }
+ /* After working with data, invalidate the data cache */
+ inv_dcache_range(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info->image_base,
(size_t)bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info->image_size);
#endif /* TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT */
- bl2_plat_set_bl32_ep_info(
- bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info,
- bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_ep_info);
- }
+ bl2_plat_set_bl32_ep_info(
+ bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_image_info,
+ bl2_to_bl31_params->bl32_ep_info);
#endif /* BL32_BASE */
return e;
@@ -361,23 +367,24 @@
bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info,
bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_ep_info);
- if (e == 0) {
+ if (e)
+ return e;
+
#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT
- e = auth_verify_obj(AUTH_BL33_IMG,
- bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info->image_base,
- bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info->image_size);
- if (e) {
- ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-3 image.\n");
- panic();
- }
- /* After working with data, invalidate the data cache */
- inv_dcache_range(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info->image_base,
+ e = auth_verify_obj(AUTH_BL33_IMG,
+ bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info->image_base,
+ bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info->image_size);
+ if (e) {
+ ERROR("Failed to authenticate BL3-3 image.\n");
+ return e;
+ }
+ /* After working with data, invalidate the data cache */
+ inv_dcache_range(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info->image_base,
(size_t)bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info->image_size);
#endif /* TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT */
- bl2_plat_set_bl33_ep_info(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info,
- bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_ep_info);
- }
+ bl2_plat_set_bl33_ep_info(bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_image_info,
+ bl2_to_bl31_params->bl33_ep_info);
return e;
}
diff --git a/include/bl32/payloads/tlk.h b/include/bl32/payloads/tlk.h
index 910f50f..bdfcc9a 100644
--- a/include/bl32/payloads/tlk.h
+++ b/include/bl32/payloads/tlk.h
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
#define TLK_PREEMPTED (0x32000002 | (1 << 31))
#define TLK_ENTRY_DONE (0x32000003 | (1 << 31))
#define TLK_VA_TRANSLATE (0x32000004 | (1 << 31))
-#define TLK_FID_SHARED_MEMBUF (0x32000005 | (1 << 31))
/*
* Trusted Application specific function IDs
diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c
index c22203b..3532beb 100644
--- a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c
+++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c
@@ -65,36 +65,6 @@
int32_t tlkd_init(void);
-/*
- * The number of arguments/results to save during a SMC call for TLK.
- */
-#define TLK_SHDBUF_SIZE 4
-
-/*******************************************************************************
- * Shared memory buffer for passing SMC args/results to TLK
- ******************************************************************************/
-typedef struct tlk_args_results {
- uint64_t args[TLK_SHDBUF_SIZE];
-} tlk_args_results_t;
-
-static tlk_args_results_t *tlk_args_results_buf;
-
-/*
- * Helper function to store args from TLK and pass results back
- */
-static inline void store_tlk_args_results(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2,
- uint64_t x3)
-{
- /* store arguments sent by TLK */
- tlk_args_results_buf->args[0] = x0;
- tlk_args_results_buf->args[1] = x1;
- tlk_args_results_buf->args[2] = x2;
- tlk_args_results_buf->args[3] = x3;
-
- flush_dcache_range((uint64_t)tlk_args_results_buf,
- sizeof(tlk_args_results_t));
-}
-
/*******************************************************************************
* Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type
* (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry
@@ -187,8 +157,9 @@
uint64_t flags)
{
cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
+ gp_regs_t *gp_regs;
uint32_t ns;
- uint64_t vaddr, type, par;
+ uint64_t par;
/* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */
assert(handle);
@@ -226,7 +197,7 @@
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
- SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, tlk_args_results_buf->args[0]);
+ SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1);
/*
* Request from non secure world to resume the preempted
@@ -281,7 +252,7 @@
case TLK_TA_LAUNCH_OP:
case TLK_TA_SEND_EVENT:
- if (!ns || !tlk_args_results_buf)
+ if (!ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
@@ -308,41 +279,67 @@
*/
set_std_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state);
- /* Save args for use by the SP on return */
- store_tlk_args_results(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3);
-
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* secure payload to do the work now.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
- SMC_RET0(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * TLK is a 32-bit Trusted OS and so expects the SMC
+ * arguments via r0-r7. TLK expects the monitor frame
+ * registers to be 64-bits long. Hence, we pass x0 in
+ * r0-r1, x1 in r2-r3, x3 in r4-r5 and x4 in r6-r7.
+ *
+ * As smc_fid is a uint32 value, r1 contains 0.
+ */
+ gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx);
+ write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X4, (uint32_t)x2);
+ write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X5, (uint32_t)(x2 >> 32));
+ write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X6, (uint32_t)x3);
+ write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X7, (uint32_t)(x3 >> 32));
+ SMC_RET4(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx, smc_fid, 0, (uint32_t)x1,
+ (uint32_t)(x1 >> 32));
/*
- * Translate NS/EL1-S virtual addresses
+ * Translate NS/EL1-S virtual addresses.
+ *
+ * x1 = virtual address
+ * x3 = type (NS/S)
+ *
+ * Returns PA:lo in r0, PA:hi in r1.
*/
case TLK_VA_TRANSLATE:
- if (ns || !tlk_args_results_buf)
+
+ /* Should be invoked only by secure world */
+ if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
- /* virtual address and type: ns/s */
- vaddr = tlk_args_results_buf->args[0];
- type = tlk_args_results_buf->args[1];
+ /* NS virtual addresses are 64-bit long */
+ if (x3 & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR)
+ x1 = (uint32_t)x1 | (x2 << 32);
- par = tlkd_va_translate(vaddr, type);
+ if (!x1)
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
- /* Save PA for use by the SP on return */
- store_tlk_args_results(par, 0, 0, 0);
+ /*
+ * TODO: Sanity check x1. This would require platform
+ * support.
+ */
- SMC_RET0(handle);
+ /* virtual address and type: ns/s */
+ par = tlkd_va_translate(x1, x3);
+
+ /* return physical address in r0-r1 */
+ SMC_RET4(handle, (uint32_t)par, (uint32_t)(par >> 32), 0, 0);
/*
* This is a request from the SP to mark completion of
* a standard function ID.
*/
case TLK_REQUEST_DONE:
- if (ns || !tlk_args_results_buf)
+ if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
@@ -366,14 +363,14 @@
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
- SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, tlk_args_results_buf->args[0]);
+ SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1);
/*
* This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished initialising itself after a cold boot
*/
case TLK_ENTRY_DONE:
- if (ns || !tlk_args_results_buf)
+ if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
@@ -388,23 +385,7 @@
* into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime
* context.
*/
- tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, tlk_args_results_buf->args[0]);
-
- /*
- * This is a request from the secure payload to register
- * shared memory to pass SMC args/results between EL1, EL3.
- */
- case TLK_FID_SHARED_MEMBUF:
- if (ns || !x1)
- SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
-
- /*
- * TODO: Check if the passed memory pointer is valid. Might
- * require a call into the platform code.
- */
-
- tlk_args_results_buf = (tlk_args_results_t *)x1;
- SMC_RET0(handle);
+ tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1);
/*
* Return the number of service function IDs implemented to